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Abstract
In this work we develop a general theoretical system for economic analysis. We do so by
building a model of the economy as an evolving network formed by the behaviour of individuals
responding to their socioeconomic environment on the basis of their psychology. We obtain a
vision of the structure and function of economic systems, their architecture, which is integrated,
holistic and systematic. This vision expands the range of phenomena economics may explain,
while incorporating the insights obtained by prior models within its rubric as special cases of a
more general theory.
Our vision of the determinants of the structure and function of economic systems is dras-
tically expanded. But unlike many past critiques of the of the narrow vision of economics our
model not only stresses the importance of psychological and sociological factors but places
them in a definite position and relation in the process of behaviour by which socioeconomic
systems are formed and evolve. Psychology and sociology are reintegrated wholesale into eco-
nomics.
Arguably the most valuable contribution of this work comes from a more quotidian focus.
A peculiar characteristic of this work is that it places equal interest on the positing of an answer
to the question of what connections do not form and why so as to what connections do. In
so doing the present work provides an explanation for why economic systems are incomplete,
some connections are not made. And in fact, this work pushes yet further to demonstrate that
the existence of non-substitutability, even its relative ubiquity, may if originating in the satiation
of needs cause it to be so that some connections can’t be made. Certain economic structures
cannot exist without the removal of certain conditions.
The incompleteness of economic systems we thus come to appreciate allows them to evolve
and our inquiries in this regard lead us to develop an account of the structural evolution of eco-
nomic systems as yet unobtained within evolutionary economics. We will arrive at a revelation
of the process of structural evolution as the transfer of connections facilitated by competition
which exploits substitutability where it exists. We obtain a new, formal vantage point on the
progression of socioeconomic history.
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Preface: from whence, for what and for
whom
It might be somewhat arrogant to think it appropriate to preface a work with a little intellectual
history of the author. I think however in this case the risk may be justified given the unusual
nature of the present work and the ability of my (meagre) intellectual history to explain how I
came to write it, to you the reader. If you will, indulge me a moment.
The genesis of the present work
As a schoolboy the way pre-rational expectations Keynesian macroeconomics seemed to pro-
vide a structural manner in which to think about how arguably the single most important social
system of humanity functioned and how it might be bettered led me to pursue it at university. I
was highly naive, and my school beat into us our responsibility to society. Entering university,
I thought that “economics” was “about” graphs, data, history, poring over the newspaper to
understand what happened in the economy the day before, and what would happen in the next.
For this reason, as I went through my undergraduate degree, I became increasingly disillusioned
with the education I was receiving.
My first year microeconomics - the demand/supply diagram, some imperfect competition
theory and Nash equilibrium game theory - while it seemed well enough suited to understanding
certain situations and particularly price dynamics, frustrated me when I realised again and again
that what the theory predicted ultimately depended on where you “drew the curves”, and what
payoffs one assigned to particular actions. Things about which the theories had nothing to
say, and which my lecturers assured me was the province of psychology, curiously a separate
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discipline to the ostensible theory of behaviour. I could also not make particular sense of how
the comparative statics of the demand-supply diagram captured “competition” - to me always
a process rather than an outcome. But I deferred to the superior wisdom of my lecturers,
assuming they must know something I did not.
My second year was a deeply unhappy one as, with the mathematical theories of the origins
of the demand and supply curve laid before me, I found utterly unconvincing the supposition
that before buying or selling something, people engage in optimisation of a “utility” function
subject to the constraints imposed within a budget set in a mathematical operation economists
themselves sometimes find difficult. The defence given me that people act “as if” they do
seemed and still seems almost deliberately philistine, counter to the very nature of “knowledge”
let alone “truth”. I was increasingly coming to the conclusion that I was doing (at the time)
very difficult mathematics for no apparent gain in understanding the structure and function of
the world, and that I might have made the wrong choice of degree.
For the sake of the present work (and my degree), I was supremely lucky on two counts. I
was working at the library of the Supreme Court of Queensland, and the librarian - hearing I had
read Amartya Sen and had a curious mind - took me under his informal tutelage, guiding my
first adventures in the Republic of Letters. I learned about literature, history, political science
and philosophy - the queen of intellectual endeavour. These bodies of work seemed incredibly
rich and depthed in comparison to the shallow and superficial knowledge masquerading as
quasi-rigorous mathematics I was developing in economics.
Around this time also, my interest piqued by Bruce Littleboy and Alan Duhs’ first year
course on political economy, I took the former’s course in the philosophy of economic thought.
In the half of it devoted to scientific philosophy I became acquainted with Karl Popper, Thomas
Kuhn and Imre Lakatos, and was reassured that my confusion at being told economics was a
“science” and yet not learning how the economy actually worked was not devoid the sanction of
these great men. And I became acquainted with the first of the two most important books I ever
read in economics - Tony Lawson’s Re-Orienting Economics (Lawson, 2003). A far less radical
book than its title suggests, it merely argues economists ought pay close attention to the nature
of what they are studying - to engage in economic and social ontology - so that economics might
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become an explanation of the structure and function of our economies consonant with their
actual reality. For me sufficient encouragement to pursue an economics with the intellectual
richness of the other sciences and philosophy, and an economics which sought explanations of
how economies actually work.
But I was yet to find an extant body of work in which that economics was presented whole-
sale in the unified, systematic manner in which the neoclassical economics (at that time the
orthodoxy) was presented, nor even a body of work which could begin to move towards that.
Behavioral (and I consciously misspell that after the American fashion) economics seemed a
step in the right direction, but didn’t present a systematic understanding of human behaviour
so much as a series of examples where the basic neoclassical model of economics failed, and
models complicating it to account for those failures. Again, I was smiled upon by providence
as by an accident I found myself in John Foster’s course on evolutionary economics.
Reduced to its most basic tenet, evolutionary economics always views the functioning of
the economy as a process. Equilibria may exist, but these are not more interesting than the
process by which the market selects different goods and services for continued production and
consumption through the interaction of many different individuals all following behavioural
rules (decision algorithms, of which constrained optimisation is one). Evolutionary economics
did not, and still does not, present a systematic treatment of the economy to rival the neoclas-
sical school but it has this unity of vision of the economy as an evolving system, continually
generating and incorporating innovation, and certainly seemed significant progress toward an
explanation of the reality of the economy.
It was in John Foster’s course that I became acquainted, through Foster (2005a) and Dopfer
et al. (2004), with the second of the two most important books I ever read in economics - Jason
Potts’ New Evolutionary Microeconomics (Potts, 2000).
Potts’, later my own supervisor Peter Earl recounted to me how Jason had been vexed by
the evolutionary theory of the entrepreneur, filling tomes without catching on a core theme until
one morning he strode into Peter’s office declaring “Peter, I’ve got it... graph theory”. How was
this, as we now say, a Big Idea? Why was graph theory, the mathematical study of networks,
the object S = {N g(N)} containing a set of nodes N and a set of connections between them
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g(N) (variously “dots and lines”, “elements and links”, “edges and vertices”) important for
economics? Jason’s proposal was twofold. First, using graph theory to conceive of economic
systems as complex systems of individuals interacting with each other, the economy could be
understood as a structure with a definite architecture, and one, most importantly, in which some
connections might not be made. Graph theory would allow us to understand the economy as
a system in which individuals are limited in the networks they can form - they neither know,
nor connect, with everyone - and thus be a system which might evolve “properly” through the
change of structure.
These are things economics has struggled to explain, at least in the formal and rigorous
methods of mathematics. But second, in expanding the frontier thus, graph theory would not
lose territory already gained, for Jason noticed that graph theory simply reveals the structure of
what economics has always been trying to study. The neoclassical school has always been con-
cerned with a special case of economies which have a complete network structure - all connec-
tions that can be made are made - and are thus amenable to be modelled as an electromagnetic
field with equilibrium points. The heterodox schools have always been concerned with, after
this manner or that, economic systems as incomplete structures, where there are connections
which have not been made. This struck me, for graph theory could therefore help construct a
general theory. It would reveal to us an understanding of the economy as an evolving network
of interactions, a picture of it as it actually exists.
Thus the story of how I came to write the current work. Jason Potts had uncovered what I
think to be a viable foundation for economics, but he hadn’t yet followed through in developing
it. My desire here is to build on his work and make a substantive step toward the formulation
of a foundation for economic analysis which reflects and explains the reality of economic sys-
tems using graph theory. I believe, and hopefully will demonstrate, that this advances our
understanding of the structure and function of economic systems.
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Participants in this conversation and the manner thereof: In-
tended audience and style
I am writing primarily for the new generation of economists. Those who are first inquiring
about the structure and function of the economic system and who are interested in social sci-
ence. I have in mind the student who goes a-wandering at their own instigation through the
social scientific literature in an intellectual quest after knowledge, the one who will read a set
text at least partly from pure curiosity. I am writing secondarily for those of my colleagues
who are interested in the development of integrated and holistic systems for economic analysis
which present a picture of reality just as it is, which may be applied for teaching and analytical
purposes.
I am not writing for those who have decided upon the pursuit of this or that pre-existing
mode of economic analysis. Still less do I write for those who think that we have reached the
ultimate irreducible plurality of such modes. And I am not writing for those who wish to have a
commentary, exegetical survey of alternative modes of thought to the neoclassical economics.
As a result, I am not assuming that my intended audience are acquainted with the neoclas-
sical economics, or any other economics. I am assuming only that they are interested primarily
in a systematic, effectively self-contained analysis of the economic system. And that they have
the mental data set of a keen social observer which they are interested in now organising by
means of a systematic, integrated and holistic framework which reveals the causal structure at
play in social history. I am not assuming at the outset that they have a primarily scholastic
interest in the ideas of past greats and their relation to one another.
I do not pretend to speak for the great thinkers of my field. I use their works to inform
and stimulate my own thought, in the conversation taking place across the ages of which Leo
Strauss spoke. Their own works, and the many commentaries written upon them speak for
themselves, the reader is directed to them if this is what they seek. Detailed exegisis and and
homage are important but I believe of secondary interest to my intended audience.
At my alma mater there an inscription from Plato in the sandstone: all our knowledge is
ourselves to know. This work is my own, I put forth my own thoughts on the working of the
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economy. I draw on great thinkers for inspiration, I stand on the shoulders of giants to see
further, but I build my system myself, and I look for myself. I may be charged with arrogance
in this, and pretensions to profundity not due. Very well, do so if that is your inclination. I will
but make two remarks in my defence against this charge.
First. From you, reader, I expect nothing. I have no right to your attention, still less your
approbation, there is no such thing. I have no inquisition like the Popes of old to compel you
to accept my ideas. It is entirely your choice to find merit or none in my work. My ideas
survive only as you find them worthwhile. If you find them not so, cast me aside like so much
intellectual detritus. But if you do find some merit in what I present to you, thank you.
Second, and finally. I think the contemporary intellectual world is in want of a little bold-
ness. We’ve a mentality in this tired and cynical era that I think encourages not merely humility,
but timidity. I do not think humility and boldness are mutually exclusive. I am an ignorant and
fallible man raised above my ignorance only by the intellectual giants of the past. My own
attempts to obtain true knowledge are necessarily a failure - true knowledge is an asymptotic
objective. But I think we can only achieve profound, let alone true, knowledge if we damn well
try.
At this point now it is appropriate to make a transition of style from the personal, to the more
impersonal manner of writing. Henceforth you, “the reader”, will implicitly be encouraged to
join me, “the author”, as “we” make “our” way through the development of “our” system of
economic analysis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“In order for it to be possible that a proposition should be true or false - agree
with reality or not - for this to be possible something in the proposition must be
identical with reality.”
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1914-1916, p.15)
In this work we will develop a general theoretical system for economic analysis. We will do
so by building a model of the economy as an evolving network formed by the behaviour of
individuals responding to their socioeconomic environment on the basis of their psychology.
We will obtain a vision of the structure and function of economic systems, their architecture,
which is integrated, holistic and systematic. This vision expands the range of phenomena
economics may explain, while incorporating the insights obtained by prior models within its
rubric as special cases of a more general theory.
Our vision of the determinants of the structure and function of economic systems is dras-
tically expanded. But unlike many past critiques of the of the narrow vision of economics our
model not only stresses the importance of psychological and sociological factors but places
them in a definite position and relation in the process of behaviour by which socioeconomic
systems are formed and evolve. Perception, personality, the social environment, the decision
context in general, needs as distinct from wants, product attributes, communication and rational
thought as well as rule following all take their place alongside more traditional determinants of
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economic behaviour (prices, income, preferences). The over-reliance on prices and their privi-
leged position in the structure and function of economic systems is thus rectified. Psychology
and sociology are reintegrated wholesale into economics.
However, the most valuable contribution of this work to our knowledge perhaps comes from
a more quotidian focus. Though it is not so exotic as the wholesale incorporation of psychology
and sociology into economics, it is a peculiar characteristic of this work that it places equal in-
terest on the positing of an answer to the question of what connections do not form and why so
as to what connections do. In so doing the present work provides an explanation for why eco-
nomic systems are incomplete, some connections are not made. And in fact, this work pushes
yet further to demonstrate that the existence of non-substitutability, even its relative ubiquity,
may if originating in the satiation of needs cause it to be so that some connections can’t be
made. Certain economic structures cannot exist without the removal of certain conditions.
The incompleteness of economic systems we thus come to appreciate allows them to evolve
and our inquiries in this regard lead us to develop an account of the structural evolution of eco-
nomic systems as yet unobtained within evolutionary economics. We will arrive at a revelation
of the process of structural evolution as the transfer of connections facilitated by competition
which exploits substitutability where it exists. We obtain a new, formal vantage point on the
progression of socioeconomic history.
It is in the realisation that economics has always been, after this or that fashion, concerned
with the architecture of economic systems that we realise the present formalism contains the
insights of prior economic analyses as special cases (Potts, 2000). Neoclassical economics
trivialises architecture, rarely departing from the assumption of a complete network in order
to apply equilibrium mathematics developed for the study of electromagnetic fields. Hetero-
dox economics invariably concerns itself with what connections aren’t made, different schools
delineated by the particular sources for and locations of incompleteness.
This all has clear implications for the conduct of economic theory and practice. A novel,
sophisticated yet simple model of economic structure and function offers fresh insight into the
simple process underlying vast socioeconomic complexity and not only why connections are
made, but why they are not. It provides a novel direction for empirical economics to expand its
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purview and co-operate with psychological and sociological methods as well as develop novel
methods to map economic structures. And it offers policymakers a coherent account of the
drastically expanded means by which they may effect change in the structure and function of
the economic system.
1.1 The contribution of the present work further considered
It is difficult to indicate the contribution of the present work to filling a well-defined, not partic-
ularly radical gap in a pre-existing and mature literature. It seeks to make a contribution to the
state of economic knowledge at a fairly fundamental level. It attempts the first major assault
by a new literature on hitherto only reconnoitered or sidestepped redoubts of the frontier of
ignorance thrown up by the intransigence of human psychology and complex architecture of
economic systems. This the reader ought keep in mind in what follows.
The contribution of the present work to economic analysis as a whole is threefold: it seeks
to offer an integrated, holistic, and systematic foundation for analysis of economies as com-
plex systems of human beings. Which is to say, it aims at providing a formal, unified and
general framework for understanding the economy and developing theories thereof which are
representations of the economy as it actually exists.
1.1.1 Integrated: unifying while simultaneously extending
Within this formalism we integrate a number of insights currently extant within economics,
as well as integrating new insights obtained at the frontier of knowledge. Our model of the
psychology of behaviour, while being fairly simple, integrates explanations of a number of
different observed psychological and behavioural phenomena, and shows there to be a deep
structure underlying what otherwise seems to be a vast and intricate collection of individuated
behavioural phenomena and heterogenous psychologies. The ability of any model representing
the reality of human psychology and behaviour to integrate within its ambit representation
and explanation of a large range of psychological and behavioural phenomena, to unify them
in a relatively simple model such as that presented here, has been identified as crucial to its
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intellectual competitiveness by Harstad and Selten (2013)1. The psychology of behaviour of
all kinds is considered at greater length in the purely psychological volume of which this work
is an extension: the Sketches of an Architecture of Mind (Markey-Towler, 2015), (currently in
draft). In the interests of producing a work of relative brevity, the focus here is on elaborating
the model of the psychology of behaviour with respect to behaviour which is peculiarly of an
economic nature.
The ability of this model to integrate explanations of a number of observed psychological
and economic phenomena within it, its ability to synthesise and unify is novel in itself. Eco-
nomics is at the present time an increasingly fragmented discipline in both the neoclassical and
the heterodox approaches. The heterodox approaches to economics remain, as Potts (2000)
noted, a virtually impenetrable morass of all but totally disconnected literatures for the unin-
doctrinated novitiate to wade through, consisting as they do of a system of analysis built up
around a fundamental disagreement with this or that aspect of the neoclassical model. And
the neoclassical economics is becoming similarly impenetrable for the novitiate but by an ex-
tended period of instruction. In an effort to account for deviations from the predictions of the
neoclassical model, and to make the rational agent model at its heart apply to ever more, the
neoclassical school of economics is increasingly becoming a collection of many relatively dis-
connected, though fairly minor variations on and extensions of the underlying rational agent
(Rabin, 2013a,b).
What is more genuinely novel than the synthesising ability of our formalism is its ability to
integrate the psychology of behaviour within a formalism of interaction. It is well known that it
is difficult to develop models of economic interaction between individuals whose behaviour is
described by models currently existing within behavioral economics, even (especially) the com-
paratively integrated Kahneman and Tversky (1979) prospect theory (Barberis, 2013; Harstad
and Selten, 2013). Within our formalism is integrated alongside economic psychology an ex-
planation of many different aspects of economic interaction: the simple mechanics of budget
constraints, contingence of economic interaction on societal and psychological factors, compe-
1The “prospect theory” outlined by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), is arguably the most integrated of these
which relaxes the standard rational agent model in four ways to explain four deviations from the standard rational
agent model: reference-dependence, loss aversion, changed attitudes to risk, under and over-weighting of objective
probabilities.
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tition between multiple sellers for the custom of buyers, and the diffusion of behaviours across
an economic system.
1.1.2 Holistic: architecture, systemic incompleteness and evolution
While it is a work of microeconomics focussing on the determination of the structure and
function of economic systems on a granular level, the present work returns again and again to
the concept of the Whole. Using the mathematics of networks to represent economic systems
forces us to consider the place of individual behaviour and interaction within the system as
a whole, how that behaviour and interaction is effected by the architecture, the structure and
function of the system as a whole, and how that behaviour and interaction effects the system as
a whole. By taking this approach of analysing behaviour and interaction in a systemic context
as a means to determine the architecture of interaction, we gain insight into the determination of
the economic system as a whole without losing sight of the role of individual parts in its deter-
mination, and the heterogeneity of those individual parts and their interaction. This is essential
if we are to have a microeconomics which can form the foundations for macroeconomics with-
out resort to what John Quiggin (2010) has called “zombie” ideas that macroeconomics can
proceed on the basis of analysing the behaviour of a single “representative agent”. As Conlisk
(1996) put it memorably, we don’t here have to imagine Robinson Crusoe and pretend he’s a
$7 trillion economy in order to gain insight into the determination of the structure and function
of the system as a whole.
The two more fundamental contributions of this formalism however, are the architectures
which are explained by our model of the psychology of economic behaviour. First, the psy-
chology of behaviour developed here can (and in all sensible cases will) generate an incomplete
network representation of an economic system. There are connections which aren’t made, in-
teractions which do not occur, and our behavioural model integrates into the formalism a basic
and general explanation of why this is the case. Secondly, because the architecture, the struc-
ture of the system is incomplete, it can evolve in a non-destructive manner. The possibility of
connections which aren’t made generates the concomitant possibility of the evolution of the
architecture, the structure of economic systems through the addition of new connections to the
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structure of the whole, as well as the removal of existing connections.
Neither of these aspects of the economic system as a whole have been particularly well
explained in the past, certainly not in an integrated and systematic manner as is attempted here.
The neoclassical school of thought (with exceptions) has focused on understanding the econ-
omy as a complete structure and thus makes the whole a rather trivial matter of aggregation.
The heterodox schools of thought have concerned themselves with economic interactions which
don’t exist, but have not provided such a systematic and integrated account thereof which can
be intellectually competitive with the neoclassical school of thought.
1.1.3 Systematic: formal mathematical expression
This work proceeds not in a discursive, but rather in a systematic manner. It proceeds logico-
mathematically from concept to concept in the development of a formal system for the analysis
of economic systems, defining and representing variables symbolically as they become relevant,
and placing them in careful relation to one another. To say that this work is systematic in its
exposition of a formalism for economic analysis is not the same as to say merely that it is
mathematical. It is logico-mathematical in nature, but its logico-mathematical formalism is
developed in a systematic manner, proceeding from self-evident statements about the nature of
the economy to their conclusions, rather than constructing a formalism to support conclusions.
Developing our formalism in a systematic manner enforces structure, rigour, formality in our
analysis of the economic system, our conclusions follow our suppositions, rather than guide
them.
And this is why it makes a contribution through its systematic nature. The neoclassical
school of thought is relatively systematic in its development of a formalism for the study of
economies as if they were physical systems, a property carried over from the original applica-
tion of that formalism to physics by Newton and Leibniz. But it sacrifices consonance with the
reality of economic systems for a systematic analysis, and even so essentially constructs a for-
malism to support the conclusion that prices exist which would generate equilibria with certain
properties desirable to a particular political ideology (the Paretian utilitarianism). The hetero-
dox schools on the other hand tend to sacrifice systematic analysis in favour of constructing
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a formalism to understand a particular point of the reality of economic systems. The present
work seeks to proceed systematically, developing a formal, rigorous and structured account of
the means by which the structure and function of economic systems is determined through in-
dividual behaving in consequence of their psychology. As a result, the formalism reveals to us
subtleties in the economic behaviour of individuals and the structure and function of economic
systems which are obscured by the formalism and theories put forth by both the neoclassical
and heterodox schools of thought.
1.1.4 The mutually supporting triad
Thus classed stand the three contributions of this work to economic analysis: an integrated,
holistic and systematic analysis of economies as systems of interacting individuals. Each of
these aspects support the others in a mutually supportive triad. If we do not analyse economic
systems in an integrated manner we are not forced to be systematic in our efforts to see indi-
vidual phenomena in the context of a holistic system. If we do not analyse economic systems
in a holistic manner, we do not enforce on ourselves the discipline of seeking to integrate into
a systematic analysis the many individual phenomena within economic systems. And we can-
not hope to provide an integrated and holistic analysis of a system without approaching it in a
systematic manner.
Each of these contributions may be criticised from the outset, so we must provide two
aplogias before we can begin in earnest. An apologia for the use of mathematics, and an
apologia for the seeking of theories which have generality.
1.2 The hedgehog and the fox: an apologia for theory and
generality
There is a wonderful little book written by Isaiah Berlin called The Hedgehog and the Fox
(1953) which meditates (in the context of Tolstoy’s novels) upon a fragment of Archilochus that
the “fox” knows an infinite variety of “little” things, and the “hedgehog” knows one “big” thing.
The work you the reader hold in your hands is very much the work of a hedgehog. It has a single
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idea at its core - that the economic system and the psychology of behaviour which determines it
can be represented and analysed using the mathematics of networks. And it develops this idea
into a foundation for economic analysis, a general formalism for understanding the structure
and function of economic systems.
There are those who would challenge the legitimacy of this enterprise, denying the value of
general theory. This is widespread a view as would surprise the layman whose more immediate
acquaintances with science and the university are with unity-seeking physics. But the modern
era is a tired and cynical one. The age of the great system builders is over, replaced by an age of
theoretical relativism and anarchy, at least in the social sciences, from which refuge is sought in
the comfort of collecting and presenting an endless procession of data, without particular drive
to connect those sets and narratives thereof to theories of much generality. We expect and desire
no more aspiring for even a fraction of the profundity of the system-building achievements of
Adam Smith, Alfred Marshall, Friedrich Hayek, Amartya Sen, still less Ludwig Wittgenstein.
They seek to challenge us to rise from our comfortable and secure niche in the cave to blink
in the light of the Platonic sun, to realise there might be a state of knowledge beyond that we
currently possess.
It would do us well to remember that why we write first and foremost is to understand our
world and our place in it. What would we write for if not to seek knowledge? It would be a
mercenary and venal quest in search of a philistine end.
But knowledge which consists only of a collection of explanations of isolated incidents is
little more than a collection of facts. Our knowledge is meagre and threadbare if it contains little
to relate particular sets of similar occurrences to other sets of occurrences without a high degree
of similarity. Profound knowledge reveals the causal structure underlying a wide range of
seemingly disconnected occurrences, observing and understanding their connexion as aspects
of, realised phenomena within, a system as a whole. It is in a way neither the knowledge of the
hedgehog or the fox. Profound knowledge consists of the knowledge of both: understanding
individual phenomena as part of a totality, a whole. The hedgehog without the fox is abstract
and meaningless, but equally the fox without the hedgehog is without direction or true insight
into the world.
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Beyond such lofty concerns general theories are, ironically given their association with
the donnish, practical. In fact, so practical are they that they are really quite essential in the
social sciences (with their immediacy to politics) as they are to physics. It is significantly less
taxing to keep in mind one system which reveals the causal structure underlying many different
phenomena, and integrates an understanding of many different situations within it than to have
many different models for each particular phenomenon, or worse, many different models for
each particular phenomenon. There is, in fact, nothing so useful as a good theory. A general
theory, a general formalism for arriving at theories of specific phenomena, integrates within it
many different insights, unifies them, shows their relation to one another. When we wish to
obtain an explanation of this or that phenomenon, we need only recover the relevant parts of
our formalism rather than reconstruct specific formalisms for specific phenomena.
We might conclude with the words of Alfred North Whitehead, the great philosopher-
scientist who probably best captures the essence of the circularity between theory and applica-
tion, and their mutual dependence:
“All theory demands exact notions, somewhere or other, however concealed. In
practice exactness vanishes: the sole problem is, “Does it work?” But the aim of
practice can only be defined by the use of theory; so the question “Does it work?”
is a reference to theory. Also the importance of theory resides in its reference to
practice. The vagueness of practice is energised by the clarity of ideal experience.”
(Whitehead, 1965, p.16)
1.3 Methodology: an apologia for the use of mathematics
Obviously this is a work of mathematical economics. Indeed, its raison d’etre is its attempt
to construct a formal mathematical foundation for economic analysis, novel in its ability to
represent, and analyse economic psychology and systemic structure. But there are many who
would doubt that one ought, or even that one is able to apply mathematics to the study of human
interaction, including economic interaction.
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One of the most famous and potent was Friedrich Hayek (1989), arguably (to the author’s
mind) the truest economic genius, and who had a singular intuitive insight into and ability to
express his analysis of the nature and working of the economic system. He was extremely
sceptical of the value of mathematics as (and this is important) applied to economics in the vast
majority of the discipline, believing it to endow a false, even dangerous sense of mechanism
and calculability to economic systems, to obscure the complexity and intricacy of what is nec-
essarily a system of human interaction, not a machine. Tony Lawson has for many years argued
passionately against the use of mathematics in economic analysis (Lawson, 2006, 2009, 2013),
on the basis that by its very nature2 it restricts us to a particular view of the socioeconomic sys-
tem which precludes analysis of almost everything of genuine importance3 in the determination
of the structure and function of economic systems. The author’s own mentor, Peter Earl, has
on numerous occasions expressed doubts as to the real usefulness of mathematics in economic
analysis, on the basis that it may act as much as a barrier to the understanding of economic
systems as a bridge, obscuring the architecture of economic systems in a mass proliferation of
Greek symbols. All valid concerns.
But we might argue these criticisms reveal not so much the invalidity of mathematical eco-
nomic analysis itself, but rather the injudicious application of mathematics in prior economic
analysis. Ludwig Wittgenstein and Bertrand Russell demonstrated that in its purest form, math-
ematics is simply logic (Russell, 1919; Wittgenstein, 1914-1916, 1921; Wittgenstein et al.,
1930-1932; Wittgenstein, 1953; Pears, 1971). It is a language for expressing ourselves, a lan-
guage with rules and structure like any other language which restrict our reading and writing
of the world to be sure (de Certeau, 1984), but which is limited only in the way we, in its appli-
cation, construct logical rules for its syntax and attach semantics to its content. If it is applied
judiciously, expressing in a symbolic “picture” just that which it is, and carefully elaborated, its
symbols and their relation to one another reveals to us the structure of the object we are trying
to understand in the semantics of its symbols and their syntactical relation to one another in
a direct way we struggle to do with “words” alone. It forces us to recognise complexity and
2Mathematics is deterministic, consisting of “if, then” statements A =⇒ B.
3Emergent entities arising from necessarily non-isolated, non-atomistic interactive individuals (Lawson, 2006,
2012, 2015b)
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subtlety which might be obscured by words alone.
Furthermore, the peculiar task of mathematics is, in fact, to eliminate the necessity for
thought as much as possible and reduce our arguments to the manipulation of symbols guided
by rules (Nagel and Newman, 1958). In doing this, mathematics reserves for and directs the
intellect to debates about meta-mathematics: the interpretations attached to different symbols
within the formalism (semantic), and the logical form of that mathematics - the syntax, the
rules, of the language in which we express the world (substantive)4. It reserves for and directs
debate to the “axioms” of our analysis. The “assumptions”, to it crudely. With mathematical
essays it is easier therefore to conduct debate which advances the frontier of knowledge.
Wittgenstein is the judge of the judiciousness of such application, his whole philosophy
(its core really (Pears, 1971)) being dedicated to the argument that any language, mathemat-
ics included, must be used represent, to express as a linguistic “picture”, just that which it is
describing, that which it is trying to express. And a picture of what it is expressing just as it
exists. Otherwise it is obscurantist, almost useless but in the way that a piece of abstract art is
useful in revealing this or that peculiarity of an object.
Prior approaches to economics have been decidedly injudicious in their application of math-
ematics to economic analysis, totally contra to Wittgenstein’s exhortation (Friedman (1953) fa-
mously in fact celebrates this contradiction), applying mathematics developed for the study of
classical physical systems (Mirowski, 1989; Potts, 2000; Beinhocker, 2006) without particular
regard to whether these mathematics impose an ontology consistent with what they are study-
ing (Lawson, 2003). They provide but a heavily restricted view of economic systems which
precludes the analysis of any aspect of human behaviour and interaction not mathematically
isomorphic with the behaviour of classical physical systems. They are necessarily obscurantist,
of psychology and systemic structure, almost useless but in the way they reveal this or that
peculiarity in the manner of abstract art. Perhaps this was justified, as Hahn (1973) claimed, in
an effort to gain some traction in understanding the economy.
This is all by way of defending the use of mathematics in the present work with reference to
the systematic nature it brings to our considerations. To apply mathematics to economic analy-
4And to those propositions undecidable without recourse to intuition (Nagel and Newman, 1958).
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sis, we must proceed by defining the relevant variables within the economic system, and setting
them in relation to one another to construct a “picture” of our vision of the economic system.
Our arguments about this or that economic phenomena then proceed by the manipulation of
these symbols within the system of logic we have constructed for economic analysis. Math-
ematics brings structure, rigour and formality to our considerations of the economic system,
its systematic nature enforces logical argument, argument which proceeds (if the mathematics
is developed correctly) within given and clear rules which we can then debate with respect to
their consonance with reality.
If we were to forgo mathematics, we would forgo the systematic aspect of our analysis.
Mathematics is not alone in linguistics in bringing structure, rigour and formality to argu-
ment. The Austrian economists, for instance, were by and large structured, rigorous and formal
in their arguments, proceeding logically and systematically without using mathematics. But
mathematics, used wisely, avoids the slightly more fuzzy revelation of the object held within
the mind of the author which purely linguistic, non-mathematical works suffer from and which
causes the delineation between what is a semantic misinterpretation and what is a substantive
debate to be that slightly less clear.
It will do us well to quote at length from Feynman (1965, pp.40-41), who eloquently ex-
presses the case for mathematical analysis, imagining an interlocutor to whom he has just
communicated Newton’s law of gravitation:
“’Why not tell me in words instead of symbols? Mathematics is just a language,
and I want to translate that language’. In fact I can, and I think I partly did. I
could go a little further and explain in more detail that the equation means if the
distance is twice as far the force is one fourth as much, and so on. I could convert
all the symbols into words. In other words I could be kind to the laymen as they all
sit hopefully waiting for me to explain something. Different people get different
reputations for their skill at explaining to the layman in layman’s language these
difficult and obtuse subjects. The layman then searches for book after book in the
hope that he will avoid the complexities which ultimately set in, even with the best
exposition of this type. He finds as he reads a generally increasing confusion, one
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complicated statement after another, one difficult-to-understand thing after another,
all apparently disconnected from one another. It becomes obscure, and he hopes
that maybe in some other book there is some explanation... The author almost
made it - maybe another fellow will make it right...
The apparent enormous complexities of nature, with all its funny laws and rules,
each of which has been carefully explained to you, are really very closely interwo-
ven. However, if you do not appreciate the mathematics, you cannot see, among
the great variety of facts, that logic permits you to go from one to the other.”
We are all of us laymen when it comes to the hitherto only reconnoitered or sidestepped re-
doubts of the frontier of ignorance thrown up by the intransigence of human psychology and
complex architecture of economic systems. We have all of us read, and written, work after
work in the hope of understanding that system, even using mathematics specifically developed
to understand particular phenomena. But we have discovered the complexities of the system
in various respects all seemingly disconnected, and this has led to the current fractious state of
economic science. We have not yet the systematic analysis the judicious application of mathe-
matics brings, and which supports our understanding of a holistic economic system into which
many different phenomena are integrated and linked together.
1.4 The structure of the present work
The present work is set out in the manner of a “pivot” in three parts. The pivot point being
the individual who interacts with their neighbourhood in socioeconomic systems, and whose
behaviour, in combination with all others, serves to determine them. This is illustrated in figure
1.1, which we will revisit in our conclusion at Chapter 8. In Part I we set down some elementary
formalism for representing the economy and society as network structures, a taxonomy, which
allows us to represent formally the neighbourhood of the individual within the system. In Part
II we then take this formalism of the neighbourhood of the individual and use it to place the
formal psychology of behaviour developed in Markey-Towler (2015) in an economic context.
From this emerges a formalism for theorising the psychology of economic behaviour, an anima
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Figure 1.1: The flow of argument: the present work pivots around the individual according to
this cycle to determine how the structure and function of economic systems are determined.
for the taxonomy. This in hand, in Part III we then “work forward” from this psychology of
behaviour to analyse the interactions of individuals within the socioeconomic system which
emerge from their economic behaviour, and how they determine the structure and function of
the economic system.
In Chapter 2 (Part I) we consider how the network approach to complex systems science
provides a formal definition and representation of “systems”, before in Chapter 3 (Part I) plac-
ing this mathematics in a socioeconomic context by defining and representing the structure
and function of socioeconomic systems as networks. We conclude Chapter 3 by resolving the
problem posed to microeconomics by the concept of emergence in complex systems, and in
justifying our units of analysis consider how a microeconomics of complex systems can be
developed into a macroeconomics.
Chapter 4 (Part II) contains some fairly dry, though important, technical considerations by
which we take the formal psychology of behaviour developed in Markey-Towler (2015) to the
behaviour of a node in the economic system. Chapter 5 then takes this formalism and uses it
to elaborate some aspects of psychology which have direct bearing on peculiarly economic be-
haviour, namely; substitutability, non-substitutability and complementarity, and the distinction
between needs and wants and the concomitant existence of “deep” psychological constraints
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on economic behaviour. We consider some matters of evolutionary concern; how demand
evolves to incorporate new products, and workers introduce new production processes before
concluding with some considerations of “information” workers engaged in management and
marketing.
Taking the psychology of economic behaviour in hand, in Chapter 6 (Part III) we begin
by providing a formal closure of the model by combining individual behaviours together to
determine the structure and function of socioeconomic systems. We then provide two theorems
- the “Mauss-Commons” and “Smith-Hayek” theorems - concerning whether or not a market or
non-market interaction will come to exist, consider how these theorems formalise the insights
of their namesakes, and how they inform policy analysis. This complete, we consider two
important points of interpretation of these theorems. First, their property of providing theories
of what connections aren’t made, of incompleteness in the structure of economic systems, and
how this generates the possibility of structural evolution in economic systems. Secondly, a more
academic consideration of the uniqueness properties of the formalism and their consonance
with scientific philosophy.
With the possibility of incompleteness in the structure of economic systems, we elaborate
in Chapter 7 (Part III) on the processes by which the evolution of economic systems progresses.
We begin this chapter, as we must, with some considerations time in economic analysis before
moving on to provide some theorems on the process of competition on the basis of prices (the
Chamberlin-Robinson theorem) and non-price attributes (the Lancaster-Ironmonger theorem),
through which structural evolution of the economy proceeds. We conclude this chapter with a
consideration of the process by which a change of behaviour at one point in the socioeconomic
system proceeds to bring about a change of behaviour at some other point in the socioeconomic
system through diffusion, and formulate the Chinese Whispers theorem thereon.
Part IV contains conclusions and appendices. In Chapter 8 we “step back” from the con-
siderations of the work preceding it to view the cyclic structure of the formalism as it pivots
around the individual: how the system effects the individual, and how the behaviour of the
individual effects the system. We then consider by way of conclusion some directions in which
future research may develop upon the foundations provided here and continue the assault on
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the redoubts of our ignorance of the structure and function of economic systems. Proofs of
all theorems contained within this work are relegated to an appendix. They are primarily of
interest to those of a technical persuasion and detract from the flow of argument.
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Part I
Foundations of Economic Analysis:
Taxonomy
17
Chapter 2
Economic systems as complex systems,
complex systems as networks
The following two statements are hardly controversial, a moments ontological reflection con-
firms their nigh axiomatic nature. They are the foundation of this work:
1. The economy is a complex system.
2. Economics is the study of the economy.
Immediately, by combining these two statements we arrive at the raison d’etre for this work,
the foundation upon which it is built:
Economics is the study of the complex system that is the economy.
This entire work is concerned with drawing out the implications of this statement, and building
them into a foundation for the analysis of economies from the vantage point secured us by
complex systems science. Complex systems science is a well-recognised approach to scientific
inquiry which supports an integrated, holistic, and systematic approach to whatever phenomena
it studies. In the past there have been repeated calls for an economics developed from this
vantage point of complex systems science following a tantalising recognition by Jason Potts
(2000) of its potential for setting economics upon a more ontologically consistent, therefore
scientifically secure basis, as well as unifying prior theories of the economy by showing them
to be special cases of a more general formalism.
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To begin, the reader shall be introduced (or reintroduced) to the basics of complex sys-
tems science before these calls for and claims of the potential of a complex systems economics
are considered. In particular, that the appropriate logico-mathematics to develop such an eco-
nomics is the network mathematics branch of complex systems science. This will allow us
to place this work in context, and move forward to constructing the framework for economic
analysis using the mathematics of graph theory - colloquially, the mathematics of networks.
2.1 Complex systems science: systems as network structures
Complex systems science finds its roots in the work of Ludwig von Bertalanffy, who noticed
the existence of “iso-morphic laws”. That is, equations which describe phenomena in different
systems but taking the same form independent of the meanings attached to the variables of
those systems. To von Bertalanffy (1950), this suggested the possibility of a science of systems
in general, one in which we study the laws governing “systems” as a general concept, and
he proposed that just such a logico-mathematical discipline, “general systems theory” should
exist.
The legacies of general systems theory have been not in the development of analysis of sys-
tems as general structures - this is simply mathematics - but in the inspiration it has provided
thinkers to realise the applicability of, in particular, two mathematical systems in obtaining us
the vantage point upon a particular system. We might therefore gain by regressing linguisti-
cally by speaking not of a complex systems science, but rather a complex systems scienta -
“scienta”, the Latin root of “science” translating as “knowledge”. Complex systems science is
an approach, vantage point, which allows us to develop knowledge of a system as a complex
one - a complex systems scienta.
One legacy of von Bertalanffy’s dream has gained much popular attention. Classed roughly
as “nonlinear dynamics”, this branch of complex systems science tends to focus upon under-
standing how “deep” and simple order underlies apparent complexity in systems. Nonlinear
equations, especially given their potential properties for geometric (i.e. exponential) progres-
sion or fairly complicated rhythmic, even cyclic periodicity are naturally suited to this study.
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Nicolis and Prigogine (1989) typify this approach, Prigogine having won the Nobel Prize in
Chemistry for his application of nonlinear dynamics to understand the apparently chaotic dy-
namics of interactive systems of elements and show their complexity is born of - “emerges”
from - an underlying simplicity in their equations. The nonlinear dynamics of the overall sys-
tem need not come from the nonlinearity of the equations describing its aggregates however. In
biological sciences John Holland (1992, 2006) was instrumental in developing models of mul-
tiple interacting agents with simple equations describing the behaviour of an organism which
when simulated generate the nonlinear process underlying selection of traits from a population.
Similar models allow us to understand the emergence of co-operation, culture and rules (Lans-
ing, 2003), even grammar and syntax (Lansing and Downey, 2011) from individuals interacting
in social environments - system wide phenomena emerging from interactions of parts due to
nonlinear dynamics born of their interaction.
The other legacy of complex systems science, not totally divorced from the tradition of
nonlinear dynamics, finds roots in a classic paper by Herbert Simon (1962), The Architecture
of Complexity. The contribution of this work was twofold: giving one of the first and best
working definitions of the amorphous concept of “system”, and hinting toward a mathematics
which might allow such a morphological vision to be implemented. A complex system, and
Simon recognised this is but a rough definition, is an object “... made up of a large number
of parts which interact in a non-simple way” (Simon, 1962, p.468). A theory developed to
understand a complex system thus defined must explain how those parts interact, how these
interactions generate the phenomena we observe at the systemic level and how they cause the
system to evolve over time. Simon’s real innovation however, was to recognise that we might
isolate certain systems and represent them using one neat mathematical tool. Any system might
be represented by a “sociometric” (or for that matter, physical) matrix S, each element ai j ∈ S
representing the interactions between parts i and j. While this matrix might not be sparse, it
might be “near decomposable” such that certain interactions ai j are sufficiently weak as to allow
us to delineate a sub-matrix S⊂ S representing only strong intra-system effects within a system
and eliminating all weak inter-system effects relating subsystems together within S. The result,
a matrix S representing interactions, becomes a morphology which allows us quite literally to
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represent the interaction between a large number of parts. It becomes an “architecture” of the
structure of the system.
In the modern day, Simon’s approach to the study of complex systems is augmented by
enlisting the more general mathematical topology of a graph, more colloquially known as a
network, to represent a system as a set of interactions between parts. The more general topology
which the matrix S of interactions between parts of a system represents is a mathematical graph
(Chartrand, 1985; Newman, 2003; Jackson, 2008)
S = {N g(N)} (2.1)
which represents the system S as a tuple comprised of a set of parts, elements, nodes, ver-
tices N, and a set of relations, links, connections, edges between (operating on) them g(N).
We say that a relation, link, connection or edge nin j between two parts, elements, nodes,
vertices,ni,n j ∈ N exists, nin j ∈ g(N) if there is some non-empty interaction anin j ∈ A between
them. That is to say
nin j =

anin j
/0
i f nin j ∈ g(N)
i f nin j /∈ g(N)
(2.2)
the object anin j is that interaction which would enter the ni-th row, n j-th column element of
any matrix A representing the system architecture.
The beauty of characterising systems in this manner - as a graph - is that it lends itself to
neat diagrammatic representations such as those in figure 2.1 whereby we may actually observe
the “architecture”, the structure, of the system of interactions. However, as we move toward
systems of a large size (the number of nodes |N|) such as that of figure 2.2 , the knowledge to be
gained from simply observing the diagrammatic of the graph of the system becomes restricted
to the intuitive because of their size and density. Hence a great deal of the mathematics of net-
works is concerned with devising metrics operating upon the graph {N g(N)} which inform
us about the system as a whole (size, density, diameter), of portions (cluster composition, clique
delineation, components), and of the position of individual parts (neighbourhood, degree, be-
tweenness and eigenvector centrality) (Newman, 2003). We will concern ourselves with such
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Figure 2.1: Some simple system networks (from Newman (2003, p.4)): (a) undirected, homo-
geneous nodes, (b) undirected, heterogenous connections and nodes (c) undirected, heterogen-
ous connection weight, heterogeneous nodes (d) directed, homogeneous nodes.
Figure 2.2: A friendship network in a US school with directed “friend” relationships (from
Newman (2003, p.18)).
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metrics as the need arises, for the purpose of complex systems science is not to develop met-
rics of existing networks in the first instance, but to understand why those networks form the
particular structure and function g(N). That is, complex systems science, insofar as it seeks to
understand systems as comprised of interactions between parts, seeks to understand the struc-
ture and function g(N) of those systems understood as networks S = {N g(N)} represented
using graph theory.
The power of graph theory to capture the essence of complex systems and reveal their
structure to us is evident in its history. It was pioneered by Euler, who developed it in order
to formulate his celebrated solution to the Koenigsberg bridge problem in 1736 (Amaral and
Ottino, 2004; Chartrand, 1985), which relies on the revelation of the underlying network struc-
ture to the bridge-island system of Koenigsberg. Its potential became even more obvious when
de Sola Pool and Kochen (1978-1979) and Watts and Strogatz (1998) discovered that even
networks formed by “random” link “rewiring” could lead to a high degree of link clustering
and low network diameter, which could then be used to explain Milgram’s famous discovery
(Milgram, 1967) of the “six degrees of separation” in “small world” social networks (Amaral
and Ottino, 2004). Still more apparent became the power of graph theory with the realisation
of the connexion between networks with a highly skewed distribution of links amongst nodes
(indicating concentration of structure), the concept of systemic resilience to distributed, but not
targeted attacks by Albert et al. (2000), and the discovery of how these networks might arise
from “preferential attachment” in the assignment of links to already highly-connected elements
(Barabasi and Albert, 1999)1.
Whether the system S = {N g(N)} be organisms, groups of interacting people, or web-
sites in the internet, the power of network analysis - graph theory - lies in its making clear how
the interaction of individual parts give rise to an organised whole (Amaral and Ottino, 2004).
That which is particularly beneficial for the social sciences, is the understanding graph theoret-
ical conceptions of complex systems offers of the place of the individual within an organised
whole, how their place in the network affects their life outcomes, how their behaviour is influ-
enced by, and has influence on others (Borgatti et al., 2009). The graph theoretical approach
1Watts (2004) and Brownlee (2007) give more notes on the history of the development of complex systems
science.
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in complex systems science focuses our attention on understanding the individual interaction
nin j ∈ g(N) which takes its place amongst many others in the determination of the structure
and function g(N) of the system S. It demands we develop understanding of the system on a
granular, and on a systemic basis, as the whole has a granular, yet integrated architecture.
2.2 Economics as complex systems science: economic sys-
tems as network structures
The applicability and the potential of complex systems science, and in particular graph the-
oretical approaches thereto, to the study of economic systems was recognised by Jason Potts
(2000). His argument - one of the prime movers behind this present work - was that the employ-
ment of graph theory in the development of economic analysis would gain economics a greater
scientific value by its peculiar consonance with the reality of economic systems2. But further,
as one would suspect if an economics founded on graph theory had such scientific potential,
he argued it would contain prior approaches to the study of the economy as special cases of a
“deeper” formal structure. Thus demonstrating the conditions necessary for their consonance
with reality the restrictions thereby placed upon their vision thereof, and the standing of their
vision in relation to others. To draw a somewhat wild analogy, graph theory was to do for
economics what relativity did for physics - expand the bounds of understanding without losing
territory gained, in fact, consolidating the grasp thereon.
That graph theory has a peculiar consonance with the reality of economic systems should
really be rather obvious. Economies are clearly network structures given the fact that they
are really a class of structures within systems of social interaction. Social systems are clearly
networks, being consisted of interactions between individual parts, exactly that which a network
mathematics, a mathematical graph represents. Schweitzer et al. (2009b, p.408-409) put it as
well as any3:
2There were others taking up a view of economics inspired by complex systems science prior to Potts such as
Alan Kirman, Peter Allen, and even Janos Kornai, but these did not have the same core vision of the economy as
a network structure which motivated Potts. The complexity economics literature in relation to the present work is
considered in Appendix A. Against tradition, we defer this literature review in order to be in a better position to
assess extant literature by reference to the present work once it it is completed.
3Almost these same authors, in Schweitzer et al. (2009a), argue that network theory supplements neoclassical
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“...nodes represent the different actors, or agents such as firms, banks or even coun-
tries, and the links between the nodes describe their mutual interactions, be it trade,
ownership, or credit/debt relationships.”
The minds, the governing faculties, of those parts/nodes of the economic system too are net-
works. The brain is a network - a physiological fact (Kandel et al., 2013). The great philoso-
phers of thought (David Hume (1777), Immanuel Kant (1781), John Dewey (1910), Friedrich
Hayek (1952)) explain the basic mental act as one of relating objects to one another. The great
psychologists also, at root, have the same formal connexion or association based structure to
their psychology be they “thought based” (psychoanalysis (Makari, 2008), personal construct
psychology (Kelly, 1963), gestalt psychology (Lester, 1995)) or “rule based” (cognitive psy-
chology (Simon, 1969; Newell et al., 1958, 1962; Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer,
1999)). Thought, be it conscious or subconscious, deliberative or automated, is a process of
making, of “seeing” the connections between objects in the world.
That the formal structure of graph theory has this consonance with economic systems has a
methodological value, as economics has for many years been restricted by the view proposed
by Friedman (1953) that the structure of the formalism used to model the economy need bear
no resemblance to the structure of the economy in reality. This is highly provisional, the barest
pragmatism at best (Hahn, 1973), and, at worst, ludicrously at odds, in fact directly contra-
dictory, with the concept of knowledge4. To obtain knowledge, we must - as Lawson (2003)
finds it necessary (rather painfully) to argue - “match” our ontology with our explanation, as
the opening quote of this work from Wittgenstein (1914-1916, p.61) exhorts. Propositions in
economic science must be consonant with the structure of the reality they explain if they are to
tell us about the world - they must be a “picture” of the reality they explain. If (as it in fact is)
the economy is a system of interacting parts, it needs to be studied as such, and therefore needs
to be studied as a network.
Apart from this basic virtue Potts (2000) argued that graph theory had unique abilities to
economics. The view of Jason Potts (2000) and also of the present author is a little more radical, rather that
neoclassical economics supplements network theory as a special case.
4The author may be in dangerous academic territory here, for quite apart from this view being at present so
widely and uncritically held within economics as to be almost a dogma, he may be dancing on the grave of his
elders. Milton Friedman was his supervisor’s supervisor’s supervisor (the academic genealogy being the author,
John Foster, David Laidler, Milton Friedman).
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capture important aspects of the economy which have hitherto been difficult to speak of. In
particular, networks allow us to map structure. They have an architecture which we can liter-
ally “see” if we represent the network diagrammatically. An economics constructed upon the
logico-mathematical foundation of graph theory is an economics which allows us to understand
the structure, the architecture, of economic systems.
It is important that this structure, this architecture, is only interesting when it is incomplete,
when there are connections which are not made, when the matrix representing the network
structure is sparse. Complete networks, where every connection that can be made is made, are
not particularly interesting, they have no real structure, they are mathematical “fields” where
every element is connected to every other directly. Earl and Wakeley (2010a) would later
recognise this as a formal manifestation of the incompleteness of knowledge, the limitations
of cognition and the strictures of worldviews which constrain the networks we construct as
economic individuals5.
The ability of graph theory to map economic structures and represent their architecture, and
the incompleteness of that structure raises the possibility of economic evolution. A complete
structure cannot evolve in a non-destructive or “deep” sense, all evolution is either the destruc-
tion of connections or merely changes of connection strength. Foster (2005b, 2006) recognised
that when economic systems, economic networks are incomplete, they may evolve “properly”
- “structurally”. There are new connections to be made and new structures to be formed.
So, an economics built upon graph theory would obtain an account of economic systems
developed in logico-mathematical structure consonant with the structure of the phenomena
studied. Such analysis would allow us to “see” and comprehend the structure of the economy
and understand its incompleteness, and allow us to understand the manner of its subjection
to evolutionary processes. But Potts (2000) went yet further in his argument, and in some
ways the major part of it was that these advances could be made while consolidating gains
already made in understanding economic systems by containing prior schools of thought, thus
illustrating their relation in the unity of economic analysis as special cases. Each had their
5Earl, Potts’ supervisor and now the author’s, has remarked to the author often how upon hearing Potts’ idea his
thoughts were “oh... that’s what I’ve been doing for the past thirty years”, realising that Potts had discovered the
formal logico-mathematics expressing the ideas about the limitations and incompleteness of economic interaction
at the heart of his life’s work.
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particular view of the underlying truth of economic systems, the assumptions of which might
be understood that much better with the aid of an economics founded upon graph theory by
bringing the assumptions employed into sharper focus.
The (at present) dominant neoclassical school (the “Talmud” of which is Mas-Collel et al.
(1995) and Jehle and Reny (2011)) and its offshoots (behavioral economics6, “New” Keyne-
sian macroeconomics, New Institutional and some branches of complexity economics) largely
concerns themselves with studying the special case of an economic system characterised by a
complete network. A complete field permits the application of 19th century electromagnetic en-
gineering to study the conditions which characterise interactive equilibria in a field (Mirowski,
1989; Potts, 2000; Beinhocker, 2006). Prices act to bring the buying and selling behaviour of
everyone with respect to everyone into a stable pattern as if it were a magnet/valve regulating
the flow of electricity/water between two sets of diodes/chambers. There is nothing to the inter-
active structure of a neoclassical economy beyond the demand-supply dichotomy (direction of
flow between diodes/chambers), it is complete, so that every element within these dichotomies
may interact with every other.
Alternative schools of thought in economic analysis are isolated, esoteric, iconoclastic. But
common to all these approaches Potts (2000) recognised the common thread of incompleteness.
All alternative approaches to economics concern themselves with considering and understand-
ing the connections which aren’t made in economic systems. Consider some of the major
alternatives. Post Keynesian economics is concerned with the breakdown of connections, pri-
marily between the financial system and the rest of the economy, and how connections between
governmental systems and the rest of the economy may “remedy” this. Neo-Ricardian eco-
nomics, post-Sraffa, is all but explicitly concerned with understanding networks in its study
of interlinkages between industries and recognition of the importance of which industries are
not connected to others - even utilising the matrix algebra which may be utilised to simulate
network function. Austrian economics is primarily concerned with how, in the absence (im-
possibility) of a socialist planner with all necessary information and unbounded computational
6This is deliberately misspelt after the US of A fashion in order to delineate it, a “relaxationist” enterprise
with respect to the neoclassical model of economic behaviour, from behavioural and psychological economics,
which is concerned more with working forward from psychology to economic behaviour than supplementing the
neoclassical model with insights from psychology.
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power, individuals with a restricted network from which they can obtain information and a
restricted set of elements with whom they may interact still contribute to the emergence of
economic order. Institutional economics concerns itself with the social institutions (commonly
held behavioural rules) which exhort individuals to form certain connections and prohibit them
from forming others. Political economy (of which we might say Marxist and Feminist eco-
nomics are subsets) concerns itself with how socio-political factors prohibit the formation of
this connection or that, and the politics of the connections which aren’t made. The common
focus of the alternative schools of economics is a structural one: the incompleteness in the net-
work structure of economic systems. The specific causes and effects of that incompleteness is
what delineates each from the other.
There is unity of economic analysis, the present dispersion and fractiousness is merely born
of different points of view upon an underlying truth, and the lack of wholesale, fundamental
application of a logico-mathematics which can represent this underlying truth to us. Economics
is about, and in fact, Jason Potts realised it always has been about, understanding the determi-
nation of the network structure, function and evolution of socioeconomic systems. This is the
argument of Potts (2000) and the present work is in its legacy.
Potts made a compelling argument in favour of graph theory as the foundation for his “new
evolutionary microeconomics”, but he did not go so far as to develop that foundation into a
system, confining himself to the argument that it would yield value. The purpose of this work
is to take up his argument and show its validity by constructing a formalism for economic
analysis using the logico-mathematical system of graph theory. It aims to develop (in Part II)
not only a relatively simple but also general model of the psychology of economic behaviour by
applying the psychological formalism of Markey-Towler (2015). This complements, lays the
foundation for, its development (in Part III) of the theory of determination of the structure and
function of socioeconomic systems understood as networks, and of the process and the factors
governing their evolution.
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Chapter 3
Representing socioeconomic systems as
network structures
If an economy is a complex system and economics aims to understand it as such, our first
task is to define its logico-mathematical form thus; its components and their relation to one
another. The same must be done for society, for the study of the economy cannot be divorced
from the study of society (by rights, the former is a subset of the latter). After considering
these fairly mechanical matters, we shall turn briefly to assess the legitimacy of the focus of
a granular microeconomic focus on the determination of the individual action by considering
(formally) what is meant by the concept of an “emergent” property of a complex system. We
shall then elaborate on the means by which the integration “up to”, and feedback “down from”,
macroeconomics may be developed.
3.1 Representing socioeconomic systems as networks: econ-
omy, society and organisation
If the economic system Es is a network, then its logico-mathematical form is represented by
a tuple consisting of the set N of elements (nodes, vertices) of an economic system and the
relations (connections, edges) between them g(N), collected together into a graph
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Es = {N g(N)} (3.1)
The elements ni ∈ N = {C P} of an economic system Es are partitioned between a set of
consumers ci ∈ C and a set of production organisations ni ∈ P - firms, governments, financial
institutions and other assorted organisations. The relations g(N)within an economic system Es,
in the abstract sense, consist of elements within a vector
[
xnin j mnin j
]
of goods and services
(objects) xnin j ∈ X transferred from element ni to element n j, and mediums of exchange (also
objects) mnin j ∈M transferred from element ni to element n j. Any connection nin j ∈ g(N) is
therefore a vector
[
nin j ∈ g(N)
]
=
[
xnin j mnin j
]
(3.2)
The vector xnin j exists within an arbitrary space of goods and services, an “object space” X ,
and similarly the vector of mediums of exchange mnin j exists within an arbitrary object space
M. In practice we restrict these spaces to exist within the |X |+ |M| dimensional Euclidean
space R|X |+|M|, where |X |+ |M| is defined as the sum of different types of goods, services
and mediums of exchange. All interaction of a strictly economic nature is constituted by this
logico-mathematical form, the exchange of objects be they goods and services or mediums of
exchange or both.
Market exchanges are coincidental with economic exchanges, being a connective act on the
parts of ni and n j. They are distinguished by or rather, arise from the exchange of one object
being linked to the exchange of the other in the mind of the individual. Formally, in a market
system Ms = {N gMs (N)}, arising from exchange in an economic system, the connections
nin j ∈ gMs (N) between elements N are of a quid pro quo nature (“this” is exchanged for “that”),
mediated by a price pnin j and summarised by the exchange equation mn jni = pnin jxnin j . That is
[
nin j ∈ gMs (N)
]
=
[
mn jni = pnin jxnin j
]
(3.3)
where we index the connection by the direction of the flow of goods and services objects.
Connective acts, of which the market system Ms constituted, contains the same primitive phys-
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ical basis as Es, the exchange of objects mn jni and xnin j . But they also contain, and this is
what distinguishes market exchanges from non-market exchanges, a mental aspect. The quid
pro quo nature of the exchange, the connection of the objects exchanged, is a property of the
understanding, of the rules in the mind of the two individuals interacting. We will, and must,
defer a discussion of exactly how the market system Ms relates to the economic system Es
which constitutes its primitive physical basis because of this psychological factor.
Nevertheless, why, one might then ask, do we separate the object space M from the object
space X? They both contain objects of exchange, and in market exchanges objects within the
two spaces stand in definite relation to one another. In primitive societies where barter exchange
reigns the one, M, is in fact a subset of the other, M ⊂ X . But it has been well known, at the
very least since Keynes (1936), that mediums of exchange are no mere “veil” over what are
ultimately exchanges of goods and services. If this were so, it would hardly make sense (albeit
on a pathological level) why Balzac’s miser Pere Grandet would have had himself placed, as
he was dying, in front of his hoarded gold, silver and jeweled treasure so as for it to be his last
sight on earth. Mediums of exchange are literally that, they facilitate exchanges of the material
necessities of life and its enjoyment, and so throughout history they have held a privileged and
differential place from ordinary objects of exchange in society and politics (Galbraith, 1975;
Ferguson, 2008). They are almost prior to the objects X for which they are exchanged - a point
forcefully made in Post-Keynesian models of economic systems (Keen, 1995, 2011; Godley
and Lavoie, 2001-2002, 2007; Harcourt, 2008) - insofar as it is the availability or not of M that
determines whether one may obtain objects in X or not. Thus they stand in reality, and thus
they will be considered in the formalism going forward, and the reader will hopefully grasp in
the considerations of later chapters the importance of this differential, singular nature of objects
in M.
It is worth noting at this point before moving on to the definition of social systems, that
interactions in financial markets are no different to any other exchange in their logical form.
They are constituted by the exchange of an object xnin j known as a “financial” instrument, for
mediums of exchange mn jni . They differ only in the temporal attributes of the object xnin j ex-
changed (a “financial instrument” in the form of a written contract stipulating future exchanges
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to take place) for a medium of exchange mn jni and the “intention” of the parties to the exchange
- the obtention by one party of a medium of exchange rather than their obtention of a good or
service, a “means” to an “end” if you will.
The study of the economy cannot be divorced from society. Individuals always exist within,
are “embedded” within, social systems of interpersonal relationships which exert influence
on their economic interactions (Granovetter, 1985, 2005; Davis, 2007, 2012). In fact it is
misleading to separate the two, for an economy is rightly thought of as constituted of relations
within social systems (Lawson, 2003, 2009, 2012). In order to maintain consistency with reality
then we must have a definition of social systems. The manner in which we conceive society as
a system is not particularly new, it is a network
Is = {N g(N)} (3.4)
comprised of the same parts as an economic system N, though here the relations between
these parts are of an informational nature such that
[
nin j ∈ g(N)
]
= vnin j (3.5)
where vnin j transferred by ni to n j in the context of society Is - most commonly, though not
exclusively, some form of communication contained within a semiotic space V . This is a logico-
mathematical form of the standard notion of a social network in the social sciences (Watts,
2004; Jackson, 2008; Bonaichi and Lee, 2012). It is differentiated, however, from networks
of “constitutative” relations, where vnin j would represent the social positioning (Lawson, 2003,
2009, 2012, 2015b) of ni with respect to n j. Here vnin j are the primitive, physical-information
basis for such networks which must exist primarily as construed in the mind. It ought become
clear how constitutative social positions come to exist in the mind and influence behaviour as
this work progresses.
Neither economic nor social systems are comprised of atomistic elements however, they
contain many subsystems, in the form of production organisations themselves collections of
parts and relations between them. The organisation ni ∈ P is itself a network
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ni = {Nni gni (Nni)} (3.6)
the graph gni (Nni) of which contains the same information as Es and Is, but reflecting the
goods and services, mediums of exchange and information flows
[
xηkηk′ mηkηk′ vηkηk′
]
be-
tween parts ηk,ηk′ ∈ Nni in the context of the organisation ni - a production “graph” (Foster,
2005b, 2006). These parts consist of the resources contained within the organisation, hence
Nni is in a sense the “resource pool” spoken of by Penrose (1959). This of course contains
the organisational stocks of goods and services ηk ∈ Xni ⊂ Nni , primary resources and inter-
mediary goods and services held as inputs into production1, inventories of completed goods
and services, and the organisational stocks of mediums of exchange ηk ∈Mni ⊂ Nni . But also
contained within the set of elements Nni is the setWni of workers ωk = ηk ∈Wni ⊂ Nni , whose
inclusion within the set of elements of the organisation we shall make contingent upon their, as
an individual consumer ck, supplying their labour hours l ∈ X to the organisation ni
ωk ∈ Nni ⇐⇒ lckni ∈ {ckni ∈ g(N)} (3.7)
We will also make the existence of the organisation itself contingent upon the inclusion of
one worker within its elements
ni ∈ N ⇐⇒ ∃ωk ∈ Nni (3.8)
Though we don’t limit ourselves to lcknibeing provided in a labour market exchange (it may
be provided in slavery or voluntary provision), one may think of this rather strange relation
(supplying labour hours to oneself) as the mathematical expression of “providing for oneself”.
Or, flipping our perspective we may realise that in a sense, as a worker, we are always decid-
ing to provide ourselves with labour hours which we input to our production. The economic
individual i thus appears in two guises within the socioeconomic system, in two “roles”. First
1This includes what economists often rather lazily, and certainly rather fuzzily (Hodgson, 2014), have classi-
fied as “capital”. In partial deference to the author’s friend and colleague Cameron K Murray who has written
extensively (and witheringly) in criticism of this troubled concept popularly, but also in partial agreement with his
analysis, the author will refrain from using this terminology here.
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i may be a consumer, that is, to abuse notation, i = ci. Second, i may be a worker within a
production organisation n j, i = ωi ∈ n j.
We must recognise finally within the set Nni of the elements of the organisation, the ex-
istence in reality of a class of goods, objects within a space KA ⊂ X which might be held
internally to the firm which one might call “production automata”. A production automaton
kA = ηk ∈KAni ∈Nni is a special class of good which has the property of not itself being an input
to be employed by a worker in production. It must, as the name suggests be a fully autonomous,
and therefore self-operating production unit - an autonomously operating machine, which in-
cludes amongst its attributes a programmed production process. It is, in this sense, a proper
substitute for a worker, insofar as it does not require a worker to operate it. This dimension of
the object space X is one neglected in economics, as at the embryonic stages of the discipline
in the early industrial revolution, such automata did not exist, and did not exist in the proper
sense of being labour-substitutes until the rise of robotics in the middle of the twentieth century
when robots could be built which were autonomous even to the extent of being programmed to
“power down” and “power up” automatically.
We will, however, continue to disregard henceforth the existence of production automata.
Not at all because they are not important - quite the contrary, their labour-saving capabilities
could be argued to be the foundation for the “next” industrial revolution - but because they
will complicate the notation of the analysis greatly without great advance in understanding the
system as a whole. In any case, we might think of them as analogous to workers, merely with
a more dubious answer to the question of their consciousness.
The organisation is a microcosm, a microsystem, or subsystem, of society and economy.
But it is not an isolated whole, it interacts with other elements of the economy through the in-
teractions its own parts have with those elements. In each case where ni or n j is an organisation
the vector
[
xnin j mnin j vnin j
]
of interactions between the two elements subsumes expansions
of terms according to the parts ηk ∈ ni of the organisation ni which are interacting with which
parts ηk′ ∈ n j of the other element n j of the system Es, that is, where both ni,n j ∈ P
[
xnin j mnin j vnin j
]
=
[[
xηkηk′ mηkηk′ vηkηk′
]
ηk∈ni
]
ηk′∈n j
(3.9)
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These vectors thus represent not only the interactions of organisations at the level of Es,
but also reflects which parts of those organisations are interacting with which. In a sense,
the connections nin j ∈ g(N) extend “beyond” the “boundary” of the subsystems ni or n j to
reflect that an organisation interfaces with the rest of the economic system through its own
elements. This is somewhat messy formally, but reflects the complex nature of heirarchy in
systems analysis (Salthe, 2012) when the whole is not an atomistic entity at higher levels of the
system but an organisation of parts which themselves interact with other parts of other wholes
in the system.
This provides a “taxonomy” of who exists within the system and interacts with whom.
These objects taken together are essentially a formalisation of Herbert Simon’s “organisational”
view of the economy (Simon, 1991). Were a martian to look down at the earth with a telescope
equipping them to see this economy, they would observe ni ∈ P as large green areas containing
little black dots of elements ηk ∈ ni of the production organisation connected pale blue lines
representing the structure of the organisation gni (Nni). Stretching out from these areas to others
n j ∈P and to little black dots alone the consumers c j ∈C the martian would see g(N) and gv (N)
as red lines - “highways” of flows of goods, services, mediums of exchange and information.
See figure 2.2 for a vision of this vision.
It is with the formation of these structures Es, Is, that economics concerns itself. The task
of economics is to understand how the structure of the network g(N) ⊂ Es is determined, and
how this network functions, and how this structure evolves over time. In this work, a work of
microeconomics, we approach this problem through the question of how the individual connec-
tion nin j ∈ g(N) between two elements is formed by the behaviour of those two elements in
the context of the system around them, and how this connection is effected by the evolutionary
dynamics of the system as a whole.
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Figure 3.1: A simple socioeconomic system: In Es the arrows reflect exchanges of goods
and services, in Is the flow of information. Herbert Simon’s martian would see these in red
between the little black dots. When we focus on one such as is circled we see an organisational
subsystem, in Simon’s experiment a green area crisscrossed by pale blue lines, switching to red
at the interface of the subsystem.
3.2 The legitimacy of microeconomics: a note on emergent
properties
A common criticism leveled by heterodox economists at those of the neoclassical school is
that that school is “reductionist” and does not pay due attention to “emergent” phenomena.
Arguments that the “whole is greater than the sum of its parts” linger in the famous Koopmans-
Vining debate (Koopmans, 1947; Vining, 1949; Koopmans, 1949), Vining defending the propo-
sition that one cannot reduce the behaviour of an economic system to the sum total of the be-
haviour of its parts. Post-Keynesian economists in particular, reacting against the proposition
that macroeconomics must have “microfoundations”, reject that an economic system can be
reduced to the behaviour of its parts added together. Lawson (2006, 2013) goes so far as to
claim that reductionism is what defines a neoclassical economist, its rejection the heterodox,
and builds his whole system Lawson (2003, 2009, 2012, 2015c,b) on the idea that the only
way to analyse economic systems is through their emergent phenomena. So before proceeding
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any further with this microeconomic study we must ask; if there are emergent phenomena in
economic systems, is microeconomics a legitimate field of study, let alone one which claims
some measure of priority?
If we provide a formal, logical definition of an emergent property2 we see readily that mi-
croeconomics of the type to be pursued here is quite legitimate, even necessary for a complete
understanding on any higher level of analysis. We tend to say an emergent property (this is so
common knowledge really as to be without reference) is a property of the system as a whole
which cannot be deduced from any individual part. So if an economic system Es = {N g(N)}
has an emergent property, there is some property e(Es) of the system as a whole which is not re-
ducible to any of its parts ni ∈N ∈Es, nor, we might go even further, to any relation nin j ∈ g(N).
The emergent properties of a system therefore are a mapping e(·) such that
e : Es→ E&
{
ni∨n j ∈ N
}∨{nin j ∈ g(N)} 6= arge(·) (3.10)
The addendum to this equation is critical, stating that an individual element or connection
cannot be taken as the argument of the emergent property. That is, an emergent property is not
defined for an individual part, nor a dyad within the system Es.
Examples of such emergent properties abound in macroeconomics. Indeed, one might make
the argument that macroeconomics is concerned with the interaction between emergent proper-
ties of economic systems. Most obvious, for it is so politically sensitive, is the emergent prop-
erty of the distribution of overall income to consumers m=
[
mci = ∑n jci∈Es mn jci
]
ci∈N
∈ e(Es),
the flows of mediums of exchange across g(N) ⊂ Es collected together. It is not reducible to
any one dyad within the system, but rather emerges from a large set of them within Es ⊃ g(N),
indeed, from all of them together. Another example is the macroeconomic aggregates, con-
sumption (the sum of all expenditures in market exchange by consumers), investment (the sum
of all expenditures in market exchange by firms), government expenditure (the sum of all ex-
penditures in market exchange by governments), transfers (the sum of all non-market exchanges
of mediums of exchange by governments) and taxes (the sum of all non-market exchanges of
2Though this is controversial, and, Lawson (2013) would claim that this constitutes an exercise in neoclassical
economics.
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mediums of exchange by consumers and firms). They emerge from the totality of all dyads
within Es ⊃ g(N) concerning relevant elements of the economic system, and become trivial if
we are to reduce them back to any one connection or node.
Another example, less obvious to economists, of such emergent properties that it is worth
mentioning are social institutions. Social institutions, even in the passionately anti-reductionist
work of Lawson (2015b) emerge from the totality of all socioeconomic networks, a social
institution being a rule “i is j in situation k with obligations o, rights r and empowerments ε”
(Searle, 2010; Lawson, 2015c). In a more general sense, they are a rule of behaviour, a habit
after a fashion, held in the mind (Hamilton, 1919; Commons, 1931; Hodgson, 1998, 2004,
2010; Dopfer and Potts, 2007; Dopfer, 2004). A social institution is differentiated from any
other rule held in individuals’ minds by being pervasive across a large swathe of the system
Es, and so in this case e(·) selects those rules which govern the formation of structure across
a sufficiently large swathe of the population to be social institutions emergent from economic
systems. A social institution cannot thus be verified extant except by observing the system on
a higher level than the individual dyad.
However, insofar as microeconomics seeks to study the determination of the structure and
function of g(N) ⊂ Es on a granular basis, it is a perfectly legitimate enterprise. Indeed, the
study of emergent phenomena is empty without it for emergent phenomena map from that
which microeconomics studies the determination of. One cannot understand the whole Es
without understanding the interaction g(N) of its parts N. But while in this sense microeco-
nomics is “prior” to macroeconomics (the system of organised parts must exist for phenomena
to emerge from it) we cannot, and must not, divorce the one from the other, for emergent phe-
nomena may, qua objects of reality e(Es), enter into the considerations of individual parts of
the economic system and thus effect its determination (Hahn, 2003). What is the history of
Marxism if not responses of individuals to emergent phenomena of income distributions and
socioeconomic class? What is the history of financial crises if not individuals responding to the
overall state of this financial market or that?
To enlist Arthur Koestler (1978), microeconomics is an enterprise in casting our gaze upon
one of the two faces of the Janus that is the whole system Es. The whole is a system of or-
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ganised parts Es = {N g(N)}, and it is a system of organised parts {N g(N)}. Microe-
conomics looks into how the organsisation of those parts (the determination of g(N)) comes
about. Macroeconomics is an enterprise in casting our gaze on the other face of Janus, that of
the phenomena e(Es) emergent from Es, taken as a whole. Or to use Slavoj Zizek’s philoso-
phy (Zizek, 2004): microeconomics is one viewpoint, the other being macroeconomics, in the
irreconcilable parallax view of the system as organisation of parts, then as integrated whole,
which is the economy. Microeconomics is in some sense prior to macroeconomics, but neither
can be totally divorced from the other.
3.3 The micro-meso-macro framework: a note on units of
analysis
The units of analysis in the microeconomics to be developed here are taken to be individual
people3. We take organisations ni ∈P to be an element of the economic system, but these too are
collections of individuals interacting with one another. The reason for taking individual people
to be the basic unit of analysis is very simple: socioeconomic systems are comprised of human
beings interacting with one another, therefore microeconomics ought take the individual and
their interactions in a certain context to be the unit of analysis. This work uses the individual as
a “pivot” point, or a “fulcrum” for analysis as it were - the individual is effected by the system,
and their behaviour, combined with others, serves to determine the system.
If we wanted to choose some different unit of analysis the position here is that we have
moved beyond strictly microeconomics to some other level of economic analysis. This is in
fact necessary in order that we be able to talk of economies beyond the level of the individual
pairwise connection in its specific context. But if we wish to move beyond individuals and
microeconomic analysis and ultimately to macroeconomics we require some means of class-
ing individuals together and considering them as groups which interact with other groups, for
beyond a certain number of “proper” (i.e. non-homogenous) individuals analysis becomes in-
tractable.
3Thanks are due here to the inimitable Professor Roberto Scazzieri, who brought the considerations of this
section into being.
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This means of classification is the concept of the “meso-rule” - a “bridge”, if we like,
between the analysis of individual dyads to the analysis of groups interacting within the system
as a whole. Dopfer et al. (2004), and later, Dopfer and Potts (2007) use this concept to build
a triadic framework of “micro-meso-macro” to facilitate discussion of both the granularities
and the systematic emergents of economic systems throughout their evolution4. This work is
focused upon the microeconomic, but whosoever wishes to place it in relation to, or develop
links with, macroeconomics would benefit from the understanding that the author would see
this best pursued in the context of the micro-meso-macro triad.
In the micro-meso-macro framework economies an individuated, granular network coa-
lesces as we broaden our view to “view” more of the system “at once” into groups of indi-
viduals and organisations classed according to the “meso-rule” they follow. A meso-rule is a
rule of behaviour with a sufficiently common structure/outcome across a broad swathe of the
population to allow us to group elements of the system together into “meso-populations”. It is,
after a fashion, a social institution. Each meso-population contains individuals and organisa-
tions applying the same core meso-rule, but with a sovereignty which allows them to develop
their own particular “variation” on the “theme” that is the meso-rule. The macroeconomy then
can be seen as populated by meso-populations interacting together on a macroscopic level - a
“network of rules”, as Dopfer and Potts (2007) call it. The Sraffa (1960) system of interrelated
industries (or, perhaps better, the Leontief system of which it is a special case) is an example
of how one constructs such a macroeconomics of relations between meso-populations (which
are emergent entities). All input-output formalisms which take industries as the unit of analy-
sis (Pasinetti (1977) gives a textbook introduction) are examples of macroeconomies in which
the meso-populations - industries - are classified by production meso-rules for similar outputs.
Post-Keynesian models in the style of Keen (1995, 2011); Godley and Lavoie (2001-2002,
2007), especially more recent types in which there is a heterogeneity of meso-populations on
the demand-side, classify meso-populations by their meso-rules in expenditure behaviour.
We focus on understanding the structure and function of economic structures Es = {N g(N)}
4Professor Dopfer himself once commented to the present author how he arrived at the idea of the “meso”
when he explained to Professor Potts the need for a “crowbar” with which to split like a stone (or rather, delineate)
microeconomics from macroeconomics in a definite manner, so they could be refashioned and set in better relation
to one another.
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taking individuals as the primary unit of analysis. But using the classification tool of the meso-
rule to identify meso-populations, and the micro-meso-macro concept, we may use the present
analysis as a basis for understanding the economy at “higher” levels with “higher” level units
of analysis.
3.4 Moving from Taxonomy to Anima
With this discussion concluded now we have considered at some length what we might call the
“taxonomy” of economic systems: the elements extant within an economic system, and what
relations may form between them. And we have a formal definition of the social system within
which the elements of the economic system exist also, allowing us to account for the fact that
the study of the economy cannot rightly be divorced from the study of society. This taxonomy
is summarised in table 3.1.
Concept Specifics Mathematical object Equation number
Economy Es = {N g(N)} 3.1
Elements N = {C P}
Relations
[
nin j ∈ g(N)
]
=
[
xnin j mnin j
]
Society Is = {N gv (N)} 3.4
Elements N = {C P}
Relations
[
nin j ∈ g(N)
]
= vnin j
Organisation ni = {Nni gni (Nni)} 3.6
Elements Nni = {Wni Xni Mni}
Relations [ηkηk′ ∈ gni (Nni)] =
[
xηkηk′ mηkηk′ vηkηk′
]
Table 3.1: Taxonomy of socioeconomic systems
Our task now is to take this taxonomy, and give it anima, animation, elucidate the factors
by which the structure and function of socioeconomic systems is determined. This anima is
provided by elaborating the behaviour of the elements of socioeconomic systems, how they
respond to their locality within the system and how they act within those systems and thus
determine their structure and function.
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Part II
The Psychology of Economic Behaviour:
Anima
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Chapter 4
The Psychology of Economic Behaviour
4.1 Individual behaviour, the fulcrum
The structure and function of economic systems Es = {N g(N)} are ultimately determined
by the totality of actions of individuals within them. Whether or not we attribute those actions
to purely individual considerations or social determinism, or some mix in between, the fact
remains that economic systems consist of interactions between individuals. It is important to
note that we shall not be taking a “reductionist” methodological individualist approach (Hodg-
son, 2007), nor one which builds from the view of an individual as an “isolated atom” of the
economic system (Lawson, 2013). The system - the structure of interaction - is as primitive
to the formalism as is the individual within it. The individual plays the role of a fulcrum, or a
pivot, around which we can construct a formalism for understanding the economic system by
understanding how the individual reacts to the system based on their psychology, and how their
behaviour then effects the determination of the system.
In order to understand how the individual interacts with the economic system Es, we will
make use of an “architecture of mind” model of mathematical psychology fully developed else-
where (Markey-Towler, 2015). A brief, self-contained exposition of this model of psychology
and behaviour will precede our application of it to the behaviour of an individual within Es as
consumer ci and worker ωi by elaborating the contents of some terms within it. We obtain thus
a theory of the determination of economic behaviour; who the individual i forms economic
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Figure 4.1: The individual as pivot point: The individual n1 constructs their own network (in
bold arrows) based on the information in their neighbourhood within the system (dotted arrows
terminating at or originating at n1). The mediating process between system effects on n1 and
the effects of n1 on the system is their psychology. The psychology of economic behaviour.
relations with, and what form those connections take.
These considerations shall be quite dry and technical. All but technicalities will be deferred
to latter chapters. It is neater to complete the development and application to economics of our
model of the psychology of behaviour wholesale before turning to finer points of interpretation
and analytical insight.
4.2 The psychology of behaviour
The processes of the individual i’s mind, like those of the brain, can be represented in the
context of using a mathematical graph, or more colloquially, a network1
µi = {Hi gH (Hi)} (4.1)
where Hi is the set of all conceptual representations of the objects of reality, and gH (Hi)
represents the individual i’s understanding of how those objects relate to one another. The
objects h ∈ Hi are the symbolic equivalents of nouns, adjectives, subjects, objects. The con-
nections Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi) express the individuals’ symbolic equivalents of verbs, and adverbs,
conjunctions. gH (Hi) expresses the weltanschauung of the individual i, the way they “infer the
unseen relations” between the objects of reality (Dewey, 1910). This object is the architecture
1This is defended at greater length in the as-yet unpublished Markey-Towler (2015).
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Figure 4.2: Perception, ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
of the objects of reality H ′i within the environment vNi(g)
in which the processes of the mind operate. That process is one of perception-analysis-decision.
The individual i perceives their neighbourhood in the system, forms an understanding of that
environment, and if necessary selects an action which manifests in their behaviour. The fol-
lowing exposition of this process is self-contained, but a “fuller”, more thorough treatment is
intended to be forthcoming in the pure psychology volume of which this work is effectively an
extension.
4.2.1 Decision processes: perception-analysis-decision
The information contained in the particular environment of the individual i is that information
vNi(g)⊂VNi(g)⊂V contained within the potential information VNi(g) contained within the neigh-
bourhood Ni (g) of individual i in the world system of potential information V , of which a par-
ticular iteration (a particular iteration of the world) is represented by v⊂V . The particular envi-
ronment vNi(g) is the information which an individual perceives, perception ρi : VNi(g)→Hi∪Ri
being a mapping from that information into symbolic representations, encoded in the brain and
extant in the mind, of the objects of reality Hi and any apparent relations between them Ri, with
the restriction that any apparent relations being perceived presupposes the objects they relate
being perceived2. Perception of a particular environment vNi(g) generates the percepts H
′
i ⊂ Hi
of the objects of reality and {Rhh′} ⊂ Ri of any apparent relations between them
2That is to say, Rhh′ ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
=⇒ h,h′ ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
.
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Figure 4.3: Analysis of the objects of reality H ′i based on gH (Hi), generating knowledge
gH (H ′i )
ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
=
{
H ′i {Rhh′}
}
(4.2)
This information means very little by way of understanding until the objects of reality may
be related together, “made sense of” by “connecting the dots”. The process of analysis is the
process by which the world-view of the individual gH (Hi), variously the system of personal
constructs (Kelly, 1963), the mental “map” of reality Hayek (1952), the “image” (Boulding,
1961), is applied to percepts of the objects of reality to form an understanding gH (H ′i ) of their
relation, an understanding of the particular environment vNi(g)
gH
(
H ′i
)⊂ gH (Hi) (4.3)
This is a formal representation of analysis as conceived of in many psychological systems
but for the obscuring of nomenclature. In Hume (1777) and Kant (1781) we find the prin-
ciple of thought, analysis, as “connexion”. In Dewey (1910) of “inferring unseen relations”.
In psychoanalysis of “association” (Makari, 2008). In cognitive psychology (Simon, 1956,
1969, 1976, 1978b,a; Newell et al., 1958, 1962) the iteration of various steps in decision algo-
rithms. In Kelly (1963) and Hinkle (1965) “the application of personal constructs” to “channel”
thoughts3. In Hayek (1952) the “classification” of stimuli from whence a “model” of a situ-
3Earl (1983, 1986a,b, 1992, 2010) has made a life’s work out of showing, albeit informally and non-
systematically and largely on the basis of case studies, how this might be applied to understanding economic
behaviour.
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Figure 4.4: Identifying the implications of three actions a1i ,a
2
i ,a
3
i ⊂ A′i ⊂ {H ′i gH (H ′i )}
ation emerges from a “map” of reality. In Boulding (1961) the “filtering” of stimuli through
the “image” of reality. In neuroscience (Kandel et al., 2013; Bennett et al., 2007; Bennett and
Hacker, 2003; Camerer et al., 2005) the “excitation” of “associative memory networks”.
If, further the individual must make a decision about how to act, they make this decision on
the basis of their analysis, their understanding of the environment vNi(g), gH (H
′
i ), itself based
on perception H ′i ⊂ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
of the objects of reality contained therein. They may choose
between the actions ai ⊂ A′i which they are aware of, extant in the situation vNi(g), and which
manifest in behaviour vaNi(g) ⊂ vNi(g) out of the set of all possible actions Ai ⊂ {Hi gH (Hi)}
contained within their mind at the intersect of it with their percepts of potential behaviour
A′i = ρi
(
vaNi(g) ⊂ vNi(g)
)
∩{H ′i gH (H ′i)}⊂ Ai (4.4)
where ρi
(
vaNi(g) ⊂ vNi(g)
)
= ρi
(
vaNi(g)
)
∩ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
. That behaviour va
∗
i
Ni(g)
which is realised
corresponds to the act a∗i = ρi
(
va
∗
i
Ni(g)
)
∩A′i.
In order that the act a∗i may be decided upon, the individual i identifies the implications
gai ⊂ gH (H ′i ) which follow from a particular course of action ai ⊂ A′i
gai =
{
Rhh′ ∈ gH
(
H ′i
)
: hh′ ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH
(
H ′i
)
&h0 ∈ ai
}
(4.5)
The implications gai of selecting ai thus written are the connections Rhh′ contained within
an analysis gH (H ′i ) of a particular environment, specifically, those which lie within chains
47
Figure 4.5: Decision about behaviour: selecting a1i as having the most preferable implications
amongst the feasible alternatives
{hkhk+1}Kk=0 contained within gH (H ′i ) extending “outward” from elements h0 within the action
ai. They are, quite literally, chains of implications. A formal expression of that which Kelly
(1963) and even more so Hinkle (1965) spoke. These implications may reflect either or both
of two kinds of thinking: “rational” thought, in the sense of constructing ratio decidendi, or
alternatively they may be thought of as the iterations of decision rules contained in long form
within gH (Hi) as pertain to ai (see appendix B). The thoughts themselves may exist in the
conscious mind or the subconscious. In any case, the experience of having those thoughts,
the consciousness of their existence, endows meaning to the syntax {gai}ai∈2A′i in which they
are constructed, and aesthetical content which allows us to determine a preference structure 
◦2gH(Hi) between different subsets of the understanding gH (H ′i ). In the usual fashion, gai  ga′i
ought be read “the implications gai are at least as preferable as ga′i”, and gai ∼ ga′i represents
indifference, gai  ga′i and ga′i  gai . The individual must also be aware in their understanding
gH (H ′i ) of a set B of feasible actions ai ⊂ A′i, actions which satisfy a number of constraints
specified in B ⊂ 2A′i on the actions A′i. This in hand, we can posit the theory of choice by
individual i as selecting the action which is feasible and associated with the most preferable
implications out of all feasible actions
a∗i =
{
ai ∈ B : gai  ga′i ∀a
′
i ∈ B
}
(4.6)
This is of course very similar to neoclassical economics, being constrained optimisation.
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But it is in fact quite different while containing that theory as a special case. It can explain in
one model many phenomena the neoclassical can only in several different models for several
phenomena. A fuller discussion is intended in Markey-Towler (2015). But notice in particular
in the definition of a∗i that the individual is not isolated in any sense from the system. It is a de-
cision made on the basis of comparison of implications gai (which may exist at a subconscious
level) which are constructed from the understanding gH (H ′i ) individual i has of the relation
of the objects of reality H ′i ⊂ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
contained within their perception of their environment
vNi(g) within the world v. Far from being an isolated atom upon which the theory of the determi-
nation of the system is built, the system in which the individual exists is primitive to the model
for the determination of their choices a∗i , the definition is moot without the input vNi(g) ⊂ v
of the system. As Margaret Archer (2003) puts it nicely, the system neither determines nor
is irrelevant for the determination of individual behaviour, the individual is the intermediary
between systemic (particularly social) influences and systemic (particularly social) structures.
4.2.2 Dynamics of gH (Hi)
It is important to recognise that the individual i’s understanding of the world gH (Hi) evolves
over time. This is slightly problematic, because the factors governing the evolution gH (Hi)
are points at which mathematics has a limited usefulness because of the inputs of the phe-
nomenological “I”, the consciousness within that entity which is “me”. The operations of the
phenomenological “I” may contravene the principle of sufficient reason in that the “I” might
cause some mental state to be the case simply because the “I” has caused it to be so.4
The sources of new relations Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi), the incorporation of which constitutes the
additions to gH (Hi), are of two kinds
1. Genuinely creative thought5: A bisociation, a thought Rhh′ is brought into existence for
no other reason than that the phenomenological “I” has, in an act which contravenes the
principle of sufficient reason (Koestler, 1964; Bergson, 1946; Shackle, 1972).
4These and issues arising from them are considered at some length in Markey-Towler (2017).
5Those who would deny the existence of “free will” deny the existence of this source and attribute all dynam-
ics to suggestion by perception of apparent relations, and would deny the indeterminacy of acceptance/rejection
thereof.
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2. Suggestion by perception of apparent relations: A relation Rhh′ is contained within the set
{Rhh′} ⊂ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
of apparent relations within perception of a particular environment
vNi(g). The environment may contain information generated by an individual engaged in
“deliberative” creative thought a la Newell et al. (1958, 1962); Simon (1998)
The first source of indeterminacy in the evolution of gH (Hi) is born of the possibility of gen-
uinely creative thought. The second source is born of the indeterminacy of the acceptance or
rejection, the incorporation or not into understanding gH (Hi) of any new relation Rhh′ presented
to individual i. If this is a matter for determination by the conscious i then there is a likelihood
pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi)) ∈ [0,1] of the relation Rhh′ being incorporated by individual i into their un-
derstanding of the world, gH (Hi) (definition 10), ranging between certainty of rejection and
certainty of acceptance6. We cannot determine the structure of an individual i’s understanding
gH (Hi) until it has actually been determined. But while we can only know the future dynamics
of gH (Hi) up to this indeterminacy (an indeterminacy not dissimilar to psychology as the un-
certainty principle to physics (Kent, 2012; Popper, 1934, Ch.9)), we can still understand certain
factors which influence the incorporation or not of any link Rhh′ into gH (Hi).
The laws of the dynamics of µi adopted here are:
1. The law of suggestion: If a relation Rhh′ is perceived within the set of apparent rela-
tions {Rhh′} ⊂ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
in a particular environment vNi(g) then it is more likely to be
incorporated into gH (Hi).
2. The law of resistance at the core: If a relation Rhh′ would exist and therefore modify
gH (Hi) at a highly “central” location it is less likely to be incorporated into gH (Hi).
3. The law of resistance to dissonance: The more a relation Rhh′ is dissonant with (implies
the opposite of) relations elicited in understanding of a particular environment gH (H ′i ),
6Solely to aid our proof in Appendix D of the Made to Stick Theorem in Appendix C, we will give a formal
definition of this likelihood here:
Definition 1 (The likelihood of incorporating Rhh′ ). The likelihood pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi)) of a particular relation
Rhh′ between the objects of reality being incorporated into individual i’s understanding of the objects of reality
gH (Hi) is a particular iteration of an individual-specific mapping pi : Ri → [0,1] from the space of relations
Ri to the likelihood of incorporation, where pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi)) = 1 represents certainty of incorporation and
pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi)) = 0 represents certainty of non-incorporation. If the relation is already part of gH (Hi) it is
certain it will be included within gH (Hi), that is, Rhh ∈ gH (Hi) =⇒ pi (Rhh ∈ gH (Hi)) = 1.
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the less likely it is to be incorporated into gH (Hi).
4. The law of entropy, or memory decay: The strength si (Rhh′) of any relation Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi)
decays over time to the point where a strength of zero means it is no longer incorporated
in gH (Hi), si (Rhh′) = 0 =⇒ Rhh′ /∈ gH (Hi). The strength of a relation only increases if
energy is expended in eliciting it, Rhh′ ∈ gH (H ′i ) in a particular environment. The rate
at which the strength of that relation decays is decreasing in the number of times that
connection has been elicited by an environment Rhh′ ∈ gH (H ′i ).
The psychology of behaviour is therefore not static, it evolves over time, though it evolves at
the margin and there is a degree of stability due to an individual’s resistance to change (Calvin,
1997).
4.3 The behaviour of the economic individual
To place the formalism of psychology and behaviour outlined above in the context of the eco-
nomic system we need to elaborate upon four objects:
1. The place within the world system v⊂V of the economic system Es = {N g(N)} and
the strictly social system Is = {N gv (N)}.
2. The economic individual i, to whose psychology and behaviour the model culminating
in equation 4.6 will apply.
3. The neighbourhood Ni (g) of individual i and the information vNi(g) ⊂ VNi(g) contained
within the environment of individual i.
4. The set of available actions A′i ⊂ {H ′i gH (H ′i )} in a particular situation and the con-
straints B⊂ 2A′i upon those actions.
We shall set down the simplifying definition going forward that at least with respect to the
actions of individual i, the representations of these actions ai is equivalent to the information
vaNi(g) ⊂ vNi(g) in which that behaviour manifests:
Ai =V aNi(g) (4.7)
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We can immediately address the first point by separating the economic Es ⊂ v and social
Is⊂ v systems out from the non-socioeconomic physical environment both internal and external
(Simon, 1956) ve = v\{Es∪ Is} ⊂V in a particular iteration of the world v⊂V . So
v = {Es Is ve} ⊂V
The second point is addressed by recognising the two contexts in which individual i exists
within Es, as a consumer ci ∈ N, and as a worker within an organisation ωi ∈ Nni ∈ ni ∈ N
(or, more generally, organisations {ni} ⊂ N). So i = ci ∨
{
ωi ∈ n j
}
, and the psychology of
behaviour thus applies to the behaviour of the individual as a node in Es or within n j ∈ P.
To arrive at the theory determining (up to the the indeterminacy born of the influence of the
phenomenological “I”) the behaviour of the individual consumer ci ∈ Es and the individual
worker ωi ∈ ni ∈ Es within, and responding to, the economic system Es we need now address
the remaining points - the neighbourhood and actions available to i = ci∨
{
ωi ∈ n j
}
.
4.3.1 The consumer
First, let us consider the psychology and behaviour of i as a consumer, when i = ci.
The neighbourhood of ci and the information contained therein
The neighbourhood Ni=ci (g) of the individual i as consumer ci in the world system v is con-
sisted of three parts. The first, economic portion of their neighbourhood is their network in-
neighbourhood and out-neighbourhood in the economic system Es = {N g(N)}, which, to
abuse notation is
Ninci (g) =
{
n j ∈ N : n jci ∈ g(N)
}
(4.8)
Noutci (g) =
{
n j ∈ N : cin j ∈ g(N)
}
(4.9)
where n j =
{
ηi ∈ Nn j
}
if n j is an organisation, n j ∈ N \C, reflecting the individual parts
within the organisation with which c j is interacting. The second part of their neighbourhood is
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their network in-neighbourhood in the social system Is = {N gv (N)}
Ninci (gv) =
{
n j ∈ N : n jci ∈ gv (N)
}
(4.10)
Noutci (gv) =
{
n j ∈ N : cin j ∈ gv (N)
}
(4.11)
where again n j =
{
ηi ∈ Nn j
}
if n j is an organisation, n j ∈ N \C, reflecting the individual
parts within the organisation with which c j is interacting. The final part of the neighbourhood
of consumer ci is their neighbourhood Nci (v
e) within the non-socioeconomic physical environ-
ment ve, which needs no further definition here. Hence
Ni=ci (g) =
{{
Ndci (g) N
d
ci (gv)
}
d∈{in,out}
Nci (v
e)
}
(4.12)
We can now define the information vNi(g) contained within the consumer ci’s environment
by attaching it to one of these neighbourhoods. The economic network g(N) is characterised
by exchanges and transfers of goods and services x and mediums of exchange m, an individual
transfer of which from ni to n j is summarised by the vector
[
xnin j mnin j
]
. Hence we can
summarise the exchanges and transfers to and from i = ci accordingly
[
xn jci mn jci
]
n j∈Ninci (g)
(4.13)
[
xcin j mcin j
]
n j∈Noutci (g)
(4.14)
where the vectors
[
xn jci mn jci
]
and
[
xcin j mcin j
]
are extended if n j is an organisation
n j ∈ N \C to
[
xn jci mn jci
]
=
[
xη jci mη jci
]
η j∈n j and
[
xcin j mcin j
]
=
[
xciη j mciη j
]
η j∈n j ,
reflecting the interaction by ci with individual parts n j ∈ n j within the organisation. The social
network g(N) is characterised by flows of information v between ni and n j which are repre-
sented by the vector vnin j . Hence we can summarise the information flows to and from i = ci
as [
vn jci
]
n j∈Ninci (gv)
(4.15)
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[
vcin j
]
n j∈Noutci (gv)
(4.16)
where the vectors vcin j and vn jci are extended to vcin j =
[
vciη j
]
η j∈n j and vn jci =
[
vη jci
]
η j∈n j
if n j is an organisation n j ∈ N \C, reflecting the interaction by ci with individual parts within
the organisation. Finally there is the information contained within the individual i = ci’s non-
socioeconomic environment vNci(ve). Hence we can summarise the information within i = ci’s
environment as
vNi=ci(g) =
{[
xcin j ,xn jci,mcin j ,mn jci,vcin j ,vn jci
]
n j∈
{
Ndci(g) N
d
ci
(gv)
}
d∈{in,out}
vNci(ve)
}
(4.17)
This is obviously a little taxing given the proliferation of subscripts. But let us step back
from the apparent complexity of equation 4.17 to observe the simplicity it actually represents.
It forces us to recognise that there is intricacy in an economic system, of course there is, it
is the intricacy that we want to understand. But it shows us is there is actually a structure
underlying this intricate complexity. The economic individual’s environment vNi=ci(g) - the
means by which the world system influences them - when elaborated, is made up of three
factors. The flows of goods and services and mediums of exchange between individuals in
the economic system
[
xcin j ,xn jci,mcin j ,mn jci
] ⊂ g(N) ⊂ Es, the flows of information between
individuals in society,
[
vcin j ,vn jci
]⊂ gv (N)⊂ Is, and the information contained in the individual
i= ci’s non-socioeconomic internal and external environment vNci(ve) (information contained in
the physical environment).
These three classes of factors all thus play into decision making by their constituting the
basis for perception
vNi=ci(g) = arg
{
H ′i {Rhh′}
}
= argρi=ci
(
vNi=ci(g)
)
(4.18)
which in turn forms the basis for the individual i = ci’s understanding of their environment
gH (H ′i ) and in turn, if it needs be made, their decision over what course of action to take in the
socioeconomic systems Is and Es.
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Figure 4.6: Perception (economic individual): The neighbourhood of i = ci presents informa-
tion into i’s environment in Es ⊃ g(N) and Is ⊃ gv (N) which is the basis for i’s perception
ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
of their environment.
Figure 4.7: Analysis (economic individual): The economic individual i = ci forms an un-
derstanding gH (H ′i ) on the basis of their percepts of their environment in in Es ⊃ g(N) and
Is ⊃ gv (N).
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The set of available actions A′i=ci available to ci
Consumer behaviour is a multifaceted thing, more than simply buying and selling goods and
services as economists have tended to misconstrue in the search for simplicity (Deaton and
Muellbauer, 1980). It also consists of the actual act of consumption of goods and services,
which is differentiated from the act of buying and selling them though the two are often con-
flated especially in macroeconomics (Lancaster, 1966b; Ironmonger, 1972; Stigler and Becker,
1977; Michael and Becker, 1973; Earl, 1983, 1986b). And it also consists of communicative
acts, requesting information and thereby engaging in search, expressing opinions, and negoti-
ating (Hirschman, 1970; Earl and Potts, 2004). Consider each of them in turn.
Most immediately important for the determination of Es are the acts of buying, selling and
transferring goods and services x and mediums of exchange m between ci and other elements
n j ∈ N ⊂ Es within the economic system. Within any individual course of action ai=ci these
may be summarised by a vector of exchanges and transfers between i = ci and elements of the
economic system n j ∈ N′ in the set of elements
N′ ⊂ H ′i ⊂ ρi=ci
(
vNi=ci(g)
)
(4.19)
of which the individual is aware. So we have
[
xcin j ,xn jci,mcin j ,mn jci
]
n j∈N′ ⊂ ai=ci ∩A
xm
i (4.20)
where the vectors
[
xn jci mn jci
]
and
[
xcin j mcin j
]
are extended to
[
xn jci mn jci
]
=
[
xη jci mη jci
]
η j∈n j
and
[
xcin j mcin j
]
=
[
xciη j mciη j
]
η j∈n j where n j is an organisation n j ∈ N \C, reflecting the
interaction by ci with individual parts within the organisation. The set of actions Axmi of pos-
sible goods and services and medium of exchange transfers and exchanges is the collection of
such vectors within the potential courses of action A′i=ci available in a particular situation
[
Xcin j ,Xn jci,Mcin j ,Mn jci
]
n j∈N′ ⊂ A
xm
i ⊂ A′i=ci (4.21)
That we have written here a subset is for a very specific reason, for while the act of transfer
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may simply be an object of reality, the act of market exchange has a connective property. There
really ought exist in Axmi a set of relations Rhh′ where h ∈ ai∩Axmi and h′ ∈ ai∩Axmi such that
pcin j ∨ pn jci ∈ Rhh′ , reflecting that the act of exchange mcin j = pn jcixn jci ∨mn jci = pcin jxcin j is
a connective one, “exchanging this (mcin j ∨mn jci) for that (xn jci ∨ xcin j) at rate pn jci ∨ pcin j”.
Otherwise the choice of mcin j ∨mn jci and xn jci ∨ xcin j is a purely coincidental one. This is what
we might call the “connective property of prices”, which exists in addition to their property of
being a standalone object of reality.
Similarly important for the determination of Is are the individual i = ci’s acts of transfer-
ring information v - communication and the like - to other elements n j ∈ N ⊂ Is within society.
Within any individual course of action ai=ci these may be summarised by a vector of informa-
tion flows between i = ci and elements of the economic system n j ∈ N′ in the set of elements
N′ ⊂ H ′i ⊂ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
of which the individual is aware
[
vcin j
]
n j∈N′ ⊂ ai=ci ∩A
v
i
where the vector vcin j is extended to vcin j =
[
vciη j
]
η j∈n j where n j is an organisation n j ∈
N \C, reflecting the interaction by ci with individual parts within the organisation. The set of
actions Avi of possible goods and services and medium of exchange transfers and exchanges is
the collection of such vectors within the potential courses of action A′i=ci available in a particular
situation
[
Vcin j
]
n j∈N′ = A
v
i ⊂ A′i=ci (4.22)
These actions are often more of interest to sociology than economics in the strictest sense,
but they are important for what economists call “search”. We might physically position our-
selves in the physical environment Nci (v
e), and thus come across information in vNci(ve) (Si-
mon, 1956) or we might request information from others in communication vcin j in the hope
that they will choose to communicate to us the information we desire. These actions Avi ⊂ A′i=ci
also are the means by which the “market for preferences” (Earl and Potts, 2004) is brought into
existence by the communication of information about goods and services throughout social
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networks. And they are the content of the interactions by which consumers use their “voice” as
Hirschman (1970) puts it, to negotiate and communicate with production organisations.
Now finally, while not so important immediately for the determination of Es and Is (though
critical at a remove) the individual i = ci acts as a consumer to consume, to consume the goods
and services obtained from production organisations. This act, as mentioned above, is distinct
from the simple act of purchase or receipt. We will posit, in line with Sen (1999) that there
exists a set Φi ⊂ gH (Hi) of “functioning” which connect, relate, the goods and services re-
ceived by i = ci, to certain higher level goods and services they may produce using them, and
goods and services that will be consumed. Lancaster (1966b); Ironmonger (1972); Michael and
Becker (1973) speak of this as a “production technology” which the consumer applies to obtain
satiation of needs and desires in “household production”7.
Within any course of action ai=ci the individual i= ci chooses to take a set of goods and ser-
vices
[[
xn jci
]
n j∈N′ , [xXici]Xi∈H ′i
]
from the stocks Xi ∈H ′i ⊂ ρi=ci
(
vNi=ci(g)
)
of goods and services
which the individual i = ci perceives themselves as having access to8 in addition to the goods
and services
[
xn jci
]
n j∈N′ they are choosing to exchange and transfer. They also choose/apply
a functioning ϕi ∈ Φi ∩ gH (H ′i ), which is a program, an algorithm, a “recipe” if one will, of
which the individual i = ci is aware
[
xci , [xciXi]Xi∈H ′i
]
= ϕi
([
xn jci
]
n j∈N′ , [xXici]Xi∈H ′i
)
(4.23)
which transforms the inputs
[[
xn jci
]
n j∈N′ , [xXici]Xi∈H ′i
]
of goods and services transferred
and exchanged, into goods and services [xciXi]Xi∈H ′i returned to the stocks of goods and services
which the individual i = ci perceives themselves as having access to9, as well as, the all im-
portant endpoint of consumption activity, the act of consumption itself, of goods xci . An act of
household production is thus a connective act, it transforms one set of objects of reality into
7Stigler and Becker (1977) in a famous paper also speak of household production though by way of modifying
the standard economic model of choice in order to support its accounting for preference changes without having
preferences actually changing, only the means of satiating them.
8This is similar, but not equivalent to, the narrower sense of Xi being the goods and services which i = ci has
property rights to.
9Note that we obtain a definition here of non-perishable goods, which are goods which can be operated on
by a functioning ϕi and be preserved in the outputs of that functioning. That is, a non-perishable good is a good
xXici : xXici ∈ ϕ (·) &argϕ (·).
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another in a definite manner. Note how “technology” thus concieved as a connector expands
the range of human capability, as it makes available goods and services (the left hand side
4.23) which i = ci would otherwise not have access to (Lawson, 2010). The reason for speci-
fying this connector is purely psychological: though we might be able to, like the economist,
recover an algebraic expression of a production function (a la Cobb and Douglas (1928)) the
individual must actually be aware of the steps, the program, algorithm, “recipe” of the process
in household production (Scazzieri, 1993).
Summarising this, decisions about household production existing within acts ai=ci are a
tuple
{[[
xn jci
]
n j∈N′ , [xXici]Xi∈H ′i
]
,ϕi, [xciXi]Xi∈H ′i ,x
c
i
}
= ai∩APi (4.24)
consisted of the goods and services
[[
xn jci
]
n j∈N′ , [xXici]Xi∈H ′i
]
to which a process ϕi will
be applied for transforming those goods and services into outputs. Those outputs consisted
of goods and services [xciXi]Xi∈H ′i to be returned to the stocks of goods and services which the
individual perceives available to them, and the goods and services consumed xci .
{[[
Xn jci
]
n j∈N′ , [XXici]Xi∈H ′i
]
,Φi∩gH
(
H ′i
)
, [XciXi]Xi∈H ′i ,X
c
i
}
= APi ⊂ A′i=ci (4.25)
This of course looks rather horrendously complex, and thankfully this is more of interest at
one remove to the determination of Es and Is. But it is in fact not so complex. The intricacy of
the expressions for potential courses of action in household production reflect the intricacy of
the act itself, but there is demonstrated a simplicity revealed reading left to right “along” the act
of household production. There are two sources of the inputs of household production, goods
and services
[
xn jci
]
n j∈N′ ∈
[
Xn jci
]
n j∈N′ immediately utilised after their exchange or transfer
alongside those [xXici]Xi∈H ′i ∈ [XXici]Xi∈H ′i drawn from the stocks the individual is aware of having
access to. The individual uses these inputs by applying a process ϕi ∈ Φi∩ gH (H ′i ) of which
of they are aware in their understanding of their environment gH (H ′i ) for transforming those
inputs into outputs [xciXi]Xi∈H ′i ∈ [XciXi]Xi∈H ′i to be returned to the stocks of goods and services
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Figure 4.8: Identifying actions (economic individual): The economic individual i= ci identifies
the actions available to them amongst percepts of and connections between the objects of reality
{H ′i g(H ′i )}.
the individual is aware of having access to, and the goods and services consumed xci ∈ Xci by
the individual i = ci.
The courses of action available to the individual i as the consumer ci are therefore the
collection of available acts of exchange and transfer of goods and services, Axmi (defined by
equation 4.21), communication, Avi (defined by equation 4.22), and household production A
P
i
(defined by equation 4.25)
A′i=ci =
{
Axmi A
v
i A
P
i
}
(4.26)
and any particular act ai=ci ⊂ A′i=ci consists of a particular course of action of the consumer
i = ci consists of a subset of this space
ai=ci ⊃

[
xcin j ,xn jci,mcin j ,mn jci
]
n j∈N′ ∈ A
xm
i[
vcin j
]
n j∈N′ ∈ A
v
i{[[
xn jci
]
n j∈N′ , [xXici]Xi∈H ′i
]
,ϕi, [xciXi]Xi∈H ′i ,x
c
i
}
∈ APi
 (4.27)
Of course, this is general, moving forward we might suppress one or the other of the facets
of consumer behaviour to focus on the determinants of Es (the first line of equation 4.27),
the determinants of Is (the second line equation 4.27), or household behaviour (the third line
equation 4.27).
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Figure 4.9: Identifying implications (economic individual): The individual i = ci identifies
the implications attendant upon various courses of action on the basis of their understanding
gH (H ′i ) of their environment.
The decision of the consumer ci and the feasible set B⊂ 2A
′
i=ci : what connections to form,
with who, and household production
With the definitions of neighbourhoods (equation 4.12), environment (equation 4.17) and alter-
native courses of action (equation 4.27) in hand we are now in a position to “fold” them into
a theory of consumer behaviour. The decision of individual i as consumer ci is like any other
decision, and determined as the solution (if there is a solution) to equation 4.6 when i = ci
a∗i=ci =
{
ai=ci ∈ B : gai=ci  ga′i=ci ∀a
′
i=ci ∈ B
}
(4.28)
where gai=ci ⊂ gH (H ′i ) are the implications of selecting an action ai=ci (defined by equa-
tion 4.27) construed within the understanding gH (H ′i ) of the environment vNi=ci(g) perceived
as {Hi {Rhh′}} = ρi=ci
(
vNi=ci(g)
)
(defined according to equation 4.2). The individual i as
consumer ci selects that course of action defined by equation 4.27, ai=ci = a
∗
i=ci which is asso-
ciated with the most preferable set of implications out of all feasible courses of action in the
environment. This is a form of constrained optimisation of course, though its foundation in
psychology and neuroscience drastically expands what it can explain within its confines com-
pared to the standard model (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980; Mas-Collel et al., 1995; Rubinstein,
2006; Jehle and Reny, 2011) which must proceed one modification at a time and return to the
standard before turning to next. This is elaborated upon at length in Markey-Towler (2015).
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Figure 4.10: Decision (economic individual): Individual i = ci makes a decision about the
course of action associated with the most preferable implications in the feasible set.
All that remains is to elaborate the contents of B and relate the action a∗i=ci to the con-
struction of ci’s network. The constraints summarised in the set B ⊂ 2A
′
i=ci connect in the
understanding gH (H ′i ) the percept of prices collected together
{
pcin j pn jci
}
n j∈N′ , and the set
of available actions A′i=ci ∩H ′i available to i = ci taken together
B =

[
xcin j ,xn jci,mcin j ,mn jci
]
n j∈N′
[xXici]Xi∈H ′i
:
∑n j∈N′mcin j ≤Mi+∑n j∈N′mn jci
& ∑Xi∈H ′i xXici +∑n j∈N′ xcin j ≤ Xi
 (4.29)
or, equivalently, we may express this to account for market exchanges mcin j = pn jcixn jci
and mn jci = pcin jxcin j (non-market transfers existing where pn jci = 0 or pcin j = 0) consisted of
elements within
[
xcin j ,xn jci,mcin j ,mn jci
]
n j∈N′
B =

[
xcin j ,xn jci,mcin j ,mn jci
]
n j∈N′
[xXici]Xi∈H ′i
:
∑n j∈N′
(
mcin j − pn jcixn jci
)
+ pn jcixn jci ≤
Mi+∑n j∈N′
(
mn jci− pcin jxcin j
)
+ pcin jxcin j
& ∑Xi∈H ′i xXici +∑n j∈N′ xcin j ≤ Xi
 (4.30)
These sets simply serve to constrain economic behaviour by dictating only those courses of
action are feasible in which nothing is transferred or exchanged which is not available to i = ci
for that purpose. Xi, again, are the stocks Xi ∈ H ′i ⊂ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
of goods and services which the
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individual i = ci perceives themselves as having access to in any given time period t. At time
period t we have
Xi (t) = d (Xi (t−1))+ xciXi (t−1)− xXici (t−1)− xci (4.31)
where d (·) is a manifestation of the entropy law (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971; Raine et al., 2006)
such that d (Xi (t−1)) ≤ Xi (t−1) which may be interpreted as a depreciation rate, a physical
depreciation rate. Mi, similarly are the stocks Mi ∈H ′i ⊂ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
of goods and services which
the individual i = ci perceives themselves as having access to in any given time period t. At
time period t we have
Mi (t) = Mi (t−1)+mciMi (t−1)−mMici (t−1) (4.32)
Now, to determine the selection by i = ci of their neighbourhoods is relatively straightfor-
ward, a simple matter of looking at where in the course of action ai pertaining to other elements
n j ∈ Es, Is of the economic system or social system the individual chooses some non-empty
course of action or otherwise. However, in the socio-economic system, i = ci only selects their
out-neighbourhood, for they only have immediate control over what they will transfer to others
Noutci (g) =
{
n j ∈ N : cin j ∈ g(N)
}
=
{
n j ∈ N :
[
xcin j ,mcin j ∈ a∗i=ci
] 6= /0} (4.33)
Noutci (gv) =
{
n j ∈ N : cin j ∈ gv (N)
}
=
{
n j ∈ N :
[
vcin j ∈ a∗i=ci
] 6= /0} (4.34)
The content of these connections is determined by the choice of course of action (equa-
tion 4.6). The in-neighbourhoods of i = ci are contingent on the decisions of others first and
foremost (as we will see in section 6.1).
63
Figure 4.11: Behaviour (economic individual): Individual i = ci’s decision immediately gov-
erns the formation of their out-neighbourhood in Es by their decision to transfer goods, services
and mediums of exchange to others.
4.3.2 The worker
Now let us consider the psychology and behaviour of i as a worker within an organisation
n j ∈ N, when i = ωi ∈ n j. This is, perhaps a little ironically (given their existence within a
subsystem n j ∈ N), simpler than the behaviour of i as consumer ci. The reason for this is that
worker behaviour is not as multifaceted as consumer behaviour, and can be, in some manner,
reduced to taking inputs, applying a functioning - specifically a production process - to those
inputs and transforming them into outputs.
The neighbourhood of ωi ∈ n j and the information contained therein
The neighbourhood Ni=ωi (g) of the individual i as a worker ωi ∈ n j within the world system
is a little more involved than the neighbourhood of the consumer because of the nature of the
organisation n j as a subsystem
{
Nn j gn j
(
Nn j
)}
of Es of which the individual i = ωi ∈ n j is
a part, and how it interacts within Es through the interactions of its parts. So we will split
the neighbourhood Ni=ωi (g) of the worker accordingly between their neighbourhood Nωi
(
gn j
)
within the organisation ni =
{
Nn j gn j
(
Nn j
)}
and their neighbourhood within the economic,
Es = {N g(N)}, and social, Is = {N gv (N)} systems Nωi (g) and Nωi (gv) Since economic,
social and organisational networks are directed, each of these is comprised further of an in-
neighbourhood and an out-neighbourhood.
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First, we have the in and out neighbourhoods of i = ωi in the subsystem n j of the organisa-
tion
Ninωi
(
gn j
)
=
{
η j ∈ Nn j : η jωi ∈ gn j
(
Nn j
)}
(4.35)
Noutωi (gni) =
{
η j ∈ Nn j : ωiη j ∈ gn j
(
Nn j
)}
(4.36)
which together form the neighbourhood Nωi
(
gn j
)
of i = ωi within the organisation
Nωi
(
gn j
)
=
{
Ninωi
(
gn j
)
Noutωi
(
gn j
)}
(4.37)
Next, we have the in and out neighbourhoods of i = ωi ∈ n j within the economic system
Es = {N g(N)}
Ninωi (g) =
{
nk ∈ N : nk
{
ωi ∈ n j
} ∈ g(N)} (4.38)
Noutωi (g) =
{
nk ∈ N :
{
ωi ∈ n j
}
nk ∈ g(N)
}
(4.39)
where after the now usual fashion nk is extended to nk = {ηk ∈ Nnk} if nk is an organisation,
nk ∈ N \C. Taken together, these form the neighbourhood of the worker within the economic
system Es = {N g(N)}
Nωi (g) =
{
Ninωi (g) N
out
ωi (g)
}
(4.40)
Finally, we have the in and out neighbourhoods of the worker i = ωi ∈ n j within the social
system Is = {N gv (N)}
Ninωi (gv) =
{
nk ∈ N : nk
{
ωi ∈ n j
} ∈ gv (N)} (4.41)
Noutωi (gv) =
{
nk ∈ N :
{
ωi ∈ n j
}
nk ∈ gv (N)
}
(4.42)
where again after the usual fashion nk is extended to nk = {ηk ∈ Nnk} if nk is an organisation,
nk ∈ N \C. Taken together, these form the neighbourhood of the worker within the social
system Is = {N gv (N)}
Nωi (gv) =
{
Ninωi (gv) N
out
ωi (gv)
}
(4.43)
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But we must also remember that the individual i = ωi also has a neighbourhood Nωi (ve)
within the non-socioeconomic physical environment ve, which needs no further definition here.
Together, equations 4.37, 4.40 and 4.43 and the parts of which they are made up, and the
non-socioeconomic physical environment comprise the neighbourhood Nωi (g) of the worker
i = ωi ∈ n j within the world system
Ni=ωi (g) =
{
Nωi
(
gnni
)
Nωi (g) Nωi (gv) Nωi (v
e)
}
(4.44)
or, to be more specific but less perspicacious, expanding each of these
Ni=ωi (g) =
{
Ninωi
(
gn j
)
,Noutωi
(
gn j
)
,Ninωi (g) ,N
out
ωi (g) ,N
in
ωi (gv) ,N
out
ωi (gv) ,Nωi (v
e)
}
(4.45)
Again, the apparent involvement of equation 4.44 and its expansion 4.45 should not obscure
us from seeing the structure they place on the environment of the individual. They break up the
individual i’s neighbourhood in the world system as a worker ωi ∈ n j into four parts, that in
the organisation n j =
{
Nn j gn j
(
Nn j
)}
, the economic system Es = {N g(N)} and the social
system Is = {N g(N)}, and the non-socioeconomic environment ve.
We can now elaborate on the information vNi=ωi(g) which is contained within the envi-
ronment of the individual i as worker ωi ∈ n j which forms the basis for their perception
ρi=ωi
(
vNi=ωi(g)
)
of that environment, their analysis gH (Hi) of that environment, and if they
must make one, their decision about what course of action a∗i=ωi to take within the context of
the organisation n j ∈ N.
Firstly, within the organisation n j we have goods and services, mediums of exchange and
information flows accruing to the individual i=ωi ∈ n j from other elements η j ∈ n j within the
organisation across their in-neighbourhoods within gn j
[
xη jωi mη jωi vη jωi
]
η j∈Ninωi
(
gn j
) (4.46)
and goods and services, mediums of exchange, and information flows from the individ-
ual i = ωi ∈ n j accruing to other elements η j ∈ n j within the organisation across their out-
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neighbourhoods within gni
[
xωiη j mωiη j vωiη j
]
η j∈Noutωi
(
gn j
) (4.47)
Now moving to interactions with elements of the economic and social systems outside the
organisation n j we have the goods and services accruing to individual i = ωi ∈ n j from other
elements nk ∈ N ⊂ Es within the economic system Es, and those transferred by individual
i = ωi ∈ n j to other elements nk ∈ N ⊂ Es
[xnkωi mnkωi]nk∈Ninωi(g)
(4.48)
[xωink mωink ]nk∈Noutωi (g)
(4.49)
where the vectors [xnkci mnkci] and [xcink mcink ] are extended to [xnkci mnkci] =
[
xη jci mη jci
]
η j∈nk
and [xcink mcink ] =
[
xciη j mciη j
]
η j∈nk if nk is an organisation nk ∈ N \C, reflecting the inter-
action by ω j with individual parts within the organisation. In the social system Is similarly
we have information flows between the individual i = ωi ∈ n j and other elements nk ∈ N ⊂ Es
within the economic system Es
[vnkωi]nk∈Ninωi(gv)
(4.50)
[vciωk ]nk∈Noutωi (gv)
(4.51)
where the vectors vcink and vnkci are extended to vcink =
[
vciη j
]
η j∈nk and vnkci =
[
vη jci
]
η j∈nk
if nk is an organisation nk ∈ N \C, reflecting the interaction by ωi with individual parts within
the organisation. Finally there is the information contained within the individual i = ωi’s non-
socioeconomic environment vNωi(ve). Hence we can summarise the information within i = ωi’s
environment as
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vNi=ωi(g) =

[
xωiη j ,xη jωi,mωiη j ,mη jωi,vωiη j ,vη jωi
]
n j∈
{
Ndωi
(
gn j
)}
d∈{in,out}[
xωin j ,xn jωi,mωin j ,mn jωi,vωin j ,vn jωi
]
n j∈{Ndωi(g) Ndωi(gv)}d∈{in,out}
vNωi(ve)

(4.52)
Again the proliferation of variables is taxing. But let us step back once again from the
apparent complexity of equation 4.52 to observe the simplicity, though intricate, it represents.
The economic individual i’s environment vNi=ωi(g) as a worker ωi ∈ n j is the same as that of the
individual as a consumer where they are interacting with elements in the broader socioeconomic
systems Es and Is and nonsocioeconomic environment ve of which the organisation is a part, and
the non-socioeconomic physical environment, but with the addition of their environment within
the organisation,
[
xωiη j ,xη jωi,mωiη j ,mη jωi,vωiη j ,vη jωi
]
n j∈
{
Ndωi
(
gn j
)}
d∈{in,out}
, made up of goods
and services, mediums of exchange and information flows into and out of the neighbourhood
of individual i = ωi ∈ n j in the content of the organisation n j.
These factors all effect decision making by constituting the basis for perception
vNi=ωi(g) = arg
{
H ′i {Rhh′}
}
= argρi=ci
(
vNi=ωi(g)
)
(4.53)
which in turn forms the basis for the individual i= ωi’s understanding of their environment
gH (H ′i ) and in turn, if it needs be made, their decision over what course of action to take in the
organisation n j of which they are part socioeconomic systems Is and Es.
The set of available actions A′i=ωi available to ωi ∈ n j: transforming inputs into outputs
While the neighbourhood of the individual i as worker ωi ∈ n j is more involved than that of
them as consumer ci, their potential courses of action are rather more simple. For where as
the consumer i = ci forms economic interactions, social interactions and engages in household
production, the individual i = ωi ∈ n j is always after one fashion or the other, taking a set of
inputs, and transforming them into a set of outputs.
The determination of the organisation n j, Es and Is in the neighbourhood of i=ωi is decided
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by the acts of buying, selling and transferring goods and services x and mediums of exchange
m and information v between ωi and other elements η j ∈ n j within the organisation and nk ∈
N ⊂ Es within the economic system. Within any individual course of action ai=ωi these acts
may be summarised by a vector of exchanges and transfers between i = ci and elements of the
organisation η j ∈ n j and economic system nk ∈ N′ in the set of elements
N′ ⊂ H ′i ⊂ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
(4.54)
of which the individual is aware. So we have
[
xωiη j ,xη jωi,mωiη j ,mη jωi,vωiη j ,vη jωi
]
η j∈n j∈N′
[xωink ,xnkωi,mωink ,mnkωi,vωink ,vnkωi]nk∈N′
⊂ ai=ωi ∩A′i=ωi (4.55)
where the vectors [xnkωi mnkωi vnkωi] and [xωink mωink vωink ] are extended where nk is
an organisation nk ∈N\C to [xnkωi mnkωi vnkωi] =
[
xη jωi mη jωi vη jωi
]
η j∈nk and [xωink mωink vωink ] =[
xωiη j mωiη j vωiη j
]
η j∈nk to reflect the interaction by ωi with individual parts within the or-
ganisation nk. The set of actions Aωi of possible goods and services and medium of exchange
transfers and exchanges is the collection of such vectors within the potential courses of action
A′i=ωi available in a particular situation
[
Xωiη j ,Xη jωi,Mωiη j ,Mη jωi,Vωiη j ,vη jωi
]
η j∈n j∈N′
[Xωink ,Xnkωi,Mωink ,Mnkωi,Vωink ,vnkωi]nk∈N′
⊂ A′i=ωi (4.56)
Note we leave vη jωi and vnkωi as they exist in the environment, as the individual i = ωi
cannot reasonably be said to have any choice over them. Again we have written here a subset
for a very specific reason, not only for the “connective property of prices”, but also because
the act of production is a connective act. The individual i as a worker ωi ∈ n j is always,
after one fashion or the other, engaging in production, production being a course of action
ai=ωi by which inputs
[
xη jωi,mη jωi,vη jωi
]
η j∈n j∈N′ , [xnkωi,mnkωi,vnkωi]nk∈N′ are transformed into
the outputs
[
xωiη j ,mωiη j ,vωiη j
]
η j∈n j∈N′ , [xωink ,mωink ,vωink ]nk∈N′ . The means by which this is
achieved is what makes the act of production ai=ωi a connective one.
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Again we will posit, in line with Sen (1999) that there exists a set Φi ⊂ gH (Hi) of “func-
tioning” which connect, relate, the goods and services, mediums of exchange and information
received by i = ωi, to other goods and services and information they may produce using them
and mediums of exchange they will transfer to others in that activity. This set now takes on
a new interpretation as something like what economists mean by “human capital” (Becker,
1962; Hodgson, 2014). Except here it is not some abstract quantity specific to an individual’s
production function, but in line with Sen (1999) (and also Loasby (1999, 2001) and Scazz-
ieri (1993)) the set of things the individual i = ωi knows “how to do”. The set of knowledge
they have about production, how to connect inputs together to transform them into outputs.
How to expand their capabilities by applying technology (Lawson, 2010). So the individual
i = ωi ∈ n j, in addition to selecting the inputs of goods and services and mediums of ex-
change and information and those they will produce, must choose to apply a particular process
ϕi ∈ Φi ⊂ gH (Hi) to transform the inputs
[
xη jωi,mη jωi,vη jωi
]
η j∈n j∈N′ , [xnkωi,mnkωi,vnkωi]nk∈N′
into the outputs
[
xωiη j ,mωiη j ,vωiη j
]
η j∈n j∈N′ , [xωink ,mωink ,vωink ]nk∈N′ :
 [xωiη j ,mωiη j ,vωiη j]η j∈n j∈N′
[xωink ,mωink ,vωink ]nk∈N′
= ϕi
 [xη jωi,mη jωi,vη jωi]η j∈n j∈N′
[xnkωi,mnkωi,vnkωi]nk∈N′
 (4.57)
The functioning ϕi ∈ Φi ∩ gH (H ′i ) is a program, an algorithm, a “recipe” or procedure if
one will, of which the individual i = ωi is aware, and which they are aware connects certain
inputs with certain outputs. The reason for this, again, is purely psychological: in reality
the individual must actually be aware of the steps of the process they are to engage in with
household production (Scazzieri, 1993). So we may specify now that any potential course of
action ai=ωi available to individual i as a worker ωi ∈ n j in organisation n j consists of a tuple,
of inputs, outputs, and the procedure for transforming one into the other
ai=ωi ⊃

 [xωiη j ,mωiη j ,vωiη j]η j∈n j∈N′
[xωink ,mωink ,vωink ]nk∈N′
 ,ϕi,
 [xη jωi,mη jωi,vη jωi]η j∈n j∈N′
[xnkωi,mnkωi,vnkωi]nk∈N′

 (4.58)
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any particular act being a particular course of action ai=ωi ⊂ A′i=ωi of the consumer i = ωi
contained within the set of such actions A′i=ωi
A′i=ωi ⊃

 [Xωiη j ,Mωiη j ,Vωiη j]η j∈n j∈N′
[Xωink ,Mωink ,Vωink ]nk∈N′
 ,Φi∩gH (H ′i) ,
 [Xη jωi,Mη jωi,vη jωi]η j∈n j∈N′
[Xnkωi,Mnkωi,vnkωi]nk∈N′


(4.59)
Notice how, following the chain back through the model, from actions A′i=ωi ⊂{H ′i g(H ′i )}
to percepts H ′i ⊂ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
to the information vNi=ωi(g) contained within the worker’s environ-
ment Ni=ωi (g), and recalling the definitions of these (equations 4.52 and 4.44 respectively) we
recognise that the production activity of the worker ωi ∈ n j, at least that which they are made
aware of, is totally dependent on their position within the organisation n j =
{
Nn j gn j
(
Nn j
)}
.
All the information which becomes available for them to perceive is within the context of the
graph gn j
(
Nn j
)
, including when that graph crosses the boundaries of the organisation to con-
stitute its interface with the rest of the economic system. Production behaviour is a function of,
and becomes part of, a location within an organisational production graph gn j
(
Nn j
)
. This for-
malises the argument of Foster (2006) who argues organisations and individuals within them
must be understood in the context of production graphs rather than a production function -
production graphs revealing the organisation of production, its structure.
The decision of the worker ωi and the feasible set B ⊂ A′i=ωi: what connections to form,
with who, the interface of the organisation n j with Es, Is at ωi ∈ n j
Now again with the definitions of neighbourhoods (equation 4.44), environment (equation 4.52)
and alternative courses of action (equation 4.58) in hand we are in a position to bring them
together into a theory of worker behaviour. The decision of individual i as worker ωi ∈ n j is
like any other decision, and determined as the solution (if there is one) to equation 4.6 when
i = ωi ∈ n j
a∗i=ωi =
{
ai=ωi ∈ B : gai=ωi  ga′i=ωi ∀a
′
i=ωi ∈ B
}
(4.60)
where gai=ωi ⊂ gH (H ′i ) are the implications of selecting an action ai=ωi (defined by equa-
tion 4.58) construed within the understanding gH (H ′i ) of the environment vNi=ωi(g) perceived
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as {Hi {Rhh′}} = ρi=ωi
(
vNi=ωi(g)
)
(defined according to equation 4.2). The individual i as
worker ωi selects that course of action defined by equation 4.58, ai=ωi = a∗i=ωi which is asso-
ciated with the most preferable set of implications out of all feasible courses of action in the
environment.
The interpretation (see appendix B) to be attached to gai here are even more salient as
when we consider the consumer. There is a long pedigree stretching back through organisation
science to Cyert and March (1963), Nelson and Winter (1982), Simon (1947, 1976, 1978b,a)
and even Kornai (1971) in which the organisation is modelled as a system of behavioural rules,
or routines. Thus gai become iterations of decision rules, production routines, expressed in
long form in gH (Hi), operating on production behaviour ai=ωi to express “if this, then that”
statements. The worker can deal with the complexity of their production environment and yet
avoid having to construct complex ratio decidendi for and against certain actions, but simply
apply their rules/routines upon the receipt of certain stimuli at their locality in the production
graph.
The constraints summarised in the set B ⊂ 2A′i=ωi connect in the understanding gH (H ′i ) the
percept of prices collected together
{
{{pωink , pnkωi}}nk∈N′
{
pωiη j , pη jωi
}
η j∈n j∈N′
}
, and the
set of available actions A′i=ωi ∩H ′i available to i = ωi taken together
B =
 [xωink ,mωink ,vωink ]nk∈N′[xnkωi,mnkωi,vnkωi]nk∈N′ :
∑nk∈N′mωink ≤ ∑nk∈N′mnkωi
∑η j∈n j mη jωi ≤M
ωi∈n j
i ,∑η j∈n j xη jωi ≤ X
ωi∈n j
i
 (4.61)
where to maintain some semblance of elegance, we subsume η j ∈ n j so that
{
n j ∈ N′
}
={{
η j ∈ n j
}}
, and Mωi∈n ji ≤ Mn j and X
ωi∈n j
i ≤ Xn j are the stocks of goods and mediums of
exchange individual i = ωi ∈ n j perceives as available to them within the stocks of the organi-
sation n j. Equivalently, we may express this to account for market exchanges mωin j = pn jωixn jωi
and mn jωi = pωin jxωin j (non-market transfers existing where pn jωi = 0 or pciωi = 0) consisted
of elements within [xωink ,xnkωi,mωink ,mnkωi]nk∈N′
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B =

[xωink ,mωink ,vωink ]nk∈N′
[xnkωi,mnkωi,vnkωi]nk∈N′
:
∑nk∈N′
(
mωink− pn jωixn jωi
)
+ pn jωixn jωi
≤ ∑nk∈N′
(
mn jωi− pωin jxωin j
)
+ pωin jxωin j
∑η j∈n j mη jωi ≤M
ωi∈n j
i ,∑η j∈n j xη jωi ≤ X
ωi∈n j
i
 (4.62)
Again, these sets simply serve to constrain behaviour by dictating only those courses of
action are feasible in which nothing is transferred or exchanged which is not available for that
purpose.
Now, to determine the selection by i=ωi of their neighbourhoods is once again a relatively
straightforward matter of looking at where in the course of action ai pertaining to other ele-
ments η j ∈ n j in the organisation the individual chooses some non-empty course of action or
otherwise. They may select their out-neighbourhoods immediately only, for their influence on
the decisions of others to transfer to them is not immediate. However, we need acknowledge
the worker does immediately effect a decision to draw down organisational stocks so
Ninωi
(
gn j
)⊃ {η j ∈ Nn j \Wn j : η jωi ∈ gn j (Nn j)}
=
{
ηk ∈ Nn j \Wn j :
[
xηkωi,mηkωi,vηkωi ∈ a∗i=ωi
] 6= /0} (4.63)
Noutωi
(
gn j
)
=
{
η j ∈ Nn j : ωiη j ∈ gn j
(
Nn j
)}
=
{
ηk ∈ Nn j :
[
xωiη j ,mωiη j ,vωiη j ∈ a∗i=ωi
] 6= /0}
(4.64)
Further, where we observe in the action ai pertaining to other elements nk ∈ Es in the eco-
nomic system the individual choosing some non-empty course of action or otherwise we are
observing the interface of the organisation n j within the economic system Es with other ele-
ments of the economic system nk ∈ Es. That is,
Noutωi (g) =
{
nk ∈ N :
{
ωi ∈ n j
}
nk ∈ g(N)
}
= {nk ∈ N : [xnkωi,mnkωi ∈ a∗i ] 6= /0} (4.65)
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and since ωi ∈ n j
Noutn j (g)⊃ Noutωi (g) (4.66)
Finally, similarly where we observe in the action ai pertaining to other elements nk ∈ Is in
the social system the individual choosing some non-empty course of action or otherwise we are
observing the interface of the organisation n j within the social system Is with other elements of
the social system nk ∈ Es
Noutωi (gv) =
{
nk ∈ N :
{
ωi ∈ n j
}
nk ∈ gv (N)
}
= {nk ∈ N : [vnkωi ∈ a∗i ] 6= /0} (4.67)
and since ωi ∈ n j
Noutn j (gv)⊃ Noutωi (gv) (4.68)
The content of those connections being determined by the choice of course of action (equa-
tion 4.6).
4.4 Summary: the psychology of economic behaviour
Our model of the psychology of behaviour, stated in its essence, is really very simple. It consists
of three objects. The individual perceives their environment
ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
=
{
H ′i {Rhh′}
}
They form an understanding of that environment based on their understanding of the world
through the process of analysis
gH
(
H ′i
)⊂ gH (Hi)
And they make a decision guided by the aesthetics  ◦2gH(Hi) of the content of implica-
tions gai =
{
Rhh′ ∈ gH (H ′i ) : hh′ ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 &h0 ∈ ai
}
construed to attend upon different
feasible actions ai ∈ B
a∗i =
{
ai ∈ B : gai  ga′i ∀a
′
i ∈ B
}
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All the rest is so much mere elaboration of vNi(g)and {ai}ai∈2A′i in order to apply this model
to the behaviour of an individual as node i = ci in the economic system Es or as node i = ωi
in the subsystem of the organisation n j ∈ P. But such a simple model nevertheless drastically
expands the range of phenomena about which we may think formally in the context of an
integrated, holistic and systematic account of economic systems. In the next chapter we will
elucidate but the most immediately economic of such phenomena.
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Chapter 5
Some salient points of the theory of
consumption and production
With the model of the psychology of economic behaviour developed above, we may now elab-
orate on some salient points of the formalism as applies to the behaviour of the consumer and
worker. These considerations are somewhat eclectic so it will be worthwhile alluding to the
method of their discussion here. First we will consider what the present formalism has to say
about the evolution of demand - how consumers “learn” to consume. Then, given their cen-
trality to prior schools of both microeconomic and macroeconomic thought, we will consider
the definitions and relations of substitutability, non-substitutability and complementarity. In
particular, how substitutability relates to the notion of cross-price elasticity and product at-
tributes while complementarity relates to the process of household and worker production. We
shall consider the implications of a common distinction in the galaxy of disciplines swirling
around economics, but not so much within the discipline - the distinction of need from want
- and how these generate “deep” constraints upon the structure and function of economic sys-
tems by their generating pre-requisite, co-requisite and “no-go” zones in economic behaviour.
And finally, we shall consider how this model captures and elaborates some interesting as-
pects of the behaviour and psychology of three different kinds of “knowledge” worker: the
entrepreneur/creative, the manager, and the marketer.
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5.1 Learning to consume: a note on evolutionary dynamics
in consumer demand
A fundamental question of evolutionary economics concerns the manner in which new goods
and services are incorporated into an individual i’s manner of thinking about the world gH (Hi),
the basis for demand. The incorporation of new goods and services [ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′ and the con-
sideration thereof into the consumer i = ci’s understanding of the world gH (Hi) concerns the
ability of i = ci to construct chains gai⊃[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
⊂ gH (Hi) of implications to follow from new
goods and services [ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′ within the course of action ai=ci . Thus, the evolution of con-
sumer demand - specifically the incorporation of novelty - is a matter of the incorporation of
new links Rhh′ ∈ gai⊃[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
⊂ gH (Hi) into the implications of new goods and services.
5.1.1 Factors in the evolution of demand
The incorporation or not of new relations Rhh′ ∈ gai⊃[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
⊂ gH (Hi) is a matter of the dy-
namics of gH (Hi), and thus is (see subsection 4.2.2) subject to the indeterminacies born of the
input of the phenomenological “I”, the conscious entity, in genuinely creative thought and the
acceptance or rejection of relations. Until the matter has been determined by the phenomeno-
logical “I” we cannot say definitely whether or not new relations Rhh′ arrived at by suggestion
(Rhh′ ∈ ρi=ci
(
vNi=ci(g)
)
) or by genuinely creative thought (extant for no reason other than the
“I” brings them into being) will be incorporated into the understanding gH (Hi) of i. However,
we can analyse the implications of some of the factors in the process of incorporating impli-
cations of new products Rhh′ ∈ gai⊃[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
⊂ gH (Hi) , which are contained within the first
three of the four laws of the evolution of gH (Hi) (subsection 4.2.2)
1. The law of suggestion: If a relation Rhh′ is perceived within the set of apparent rela-
tions {Rhh′} ⊂ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
in a particular environment vNi(g) then it is more likely to be
incorporated into gH (Hi).
2. The law of resistance at the core: If a relation Rhh′ would exist and therefore modify
gH (Hi) at a highly “central” location it is less likely to be incorporated into gH (Hi).
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3. The law of resistance to dissonance: The more a relation Rhh′ is dissonant with (implies
the opposite of) relations elicited in understanding of a particular environment gH (H ′i ),
the less likely it is to be incorporated into gH (Hi).
The factors in whether or not the “idea” of a new product, the implications gai⊃[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
⊂
gH (Hi) will as a whole be incorporated within the individual’s worldview is a special case of
theorem 12 of Markey-Towler (2015), the “made to stick” theorem formulated in Appendix C.
Theorem 1 (Made to stick: evolution of consumption). If the perception mapping displays the
salience property, the likelihood of the implications {Rhh′} = gai⊃[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
of selecting new
products ai ⊃ [ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′ being incorporated within gH (Hi) is
1. Decreasing in the number of relations Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′} = gai⊃[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
contained within
the idea {Rhh′}= gai⊃[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
.
2. Increasing in the number of relations Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}= gai⊃[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
contained within the
idea {Rhh′}= gai⊃[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
already contained within gH (Hi).
3. Increasing in the relative noticeability of the information v′ ∈ 2vNi=ci(g) : h= ρi (v′) &Rhh′ ∈
{Rhh′}= gai⊃[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
between percepts h= ρi (v′) of which relations Rhh′ ∈{Rhh′}= gai⊃[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
will be construed.
4. Decreasing in the dissonance of each individual relation Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′} = gai⊃[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
within the idea {Rhh′}= gai⊃[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
with the individual i’s assessment gH (H ′i ) of their deci-
sion environment.
5. Decreasing in the centrality within gH (Hi) of any particular relation Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′} =
gai⊃[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
within the idea {Rhh′}= gai⊃[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
.
It can be seen (and a discussion is intended in Markey-Towler (2015)) that each of these
properties map onto the properties of “sticky” ideas identified by the brothers Heath and Heath
(2007). The implications of the new product [ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′ need to be (with certain nuances of
course) simple, unexpected, concrete, credible, emotional, and told within a story (Heath and
Heath, 2007). Perhaps of most interest here is that, in addition to the “shrinking” of the con-
sumer from the challenges presented by dissonant ideas1, the consumer will be (property 5.)
1Earl (2013) provides many examples of how the poor reception of many novel products can be traced to their
dissonance with personal constructs common at that particular point in history.
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resistant to the incorporation of relations concerning the implications of a new product the
more those relations would instigate changes at the “core” of who they are - at the core of their
conception of reality in the core of the network that is gH (Hi).
But further, property 1. tells us the idea needs to be simple, the more we need to know about
a product the less likely we are to incorporate it within our understanding of reality. Property 2.
is less straightforward and more interesting. It roughly corresponds to what the brothers Heath
have called “concreteness”. The more relations within the implications {Rhh′}= gai⊃[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
of a product that are already incorporated within gH (Hi), the more likely the implications as a
whole are to be incorporated. If we were to recognise that, or even define, a novel product as
more “radical” the fewer the implications of that product extant within gH (Hi) we then find that
the more radically novel a product, the less likely the implications requisite for the supporting
of demand for that product are to be incorporated within individual i = ci’s understanding of
the world gH (Hi).
5.1.2 New Consumer Theory and learning to consume
This perspective on the evolution of consumer demand as a process of incorporating new links
into gH (Hi) to form part of the implications gai⊃[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
⊂ gH (Hi) of new products is con-
sonant with, indeed extends upon, the pioneers of evolutionary demand theory. The pioneers
of evolutionary demand theory in economics were the New Consumer Theorists (Ratchford,
1975). Ironmonger (1972) and also Lancaster (1966a)2 set out to build a theory of the in-
corporation of new goods and services into consumer demand schedules, and the result is
one of the three major advances of the New Consumer Theory (Ratchford, 1975). The cen-
tral tenet of both Ironmonger (1972) and Lancaster (1966b), is that utility is, or here, im-
plications within gH (Hi) are, founded primarily upon the perceived attributes α ⊂ H ′i of the
goods and services [ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′ ⊂ H ′i rather than the goods and services themselves. That is
to say, preferences  ◦2gH(Hi) are determined primarily by the implications gα ⊂ gH (Hi) to
follow from the attributes α (·) ⊂ Hi rather than the goods and services which have those at-
tributes. Provided then that the consumer can locate new goods and services within character-
2An extension of his seminal Lancaster (1966b) paper.
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Figure 5.1: The structure of New Consumer Theory: In the New Consumer Theory, individual
i = ci may have the implications of some attributes in their understanding already - (a). They
understand how a point in attribute space relates to their “deep” psyche. All they must do then
is locate a new good or service in attribute space by connecting it with those attributes - (b).
istics space, that is, identify the relation α
(
[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
)
⊂
{
R[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′α
}
between new goods
and services [ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′ ⊂ H ′i and attributes α ⊂ H ′i and complete the chain of implications
gai⊃[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
= gα ∪
{
R[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′α
}
, their preferences with respect to new products will be
determined, and their demand schedule for new products similarly with it (Ironmonger, 1972).
We see this mirrored in condition 2. of the “made to stick: evolution of consumption” theorem.
The more implications of a good or service are already contained within gH (Hi), the more
likely they are to be incorporated as a whole.
The present perspective does constitute a generalisation however, and show what was a
matter of assumption in New Consumer Theory. It was assumed there that individuals could
locate the product in characteristic space, and thereby incorporate it ipso facto into their pref-
erence schedule. Here, we find this in turn contingent upon either the presentation of the links
α
(
[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
)
⊂ R[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′α
between new goods and services [ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′ ⊂H ′i and attributes
α ⊂ H ′i to the perception ρi=ci
(
vNi=ci(g)
)
, or their conscious creation by the individual i = ci,
and their acceptance for incorporation into the world view gH (Hi). The individual must be able
to locate the goods or services in attribute space by connecting it to a location in that space.
Similarly, it may not always be the case that the implications gα ⊂ gH (Hi) to follow from
attributes exist, a situation especially easy to imagine with respect to a radical novelty with
attributes hitherto not encountered. The implications gai⊃[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
construing the use-value of
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Figure 5.2: Implication chains in economic behaviour: The goods and services xn ji yield at-
tributes αi, which are construed to imply, perhaps in combination ∆i, the stimulation or satiation
of elements of the “deep” psyche ψi.
some goods and services might have to be constructed wholesale. However, if the conditions
described by New Consumer Theory exist, and implications gα ⊂ gH (Hi) from attributes of
products such that gα ⊂ gai⊃[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
fairly well exist within gH (Hi), then the “made to stick”
theorem above tells us it is far more likely that product can be established within the individ-
ual’s understanding of the world gH (Hi). It is far more easy to do so, all that is needed in
that situation is for the consumer i = ci to establish the links α
(
[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
)
⊂ R[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′α
between new goods and services [ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′ ⊂ H ′i and attributes α ⊂ H ′i .
This perspective on the evolution of demand vindicates and elaborates on the view of Ulrich
Witt (2001). If we want to understand the evolution of demand, how individuals “learn to
consume”, we must understand how they construe the relation of goods and services to the ends
they serve, the visceral factors - behavioural drives and emotions - which they elicit and satiate.
We must understand the chains of implications gai⊃[ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′
⊂ gH (Hi) which relate goods and
services to the consequences they have with respect to satiation of needs and wants, and the
elicitation of emotions. This is not an impossible task, in fact, means-end chain marketing
has recognised this fact and utilised it to great effect outside of economics as a means for
understanding how different products “fit” into individual consumers’ worldviews (Gutman,
1982; Walker and Olson, 1991; Pieters et al., 1995). The view of Witt (2001) is an approach to
studying the evolution of consumer demand, containing though extending the New Consumer
Theory to operationalise the theory of “learning to consume” by the incorporation of relations
Rhh′ into individual i = ci’s understanding gH (Hi) of novel products [ ¯xnkci]nk∈N′ .
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5.2 Substitution, non-substitutability and complementarity
in consumer and producer action alternatives: “deep”
constraints on behaviour
With the formalism of psychology of behaviour applied here we may consider some interesting
questions about the relation of different courses of action to one another, and how the individual
i = ci∨ωi decides amongst them. The core concept around which we build here is the notion
of substitutability, the ability or not to take one course of action, substitute it for another course
of action in decision and behaviour and obtain roughly equivalent results.
5.2.1 Substitutability
Definition 2 (Substitutability). A course of action ai can be said to be substitutable for another
course of action a′i if and only if the implications of choosing ai are approximately equivalent
those of choosing a′i, that is, if and only if
gai ∼approx. ga′i (5.1)
This may be now put in a more specifically economic context, as pertains to goods and
services “in” vectors [xnki]nk∈N′ ⊂ ai=ci∨ωi and [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ ⊂ a′i=ci∨ωi , where ωi ∈ n j and we
have subsumed η j ∈ n j so that
{
n j ∈ N′
}
=
{
η j ∈ n j
}
.
Definition 3 (Goods and services substitutability). The goods and services [xnki]nk∈N′ ⊂ ai=ci∨ωi
can be said to be substitutable for another set [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ ⊂ a′i=ci∨ωi , in the context of ai,a′i if
and only if the implications of choosing [xnki]nk∈N′ ⊂ ai=ci∨ωi are approximately equivalent
those of choosing [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ ⊂ a′i=ci∨ωi , where ai=ci∨ωi \ [xnki]nk∈N′ = a′i=ci∨ωi \ [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ (ce-
teris paribus). That is, the vectors of goods and services are substitutable if and only if
gai ∼approx. ga′i (5.2)
where ai=ci∨ωi ⊃ [xnki]nk∈N′ a′i=ci∨ωi ⊃ [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ and ai=ci∨ωi \ [xnki]nk∈N′ = a′i=ci∨ωi \ [xnki]
′
nk∈N′
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.This is a definition of substitutability more consistent with the connotations of the word
than the definition typically given it by models in the neoclassical tradition (Mas-Collel et al.,
1995; Jehle and Reny, 2011), and can be shown to be a “deeper” concept of substitutability
from which that definition follows as a matter of logic. The standard economic model defines
goods and services substitutable those for which price increases of the one lead to a change of
behaviour to selecting the other, and takes goods and services being substitutable at the deeper
level of actually being substitutable for one another as given.
To show the relation of the two notions first we need observe the effects of price changes
upon preference.
Lemma 1 (Substitutability and cross-price effects). Suppose that the prices of the goods and
services [xnki]nk∈N′ ⊂ ai=ci∨ωi are [pnki]nk∈N′ . If
1. The goods and services [xnki]nk∈N′ ⊂ ai=ci∨ωi are substitutable for another [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ ⊂
a′i=ci∨ωi , in the context of ai,a
′
i : ai=ci∨ωi \ [xnki]nk∈N′ = a′i=ci∨ωi \ [xnki]
′
nk∈N′
2. Preferences over implications of courses of action ai are non-increasing with respect
to prices paid for goods and services therein (that is, gp2ai 6 gp1ai ⇐⇒ p2 > p1 ) but maintain
comparability and
3. The preference structure  ◦2gH(Hi) is transitive with respect to rankings of the alterna-
tive courses of action ai and a′i
Then supposing the prices of the goods and services [xnki]nk∈N′ ⊂ ai=ci∨ωi were to increase,
a strict preference would be established against this for [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ ⊂ a′i=ci∨ωi . That is
[∂ pnki]nk∈N′ > 0 =⇒ ga′i  gai (5.3)
If we now work forward to observed behaviour we can, with a few more assumptions,
generate a particular observed behaviour.
Theorem 2 (Substitutability, cross-price effects, and observed behaviour). Suppose the goods
and services [xnki]nk∈N′ ⊂ ai=ci∨ωi are substitutable for another [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ ⊂ a′i=ci∨ωi , in the
context of ai,a′i : ai=ci∨ωi \ [xnki]nk∈N′ = a′i=ci∨ωi \ [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ , and the price-preference condition
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(condition 2.) and technical condition (condition 3.) of lemma 1 hold. If the prices [pnki]nk∈N′
of the goods and services [xnki]nk∈N′ ⊂ ai=ci∨ωi were to increase, and the actions ai=ci∨ωi ⊃
[xnki]nk∈N′ and a
′
i=ci∨ωi ⊃ [xnki]′nk∈N′ , (where ai=ci∨ωi \ [xnki]nk∈N′ = a′i=ci∨ωi \ [xnki]
′
nk∈N′) remain
feasible and strictly preferable to all other alternative courses of action a′′i in the feasible set B
then observed behaviour is that
a′i = a
∗
i (5.4)
To put the result of theorem 2 in slightly looser terminology, it states that if two actions are
substitutes for one another, and the price of goods and services in one increases, then subject to
some technical conditions and an assumption on the response of preference to price, the other
action will be selected. In more vulgar terminology, the cross-price elasticity of demand is
positive between the goods and services contained in two actions.
Lemma 1 and theorem 2 are important because they elaborate how the neoclassical defini-
tion of substitutability relates to the more commonsense notion, which itself is important for
its normative content. We find that, adding some technical conditions as well as an assumption
about the role of price in preference, the standard economic definition of substitutability follows
from an intuitive definition of the notion consistent with the connotations of the word “substi-
tute”. But we see also by the necessary addition of the technical conditions and assumption
concerning the role of price in preference that the notion of substitution in standard economics
contains much more content with respect to psychology and behaviour than one might expect
given the connotations of the word.
Importantly, while we can demonstrate that if actions are substitutes then increases in the
price of one induce (with additional assumptions) a preference for the other, the converse is
not necessarily the case. It is not necessarily the case that when a price increase correlates
with a change of behaviour that any behaviour hitherto engaged in is susbtitutable for another,
indeed, if we observe that choice is only well defined if preference over implications to follow
from the chosen course of action is strict, it cannot be. This means that a change of observed
behaviour correlating with a changed price is not necessarily a change of behaviour between
courses of action which are substitutes for one another, and therefore roughly equivalent in
the preferability of the implications, the consequences, attendant upon them. This is very
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important in estimations of policy based on price manipulation. The neoclassical definition
of substitutability, we see here, may give false indications of neutrality. We cannot say price
manipulation will not cause changes to the preferability of the situation faced by the individual
i.
One of the major advances of the New Consumer Theory was the explanation it offerred
for the existence of substitutability between two goods and services (Ratchford, 1975). Though
neither Lancaster (1966b) nor Ironmonger (1972) themselves made much of this connexion. It
also offerred thus - and theorem 2 makes explicit exactly how this follows from substitutability
- an explanation for the elasticity of demand (Ratchford, 1975). We can see the explanation for
the existence of substitutability by formulating the “Lancaster-substitutability” theorem.
Theorem 3 (Lancaster-substitutability). Suppose we have two goods and services
[
xn ji
]
n j∈N′
and
[
x′n ji
]
n j∈N′
and two actions ai,a′i : ai \
[
xn ji
]
n j∈N′ = a
′
i \
[
x′n ji
]
n j∈N′
which contain them.
Suppose also that there exist two attribute sets α,α ′ ∈ Hi such that
gα ∼approx. gα ′
where gα =
{
Rhh′ ∈ gH (H ′i ) : hh′ ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 &h0 ∈ α
}
and that, as per the New Con-
sumer Theory, implication preferability is determined by the implications of attributes rather
than actions, so that gα  gα ′ =⇒ gα ∪{Raiα}  gα ′ ∪
{
Ra′iα ′
}
. If actions are connected only
to their characteristics in the mind of i, NgH (ai) = N
out
gH (ai) = α and NgH (a
′
i) = N
out
gH (a
′
i) = α ′,
then
[
xn ji
]
n j∈N′ and
[
x′n ji
]
n j∈N′
are substitutable in the context ai,a′i.
The New Consumer Theory, specifically Lancaster’s variant which was more focused of
susbtitutability by virtue of its being more in the neoclassical tradition (hence the nomenclature
of the above theorem) thus offers an explanation for substitutability, and by extension to theo-
rem 2, the elasticity of demand. If two locations in attribute space are construed to have equally
preferable implications - “do” things of a similar preferability - then any two goods/services
within actions which can be connected to those locations will be substitutable. They need not
be the same good, but if they are not we must be able to “swap out” the one set of goods/services
for the other without removing the location of the action containing them to a region of attribute
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space which would effect the preferability of the implications to follow from those attributes.
Thus we have an explanation of substitutability as given by Earl (1983, 1986a,b, 1995) in
an informal manner as the property of having locations in attribute spaces which by personal
constructs and aesthetics are linked. Not dissimilarly to points in space linked by an Einstein-
Rosen bridge. If the two locations are so linked we may go between one and the other in
or goods/services choices, substitute positions with roughly equally preferable construed out-
comes.
5.2.2 Non-substitutability in the distinction between want and need: pre-
requisites, co-requisites, “no go” zones
If actions are not substitutes for one another, then we cannot say that one can be substituted for
the other without a non-insignificant change of preferability of consequences. This might be the
case for any number of reasons, but ultimately these reduce to the implications gai and ga′i being
sufficiently different that the one course of action ai cannot be substituted for another. But we
can go further to see just how “deep” into the psyche, and how fundamental non-substitutability
can become.
It will be interesting to consider how the model above elucidates some deep constraints
on economic behaviour, deeper indeed than the feasible set as they pertain to the preferences
 ◦2gH(H ′i) defined (among other things) on sets of implications {gai}ai∈2A′i . We will show
that the notion of a need, which is distinct from the notion of a want, leads us to conclude
the existence of pre-requisites, co-requisites and “no-go zones”. Connections that must be
made, connections that must be made together, and connections that will never be made. These
constraints constitute a non-substitutability between different actions. This section is a formal
elaboration on and synthesis of the work of Peter Earl (1983, 1986a,b, 1990, 1995, Undated),
whose life work has concerned understanding how personal construct psychology and cognitive
heuristic psychology contribute to the existence of “breaks” in substitution between alternative
courses of action and place limits beyond those of feasibility on what courses of action will be
engaged in (Earl, 1983, 1986a,b, 1990, 1992, 2010, 2013).
There are two interpretations to be given to the sets of implications {gai}ai∈2A′i over courses
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of action ai ∈ 2A′i . The first is consistent, in an economic context, with the notion of “means-
end chains” (Gutman, 1982; Walker and Olson, 1991; Pieters et al., 1995) in both consumer
and worker decision making, ratio decidendi, the relation of courses of action directly through
thought to the visceral factors Ψ ∈ Hi - behavioural drives they satiate and emotions they elicit
(Witt, 2001) (see appendix B). The second interpretation is that the implications {gai}ai∈2A′i
represent the operation of decision rules upon the courses of action ai ∈ 2A′i , the filtering of
different courses of action through heuristics (Simon, 1976, 1978b,a; Gigerenzer and Goldstein,
1996; Gigerenzer, 1999; Gigerenzer and Selten, 1999a) held within the mind, the system of
personal constructs gH (Hi) for application upon the receipt and perception of certain sensory
stimuli H ′i ⊂ ρi=ci∨ωi
(
vNi=ci∨ωi(g)
)
(again, see appendix B).
But even in this latter interpretation of the implications {gai}ai∈2A′i over the courses of action
ai ∈ 2A′i it is difficult to imagine the non-involvement, the non-stimulation of visceral factors
Ψ∩H ′i ⊂ H ′i , at least in the subconscious, for behavioural drives are exactly that. Without
the relation of the outcome of decision rules within the understanding gH (H ′i ) ⊂ gH (Hi) of
the decision environment to the visceral factors H ′i , even if it is as trivial a visceral factor
as a quasi-neurotic/autistic need to conform to a consistent pattern of behaviour3, it is hard
to imagine that the preference  ◦2gH(H ′i) over, inter alia, implications {gai}ai∈2A′i over the
courses of action ai ∈ 2A′i are sufficiently well defined for a∗i to be well defined (according to
equation 4.6). Among the visceral factors in Hi which figure into understanding gH (Hi) of any
given environment we have behavioural drives - wants and needs.
Needs are distinct from wants in that by their very etymology they have a “necessity” not as
insistent in wants. This - the satiation of needs - is the fundamental factor which underlies the
necessity of certain kinds of economic behaviour. To this end, it is important to give a definition
of needs, as they form the basis for such “deep” constraints upon the economic structure Es.
Definition 4 (Needs, distinct from wants). A need is a visceral factor ψ such that, when
elicited by the environment, ψ ∈ H ′i , if a non-satiation relation Rhψ = ¬ψs exists in a chain
{hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (H ′i ) : h0 ∈ ai &hK = ψ from a course of action ai ∈ A′i to the visceral factor
3The desire for homeostasis, for consistency, for stability, is a rather important and common desire if not totally
dominant. The desire for novelty is also well established (Scitovsky, 1976), and exists in tension with the desire
for stability.
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ψ ∈ H ′i , its implications gai are strictly less preferable than those ga′i of any other course of
action a′i ∈ 2Ai for which there exists a satiation relation Rhψ = ψs in a chain {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂
gH (Hi) : h0 ∈ ai &hK = ψ . That is, formally,
∃Rhψ = ¬ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH
(
H ′i
)
: h0 ∈ ai &hK = ψ
=⇒ ga′i  gai ∀a
′
i ∈ 2Ai :
{
∃Rhψ = ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (Hi) : h0 ∈ a′i &hK = ψ
}
(5.5)
Now there is an interesting paradox arising out of this definition. Note that if we took two
actions, ai and a′i and two needs ψ and ψ ′, and suppose the first action satisfied the former but
not the latter need, and vice versa for the second action, we would find this definition dictating
that gai  ga′i and ga′i  gai , which is clearly absurd. But informative. For in the absence of a
“tie-breaker” alternative, such actions would potentially lead to the choice function 4.6 being
ill-defined - which is to say, the individual cannot decide which course of action to take. One
form of decision paralysis is then to be attributed to the inability of the individual i to make a
decision, effectively, between competing needs.
Further instructive is the obvious implication that in order to resolve this paradox one must
have more information on mental constructs - specifically, one must postulate some hierarchy
after the fashion of Maslow (1943) between needs. The paradox does not particularly cripple
our analysis by giving rise to paralysis as the norm if we recognise the importance of time to
economic analysis. Decisions are made on the basis of information available at this particular
duration of time, and only this particular duration, and intuition would suggest it comparatively
rare for two needs to be elicited at once, and further for them to exist without some potential
course of action which might satisfy both of them. So, this paradox is something to be investi-
gated formally in the future4, but allowing it to stand does not particularly damage our analysis,
is actually informative, and its resolution would require an addendum to the definition of needs
of some sufficiently considerable mathematical apparatus as to undermine its present worth.
Immediately out of this definition arises a potential source of non-substitutability which was
alluded to implicitly by Ironmonger (1972) in his thinking of utility as the satiation of desires
4Peter Earl, particularly in Lifestyle Economics (1986b) has studied the problem of competing needs exten-
sively albeit informally.
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organised hierarchically. We ought name this form of non-substitutability however also for
Earl (1983, 1986a,b, 1990, 1995, Undated), who has extensively though informally developed
Ironmonger’s implications.
Theorem 4 (Ironmonger-Earl non-substitutability). Suppose we have two goods and services[
xn ji
]
n j∈N′ and
[
x′n ji
]
n j∈N′
and two actions ai,a′i : ai\
[
xn ji
]
n j∈N′ = a
′
i\
[
x′n ji
]
n j∈N′
which contain
them. Let us also suppose that the individual’s understanding of their environment gH (H ′i ) has
the property that there exists an attribute αN such that some need ψ ∈ H ′i is not satisfied in the
implications of an action ai if and only if that action does not have that attribute. That is,
∃ψ ∈ H ′i : ¬ψs ∈ gai ⇐⇒ @RaiαN ∈ gai
and suppose that @¬ψs ∈ gai =⇒ ∃ψs ∈ gai . Then if ga′i⊃
[
x′n ji
]
n j∈N′
6⊃Ra′iαN , but gai⊃
[
xn ji
]
n j∈N′
⊃
RaiαN , the goods/services
[
x′n ji
]
n j∈N′
are not substitutable for the goods/services
[
xn ji
]
n j∈N′ in
the context ai,a′i.
If there is non-substitutability of this kind, there is some attribute αN which consumers (or
workers) “can’t go without”, and so any product which does not contain that attribute will not
be able to be substituted for one that does. Earl and Wakeley (2010b) have elaborated how
there may thus exist “uncompromising” decision rules with respect to certain attributes which
generate the Ironmonger-Earl non-substitutability. And we see in the theorem above why this is
so. The non-obsolescence of needs, the satiation of which is predicated on the presence of some
attribute means that it must be met by a course of action to be even potentially substitutable
for one which does. And if that need is not met, there is a break in the chain of, limits to,
substitution (Earl, 1983). Thus elaborated as it is here, the New Consumer Theory allows us to
understand the origins of non-substitutability.
One may show two further more general results (theorem 6 and corollary 4 Markey-Towler
(2015), proved in appendix D here) which arise from this concept of need: first that if it is
possible to satiate a need, a course of action which satiates that need must be selected, and
second, that if it is impossible to satiate a need, then a course of action may be selected which
does not satiate that need.
89
Theorem 5 (If possible, needs can’t not be met). A course of action ai ∈ B may only be selected
(ai = a∗i , defined by equation 4.6) if
1. there is no chain {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (H ′i ) : h0 ∈ ai &hK = ψ from that course of action
ai ∈ A′i to a need elicited by the environment, ψ ∈ H ′i , in which a relation exists ¬ψs ∈ gH (H ′i )
indicating its non-satiation, or
2. there is no other feasible course of action a′i ∈B for which there is a chain {hkhk+1}Kk=0⊂
gH (H ′i ) : h0 ∈ ai &hK = ψ in which a relation exists ψs ∈ gH (H ′i ) indicating its satiation.
Corollary 1 (If needs can’t be met, they aren’t). A course of action ai ∈ B for which there is
a chain {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (H ′i ) : h0 ∈ ai &hK = ψ from that course of action ai ∈ A′i to a need
elicited by the environment, ψ ∈H ′i , in which a relation exists ¬ψs ∈ gH (H ′i ) indicating its non-
satiation, may be selected (ai = a∗i , defined by equation 4.6) provided there is no other feasible
course of action a′i ∈ B for which there is a chain {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (H ′i ) : h0 ∈ ai &hK = ψ in
which a relation exists ψs ∈ gH (H ′i ) indicating its satiation.
In an economic context, the courses of action ai=ci∨ωi of the consumer ci or the worker ωi ∈
n j contain the elements of economic connections which exist within g(N)⊂ Es. The manner in
which these actions relate to needs allow us to investigate and conclude the existence of three
“deep” constraints on what structures within Es can arise with respect to the neighbourhood
of the individual i = ci ∨ωi. The existence of needs leads to the existence of pre-requisites
(connections which must be made if possible), co-requisites (connections which must be made
together if possible) and “no-go zones” (connections which will never be made if avoidable).
The pre-requisite: satiating a need
Definition 5 (Pre-requisites). Suppose for individual i= ci∨ωi there exists a set P=
{
[xink xnki]nk∈N′
}
⊂
A′i of goods and services such that there exists a chain of implications gai⊃[xink xnki]nk∈N′∈P
from
actions ai⊃ [xink xnki]nk∈N′ ∈P containing elements of P to a needψ ∈H ′i in which there exists
a relation ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0⊂ gai⊃[xink xnki]nk∈N′∈P
: h0 = [xink xnki]nk∈N′ &hK =ψ indicating
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the satiation of a need ψ ∈ H ′i . That is, suppose for individual i = ci∨ωi there exists a set
P =
{
[xink xnki]nk∈N′
}
⊂ A′i :{
∃ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gai⊃[xink xnki]nk∈N′∈P
: h0 = [xink xnki]nk∈N′ &hK = ψ
}
(5.6)
The set P is a set of pre-requisites.
Using the definition of a need and the theory of choice we can now see why this set of goods
and services are so-called as “pre-requisites”.
Theorem 6 (Necessary properties of actions). Given the definition (4) of a need, if there
exists some feasible action containing an element of the set P of pre-requisites, ∃ai ∈ B :{
[xink xnki]nk∈N′ ∈ P
}
⊂ ai, then the course of action a∗i (defined by equation 4.6) engaged
in by individual i = ci∨ωi must always contain at least one element of the set of pre-requisites
P, that is
∃ai ⊂ B :
{
[xink xnki]nk∈N′ ∈ P
}
∈ ai =⇒ a∗i ∩P 6= /0 (5.7)
assuming that the presence of satiation relations with respect to needs ψ ∈ H ′i is mutually
exclusive and collectively exhaustive i.e. that
@ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gai⊃[xink xnki]nk∈N′∈P
: h0 = [xink xnki]nk∈N′ &hK = ψ
⇐⇒ ¬ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gai⊃[xink xnki]nk∈N′∈P
: h0 = [xink xnki]nk∈N′ &hK = ψ
This is important because the existence of pre-requisites effect the determination of eco-
nomic structure g(N) ⊂ Es. Pre-requisites are sets of goods and services - the elements of
connections in g(N) - out of which at least one connection must always be made if it is feasi-
ble. The only case in which structures arise in Es in which no connection the elements of which
are contained in the set of pre-requisites P is made is when the elements of those connections
are outside the set of feasible actions for the individual i = ci∨ωi.
A special case of the set of vectors P which are pre-requisites, and a subset thereof, is the
set of co-requisites χ ⊂ P. This subset is defined by its containing vectors of more than one
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individual good or service, which taken together satiate a need.
Definition 6 (Co-requisites). Suppose for individual i = ci∨ωi there exists a set χ ⊂ P⊂ A′i of
goods and services such that
χ =
{
[xink xnki]nk∈N′ ∈ P :
∣∣∣[xink xnki]nk∈N′∣∣∣> 1}⊂ P
The set χ ⊂ P is a set of co-requisites.
Since χ ⊂ P is contained within the set P of pre-requisites, theorem 6 applies to it as it
does to P and so the vectors within it take their place among the set out of which i = ci ∨ωi
must select at least one element. Noting this “one” element is a vector. Hence the vectors
within it are pre-requisites. And the elements of any vector within χ are, further, co-requisites
because they contain more than one element. If the one element of a vector within χ is selected,
the other elements must be also selected in order for (in the understanding of i = ci ∨ωi) the
satiation of an elicited need ψ ∈ H ′i .
Note there is a specificity to this definition which must be recognised. We call those goods
and services which must “go together” co-requisites only if they are also pre-requisites. This is
different from the notion of complementarity (definition 9 below), the reason for this stemming
from the nature of the word “requisite”, which suggests necessity. Pre-requisites are necessary
because they satiate a need, and similarly, two or more goods and services need to “go together”
only if they satiate a need together. Otherwise (the converse of theorem 6) they have not this
“necessity” and it is merely preferable for them to “go together” (theorem 8 below).
“No-go” zones: when behaviour contradicts a need
Definition 7 (No-go Zones). Suppose for individual i= ci∨ωi there exists a set Z =
{
[xink xnki]nk∈N′
}
⊂
A′i of goods and services such that there exists a chain of implications gai⊃[xink xnki]nk∈N′∈P
from
actions ai ⊃ [xink xnki]nk∈N′ ∈ Z containing elements of Z to a need ψ ∈ H ′i in which there ex-
ists a relation ¬ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gai⊃[xink xnki]nk∈N′∈P
: h0 = [xink xnki]nk∈N′ &hK = ψ in-
dicating the contradiction, the non-satiation, of a need ψ ∈ H ′i . That is, suppose for individual
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i = ci∨ωi there exists a set
Z =
{
[xink xnki]nk∈N′
}
⊂ A′i :{
∃¬ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gai⊃[xink xnki]nk∈N′∈P
: h0 = [xink xnki]nk∈N′ &hK = ψ
}
(5.8)
This set Z is a “no-go zone”.
We may now justify the labeling of this set Z a “no-go zone” by noticing its relation to
theorem 5 and corollary 1.
Theorem 7 (No-go zones avoided if possible). Given the definition of a no-go zone (definition
7), an element of a no-go zone Z may be selected (a∗i ∩Z 6= /0) only if there is no other feasible
course of action a′i ∈ B for which there is a chain {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (H ′i ) : h0 ∈ ai &hK = ψ in
which a relation exists ψs ∈ gH (H ′i ) indicating the satiation of a need ψ . That is
a∗i ∩Z 6= /0 =⇒ @a′i ∈ B :
{
∃ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH
(
H ′i
)
: h0 ∈ ai &hK = ψ
}
(5.9)
Again, why this is important is because the existence of no-go zones effect the determina-
tion of economic structure g(N)⊂ Es. Sets of goods and services - the elements of connections
in g(N) in the no-go zone contradict needs, if they can be avoided, they always will be. The
only case in which structures arise in Es in which such connections, the elements of which are
contained in the no-go zone Z, are made is when the individual i = ci∨ωi can’t possibly avoid
them.
5.2.3 Complementarity
The non-substitutability of two courses of action may actually transition further into the realm
of complementarity, when two actions “go better together”.
Definition 8 (Complementarity). Actions αi⊂ ai within a course of action ai are complemented
by those in another set α ′i if and only if the implications of choosing both (gai⊃αi,α ′i ) are more
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Figure 5.3: Pre-requisites, co-requisites and no-go zones: An action selected, a∗i such as the
solid oval, must always overlap with the set of pre-requisites P ⊃ χ containing the set of co-
requisites χ and must never overlap the no-go zone Z unless it is infeasible and B contains only
subsets of A′i outside of P and within Z.
preferable to those of choosing the former alone (gai\α ′i ), that is, if and only if
gai⊃αi,α ′i  gai\α ′i (5.10)
We can now again put this in a more specifically economic context, as pertains to goods
and services “in” vectors [xnki]nk∈N′ ⊂ ai=ci∨ωi and [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ ⊂ ai=ci∨ωi , where ωi ∈ n j and we
have again subsumed η j ∈ n j so that
{
n j ∈ N′
}
=
{
η j ∈ n j
}
.
Definition 9 (Goods and services complementarity). The goods and services [xnki]nk∈N′ ⊂
ai=ci∨ωi are complemented by another set [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ , in the context of ai=ci∨ωi if and only if
the implications of choosing both (gai⊃x,x′) are more preferable to those of choosing the former
alone (gai\x′), that is, if and only if
gai⊃x,x′  gai\x′ (5.11)
Goods and services are complements insofar as they “go together”, insofar as any action in
which the one is selected without the other is less preferable than an action in which both are
selected.
Why might this complementarity exist between two different sets of goods and services?
The most obvious candidate answer concerns the manner in which the two sets play into house-
hold and worker production. In household production, where goods and services are operated
94
upon by a functioning in order to, among other things, consume them, different goods and
services are operated on together such that the removal of one or the other might preclude
the production of some certain output. This is more consistently modelled in the Michael and
Becker (1973); Stigler and Becker (1977) variants of New Consumer Theory, where goods are
operated on to obtain new goods. In the Lancaster-Ironmonger variant goods are operated on to
obtain attributes, though these too might be interpreted (after a fashion) as consumption goods
also. Similarly in the production process of a worker, if we take an input away we might not be
able to produce the same goods or services as if we had it.
Theorem 8 (Complementarity in household and worker production). Suppose we have an ac-
tion ai=ci∨ωi in which there exists a vector of outputs [xink ]nk∈N′ ∨ xci of worker or household
production such that the preferability of the implications gai=ci∨ωi are increasing in the presence
or not of this vector in the actions ai=ci∨ωi , that is
gai=ci∨ωi⊃[xink ]nk∈N′∨x
c
i
 gai=ci∨ωi 6⊃[xink ]nk∈N′∨xci
(5.12)
If the vector of outputs [xink ]nk∈N′∨xci ∈ ϕi (·) is predicated upon the use of two sets of inputs
[xnki]nk∈N′ and [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ , that is,
[xink ]nk∈N′ ∨ x
c
i ∈ ϕi (·) ⇐⇒ [xnki]nk∈N′ , [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ ∈ argϕi (·) (5.13)
then those inputs are complements.
If we want to investigate further the sources of complementarity extant thus, we rapidly
enter the realm of engineering and operations research. For the reason two goods “go together”
in production is the manner in which the production function/process ϕi operates on them.
This will, as Earl (1986b, 1995) has rightly recognised, depend on the characteristics of those
products, so that ϕi = ϕi
(
·|Rxnkiα ∈ g(H ′i)
)
, reflecting some contingency extant in the chemical
engineering of the matter. This is a promising area, already explored by Scazzieri (1993) for
cross-disciplinary research between engineering, operations research and economics.
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Figure 5.4: Complementarity in household production: In the first case (a), the lack of some
input leads to the inability to produce the consumption good, realise its attributes, and obtain
its satiation/stimulation. In the second case (b) the presence of the same input leads to the
converse ability, thus the two inputs into ϕi are complements.
5.3 An elaboration of some particular types of worker be-
haviour
It might be argued that the vision of the individual as worker i = ωi here is a purely functional
one, that it is based on an outmoded (in the modern day) view of the worker as if they were
little more than a machine, taking inputs and combining them together to produce outputs. It
might be argued that this view fails to give an account of two particularly important types of
worker, those that drove the industrial revolution and constitute the foundation for a dynamic
economy. To guard against this misconception we shall elaborate here how the formalism of the
psychology of economic behaviour developed above accounts for the behaviour of the innovator
(or “creative”, “entrepreneur”), and the “knowledge” worker (or “manager”, “marketer”).
5.3.1 Invention and innovation: the creative and the entrepreneur
Consumption may be a sort of teleological “endpoint” towards which the activities of the pro-
ductive systems of the economy are oriented, but consumption activity acts upon the outputs
of production. The source of novelty in the economic system Es is thus ultimately in produc-
tion activity, and this is the function, and the defining trait, of the worker as entrepreneur - to
introduce novelty into the economic system. Novelty is introduced in the implementation of
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new connections between inputs and outputs (Potts, 2000; Loasby, 1999; Foster and Metcalfe,
2012). Schumpeter puts all this rather eloquently:
“The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes
from the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of production or transformation,
the new markets, the new forms of industrial organisation that capitalist enterprise
creates.”
(Schumpeter, 1950, p.83)
The “fundamental impulse” is generated by the application of new production techniques, their
application of new “combinations”, connecting new inputs with new outputs. The “motion”
born of this introduction of novelty is what Schumpeter calls economic development - in mod-
ern times we would say economic “evolution” - and;
“...development consists primarily in employing existing resources in a different
way, in doing new things with them, irrespective of whether those resources in-
crease or not”
(Schumpeter, 1911, p.68)
This “doing new things” is the activity of innovation, which “... is defined by the carrying out of
new combinations” (Schumpeter, 1911, p.66), and “...it is the carrying out of new combinations
that constitutes the entrepreneur” (Schumpeter, 1911, p.75).
The entrepreneur i = ωi brings a new production activity into being, they engage in and
they put into operation, an act of creation. Formally the act of creation is a new production
technique ϕ ′i - to use Koestler’s (1964) terminology a “bisociation” - a connection ϕ ′i ∈ Rhh′ ∈
gH (Hi) : h = [xnkωi,mnkωi,vnkωi]nk∈N′ ,h
′ = [xωink ,mωink ,vωink ]nk∈N′ between inputs and outputs
which had not been implemented before, and which did not exist at some point in the past.
The entrepreneur is defined as a particular worker therefore primarily by their application
ϕ ′i ∈ a∗i=ωi , of a new production technique ϕ ′i , and while they need not necessarily be the pro-
genitor of this technique, the technique must itself be novel to their and to others’ minds before
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Figure 5.5: The act of creation and innovation: The act of creation, invention, is realising the
connection between a set of inputs which did not exist before - moving from (1) to (2) in (a).
The act of innovation is constituted by implementing that connection in production behaviour
- (b).
it can be in any consistent manner be labeled “novel”. There is a distinction to be made between
invention (the imagining of a new production technique, ϕ ′i ∈ gH (H ′i )) and innovation (the ap-
plication of that production technique, ϕ ′i ∈ a∗i=ωi). But the one is moot without the other (since
ϕ ′i ∩a∗i=ωi ⊂ gH (H ′i )), so we ought consider first the origins of a new production technique ϕ ′i .
If a production technique ϕ ′i is to be novel, it must not have existed in the mind gH (Hi) at some
point in the past, and thus must originate in the two sources for new connections Rhh′ discussed
above (section 4.2.2).
The first such source is genuinely creative thought, a sui generis whereby the conscious
entity - the phenomenological “I” of the individual i = ωi brings into being a new relation
Rhh′ ⊃ ϕ ′i containing the novel production process ϕ ′i . This is the “flash of brilliance”, whereby
a bisociation is made which permits the production of something hitherto impossible. The
product of such acts of creation is a production process such that there is often no close com-
parison to be made with other production processes. It is therefore a “product” innovation, a
“radical” innovation spoken of by “Schumpeter Mark I” (Fagerberg, 2003).
The second kind of invention proceeds through the presentation to the perception ρi=ωi
(
vNi(g)
)
of individual i = ωi of information v′ ⊂ vNi(g) which, in the context of the environment vNi(g),
contains a new connection Rhh′ ⊃ ϕ ′i containing the new production process ϕ ′i . This second
is also the point of an interesting recursion to be explored briefly in Markey-Towler (2015,
s3.4.2) whereby the individual, through their own acts of production ϕi ∈ a∗i=ωi in the past, may
produce themselves the information which presents itself to perception as a new connection
Rhh′ ⊃ ϕ ′i containing a new production process ϕ ′i . This corresponds to what might be called
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the process of deliberative or calculative creative thought, the sort of creative thought that we
might imagine being able to be simulated by a computer5. Simon, Newell and Shaw’s Logic
Theorist (Newell et al., 1958, 1962) was programmed with rules for manipulating symbols akin
to production processes ϕi, and able to “calculate” substantial parts of Russell and Whitehead’s
Principia Mathematica, while Simon (1998) was able to write a simple production process by
which a computer could re-derive Newton’s law of gravitational force. Innovations produced
thus will often “improve”, or, more objectively, “build” on pre-existing production processes
ϕi ∈ gH (Hi) - the production process “tinkers” with the parameters of the old ϕi. Nelson and
Winter (1982) envisaged the search for new production processes as such - a search in a param-
eter space of a production function ϕi. It is therefore an “incremental” innovation, something
which can be essentially “professionalised” - reduced to the application of routines, that which
“Schumpeter Mark II” speaks of (Fagerberg, 2003):
“...innovation itself is being reduced to routine. Technological progress is increas-
ingly becoming the business of teams of trained specialists who turn out what is
required and make it work in particular ways... so many things can be strictly
calculated that had of old to be visualised in a flash of genius.”
(Schumpeter, 1950, p.132)
It is worth noting now that the means - the inventive act of creation - by which a novel produc-
tion process ϕ ′i is created and incorporated into gH (Hi) is not, in the context of the dynamics of
the mind (section 4.2.2) determinate, and this illustrates to us the source for, the reason why, in-
vention, and therefore innovation, is an indeterminate process. In other models of development
through innovation (particularly Nelson and Winter (1982) and Aghion and Howitt (1992)),
this is assumed with little justification. Here, the indeterminacy of invention, therefore innova-
tion, and thus economic development (evolution), and that which separates its determined past
from its fundamentally, radically indeterminate future (Bergson, 1946; Shackle, 1969, 1972;
Metcalfe, 2014), is the indeterminacy of the act of creation and its acceptance or rejection. The
5From Turing (1950), we know a computer needs: 1. a physical memory (here gH (Hi)), 2. a control unit (that
which manipulates the symbols, here, ρi (·) and ϕi ∈ gH (Hi)) and 3. an executive unit (here, a∗i ).
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existence of the phenomenological “I” allows for genuinely creative thought, something “...ex-
empted by its nature from the governance of given and delimited premisses” (Shackle, 1972,
p.444) and which can “...exist in no way prior to its realisation...” (Bergson, 1946, pp.18-19),
and governs ultimately the acceptance (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi)) or rejection (Rhh′ /∈ gH (Hi)) of new links
in such a way as cannot be determined until it has come to pass.
However, the act of creation, the act of invention, the addition of ϕ ′i ∈ gH (Hi) is not suffi-
cient for innovation, the implementation of ϕ ′i ∈ a∗i=ωi of an invention, the two need not even,
in the first instance, be carried out by the same person:
“As long as they are not carried into practice, inventions are economically mean-
ingless... Although entrepreneurs of course may be inventors... they are inventors
not by nature of their function but by coincidence and vice versa”
(Schumpeter, 1911, p.88-89)
Invention is economically inert until it is applied, ϕ ′i ∈ a∗i=ωi , in an act of innovation. The
conditions which govern the application of inventions in innovative acts can be investigated
by an analysis of the theory of choice (equation 4.6). In honour of the great economist of
innovation, development and evolution we proceed by formulating the “Schumpeter theorem”.
Theorem 9 (Schumpeter theorem). The following conditions are each necessary, but not suffi-
cient for an act of innovation ϕ ′i ∈ a∗i=ωi by individual i = ωi
1. The invention ϕ ′i contained within the innovative act ai⊃ϕ ′i is contained within gH (H ′i )⊂
gH (Hi), that is, ϕ ′i ∈ gH (H ′i ).
2. An innovative act ai ⊃ ϕ ′i is contained, ai ∈ B, within the set of feasible actions B
available to i = ωi
3. An innovative act ai ⊃ ϕ ′i is associated with implications gai⊃ϕ ′i ⊂ gH (H ′i ) which are
more preferable than those implications of any other feasible act ai ⊂ B.
If any innovative act ai ⊃ ϕ ′i satisfies all three conditions simultaneously, these conditions
are sufficient for the application of an innovation ϕ ′i ∈ a∗i=ωi by individual i = ωi.
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Immediately we observe that the act of innovation ϕ ′i ∈ a∗i=ωi by virtue of the fact that
ϕ ′i ∈ a∗i=ωi =
{
ai ∈ B : gai  ga′i ∀a
′
i ∈ B
}
requires far more to be brought into existence than merely the act of invention. Of course, it
is necessary (condition 1.) that the connection ϕ ′i ∈ a∗i=ωi between inputs and outputs be made
in the mind - the whole process is moot otherwise - but there are other connections necessary
also for the act of innovation. Invention is logically and mathematically necessary, but not
sufficient for innovation.
But one cannot innovate without the resources B at one’s disposal to do so (condition 2.).
By this we mean the physical inputs in [xnkωi mnkωi vnkωi]nk∈N′ ⊂ ai=ωi upon which the pro-
duction process ϕ ′i operates6. Not only are the physical inputs [xnkωi]nk∈N′ necessary (this is
rather self-evident) for this, but also we may find it necessary that there are mediums of ex-
change [mnkωi]nk∈N′ in the available inputs to production, for they may be necessary for buying
inputs. This is not a trivial matter, nor is it self-evident that these will be readily at hand for
the innovator, for often innovators will not personally have substantial sums necessary for the
purchase of physical inputs of production:
“...command over means of production is necessary to the carrying out of new
combinations... the possessor of wealth, even if it is the greatest combine, must
resort to credit if he wishes to carry out a new combination which cannot like an
established business be financed by returns from previous production.”
(Schumpeter, 1911, pp.68-69)
Hence the importance of finance for innovation as a means of obtaining the mediums of ex-
change which are necessary inputs to production:
“He (the banker) stands between those who wish to form new combinations and
the possessors of productive means... He makes possible the carrying out of new
combinations, authorises people, in the name of society as it were, to form them.”
6Hence the argument of Foster (2014) that methods for the exploitation of energy sources and methods for
their use in production are co-evolutionary. The development of new energy sources opens possibilities for their
use in new methods of production, and new production methods demand the development of new energy sources.
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(Schumpeter, 1911, pp.68-69)
However, the innovative act ai=ωi ⊃ ϕ ′i being contained within the budget set B is necessary, but
not sufficient, for the innovative implementation a∗i=ωi ⊃ ϕi. Condition 3. of the Schumpeter
theorem amounts to requiring the entrepreneur be willing to put their innovation into practice.
It is not enough that they merely be able to, i = ωi must be willing to innovate. And in this the
Schumpeter theorem elaborates upon an assumption contained within prior theories. Both neo-
classical models (Aghion and Howitt (1992); Romer (1986, 1990); Lucas (1988)) and the older
evolutionary models (Nelson and Winter (1982); Malerba et al. (1999)) tend to assume that the
willingness to innovate is present in the combination of the assumptions of the remunerative
motive (in one guise or another) and the assumption that innovations will (ultimately) lower the
costs of production. In such models an agent would always be willing to innovate, which might
suggest that all that is required for innovation is ready access to finance to expand the budget
set, and to finance research and development activities. This would allow necessary conditions
1. and 2. to be satisfied. But access to finance does not innovation make. The willingness of
the individual to innovate, their belief in the preferability of the implications of innovating over
all other courses of action, is necessary, and only in combination with this is access to finance
sufficient for innovation.
So, the Schumpeter theorem emphasises that the innovative act, and the ultimate source
of dynamism in an economic system, must contain three elements: the act of invention, the
ability to actually implement that invention, and the willingness to implement that invention.
It confirms the arguments of those evolutionary economists like Earl (2003) who argue the en-
trepreneur must be understood as a constructor of connections in more than just the sense of
invention and applicator of new production techniques. The entrepreneur must be able to imag-
ine the implications gai⊃ϕ ′i which follow from this action, extrinsic benefits (remuneration) and
intrinsic benefits (artistic, aesthetic, laudatory), and find those benefits sufficiently greater than
the costs to make them most preferable among all courses of action (Earl, 2003). The very fact
that the act they are engaging in is novel - at least to their mind hitherto unknown - necessi-
tates the ability to imagine worlds beyond that hitherto presented to their senses: their mental
maps gH (Hi) must include more content, construe further relations, than are fully justified by
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recourse to past states of affairs (Metcalfe, 2014; Witt, 1998; Loasby, 1999; Potts, 2001). Thus
demonstrated is the criticality of imagination, for there is fundamentally no objective data upon
which to base expectations concerning a novel enterprise. It is subject to radical uncertainty
(Taleb, 2007; Shackle, 1969).
If the connections, the implications in the set gai⊃ϕ ′i associated with an innovative act ai⊃ϕ ′i
are necessarily not contained within gH (Hi), as is likely at least partially true given the novel
nature of innovations prior to the act of invention, they must themselves be either suggested to
the individual, or the product of genuinely creative thought, of pure imagination. And whether
these relations are incorporated into the mental map gH (Hi) of the entrepreneur i = ωi is in-
determinate until it is resolved by the phenomenological “I”. But we may ask still what is
necessary in order for the set of implications gai⊃ϕ ′i containing an innovative act ai ⊃ ϕ ′i to be
incorporated into gH (Hi). For this purpose we may remember the “made to stick” theorem and
apply it in the context of an innovative act ai ⊃ ϕ ′i .
Theorem 10 (Made to stick: innovation). If the perception mapping displays the salience prop-
erty (equation 6.2.3 of Markey-Towler (2015)), the likelihood of the implications {Rhh′} =
gai⊃ϕ ′i of an innovative act ai ⊃ ϕ ′i being incorporated within gH (Hi) is
1. Decreasing in the number of relations Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′} = gai⊃ϕ ′i contained within the idea
{Rhh′}= gai⊃ϕ ′i .
2. Increasing in the number of relations Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′} = gai⊃ϕ ′i contained within the idea
{Rhh′}= gai⊃ϕ ′i already contained within gH (Hi).
3. Increasing in the relative noticeability of the information v′ ∈ 2vNi=ci(g) : h= ρi (v′) &Rhh′ ∈
{Rhh′} = gai⊃ϕ ′i between percepts h = ρi (v′) of which relations Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′} = gai⊃ϕ ′i will be
construed.
4. Decreasing in the dissonance of each individual relation Rhh′ ∈{Rhh′}= gai⊃ϕ ′i within the
idea {Rhh′}= gai⊃ϕ ′i with the individual i’s assessment gH (H ′i ) of their decision environment.
5. Decreasing in the centrality within gH (Hi) of any particular relation Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′} =
gai⊃ϕ ′i within the idea {Rhh′}= gai⊃ϕ ′i .
Note, this is not sufficient for the innovative act ai ⊃ ϕ ′i in question to be selected. It merely
outlines the various factors at play in the problem of whether or not the psychology gai⊃ϕ ′i of the
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innovative act ai ⊃ ϕ ′i , will be extant within gH (Hi), which in turn is a necessary condition for
its elicitation by the environment vNi=ωi(g), gai⊃ϕ ′i ⊂ gH (H
′
i ) = gH
(
ρi=ωi
(
vNi=ωi(g)
)
\{Rhh′}
)
(necessary, since gH (H ′i ) ⊂ gH (Hi)). But even were it the case that it were elicited, gai⊃ϕ ′i ⊂
gH (H ′i ), this is not sufficient for the innovative act ai ⊃ ϕ ′i to be selected.
Notwithstanding this, we may consider some psychological traits of the entrepreneur which
contribute to the satisfaction of the necessary conditions of the Schumpeter theorem, and the
“favourable” influence thereon of the factors of the “made to stick” theorem. Schumpeter
(1911) identifies three broad psychological traits of the entrepreneur:
1. Sufficient imagination to overcome uncertainty: “...outside... accustomed channels the
individual is without those data for decisions and those rules of conduct which are usually
very accurately known to him within them. But many things must remain uncertain, still
others only ascertainable within wide limits, some perhaps can only be “guessed”...”
“...the success of everything depends on our intuition, the capacity of seeing things in
a way which afterwards proves to be true, even though it cannot be established at the
moment...” (Schumpeter, 1911, pp.84-85).
2. A willingness to “go against” personal misgivings about unknowns: “It is not only objec-
tively more difficult to do something new than what is familiar and tested by experience,
but the individual feels reluctance to it and would do so even if objective difficulties did
not exist” “...the forces of habit rise up and bear witness against the embryonic project.
A new and another kind of effort of will is therefore necessary to wrest... scope and time
for concieving and working out the new combination and to bring oneself to look on it as
a real possibility and not merely as a daydream” (Schumpeter, 1911, pp.86).
3. A willingness to break with existing conventions: “...any deviating conduct by a member
of a social group is condemned, though in varying degrees according as the social group
is used to such conduct or not” (Schumpeter, 1911, pp.87).
We find in condition 3. of the Schumpeter theorem and the “made to stick: innovation” the-
orem confirmation of the necessity of each of these traits to the entrepreneur’s engagement in
innovation - they elaborate on the content of the implications gai⊃ϕ ′i which would constitute
104
“willingness” to engage in innovation.
Firstly, one requires imagination - the phenomenological “I” - to create new expectations
Rhh′ ⊂ gai⊃ϕ ′i of the future ex nihilio the more radically novel is the innovation, the more un-
foreseeable the consequences that are to follow. Condition 2. of the “made to stick: innovation”
theorem tells us the idea gai⊃ϕ ′i is more likely to be incorporated within gH (Hi) as a whole the
more implications are already contained within gH (Hi), a number obviously smaller the more
radical the nature of the innovation, unless some other implications ga′i can be construed to fol-
low from the radical act gai⊃ϕ ′i . This also speaks to the misgivings Schumpeter writes of about
doing something which is not “familiar and tested by experience”. The phenomenological “I”
must be able to complete some significant feats of imagination to “connect up” the conse-
quences of radical novelties and be unusually ready to accept a number of new connections
presented by the environment (unlikely the more radical the novelty) or by the phenomenolog-
ical “I”.
The latter two traits of Schumpeter’s entrepreneur are particularly emphasised by Ger-
schlager (2012), who notes that perhaps the core trait of the entrepreneur - an “agent of change”
- is that they be willing to go against psychological barriers in their mind auguring against inno-
vation - both social and more strictly personal. We see this in the “made to stick: innovation”
theorem reduced to the personal: the resistance of the individual to incorporate ideas which
are cognitively dissonant with their personal constructs, and which challenge the core of “who
they are” (conditions 4. and 5.). The entrepreneur is an individual who (typically) is not highly
averse to uncertainty, still less risk (which would augur against incorporating risky associations
in a positive manner) and whose ideas about novel production processes do not go challenge
the “core” of their personal constructs (the entrepreneur is not someone whose core world-view
must change to understand some innovation). They must not, beyond this “strictly” personal
level, be an individual who would tend to see themselves as deferring to societal institutions,
particularly social mores and taboos about breaking with established traditions. To innovate, to
do something hitherto undone, is to not follow a rule, deeply contradictory with a conception of
self as deferring to social custom. Or, if innovations do contradict societal institutions, and the
individual knows this to be the case (the relevant associations are within gH (H ′i )), and knows
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the consequences (approbation, ostracism, loss of standing) they must pay little heed to this in
the determination of their preferences  ◦2gH(H ′i).
5.3.2 The “information” worker: the manager and the marketer
Within any production organisation n j beyond the smallest, we will observe the existence of
individual workers i = ωi ∈ n j whose production activity ϕi consists largely of the collection
of information [vnkωi]nk∈Nini=ωi(g)
and the communication of other information [vωink ]nk∈Nouti=ωi(g)
.
These workers we might call “information” workers in this regard - they are primarily con-
cerned with the taking of informational inputs and transformation thereof into informational
outputs. Their reasons for this are to manage and coordinate the behaviour of those within
the organisation n j toward a particular end, and to influence the behaviour of those outside the
organisation n j. Individuals k must base their decisions upon the information contained within
their environment vNk(g), and insofar as the individual i = ωi ∈ n j may influence this, they may
influence a∗k . In the first function the workers i = ω j ∈ n j are what we call “managers” and in
the second “marketers”.
This is what Janos Kornai (1971) called the “control” sphere of the economy. Organisations
are typically hierarchical control structures by which certain workers collect and communicate
informationto guide the behaviour of others (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 2002). Because
these worker types concern themselves with the production of informational outputs with a
view to the changing of other individual’s behaviour, the relevant theory of psychology is that
of theorem 8 of Markey-Towler (2015) (see appendix D here), which pertains to changes of
preference among implications of courses of action.
Theorem 11 (Preference reversal). Take two environments vNi(g) and v
′
Ni(g)
such that a∗i ,a′i ∈
B ⊂ A′i
(
vNi(g)
)
and a∗i ,a′i ∈ B′ ⊂ A′i
(
v′Ni(g)
)
(where A′i
(
vNi(g)
)
and A′i
(
v′Ni(g)
)
are defined ac-
cording to equation 4.4), and a∗i =
{
ai ∈ B : gai  ga′′i ∀a′′i ∈ B
}
. We find a′i =
{
ai ∈ B′ : g′a′i  g
′
a′′i
∀a′′i ∈ B′
}
,
and a change of behaviour a∗i → a′i where g′ai,g′a′i ⊂ gH
(
ρi
(
v′Ni(g)
)
\{Rhh′}
)
if and only if the
change in environment vNi(g)→ v′Ni(g) is sufficient to induce
gH
(
ρi
(
v′Ni(g)
)
\{Rhh′}
)
: g′a′i  g
′
a′′i
∀a′′i ∈ B′ (5.14)
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i.e. an understanding in which the implications of a′i can be established to be strictly pre-
ferred to the implications of any other alternative.
Now of course, we want to work a little further to link this change of behaviour on the part
of k to the behaviour of i = ωi.
Corollary 2 (Management/marketing). Individual i = ωi can induce a change of behaviour
a∗k → a′k if there exists a communicative act vωik such that in the context of the environment
v′Nk(g), k’s understanding gH
(
ρk
(
v′Nk(g)
)
\{Rhh′}
)
of the situation is such that the implications
of a′k can be established to be strictly preferred to the implications of any other alternative. That
is, if
∃vωik ⊂ v′Nk(g) : g′a′i  g
′
a′′i
∀a′′i ∈ B
where g′a′i  g
′
a′′i
⊂ gH
(
ρk
(
vωik ⊂ v′Nk(g)
)
\{Rhh′}
)
.
By elaborating now on whether we have k as a buyer of goods held by i = ωi ∈ n j (where
ak ⊃ xωik) or as a worker k = ωk ∈ n j under i = ωi’s management (where ak ⊃ ϕk), we get,
respectively, a theory, or at least a grammar of management and of marketing.
Management
The individual i=ωi ∈ n j as a manager is concerned with influencing the behaviour of another
individual k = ωk ∈ n j with respect to their production behaviour ak ⊃ ϕk and does this by
presenting information to that individual in their acts a∗i=ωi ⊃ vωik. This forms part of the
information vNk(g) ⊃ vωik contained within k’s environment, upon which k’s decision processes
operate. The manager i = ωi’s behaviour is a bid to influence preference by the elicitation of
certain implications gak⊃ϕk ⊂ gH
(
H ′k
)
within the mind of individual k, and thus influence the
preferability within  ◦2gH(H ′k) of the implications of actions ak ∈ A′k. The canonical text in
this area is that of Herbert Simon (1947), who breaks this process down into three parts:
“(1) the development of a plan of action for all members of the group (not a set of
individual plans for each member), (2) the communication of the relevant portions
of this plan to each member; and (3) a willingness on the part of the individual
members to permit their behaviour to be guided by the plan.”
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Figure 5.6: The place of the manager in the organisation: The challenge of the manager ωm
is to accrue information within gni (Nni) (to the left of the dotted vertical line) and transform
it into new information (to the right of the dotted vertical line) which effects the behaviour,
interaction, of others within gni (Nni)
(Simon, 1947, p.115)
Roy Radner (1992, p.1384, 1389) goes further to emphasise production activity ϕi on the part
of a manager consists of the collection of information [vnkωi]nk∈Nini=ωi(g)
and the communication
of other information [vωink ]nk∈Nouti=ωi(g)
to define “management” as facilitating, co-ordinating,
and planning the function of the organisation internally and its interaction with the rest of the
system. The challenge for management is that they must in organising the organisation “exhort,
persuade, set goals and values” (Radner, 1992, p.1384) - in Simon’s words, make the individual
members “willing” to behave a certain way - while coping with the fact that different individuals
have different motives which can lead them to disagree over the best course of action (Radner,
1992, p.1384). They need to induce behaviour on the part of k = ωk ∈ n j consonant with the
goals of the organisation.
The Simon (1947) theory of the decision of k = ωk ∈ n j, that which i = ωi is trying to
influence through their communications, is noticeably similar to that applied here:
“The task of decision involves three steps: (1) the listing of all alternative strate-
gies, (2) the determination of all the consequences that follow upon each of these
strategies; (3) the comparative evaluation of these sets of consequences”, though
“the word “all” is used advisedly. It is obviously impossible...”
(Simon, 1947, p.77)
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“The function of knowledge in the decision making process is to determine which
consequences follow upon which of the alternative strategies” .
(Simon, 1947, p.78)
“What he [the worker] does is to form expectations of future consequences, these
expectations being based upon known empirical relationships, and upon informa-
tion about the existing situation”.
(Simon, 1947, p.78)
“A means-end chain is a series of anticipations that connect a value with the situ-
ations realising it, and these situations, in turn, with the behaviours that produce
them”.
(Simon, 1947, p.78)
The theorems developed here ought therefore contain Simon’s vision. Three theorems in par-
ticular apply: the “preference reversal” theorem and the “management/marketing” corollary
above (theorem 11, corollary 2), and where managers are presenting information vωik ⊂ vNk(g)
in a bid to have new ideas gak⊃ϕk about the product production process ϕk ⊂ ak incorporated
within gH (Hk) the “made to stick: innovation” theorem (theorem 10) applies as a matter of
mathematical isomorphism. We must also allow for the possibility that the behaviour i = ωi is
trying to induce k = ωk to select is novel from the point of view of k = ωk, for all intents and
purposes an innovative act, in which case the Schumpeter theorem (theorem 9) is also relevant.
Let us take the most “extreme” case first, that where the manager is presenting information
vωik ⊂ vNk(g) in a bid to have new ideas gak⊃ϕk about the product production process ϕk ⊂ ak
incorporated within gH (Hk), to change gH (Hk). Here the “made to stick: innovation” theorem
is of relevance to understanding what will make the incorporation gak⊃ϕk ⊂ gH (Hk) of these
ideas more likely. As is now familiar, this hinges on the possibility of making the idea very
simple (containing few links), fitting the links Rhh′ ⊂ gak⊃ϕk into pre-existing structures within
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gH (Hk). The manager must seek ideas gak⊃ϕk which are consonant with the individual k =ωk’s
understanding of their production environment gH
(
H ′k
)
and they must not greatly challenge the
k = ωk’s understanding of themselves at the core.
Two points are of particular nuance here when we speak of the manager. First, notice
in the “made to stick: innovation” theorem that the degree to which links Rhh′ ⊂ gak⊃ϕk the
idea are dissonant is defined within the context of k = ωk’s understanding of their production
environment gH
(
H ′k
)
, not their worldview gH (Hk). So the manager may in fact be able to
change k = ωk’s mind in order that an idea gak⊃ϕk dissonant with gH (Hk) be incorporated,
though they must be careful to not elicit the relevant links within the context of gH
(
H ′k
) ⊂
gH (Hk) in which they are trying to have gak⊃ϕk incorporated. Secondly, if we were to broaden
our ontology of production and allow for the possibility that ϕi is not contained within a single
link ϕi ∈ Rhh′ between a vector of inputs and outputs, and instead allow for it to be a series
of links ϕi ⊃
{
Rhh′ ∈ gH
(
H ′k
)}
of different steps - an “expansion” if you will - then the same
provisions of the “made to stick: innovation” theorem apply to the very production process
itself. In particular, the more complex a production process - the more steps it involves, and
the less consonance between those steps - the more difficult it is for the manager to have it
incorporated within the mind gH (Hk) of k = ωk .
This last point becomes one of critical importance if we refer ourselves to the Schumpeter
theorem, for if the production process ϕk ⊂ ak is novel with respect to k = ωk, their production
will be an innovative act. They cannot engage in an innovative production act without being
aware of how to connect inputs with outputs. Production technologies ϕk are a production
pre-requisite, a functioning, something which is necessary for a capability to exist (Sen, 1993;
Earl, Undated). The presence of certain production techniques ϕk ⊂ ak in the understanding
gH (Hk) of the individual k = ωk is what is meant by “human capital” (Becker, 1962, 1993;
Hodgson, 2014). The manager’s bid to influence production behaviour on the part of k = ωk is
moot unless the human capital that is the functioning ϕk is present within gH (Hk), or can be
presented to k = ωk’s perception and incorporated into their understanding.
The Schumpeter theorem also however declares moot the efforts of the manager unless the
feasible set B⊂ 2A′k of k =ωk’s actions is sufficiently expansive to include the inputs which k =
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ωk must operate the functioning ϕk upon. This is neither new nor particularly controversial, but
it is a crucial point overlooked often in economics where the feasible set is rather de rigeur. In
organisation science, particularly as concerns the production line the necessity for the manager
to ensure the pre-requisites for production are provided is critical.
But even if the functioning ϕk and the ability to apply it (ak ⊃ ϕk) ∈ B are present, this
is not sufficient for the manager’s bid to present information vωik ⊂ vNk(g) so that k = ωk im-
plements a particular production process ϕk ⊂ ak to be successful. The Schumpeter theorem
demands also that the individual k = ωk be willing to implement that production process - that
the implications gak⊃ϕk of implementing ak ⊃ ϕk must be more preferable than those of imple-
menting any other. This requires that the “management/marketing” corollary (corollary 2) of
the “preference reversal” theorem (theorem 11) hold, and that the manager i = ωi be aware of
the information vωik ⊂ vNk(g) for which it would.
First we ought note there is a deep constraint upon the degree to which the manager
i = ωi may affect a preference reversal in k = ωk and induce behaviour per the “manage-
ment/marketing” corollary which is created by the existence of “no-go zones”. If an action
ak ⊃ ϕk is contained within a no-go zone Z then it will only be selected if there is no alternative
course of action (theorem 7)7. Conversely, if a manager is able to take advantage of a relation{
Rhψ ⊃ ψs
} ∈ gak⊃ϕk ⊂ gH (H ′k) which serves to relate a course of action ϕk to the satiation
ψs of a need ψ ∈ HK , that action ak ⊃ ϕk will be a pre-requisite which the individual k = ωk
will always engage in if possible (theorem 5). Corporate cultures and their relation to social
norms and identity are particularly interesting in this regard, as the dictats of identity and of
society are well known needs, if a little less basic and higher-order than others (Maslow, 1943).
A corporate culture consists of a set of commonly known and mutually understood norms and
desirable connotations attached to certain production behaviours (Kreps, 1986). Kreps (1986)
of course, being a neoclassical economist, sees adherence to a corporate culture in behaviour to
be supported by a fairly rudimentary cost-benefit logic where costs of defection are enforced by
others, so that the culture itself emerges through an evolutionary cooperation game in the style
of Axelrod and Hamilton (1981). And this may be one way a pre-requisite may be exploited by
7In this context, the space Z is a generalised version of the Simon (1951) notion of an “unacceptable” produc-
tion space.
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a manager, if the punishment by others leads to the non-satiation of a need. But adherence to
a corporate culture can also quite easily become a matter of identity for an individual k = ωk,
in the same manner the culture of a tribe influences the identity of an individual so that the
individual considers defection unacceptable independently of costs imposed by others, and a
particular production activity a pre-requisite, something they will always engage in if possible
(Ouchi, 1980).
Turning now to less extreme considerations, there has been much literature in organisation
science about what content the information vωik ⊂ vNk(g) may elicit within gH (Hk) in order that
a preference may be induced in k = ωk by the manager ωi for one course of action or another.
The present theory goes beyond the relatively crude theory of incentives (Jehle and Reny, 2011;
Simon, 1951, s8.2) to embrace some of the richer (albeit less formal) aspects of organisation
science. The notions of culture and identity discussed above are one such aspect, but other
factors can be elicited in gH
(
H ′k
)
by i = ωi in order to induce a preference for the implications
of a course of action ak ⊃ ϕk.
It is rather de rigeur that intrinsic motivations may exist within H ′k = arggH
(
H ′k
)
alongside
the extrinsic (Frey and Stutzer, 2007), but even beyond motivational theory quite the most basic
aspect of organisational science the notion of influence and authority found in Simon (1947,
p.129) can exist within gH
(
H ′k
)
. Authority exists when
“[The worker] sets himself a general rule which permits the communicated deci-
sion of another to guide his own choices (i.e. to serve as a premise of those choices)
without deliberation on his own part on the expedience of those premises.”
Authority expresses itself in social institutions, which proscribe certain behaviours and encour-
age others by relating the rights, obligations and empowerments of one individual to another
(Searle, 2010; Lawson, 2012, 2015b). In the present system they take the form of statements
within gH
(
H ′k
)
to the effect that “in situation n j, ωi is m”, where m is a “manager” concept
related further with a series of rights r ∈H ′k, obligations o∈H ′k and empowerments e∈H ′k with
respect to k. In corporations managers i = ωi occupy a social position which, in the minds of
workers ωk, is associated in particular with the right to be obeyed, and the empowerment to
require certain actions be taken (Lawson, 2015c). The distinction between authority and influ-
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ence, where reason is set out by the manager i=ωi in favour of one course of action or another
is a rather fuzzy one (Simon, 1947, p.180), for while it might be the case that the authority of
a manager determines preference  ◦2gH(H ′k) among the implications gak⊃ϕk of courses of pro-
ductive action ak ⊃ ϕk in a trivial manner, the decision to abide by this authority is still a matter
within the worker k = ωk’s autonomy. It may be necessary for the manager to set out either
reasons for their decision, or reasons for why it should be followed, and indeed this mixing of
authority and influence in communication vωik ⊂ vNk(g) by managers i = ωi is often the case in
reality.
It is important to recognise that the communications vωik ⊂ vNk(g) which satisfy the man-
agement/marketing corollary, let alone the efficacy in inducing a particular behaviour ak ⊃ ϕk
of those actually made by the manager, are contingent upon the background of inter-personal
relationships, social conventions and the physical environment. The knowledge elicited by this
context vNk(g) ⊃ vωik may not be something which may be expressed linguistically, or even may
be something which it is not possible to expressed explicitly such knowledge exists within the
“tacit” dimension of gH (Hk) (Polanyi, 1967). And yet it must certainly exert influence over
 ◦2gH(Hk), and have an impact on the ability of the manager i = ωi to influence the behaviour
of the worker k = ωk.
The manager must therefore, if they want to design vωik ⊂ vNk(g) effectively other than by
accident must be a relatively astute psychologist and sociologist. They must have some idea of
the process, the psychology of behaviour, discussed by Simon (1947, pp.77-78) and developed
here within their own mind gH (H ′i ) allowing them to predict the behaviour of others, some sort
of understanding of the shape of ρk (·), gH (Hk) and  ◦2gH(H ′k).
“In every case the state of mind of the recipient, his attitudes and motivations must
be the basic factors in determining the design of the communication. The function
of communication, after all, is not to get something off the mind of the person trans-
mitting it, but to get something into the mind and actions of the person receiving
it.”
(Simon, 1947, p.217)
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This might seem a hopeless task given the intricate individuality of human beings, but in reality,
decision processes are often quite simple, and thus not a great deal of information is required
on behalf of the manager to influence them:
“... most significant chains of causes and consequences are short and simple...
Administrators (and everyone else for that matter) take into account just a few of
the factors of the situation regarded as most relevant and crucial... the limits to
attention simply don’t permit everything to be attended to at once”.
(Simon, 1947, p.78)
To what end, now, is this behaviour on the part of managers directed? It is, quite simply, to the
end of having the organisation n j =
{
Nn j gn j
(
Nn j
)}
of which the manager i = ωi ∈ n j and
the worker k = ωk ∈ n j are a part to be structured (gn j
(
Nn j
)
) and to function (the content of
gn j
(
Nn j
)
) in a certain way.
First consider the question of structure, of what “shape” a manager would wish gn j
(
Nn j
)
to
take - something they influence by the behaviour they affect in the workers k=ωk. Particularly,
who k = ωk will form connections ωkη j ∈ gn j
(
Nn j
)
with in n j. It is relatively uncontroversial
to claim that the “effective” manager i = ωi will prefer a structure gn j
(
Nn j
)
which minimises
the time taken to process and communicate information vηiη j ∈ gηiη j within the context of
the graph gn j
(
Nn j
)
, as this is important to facilitate rapid adaptation to changing situations (an
adaptive “capability”). This is a very simple mathematical problem in one sense, merely requir-
ing the number of links necessary to process information to be traded off against the time taken
for a link to transfer information. As a mechanical problem with simple equations for process-
ing time costs star-spoke networks centered around managers are rather obviously optimal in
this regard (Radner, 1992; Bolton and Dewartipont, 1994). In reality, the optimal structure of
gn j
(
Nn j
)
is heavily contingent on the heterogeneity of the individual k =ωk’s ability to process
different kinds of information, and the desire on the part of i = ωi for redundancy to be built
into gn j
(
Nn j
)
.
In general, the structure gn j
(
Nn j
)
of the organisation the manager i = ωi ∈ n j wishes to
induce is a problem of connecting together the different resources at their disposal in a way
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most consonant with their goals, the manager is, as Penrose (1959) put it, a “resource manager”.
The question of structure, of what resources ηk ∈ Nn j to connect together at this point becomes
informed by the function of the organisation - the content of the connections gn j
(
Nn j
)
, or the
“production graph” Foster (2005b, 2006) - that the manager is trying to implement. There is a
fairly simple principle underlying this problem as well prior to more complex considerations,
insofar as the “effective” manager will wish to induce a structure gn j
(
Nn j
)
as void of non-
complementary relationships as possible. By this we mean, we should expect a manager to be
guided in the structure of the organisation gn j
(
Nn j
)
they wish to implement by their wishing to
make available to individual points within Nn j inputs into production which are complementary
(see definition 9 and theorem 8).
For Penrose (1959, p.32-38) the manager, as for Earl (2003) the entrepreneur, is in this man-
ner (managing, connecting together, resources so that the organisation n j =
{
Nn j gn j
(
Nn j
)}
has a particular function), a constructor of connections. In their “image” of reality (Penrose
(1959) here makes use of Boulding (1961)) within gH (Hi) the manager i = ωi must be able
to connect the desired outputs of the organisation (the “function” of the graph gn j
(
Nn j
)
) with
the structure gn j
(
Nn j
)
which supports them. Their ingenuity in themselves or through others
k = ωk raising the necessary funds for the provision of these inputs, their judgement in being
able to connect in their minds gH (Hi) the structure and function of gn j
(
Nn j
)
with “desirable”
outcomes, and their versatility in understanding what structure and function gn j
(
Nn j
)
must
have in a range of different environments for this to be so is what in the view of Penrose (1959)
determines the efficacy of the manager i=ωi. It is what endows the organisation n j with certain
production capabilities and proscribes others.
At a fairly “high” level, the manager’s efforts are not dissimilar to those of the entrepreneur
as conceived by Israel Kirzner and Ludwig Lachmann, recognising opportunities for profit,
or the obtaining of the organisation’s objectives more broadly by expanding into “gaps” in
the market through the function of the organisation (Kirzner, 1997; Enders and Harper, 2013).
They recognise opportunities to exploit synergies - the complementary connection between two
outputs - by expanding the function of the organisation (Kay, 1982). To develop capabilities
in the function of n j they must allocate resources to facilitate the putting into practice of new
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production technologies, and in this connection are effectively allocating resources for research
and development (R&D). And, provided they are dealing with a sufficiently large organisation
where the uncertainty of individual production projects within gn j
(
Nn j
)
may “average out”,
they may be quite systematic, strategic and “rational” (be able to construct reasons) in the
beliefs gai⊃vωiωk ⊂ gH (H ′i ) which support their decisions about the function of gn j
(
Nn j
)
when
compared with the manager/entrepreneur of a smaller, less diversified entity (Kay, 1979). They
balance the competing interests of the “creatives” within the organisation who want to “push”
the function gn j
(
Nn j
)
of the organisation into ever-new territories against the “accountants”
who wish to consolidate gains already made and keep the function gn j
(
Nn j
)
within controllable,
relatively certain arenas (Earl and Potts, 2013).
The more quotidian concerns of the manager are the subject of the famous study of Cy-
ert and March (1963). In the Cyert and March (1963, pp.41-43) system there are five major
objectives kept within the mind of the manager day to day:
1. Minimal deviation from a desired amount or threshold of production
2. A certain amount of inventories to be held in anticipation of sales and shocks to demand
3. A sales goal for how much the organisation wishes to sell, or needs to sell in order to
survive
4. An aspiration for its share of sales relative to the market
5. A profit level to be obtained from these activities
Clearly there are more variegated concerns in the mind of the manager ωi in reality. But no
matter what their objectives are, at their disposal in meeting these goals are two outcomes
of the production graph gn j
(
Nn j
)
. The range and level of different organisational outputs,
and the price that will be charged for them, that is, xωkn j and pωkn j ∈ vωkn j at the “terminal”
nodes in gn j
(
Nn j
)
, the manager through their communications vωiωk ⊂ a∗i=ωi can influence this
to the ends their desire. The legacy of the Oxford and later studies of pricing behaviour8 is
to demonstrate there is no particular rule which we may set down as “the” rule of pricing
8See Hall and Hitch (1939), Andrews (1949, 1950, 1964), Nelson and Winter (1982), Earl (1995, Ch.2,8,9),
Lavoie (1996), Blinder et al. (1998) and Markey-Towler (2016).
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by organisations, but rather that many and various factors may and do enter into the reasons
gai⊃vωiωk that managers construct for having this or that price charged. The price managers
will accept9 for organisational outputs may be influenced by an understanding of how those
prices generate or constrain the frequency of sales, the maintaining of a certain inventory, the
recovery of costs, the making of a certain profit, conventions with customers, negotiations with
customers, how those prices relate to and interact with the prices of competitors, the outcome
of auctions and so on and so forth.
Similarly, there is no particular rule by which the output of the organisation is determined
by managers. The consonance of certain outputs with organisational objectives in the con-
siderations gH (H ′i ) of the manager i = ωi ∈ n j of their perceptions H ′i ⊂ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
of their
production environment is primary. It is, however, a well documented phenomenon is the de-
sire of managers to keep certain unsold inventories on hand (Andrews, 1949, 1950; Cyert and
March, 1963), and to not operate at capacity production (Leibenstein, 1966). It is “...a sim-
ple fact that neither individuals nor firms works as hard, nor do they search for information as
effectively, as they could” (Leibenstein, 1966, p.407). Aside from concerns about supplying
demand by the structure and function of the organisation, all theories of management recognise
it is important for there to exist what is now called “organisational slack” (Pitelis, 2007) to
react to unforeseen situations by utilising of hitherto unutilised resources and capabilities. One
of the major benefits of organisation, in the mind of Kay (1984), is the ability of a manager
to coordinate the organisation’s structure and function gn j
(
Nn j
)
and marshal capabilities and
slack in the pursuit of the organisation’s objectives in the face of unforeseen events.
As a final consideration now, we might briefly turn to the question of what makes the
manager effective in attaining their objectives? We have already answered one of two aspects
of this - insofar as we have considered what is required of information communicated by i=ωi,
vωik ⊂ vNk(g), in order to induce desired behaviour on the part of k = ωk. The second aspect
of a manager’s efficacy is the speed with which they can assess the information they receive,
and come to a decision on the basis thereof - what in a more archaic English was called the
9Even in auction markets, where prices arise out of mutual communication. The canonical Myerson (1981);
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) models obscure that the seller is ultimately the decider of the price that they
will accept for their output, even if that decision is constrained by law or by power.
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“dispatch” with which they carried out their task. Given his emphasis throughout his work on
the ability of human beings to make decisions in a complex world (Augier, 2001) we shall call
the theorem pertaining to this the “Simon theorem”.
Theorem 12 (Simon theorem). If we suppose that the time taken to form gH (H ′i ) and deter-
mine  ◦2gH(H ′i) is monotonically increasing in the number of links Rhh′ ∈ gH (H ′i ) which must
be formed on a conscious level of awareness, and is monotonically increasing at a compara-
tively infinitesimal rate in the number of links Rhh′ ∈ gH (H ′i ) formed on a subconscious level of
awareness10, any structure of gH (Hi) and form of ρi (·) which guarantees:
1. A decision will be made
2. Minimal time will be taken in making a decision
3. “Reasoned” decision making, by which we mean the existence in gH (H ′i ) of sentence-
equivalents expressing a “because” conjunction between an act ai and some terminal axiom
h ∈ Ψ, and invariance of  ◦2gH(H ′i) to any other links Rhh′ ∈ gH (H ′i ) but for those which
establish heirarchies between terminal axioms h ∈Ψ
is a structure of gH (Hi) and form of ρi (·) which has the following properties:
i.ρi (·) generates {H ′i {Rhh′}} with the minimal |{H ′i {Rhh′}}| (number of elements) suf-
ficient for  ◦2gH(H ′i) to be established
ii. gH (H ′i ) is comprised only of connections which have the contents necessary to establish
sentence equivalents expressing a “because” conjunction between an act ai and some terminal
axiom h∈Ψ, and invariance of◦2gH(H ′i) to any other links Rhh′ ∈ gH (H ′i ) but for those which
establish heirarchies between terminal axioms h ∈Ψ
iii. The only connections formed on a conscious level of awareness are those Rhh′ ∈ gH (H ′i )
which were not hitherto incorporated into gH (Hi).
Both Cyert and March (1963) and Simon (1947, 1976) stress the need for individual to be
able to “focus” upon a few “key” bits of information, and to sublimate many thought processes
to an automated, subconscious level. The Simon theorem tells us that the less an individual
10The same result might be proved if the time taken to form gH (H ′i ) and determine ◦2gH(H
′
i ) is monotonically
increasing in the number of links Rhh′ ∈ gH (H ′i ) formed on a subconscious level of awareness is increasing at a
less than or equal rate to the rate at which it increases in the number of links Rhh′ ∈ gH (H ′i ) formed on a conscious
level of awareness.
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has to consciously form the means-end chains necessary to establish reasons for or against a
course of action, the more these are already present in their mind, and the more they are elicited
automatically upon the receipt of certain stimuli, the faster they can come to a decision:
“The ability, often noticed, of the expert to respond “intuitively” and often very
rapidly, with a relatively high degree of accuracy and correctness, is simply the
product of this stored knowledge and the problem-solving by recognition that it
permits. Intuition, judgment, creativity are basically expressions of capabilities for
recognition and response based on experience and knowledge”.
(Simon, 1947, p.129)
The intuition of the manager is their ability to have a small number of links gH (H ′i ) by which
they can recognise, characterise, understand, and reason about a situation without having to
bring this process particularly far into the time-consumptive realm of the consciousness.
Marketing
The individual i=ωi ∈ n j as a marketer is concerned with influencing the behaviour of another
individual k= ck∨{ωk ∈ nk}with respect to their acquisitions xωik⊂ ak. This is actually a more
general problem than we would typically think of as the “marketing” problem. The simplest
image of a marketer is that they try to get consumers to buy their goods and services, but we also
find marketing activity in supply chains - producers selling to producers. Particularly interesting
in this latter case is the marketer i=ωi ∈ n j trying to sell a financial instrument to an individual
k = ωk ∈ nk in a bank nk, in return for mediums of exchange mωkωi ∈ mnkn j ∈ Es. Marketing
involves the selling of financial obligations as well as the selling of production outputs.
The marketer does this by presenting information vωik ⊂ a∗i=ωi , which is part of the infor-
mation vNk(g)⊃ vωik contained within k’s environment. The marketer i=ωi’s behaviour is a bid
to influence preference by the elicitation of certain implications gak⊃xωik ⊂ gH
(
H ′k
)
within the
mind of individual k, and thus influence the preferability within  ◦2gH(H ′k) of the implications
of actions ak ∈ A′k. Two theorems therefore apply: the “preference reversal” theorem and the
“management/marketing” corollary above (theorem 11, corollary 2), but also, when marketers
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are presenting information vωik ⊂ vNk(g) in a bid to have new ideas gak⊃xωik about the prod-
uct xωik incorporated within gH (Hk) the “made to stick: evolution of consumption” theorem
(theorem 1) applies.
In one sense, marketing - generating sales - is quite a demand-driven process. One part
of marketing is working out “what the customer wants”, that is, what actions ak ⊃ xωik are
associated with the most preferable implications gak⊃xωik , and ensuring in the presentation of
information vωik ⊂ vNk(g) that these are in fact contained within the feasible set B ⊂ A′k. The
marketer needs be aware of the contents of another’s mind - some sufficient subset of gH (Hk)
- in order to ensure this is the case. In this regard, marketers are greatly aided by habits, as
the consistent selection of a particular behaviour a∗k reasonably suggests itself to i = ωi as a
link Ra∗kh in their perception ρi
(
vNi(g)
) ⊃ Ra∗kh between an action and the preferability of its
consequences to k. In this case the marketer i = ωi would not find it necessary to reconstruct
large portions of gH (Hk) in order to understand the customer’s demand.
But generating sales - marketing - is also a process of generating demand where there may
be none presently. This is where the “preference reversal” theorem and “management/marketing”
corollary and “made to stick: evolution of consumption” theorem have much more to say, for in
this situation the marketer i = ωi presents information vωik ⊂ vNk(g) in a bid to alter behaviour
from an act a∗k 6⊃ xωik to an act a′k ⊃ xωik. As Galbraith (1958) put it nicely; the customer is
not entirely sovereign, and supply in a sense creates its own demand. The marketer’s task is to
present information vωik ⊂ vNk(g) so as to elicit implications gak⊃xωik ⊂ gH
(
H ′k
)
in order that the
course of action ak ⊃ xωik is that which is selected - to create a dissatisfaction with any other
course of action and create wants and needs for ak ⊃ xωik (Packard, 1957, p.24-25).
Provided that the conditions of theorem 11 and corollary 2 can be met - that there is in-
formation vωik ⊂ vNk(g) within a context vNk(g) that can elicit implications gak⊃xωik ⊂ gH
(
H ′k
)
more preferable than any associated with any other feasible action a∗k ∈ B - the marketer i = ωi
can alter behaviour from an act a∗k 6⊃ xωik to an act a′k ⊃ xωik. This seems simple, but we must
recognise that unless the marketer wants to rely on luck, they must have some understanding in
their own mind gH (H ′i ) of the implications gai⊃vωik of selecting ai ⊃ vωik. This ought contain
some understanding of how that information vωik ⊂ vNk(g) will be perceived by k in the context
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vNk(g), ρk
(
vωik ⊂ vNk(g)
)
, how those percepts interact within k’s understanding of their world
gH (Hk) to generate implications gak ⊂ gH
(
H ′k
)
for selecting this course of action or that, and
the preferability attached to those implications  ◦2gH(H ′k).
We might think this a hopeless task, for we know human beings to be highly variegated and
intricate in their thought, but this is as a whole, within gH (Hk). The considerations attendant
upon particular courses of action, the implications gak⊃xωik ⊂ gH
(
H ′k
)
are more often of a rela-
tively simple nature. They must be, for human beings are cognitively constrained. Marketing
has long recognised that the implications gak⊃xωik ⊂ gH
(
H ′k
)
are not impossible to understand:
“People don’t seem to be reasonable. But people do act with purpose. Their be-
haviour makes sense if you think about it in terms of its goals, of people’s needs
and their motives. That seems to be the secret of understanding or manipulating
people.”
(Packard, 1957, p.22)
And they do not need to contain particularly much, because individuals need to make decisions
quickly with what limited cognitive capacity they have (remembering Simon (1947, p.119)
from p.114 above).
Marketing is a very subtle art however, and theorem 11 and corollary 2 make this clear in
the dependence of their provisions on the context vNk(g) of individual k’s environment. The
context vNk(g) is holistic, it is all the information contained within the environment, not of
i = ωi, but of k. The marketer i = ωi needs - if they are not to design vωick ⊂ vNk(g) by accident
- to be aware of any alternatives within A′i of a first order significance and how they play into
the preferability  ◦2gH(H ′i) of implications {gak}ak⊂A′i . Other marketers will be presenting
information in as strategic a manner as i = ωi is, which effects whether vωick ⊂ vNk(g) exists
which satisfies corollary 2, and if so, what form it takes. There is tacit knowledge within vNk(g)
concerning social norms which cannot be expressed particularly well linguistically (Polanyi,
1967) which nonetheless plays an important role in swaying the preferability of implications
◦2gH(H ′i), which means the marketer needs be an astute sociologist as well as psychologist. The
marketer i = ωi themselves is the source of information in their physical appearance. “Erotic
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capital” - the ability of the marketer to elicit pleasant connections between the action ak=ck ⊃
xωick and their sexuality in the mind of k (Hakim, 2010) - can as a result of its relating to the
powerful sex drive (Maslow, 1943; Lester, 1995) contribute major persuasiveness to particular
implications {gak}ak⊂A′i .
The marketer can exploit a great deal of behavioural phenomena. Depending on the context
vNk(g), multiple “selves” of k may be elicited, which will affect the context gH (H
′
i ) out of which
the implications gak⊃xωik are constructed (Elster, 1986; Ainslie, 1986; Rorty, 1986). A “reflec-
tive”, “cautious”, “forward looking” self gH (Hi)λ ⊂ gH (Hi) is unlikely to form associations
concerning an impulse purchase with as great a preferability as a “spontaneous”, “impulsive”,
“myopic” self gH (Hi)λ ′ ⊂ gH (Hi). Emotions elicited within gH (H ′i ) ≈ gH (Hi)λ ′ may over-
whelm more “objective” considerations which would have a greater influence in gH (Hi)λ ⊂
gH (Hi) by virtue of their visceral nature (Elster, 1998; Loewenstein, 1996, 2000; Baddeley,
2010, 2013). Salience - the “noticeability” or “availability” of information vωik ⊂ vNk(g) within
the context vNk(g) to the senses of k - is critical to the ability of the marketer i = ωi to elicit
the necessary implications gak⊃xωik ⊂ gH
(
H ′k
)
of the act ak ⊃ xωik for it to be most prefer-
able11. Information presented by a marketer may be “drowned out” by the efforts of other
marketers to catch the attention of k’s perception of vNk(g), but equally they can “drown out”
unpleasant information about their product. “Anchors”, δ ∈ Hk to which actions ak may be
relative (such as relative income, consumption, past consumption habits) can be suppressed or
elicited in order that the “loss-aversion” or “risk-seeking viz losses” commonly observed (Kah-
neman and Tversky, 1979) in the preferability of implications gak⊃xωik can be manipulated to
make the implications of ak ⊃ xωik more or less preferable as the situation demands. If indi-
viduals are loss-averse, and base their considerations on a dyad xωikRxωik,δδ ⊂ {H
′
i gH (H
′
i )}
marketers may exploit the phenomenon of “conspicuous consumption” (Veblen, 1899; Duesen-
berry, 1949; Frank, 2011) where assessments of outcomes good and bad are based on relative
position rather than absolute.
A fundamental constraint, however, without the marketer beginning to alter the mind gH (Hk)
of the individual k itself, is the existence of “no-go zones”, things that a customer finds unac-
11This is intended to be elaborated in theorem 10 of Markey-Towler (2015).
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ceptable. It might be that there are actions ak ⊃ xωik which satisfy the conditions of definition 7,
and exist therefore in a “no-go zone” and which will not be selected if at all possible (theorem
7). This relates somewhat to Earl’s notion (Earl, 1983, 1986a,b) of the “fit” of a product with a
“lifestyle”, defined as the system of personal constructs gH (Hk), the way individual k “looks at
the world”. No-go zones are the very definition of a “misfit” with a “lifestyle”, they contradict
the basic needs upon which that lifestyle is built and toward the satiation of which actions are
selected. “No-go zones” may be quite fluid of course, because the non-satiation relation upon
which they are predicated (definition 7) may not be elicited. But when they are elicited, the
needs which form the basis for no-go zones form a deep constraint on what a marketer i = ωi
can influence k to select.
But further, it might be case that the marketer is making a bid to change the individual
k’s worldview gH (Hk) itself. Again the marketer i = ωi presents information vωik ⊂ vNk(g),
this time in a bid to present apparent relations Rhh′ ∈ ρk
(
vωik ⊂ vNk(g)
)
to the individual k’s
perception of the environment which become part of implications gak⊃xωik ⊂ gH (Hk) attached
to the action ak ⊃ xωik. As we are concerned with a bid by the marketer i = ωi to have new
ideas gak⊃xωik about the product xωik incorporated within gH (Hk) the factors influencing this
matter are those developed in the “made to stick: evolution of consumption” theorem (theo-
rem 1). Those ideas gak⊃xωik ⊂ gH (Hk) about a product which have an increased likelihood
pk
(
gak⊃xωik ⊂ gH (Hk)
)
of incorporation by k are those ideas which in another sense now “fit”
with the lifestyle expressed in gH (Hk). Three points are of interest.
Firstly, the implications gak⊃xωik of a product xωik ⊂ ak have a better “fit” with the lifestyle
of k, and are more likely to be incorporated gak⊃xωik ⊂ gH (Hk), if the marketer can present
the information vωik ⊂ vNk(g) supporting the perception ρk
(
vωik ⊂ vNk(g)
)
of the links Rhh′ ⊂
gak⊃xωik such that those links are neither particularly dissonant with the rest of gH (Hk), nor
would be at the “core” of that personality. This is the implication of conditions 4. and 5. of the
“made to stick: evolution of consumption” theorem (theorem 1). The implications of a product
are more likely to be incorporated, the marketer i the more likely to be able to influence the
content of k’s mind, the less that idea would change connections at the “center” of the network
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that is gH (Hk), and the fewer relations Rhh′ ∈ gH
(
H ′k
)
that idea contradicts - is dissonant with12.
Secondly, as explored above (subsection 5.1.2), the “made to stick: evolution of consump-
tion” theorem elaborates on the insights of New Consumer Theory and means-end chain mar-
keting. The challenge of the marketer is to get the buyer to “connect products with self”, to in-
corporate the necessary remaining links that there exist the necessary chains gak⊃xωik ⊂ gH (Hk)
for the action ak ⊃ xωik to be selected. Condition 2. of theorem 1 confirms this notion, similarly
to the idea of Heath and Heath (2007) that new ideas need to “hook” onto existing ideas, that if
marketers can exploit the pre-existence of chains
{
gak⊃xωik ⊂ gH (Hk)
}
\
{
Rxωikα ∈ α (xωik)
}
relating attributes to their implications they are more likely to “fit” their product into the
lifestyle of k.
Finally, the “made to stick: evolution of consumption” theorem gives us an explanation for
the tendency of marketers in the contemporary world to recognise the power of “simple” and
“emotive” ideas. “Good” advertisements promulgated by i = ωi try to suggest one or perhaps
two simple links {Rhh′} ⊂ gak⊃xωik to the individual concerning the implications gak⊃xωik of
ak ⊃ xωik, and condition 1. of the theorem tells us this ceteris paribus makes that idea more
likely to be incorporated within gH (Hk). “Good” advertisements also go for “depth” of the
percepts h′ in the few relations Rhh′ they try to suggest to k’s perception, by which it is meant
“deep” visceral factors within the psyche h′ ∈ Ψ ⊂ Hi (Packard, 1957, Ch.3). Condition 3.
of the theorem explains why this is the case: “visceral” factors are more salient almost by
definition, and thus relations which elicit them are more likely to be incorporated into gH (Hk).
12It is interesting to note a theoretical point concerning how condition 4. of theorem 1 relates to a well-known
problem in economics; the famous “market for lemons” (Akerlof, 1970). In its more advanced development it is
the phenomenon “pooling strategies” by marketers in which all marketers will claim to have a high-quality product
(or, strictly speaking, price it as such as a signal) (Jehle and Reny, 2011, s.8.1), so that no advantage comes from
producing a higher quality product at a higher cost - there is “adverse selection” of low-quality along with high-
quality. Part of the reason for this is the understanding arrived at by buyers that there is a disconnect between the
signal and the reality of the product quality, the buyer knows in a “pooling strategies” situation that both high and
low quality goods cannot be discerned a priori. Condition 4. suggests a foundation for this knowledge, a ground
for the stability of this situation, and (in conjunction with the difference between connections gak⊃xωik a priori and
ex post) a means by which the situation may collapse and “adverse selection” be resolved. Firstly, the individual
in a “pooling strategy” situation will come to understand that all marketers will uniformly claim a high quality for
their goods - and any claim by a marketer that their good is of a higher quality than any other is dissonant with
this fact. This therefore, secondly, makes the situation of “pooling strategies” quite stable, for it is difficult for
any one marketer to persuade customers that their product is of a higher quality than another. However, finally,
the situation whereby low quality goods are selected along with high quality goods might collapse if, as is likely,
customers sample and accept the consequences apparent to their senses of selecting different products which
determine the quality of different goods, such that the suggestions of low-quality marketers becomes dissonant
with the knowledge of their low-quality product.
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The “good” marketer works out how to present a simple dyad xωikRxωikψψ to the buyer so that
they don’t even sell their product so much as they sell “happiness”, “freedom from pain” and
of course “sex”. The “stakes” in this matter are high: notice that if the visceral factor ψ in
the dyad xωikRxωikψψ is accepted, and is a need rather than a want, the product xωik becomes a
pre-requisite by definition 5, and must be selected by k when it is possible to do so (theorem
6). But simply reducing the idea the marketer wants to present to a dyad xωikRxωikψψ does
not mean the relation Rxωikψ will be incorporated, for we must remember also that this relation
may be highly dissonant with the individual’s notion of themselves, and, by virtue of the basic
nature of needs, be an idea that changes the “core” of who they are.
Thus stands the problem of the marketer. They must be reasonably astute psychologists and
sociologists - understanding how the individual they interact with thinks, what their lifestyle is,
and how to present information either that their product “fits” with that lifestyle, or to change
that lifestyle in order that their products be thought of in a different manner.
5.4 Recapitulation
We have now considered how the individual responds to and acts to influence their neigh-
bourhood within the economic system Es which allows us now to understand how individual
behaviours act in concert to determine the structure and function of the system. The essential
aspects of our model are recapitulated in table 5.1. Observe again its relative simplicity. The
model itself is contained in the first four rows. All the rest is so much mere elaboration to make
clear how the model applies to the economic individual.
The implications ga
i=ci∨{ωi∈n j} of courses of action ai=ci∨{ωi∈n j} available to the individual
i = ci∨
{
ωi ∈ n j
}
, specifically, the manner in which they relate, ultimately, courses of action
to the visceral factors they elicit and satisfy, provide even deeper constraints on behaviour than
the sets B. We have seen how these implications, the aesthetics of them, determine whether
different goods and services are substitutable for each other, or complement one another. We
have also seen that the way these implications construe relations with respect to needs in the
“deep” they determine what connections
{
ci∨ωi ∈ n j
}
nk ∈ g(N) must be made if possible,
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must be made together, and those that must not be made.
We have also seen that the “made to stick” theorem as applies to the idea that is the impli-
cation chain ga
i=ci∨{ωi∈n j} provides us with a theory of the evolution of consumption, as well as,
in concert with the “Schumpeter” theorem, a theory of the evolution of production behaviour -
innovation. And the ability of an individual to change the information environment of another,
thereby eliciting different sets of implications ga
i=ci∨{ωi∈n j} ⊂ gH (Hi) than might otherwise
have been, and suggest ideas to the other individual provides us with a model on which to base
our considerations of management and marketing behaviour in organisations.
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Part III
Interactions: What structures arise, and
how do they evolve?
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Chapter 6
Interactions in economic systems: what
structures arise?
With the anima provided to our taxonomy (table 3.1) by our psychology of economic behaviour
(table 5.1) we may now begin to understand how the structure and function g(N) of the eco-
nomic system Es is determined. First we must consider some matters of defining the relation
between individual decisions about behaviour and the interactions they form thereby within Es.
We will then consider how the structure of Es relates to the structure of the market system Ms,
for which it forms the primitive physical basis. These matters in hand, we will consider some
immediately apparent “deep” constraints upon the structures within Es, and thus Ms which are
born of the existence of needs (the corollaries of theorem 5). The factors governing the forma-
tion of the structure of Es and Ms on a granular basis will be elaborated in the Mauss-Commons
and the Smith-Hayek theorems, which respectively regulate which non-market and market con-
nections will and will not arise. Before concluding by elaborating upon how these provide a
theory of incompleteness in Es and Ms (thus allowing for their evolution) we will engage in
some auxiliary considerations; specifically, how the structure of the system Es is unique up to
creativity, and the scientific philosophical consequences of this.
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6.1 Formation of structure out of individual behaviour
We have in the psychology of economic behaviour (table 5.1), a model of the economic be-
haviour of the individual, in equation 4.6 and the economic contents of action, (equations
4.27 and 4.58). By definition, the economic contents of action, insofar as they are vectors[
xnin j mnin j
]
of exchanges of goods and services and mediums of exchange, are the contents
of connections in economic systems Es (equation 3.2). So we say that an economic connection
exists if a non-empty economic interaction - exchanges of goods and services and mediums of
exchange
[
xnin j mnin j
]
- with n j is contained within the decisions of the individual or organi-
sation ni. That is,
nin j ∈ g(N) ⇐⇒ a∗i=ci ∨
{
a∗k=ωk
}
ωk∈ni ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
] 6= /0 (6.1)
Thus forming up the graph g(N)⊂ Es of the economic system Es we obtain
g(N) =
{
nin j : a∗i=ci ∨
{
a∗k=ωk
}
ωk∈ni ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
] 6= /0} (6.2)
where, it is perhaps redundant to add that the contents of those connections nin j ∈ g(N) are
the exchanges decided upon by the individual or organisation ni:
[
nin j ∈ g(N)
]
=
[
xnin j mnin j
]⊂ a∗i=ci ∨{a∗k=ωk}ωk∈ni (6.3)
We are not so concerned as the sociologist with the determination of social systems Is,
but as economics cannot be divorced from their study, it does us well to recognise that in
social systems, as in economic systems, a connection exists if a non-empty social interaction -
exchange of information
[
vnin j
]
- with n j is contained within the decisions of the individual or
organisation ni:
nin j ∈ gv (N) ⇐⇒ a∗i=ci ∨
{
a∗k=ωk
}
ωk∈ni ⊃
[
vnin j
] 6= /0 (6.4)
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Thus, again forming up the graph gv (N)⊂ Is of the social system Is we obtain
gv (N) =
{
nin j : a∗i=ci ∨
{
a∗k=ωk
}
ωk∈ni ⊃
[
vnin j
] 6= /0} (6.5)
where, again, it is perhaps redundant to add, the contents of those connections nin j ∈ g(N)
are the interactions decided upon by the individual or organisation ni:
[
nin j ∈ gv (N)
]
=
[
vnin j
]⊂ a∗i=ci ∨{a∗k=ωk}ωk∈ni (6.6)
So, to summarise, substituting 6.3 into 6.2 and 6.6 into 6.5 and reorganising the statement
a little; the economic system is the collection of individuals and organisations N and relations
g(N) between them
Es = {N g(N)} (6.7)
where the relations are consisted of exchanges of goods, services and mediums of exchange
g(N) =
{[
xnin j mnin j
] 6= /0⊂ a∗i=ci ∨{a∗k=ωk}ωk∈ni}ni∈N (6.8)
and the social system is the collection of individuals and organisations N and relations
gv (N) between them
Is = {N gv (N)} (6.9)
where the relations are consisted of exchanges of information
gv (N) =
{[
vnin j
] 6= /0⊂ a∗i=ci ∨{a∗k=ωk}ωk∈ni}ni∈N (6.10)
Before moving on to understanding what factors need be present for connections to be
included in g(N)⊂ Es, it is necessary to understand how the economic system, Es relates to the
market system Ms.
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6.1.1 Market systems out of economic systems: the emergence of market
structure
A market exchange exists when two individuals intentionally exchange one object for another.
The primitive physical basis for market exchange exists in Es in the exchange by one party ni
to another, n j of some goods and services xnin j , and the exchange by the other party n j to ni of
some mediums of exchange mn jni , the ratio between these objects being the rate of exchange,
or the price pnin j which ni will release the goods and services xnin j for mn jni . Summarised in
the equation of exchange, familiar to economists, a market exchange is a mutual exchange
mn jni = pnin jxnin j (6.11)
The market system is, like the economic system which constitutes its primitive physical
basis, a network between individuals and organisations
Ms = {N gMs (N)} (6.12)
The market system contains, obviously, the same elements N as the economic system. But
the relations between them collected together within g(N) are now comprised of market ex-
changes rather than their physical primitives. We will index connections nin j ∈ gMs (N) within
the market system Ms by the direction nin j of the exchange of goods and services xnin j , so any
connection in a market exchange is described by the exchange equation 6.11
[
nin j ∈ g(N)
]
=
[
mn jni = pnin jxnin j
]
(6.13)
What distinguishes the market system is the mutuality of exchange in the minds of individ-
uals engaged in it. Unless there is this understanding, this awareness that market exchange is
a connective act, a quid pro quo, it is merely coincidence that the one element ni exchanges
goods and services to n j and n j exchanges mediums of exchange to ni. Thus, where all that
is necessary and sufficient for an exchange to exist within Es is that the relevant objects be
contained within the actions of the relevant element in N (equation 6.7), there are two objects
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which must be contained within the actions of both parties to a market exchange. For a market
exchange nin j to exist, the primitive physical elements
[
xnin j mn jni
]
must be included within
the actions of both parties to the exchange (both parties to the transaction agree to engage in
it), but also, the ratio of exchange, the price pnin j , must also be included in the actions of both
parties to the exchange (in order that the act be a connective act, quid pro quo).
Formally, the existence of connections, market exchange, in the market system Ms are now
made conditional upon the two relevant objects being contained within the actions of the two
relevant individuals:
nin j ∈ gMs (N) ⇐⇒

[
xnin j mn jni
] 6= /0
pnin j : mn jni = pnin jxnin j
∈
a∗i=ci ∨
{
a∗k=ωk
}
ωk∈ni
&a∗j=c j ∨
{
a∗k′=ωk′
}
ωk′∈ni
(6.14)
Given the definition of the formation of economic systems Es ⊃ g(N) out of individual
actions {a∗i }i∈N (equation 6.7), the market system therefore emerges from, is mapped out of,
the economic system in general by reference to the actions of the individuals within the system
Es&{a∗i }i∈N →Ms (6.15)
Or, if we recognise that a∗i ⊂ {H ′i gH (H ′i )}, {H ′i gH (H ′i )} ⊂ ci ∨
{
ωi ∈ n j
}
and so
{H ′i gH (H ′i )} ⊂ Es:
Es→Ms (6.16)
such that, according to the definition of the contents of market exchange (equation 6.11)
and the conditions of their existence (6.14)
gMs (N) =
[mn jni = pnin jxnin j] :
[
xnin j mn jni
] 6= /0
& pnin j : mn jni = pnin jxnin j
∈
a∗i=ci ∨
{
a∗k=ωk
}
ωk∈ni
&a∗j=c j ∨
{
a∗k′=ωk′
}
ωk′∈ni

(6.17)
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6.1.2 “Deep structure”: constraints upon g(N) ⊂ Es caused by the exis-
tence of needs
Immediately, even before formulating the Mauss-Commons and Smith-Hayek theorems on
structures in Es and its emergent Ms, we can see that according to this definition, certain struc-
tures are forbidden from arising by theorems 5, 6 and 7. The existence of pre-requisites forbids
economic structures from arising in which, if it is possible to meet them, those pre-requisites
are not selected, and the existence of no-go zones forbids economic structures from arising in
which, if it is possible to avoid them, individuals’ acts overlap with no-go zones.
Theorem 13 (Certain structures g(N) ⊂ Es and gMs (N) ⊂ MS do not arise). Subject to the
realisation of a particular set of environments vNi(g) for economic individuals i= ci∨
{
ωi ∈ n j
}
,
any structure Es ⊃ g(N) and Ms ⊃ gMs (N) can only
1. not include within the set of connections
[
xnin j mnin j
] ⊂ g(N) ,gMs (N) elements of
pre-requisite spaces Pi for each individual i = ci∨
{
ωi ∈ n j
}
if they are not within the budget
set
2. contain within the set of connections
[
xnin j mnin j
] ⊂ g(N) ,gMs (N) elements of no-go
zones Zi for each individual i = ci ∨
{
ωi ∈ n j
}
if there is no element of the budget set which
does not include them.
If we imagine the primordial economic system Es, prior to the formation of any structure
g(N) and comprised only of elements N containing individuals in the process of coming to an
understanding of their environments vNi(g), theorem 13 functions as a sort of “first sweep” of
eliminations precluding potential g(N) ⊂ Es. It reveals “blocks” to the formation of structure
much as bedrock obstructs the flow of a river to the sea. If there is no other alternative, then this
obstacle - the existence of needs which create pre-requisites and no-go zones - to the formation
of structure, cannot stand in the path of the formation of structure. But if there is some other
outlet for the connective activities of elements in the system, then we will never see economic
structures arise in which the necessary connections for the obtention of pre-requisite items are
not made, and we will never see economic structures arise in which connections containing
elements of no-go zones are formed.
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These “deep” constraints on economic structure, born quite literally of necessity, now elu-
cidated, we may turn our attention to more immediate considerations in the determination of
the economic Es ⊃ g(N) and market Ms ⊃ gMs (N) systems on a granular basis. Specifically,
we may now ask of what factors are necessary and sufficient for non-market connections to
arise within Es, and what factors are necessary and sufficient for market connections to arise
within Es and Ms.
6.2 The Mauss-Commons Theorem: non-market structures
Our first inquiry into the structure of the economic system beyond the primordial concerns the
contents of Es which do not also constitute the primitive physical basis for market exchanges.
Such structures, connections, within the economic system Es are non-market exchanges - gifts,
charity, taxes and the like. We may formulate the necessary and sufficient conditions for non-
market exchange within what shall be called the “Mauss-Commons” theorem, after Marcel
Mauss, the pioneer of the sociology of gift, and John Commons, to date the greatest scholar
of the impact of the law upon the economy. The insights of Mauss constitute the basis for the
understanding of “voluntary” non-market exchanges, while Commons’ insights constitute the
basis for the understanding of “compulsory” non-market exchanges.
Theorem 14 (Mauss-Commons theorem). Define for convenience ℵ= ci∨{ωk ∈ ni} and sup-
pose for what follows that
[
xnin j mnin j
] 6= /0. The following conditions are necessary and
sufficient for the existence of a non-market exchange
[
nin j ∈ g(N)⊂ Es
]
/∈Ms
1. The individual or individuals within organisation ni are aware of the individual or or-
ganisation n j
n j ∈ ρℵ
(
vNℵ(g)
)
(6.18)
2. The individual or individuals within organisation ni are aware of the elements of a non-
market exchange to be formed with individual or organisation n j
[
xnin j mnin j
] ∈ ρℵ (vNℵ(g)) (6.19)
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3. The elements of a non-market exchange to be formed with individual or organisation
n j are contained within some action within individual or individuals within organisation ni ’s
budget set [
xnin j mnin j
]⊂ aℵ ∈ Bℵ (6.20)
4. The elements of a non-market exchange to be formed with individual or organisation are
contained within some action which individual or organisation ni considers to have preferable
implications when compared to those of all other feasible actions
[
xnin j mnin j
]⊂ aℵ : gaℵ  ga′ℵ ∀aℵ ∈ Bℵ (6.21)
5. Condition 6.14 is not met. There is no quid pro quo in the minds of individual or
organisation ni nor n j.
These conditions, though confirming our intuition with rigorous mathematical argument,
and ordering our thinking about research conducted into the more exact contents of the psy-
chology of non-market exchange seem almost trivial on first glance, prima facie. But on a more
careful examination, we find there to be important and informative subtlety.
Condition 1. requires that the individual ci∨{ωk ∈ ni} be aware of the individual or organ-
isation n j with whom they are to form a non-market exchange. This is fairly trivial, but observe
that it does not require that the individual ci ∨ {ωk ∈ ni} be directly connected to n j within
society, economy, or even be within their physical environment. It requires only that some
information within their social network, their economic network, or their physical locality be
the basis for their perception of n j. Either ci ∨{ωk ∈ ni} is made aware of n j by individuals
in their social network neighbourhood Ninci∨{ωk∈ni} (gv), their economic network neighbourhood
Ninci∨{ωk∈ni} (g), or they are in physical proximity to them. Connections may be formed between
individuals in Es who are not directly connected in Is, though we can imagine it would be rel-
atively easy to demonstrate that condition 1. implies that there must exist some path between
the two.
Condition 2. requires that the individual ci∨{ωk ∈ ni} be aware of the elements
[
xnin j mnin j
]
of non-market exchange with individual or organisation n j. This is again less trivial than it
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seems, for it does not simply say that this information be contained within the environment
vNci∨{ωk∈ni}(g)
, but that it must be contained within their perception of that particular environ-
ment, ρci∨{ωk∈ni}
(
vNci∨{ωk∈ni}(g)
)
. This is a more difficult requirement to satisfy than merely
presenting the information to ci∨{ωk ∈ ni}. Given the fact of the existence of salience in per-
ception, we will find it necessary for condition 2. for this information to have an impression
on the sensory organs above a certain threshold, it cannot be simply “lost amongst the noise”
of the environment. Or potentially, given the possibility of recursive dependence of ρi (·) upon
the structure of gH (Hi), it might be necessary for condition 2. to hold that the “right” infor-
mation be perceived which, through its connection in gH (Hi) to
[
xnin j mnin j
] ∈ Hi, leads to
its elicitation. It is intended to elaborate at greater length on these properties of perception in
Markey-Towler (2015).
Condition 3. requires that individual ci ∨ {ωk ∈ ni} find the selection of the elements[
xnin j mnin j
]
of non-market exchange with individual or organisation n j feasible. Obvious
enough, except we must remember that the question is not whether the elements
[
xnin j mnin j
]
alone are feasible, but whether they are contained within an action aci∨{ωk∈ni} ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
]
which is feasible. Rarely do we make any decision outside of a context, rarely will we be con-
sidering the selection of the elements
[
xnin j mnin j
]
in isolation, so that aci∨{ωk∈ni}=
[
xnin j mnin j
]
.
There will be other considerations in the decision process which may make any action aci∨{ωk∈ni}⊃[
xnin j mnin j
]
containing the elements of a non-market exchange infeasible. We require
[
xnin j mnin j
]
to be feasible in the context of the decision overall.
Condition 4. requires that the ci∨{ωk ∈ ni} find the selection of the elements
[
xnin j mnin j
]
of non-market exchange with individual or organisation n j to have implications more preferable
than any other course of action. Again, we must recognise that these elements are contained
in an action aci∨{ωk∈ni} ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
]
, which is rarely going to be such that the elements[
xnin j mnin j
]
can be divorced from a broader analysis. This condition is where both the no-
tion of complementarity (definition 9) and the definition of needs (definition 4) come to be
important. The action in question must not contradict any need which is elicited while there
exists another action which does satisfy that need. If this is the case, then this action will be less
preferable to some other feasible action. It might also be possible that the non-market exchange
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is complementary with some other part of the action aci∨{ωk∈ni} ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
]
, interacts with
other contents of aci∨{ωk∈ni} to make the implications of selecting it more preferable than other-
wise. And we must remember of course that the satisfaction of condition 4. is totally contingent
upon the individuals’ analysis gH (H ′i ) of the objects of reality H ′i ⊂ ρci∨{ωk∈ni}
(
vNci∨{ωk∈ni}(g)
)
perceived within their environment vNci∨{ωk∈ni}(g)
and thus the phenomena of preference reversal
and multiple selves (theorem 11 and discussion).
Condition 5. requires finally that the conditions for market exchange be not satisfied. In
order for the non-market exchange to not form the primitive physical basis, it is necessary that
there not be mutuality to the transaction which constitutes a quid pro quo - a mutual agreement
to exchange the one thing for the other. While we mean medium of exchange in a fairly strict
sense here as some object which is transferred in return for goods and services, we might
find upon a second glance market exchanges where we might have believed only non-market
exchanges to exist, for mediums of exchange may not take the form of the legal tender of a
particular political state.
To bring these abstract conditions closer reality, we might consider the conditions of the
Mauss-Commons theorem in the context of the two most immediate examples of non-market
exchanges: gifts (of which charity is a special case), and formally obligatory (i.e. legally
mandated) exchanges. Two forms of behaviour to which Mauss and Commons contributed
much respectively by way of understanding1.
With respect to obligatory exchanges, typically mandated by the government, condition 1.
emphasises the necessity of what might be called by theorists of political power a governmental
“presence” in the minds of its citizens. The reason uncontacted aboriginal tribes in the Northern
Territory or Papua New Guinea Territory did not pay their taxes nor receive the exchanges of
the Australian government was simply for that reason - they did not even know the Australian
1It is worth noting that another example we might have used is found in the rise in modern times of the
“sharing” economy, in which a good or service is provided gratis by a production organisation with pecuniary
objectives, but where the remuneration for the provision of that good or service is generated by the provision of
some goods and services to individuals other than who might be called the “primary” consumer. Instances of such
non-market exchanges have existed for quite some time, such as the commercial free-to-air broadcasters of radio
and television, who obtained remuneration through the sale of rights to have their advertising bundled with the
broadcasting material provided to consumers gratis. The contemporary providers in such non-market exchanges
are quite the largest, far-reaching and well-known corporations in the world: Facebook provides a communications
platform gratis, Google provides a service permitting users to search the internet gratis, YouTube provides music
and video gratis, all obtain revenues from the sale of advertising rights and information they collect on users.
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government existed. The government had no presence to them. Less extreme examples abode
wherever a government is particularly weak, so weak that citizens do not even become aware
of the government with whom they are supposed (by law) to interact when they are to interact
with it.
Condition 2. becomes a very interesting one in the context of mandated exchanges. The ac-
tive statutes of contemporary governments are large enough to fill libraries by themselves; the
United States government alone fairly routinely though notably enacting statutes some thou-
sands of pages long2. Not merely are statutes extensive in their provisions, they are often highly
complex, given the extreme number of contingencies they must make provision for even where
statute is supplemented by the common law. It is not difficult to imagine that complexity and the
sheer size of statute law may obscure what is and what is not mandated by way of non-market
exchange.
We understand why formally obligatory non-market exchanges are mandatory by under-
standing the place of institutions such as the law in the determination of preferences ◦2gH(Hi)
over the implications of courses of action. Commons (1924, 1931), as a pioneering institutional
economist, recognised that when we engage in any kind of economic behaviour, we are guided
by rules, social institutions being an important subset therein. Laws are a special case of so-
cial institutions which have the property of formality, being written in statute as a statement
of a rule (Hart, 1961; Lawson, 2012, 2015c; Searle, 2010) that “in situation j, i is k, and k is
associated with rights r, obligations o, and empowerments e”. These rights, obligations and
empowerments are typically also associated in the law with some galaxy of punishments for
transgression of the institution and rewards for adherence3. Condition 4. reminds us that we
cannot simply say an exchange mandated by law will be engaged in, because it may be that
the understanding of that law within  ◦2gH(H ′i) is insufficient to establish “legal” behaviour
as having implications more preferable than any other feasible action. Laws may well effect
preferences over act-implications trivially but it may be necessary to supplement laws with pun-
2By way of comparison, the author’s own copy of War and Peace is a little over a single thousand pages long,
his copy of IQ84 around the same and his copy of the Lord of the Rings trilogy about one and a half thousand
pages long. These examples picked, for each is actually a compendium of three already long individual books.
3It is discussed at length in appendix B how rules are represented in algorithmic long form as chains gH (Hi),
and have in their aesthetic content impact upon preference  ◦2gH (Hi).
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ishments for transgression, rewards for adherence, and provisions for the application of these
punishments.
Now consider the analysis of voluntary exchanges - specifically gifts. Condition 5. is of
particular interest in both cases. If condition 5. does not hold, and there is mutuality to the
exchange, and understanding of a quid pro quo, we are not faced with a non-market exchange.
When we give gifts, it is well known that sociologically there is some aspect of reciprocity in
the considerations of the gift ci ∨{ωk ∈ ni}, but this is not the sort of quid pro quo in which
there is an immediate exchange of the one thing for the other. Nonetheless, what appears to be
a voluntary non-market exchange of a gift may in fact not be, for the reason that there is some
non-obvious medium of exchange exchanged in return for goods and services.
With respect to gift giving, condition 4. is typically thought by economists to be satisfied
by the existence of some form of “warm glow” psychic wellbeing from altruistic giving to oth-
ers (Becker, 1993; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2011; Landry et al., 2006; Benz, 2007; Meier,
2007). Halfpenny (1999) characterises it nicely as a sort of “warm glow +” explanation of
how condition 4. might be satisfied - by assuming voluntary non-market exchanges generate
“utility”, or that “disutility” is born of breaking social rules about gift-giving/charity. Undoubt-
edly such a simple explanation is valid in some degree, it is a variant of the theory that there
is an innate desire on the part of individuals to see other individuals achieve their goals, and
that there is an innate desire to behave in a manner consistent with social norms concerning
charitable giving (Halfpenny, 1999; Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011). But slightly more complex
considerations go toward making the course of action aci∨{ωk∈ni} ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
]
preferable,
as, to use the words of Caplow (1984, p.1320), “gift exchange, in effect, is a language that
employs objects instead of words as its lexical elements”. They are an attempt to project into
the analysis of the receiver (but also the giver) a view of the personality of the giver and the
receiver (Schwartz, 1967, pp.2-3). They are more preferable to the giver ci ∨{ωk ∈ ni} they
are expected to surprise the recipient by their generosity, the more they affirm the strength and
value of a social relationship, and the more they can be expected to exploit or satisfy the princi-
ple of reciprocity (Caplow, 1984, pp.1315-1316). The implications gaci∨{ωk∈ni} of the exchange[
xnin j mnin j
]
express this rationale in the understanding of the individual. The uniformity and
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Figure 6.1: Mauss-Commons theorem as a logical test
concomitant inability of money to project a particularly nuanced personality or relationship
means these implications cannot be supported (Webley and Wilson, 1989), making it far less
likely to satisfy condition 4. of the Mauss-Commons theorem.
Of particular interest, finally to voluntary non-market exchange is condition 2. that the
individual be aware of the elements of a non-market exchange. In combination with condition
1. these requirements characterise the problem of “raising awareness” in charitable giving, the
knowledge of ci∨{ωk ∈ ni} of who is in need and what they are in need of, which are a major
factor relatively removed from the immediate control of the giver (Bekkers and Wiepking,
2011). But in gift exchange more broadly, condition 2. is a condition which can be extremely
difficult to satisfy - hence the common refrain “I don’t know what to get person n j” for festive
holidays. Unless the individual ci∨{ωk ∈ ni} is aware of what they may exchange to individual
or organisation n j, can perceive it in the information contained in their environment, the whole
question of whether or not a non-market exchange will arise is moot.
By way of conclusion, we would do well to note that the Mauss-Commons theorem, as it
formulates necessary and sufficient conditions for non-market exchanges to exist, constitutes
the departure point for policy analysis. It gives us a logical test (figure 6.1 ) for the design of
policy to encourage or discourage formation of non-market structures. If each of the conditions
1. through 5. (being sufficient) are satisfied through the influence of policymakers, then a non-
market exchange will come to exist, if any single one is not satisfied, then (being necessary)
a non-market exchange will not exist. Taking in hand this particular political ideology or that
political philosophy, the Mauss-Commons theorem may act as a guide for understanding why
the structure of an economic system Es may be inconsistent with the dictats of that politics,
and how policy may be designed such that that structure becomes consistent with it. Policy is a
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matter of “making connections” between the recipient and the provider of non-market exchange
(condition 1.), encouraging or engaging in communication of a particular type which ensures
the provider knows what exchange they may engage in (condition 2.), and also form an analysis
of the decision environment such that this exchange exists within in a feasible action (condition
3.) which has more preferable implications than any other feasible action (condition 4.).
6.3 The Smith-Hayek Theorem: market structures
Next we may inquire about the factors governing the structure and function of Es as the phys-
ical basis for the structure and function of the market system Ms. The necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of a market exchange nin j ∈ gMs (N)⊂Ms are formulated in what
shall be called the “Smith-Hayek” theorem, after Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek, the unpar-
alleled pioneers of the study of market systems. We shall see that inter alia, this theorem distills
the essence and formalises the insights of these great minds into the structure and function of
market systems.
Theorem 15 (Smith-Hayek theorem). Define for convenience ℵ = ci ∨ {ωk ∈ ni} and i =
c j∨
{
ωk′ ∈ n j
}
and suppose for what follows that
[
xnin j mn jni
] 6= /0. The following conditions
are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a market exchange
[
nin j ∈ g(N)⊂ Es
] ∈Ms
1. The individuals or individuals within organisations ni,n j are aware of each other
n j ∈ ρℵ
(
vNℵ(g)
)
&ni ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
2. The individuals or individuals within organisations ni,n j are aware of the elements to a
market exchange between them
[
xnin j mn jni
] ∈ ρℵ (vNℵ(g))∩ρi (vNi(g))
3. The elements of a market exchange to be formed between individuals or individuals
within organisations ni,n j are contained within some actions within individuals or individuals
142
within organisations ni,n j ’s budget sets
[
xnin j mn jni
]⊂ aℵ ∈ Bℵ
[
xnin j mn jni
]⊂ ai ∈ Bi
4. The elements of a market exchange to be formed between individuals or individuals
within organisations ni,n j are contained within some action which individuals or individuals
within organisations ni,n j consider to have preferable implications when compared to those of
all other feasible actions
[
xnin j mn jni
]⊂ aℵ : gaℵ  ga′ℵ ∀aℵ ∈ Bℵ
[
xnin j mn jni
]⊂ ai : gai  ga′i ∀ai ∈ Bi
5. The ratio of exchange mediating the market exchange, the price pnin j : mn jni = pnin jxnin j ,
is contained within the minds of the individuals or individuals within organisations ni,n j, and
within their perception of potential and realised behaviour
pnin j ∈ gH (Hℵ)∩gH (Hi) (6.22)
pnin j ∈ ρℵ
(
vaℵNℵ(g) ⊂ vNℵ(g)
)
∩ρi
(
vaiNi(g) ⊂ vNi(g)
)
(6.23)
pnin j ∈ ρℵ
(
va
∗
ℵ
Nℵ(g)
)
∩ρi
(
va
∗
i
Ni(g)
)
(6.24)
It should be fairly obvious that these conditions are very similar to the conditions of the
Mauss-Commons theorem, but for their emphasis on the mutuality which is necessary for eco-
nomic structures nin j ∈ g(N)⊂ Es to support market structures nin j ∈ gMs (N)⊂Ms.
Condition 1. requires that the individual ci ∨{ωk ∈ ni} and the individual c j ∨
{
ωk ∈ n j
}
who are potential parties to a market exchange be mutually aware of each other. This might
seem fairly trivial at first glance, and fairly easy to satisfy when both parties are in each other’s
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immediate socioeconomic neighbourhoods Nci∨{ωk∈ni} (g) and Nc j∨{ωk∈n j} (g). But if both par-
ties are not connected to each other at one remove, then they rely on the communications of
intermediaries in socioeconomic networks to make each aware of the other. Condition 1. re-
quires that some information within their social network, their economic network, or their
physical locality be the basis for their perception of each other. Again, connections may be
formed between individuals in Es who are not directly connected in Is, though we can imagine
it would be relatively easy to demonstrate that condition 1. implies that there must exist some
path between the two.
Granovetter (1973, 1983) showed how this condition might be critical to the formation of
economic structure with his “strength of weak ties” argument - that parties to market exchange
often do not know of each other directly, but are made aware of each other through intermedi-
aries in social networks. It also explains the existence, the necessity in fact, of “market-makers”
where ultimate buyers and sellers are not aware of each other. If we are not aware of someone’s
existence, we cannot interact with them, period, and market makers, by specialising in build-
ing what appears to be one market exchange, by being the common point in two dyads within
gMs (N), facilitate the exchange of goods and services between ultimate consumers and produc-
ers which would not otherwise exist because of the failure of condition 1. of the Smith-Hayek
theorem4.
Condition 2. requires that the individual ci ∨{ωk ∈ ni} and the individual c j ∨
{
ωk ∈ n j
}
who are potential parties to a market exchange be aware of the elements
[
xnin j mnin j
]
of mar-
ket exchange between them. Again, it does not simply say that this information be contained
within the environments vNci∨{ωk∈ni}(g)
, vN
c j∨{ωk∈n j}(g), but that it must be contained within per-
ception of those particular environments, ρci∨{ωk∈ni}
(
vNci∨{ωk∈ni}(g)
)
, ρc j∨{ωk∈n j}
(
vN
c j∨{ωk∈n j}(g)
)
.
It will be necessary for condition 2. for this information to have an impression on the sensory
organs above a certain threshold. It is necessary for it to be salient in the environment. Or
again, given the possibility of the dependence of ρi (·) upon the structure of gH (Hi) it might be
4Kirman (2011) has a nice diagram early in his book illustrating the social network structure of the canonical
Walrasian market model of neoclassical economics, which is a tripartite network of buyers, sellers, and Walrasian
auctioneer. In such models, the Walrasian auctioneer (actually a socialist planner) determines the equilibrium
price to be paid for goods and services with mediums of exchange, receives what each buyer and seller is willing
to exchange of these, pools them together, and rations them out according to the market price. Condition 1. is
satisfied by each buyer and seller being aware of the auctioneer, the market-maker.
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necessary for condition 2. to hold that the “right” information be perceived which, through its
connection in gH (Hi) to
[
xnin j mnin j
] ∈Hi, leads to its perception. Tacit knowledge (Polanyi,
1967) and “burying the lead” in advertising (Heath and Heath, 2007) are both particularly
salient in this regard. Again, it is intended to expand on these properties of perception at
greater length in Markey-Towler (2015).
Condition 3. requires that the individual ci ∨{ωk ∈ ni} and the individual c j ∨
{
ωk ∈ n j
}
who are potential parties to a market exchange find the selection of the elements
[
xnin j mnin j
]
of market exchange between them feasible. This is more or less the content of the neoclas-
sical theory of Walrasian markets, where prices must be adjusted so as for each buyer to
be able to afford what each seller offers. But again we must remember that the question is
not whether the elements
[
xnin j mnin j
]
alone are feasible, but whether they are contained
within actions aci∨{ωk∈ni} ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
]
and ac j∨{ωk∈n j} ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
]
which is feasi-
ble. Individual market exchanges take their place amongst a bundle of other actions within
aci∨{ωk∈ni} ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
]
and ac j∨{ωk∈n j} ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
]
, which may mean that an indi-
vidual market exchange is not feasible within a particular context. We require
[
xnin j mnin j
]
to
be feasible for both potential parties to a transaction in the context of the decision overall.
Condition 4. is particularly crucial and particularly intricate. Though prima facie it simply
requires that the individual ci∨{ωk ∈ ni} and the individual c j ∨
{
ωk ∈ n j
}
who are potential
parties to a market exchange find the selection of the elements
[
xnin j mnin j
]
of market ex-
change between them to have implications mutually more preferable than any other course
of action. But we must remember that the satisfaction of condition 4., and thus the exis-
tence of the market exchange containing
[
xnin j mnin j
]
is totally contingent upon the indi-
viduals’ analyses gH (H ′ℵ), gH
(
H ′i
)
of the objects of reality H ′ℵ ⊂ ρci∨{ωk∈ni}
(
vNci∨{ωk∈ni}(g)
)
,
H ′i ⊂ ρc j∨{ωk∈n j}
(
vN
c j∨{ωk∈n j}(g)
)
perceived within their environment vNci∨{ωk∈ni}(g)
. The ex-
istence of market exchanges becomes then contingent upon the phenomena of preference re-
versal and multiple selves (theorem 11 and discussion), contingent upon the socioeconomic
systemic environment individuals find themselves in.
Recognising here also that these elements are contained in actions aci∨{ωk∈ni}⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
]
and ac j∨{ωk∈n j} ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
]
, which are rarely going to be such that the elements
[
xnin j mnin j
]
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can be divorced from a broader analysis is to recognise the importance of complementarity in
market exchanges. We often find that certain goods and services obtained through market ex-
change are more preferable together than they are alone (definition 9). The complementarity of
objects together may either make their co-presence within an action decisive for the satisfaction
of condition 4.
We must also recognise in order for condition 4. to be satisfied that the action in question
must not contradict any need which is elicited while there exists another action which does
satisfy that need. The market exchange must exist in actions aci∨{ωk∈ni} ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
]
and
ac j∨{ωk∈n j} ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
]
neither of which have stray into no-go zones (definition 7, theorem
7), nor which no overlap with the set of pre-requisites (definition 5, theorem 6). Otherwise that
market exchange can only be selected if there is no feasible alternative action which does not
fail to overlap the set of pre-requisites or avoid no-go zones.
Finally, we must not forget condition 5., for it is the primary means by which we discern
between non-market and market exchanges. It requires that the individual ci∨{ωk ∈ ni} and the
individual c j ∨
{
ωk ∈ n j
}
who are potential parties hold in their mind some knowledge of the
ratio of exchange mediating the market exchange, the price pnin j : mn jni = pnin jxnin j . We might
call this the “institutional knowledge” condition. It also requires in the second subcondition
information corresponding to that knowledge to be included within the information in both
environments corresponding to that behaviour - what we might call the “percieved quid pro
quo” condition. This, together with the requirement of the third subcondition - which we might
call the “percieved adherence” condition - ensures that the selection of the elements of market
exchange
[
xnin j mnin j
]
is a connective act, trading the one thing for another at a price. Both
parties must expect to receive something in return for their exchange to the other. If this is not
the case, there is no consciousness of a quid pro quo, and we simply have a happenstance where
goods and services are exchanged by one party to another, and the other party exchanges some
medium of exchange back, but not in return, and not mediated by a ratio of exchange. This
condition thus contains the essence of the insights of the early institutional economists into the
importance of prices as means of coordinating expectations (Commons, 1924, 1931; Hamilton,
1919).
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This “Smith-Hayek” theorem is so called for it formalises some of the most potent ideas
ever put forth in economic analysis, those of Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek about the func-
tion of market systems. It distills the essence of their thought into the five relatively simple
conditions formulated above, and demonstrates logico-mathematically the truth of their argu-
ments about the structure and function of economic systems.
Friedrich Hayek throughout his life returned again and again to the theme of knowledge
- how knowledge contributes to the formation of economic structure and function. His view
and understanding of the economy as a complex system is arguably one of the most insightful,
perceptive, and profound of all time - one could easily argue that the present work merely
constitutes a formalisation of his vision. His early papers Hayek (1937) and Hayek (1945) are
undeniably the greatest expositions of the process of organisation in markets ever set forth.
He argued that very little knowledge indeed is required for the formation of economic struc-
ture. The individual need not have any knowledge of the system Es = {N g(N)} as a whole
at all, nor particularly of any other individual. All they need know is how from their partic-
ular location in the economic system they may obtain the material necessities of life through
production and consumption behaviour. That is all5. Demand and supply will then coordinate
through interactions in these localities and determine the structure and function of the system
as a whole. Dispersed information and knowledge is, in a sense, aggregated through these in-
dividual interactions and reflected in the structure and function of the economic system as a
whole, Es, so that the products for satiating their needs and desires are produced by the passage
of goods and services and mediums of exchange through chains in g(N) ⊂ Es, despite no one
individual knowing much more about these chains other than their particular position within
them:
“The order of the extended economy is, and can be, formed... from an evolved
5Both early (Hayek, 1937) and late (Hayek, 1989) in his career, this view would put Hayek in a somewhat
strained relationship with the neoclassical, the Keynesian, the New Keynesian and of course the Marxist schools
of thought. All these schools up to that point (and still somewhat in the modern day, especially in the core of
the neoclassical school), assumed that individuals had complete knowledge; of every possible individual with
whom to interact, every possible bundle of goods and services they could obtain, of their own preferences, and
of course unbounded cognitive capabilities to compute all this information to maximise preferences. To Hayek
this was inconsistent with the reality of economic structure and function, and in a dangerous manner, giving the
illusion that the economy could be computed like an engineering problem if only the requisite information could
be obtained, and indeed using “off the shelf” mathematics borrowed from engineering. He went so far as to use
his Nobel prize acceptance speech (Hayek, 1989) to voice this concern.
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method of communication that makes it possible to transmit, not an infinite mul-
tiplicity of reports about particular facts, but merely certain abstract properties of
several particular conditions, such as competitive prices, which must be brought
into mutual correspondence to achieve overall order.”
(Hayek, 1988, p.84)
Let us fuse this vision with the five Smith-Hayek conditions above by blending Hayek’s lan-
guage of knowledge, coordination and order with our mathematics. The order of a market sys-
tem gMs ⊂Ms which emerges out of an economy Es is formed on a granular basis by the creation
of a market exchange nin j ∈ gMs (N)⊂Ms, which, theorem 15 shows, requires very little knowl-
edge. Communication, and the transmission of information vNci∨{ωk∈ni}(g)
, vN
c j∨{ωk∈n j}(g) within
the socioeconomic environment, when perceived ρci∨{ωk∈ni} (·), ρc j∨{ωk∈n j} (·) must make the
individuals aware of each other within their socioeconomic locality (condition 1. of theorem
15), and the potential elements of market exchange between them (condition 2. of theorem 15).
Perception generates knowledge (to use Hayek (1952) a “model”) gH
(
ρci∨{ωk∈ni}
(
vNci∨{ωk∈ni}(g)
))
,
gH
(
ρc j∨{ωk∈n j}
(
vN
c j∨{ωk∈n j}(g)
))
, which must reflect an understanding for both individuals
that the elements for market exchange exist within a feasible action (condition 3. of theorem
15). And this information, perception and knowledge must lead to a coordination of preferred
courses of action (condition 4. of theorem 15). That is to say, each individual must have just
sufficient knowledge to establish the implications of a course of action for both parties contain-
ing this exchange to be more preferable than any other. Economic structures g(N) ⊂ Es and
gMs (N)⊂Ms form out of these myriad coordinations of individual interactions.
Taken together, when we think about them a little, the Smith-Hayek conditions set out as-
tonishingly small requirements by way of information and knowledge compared wit the com-
plexity of the systems they govern the formation of. This reflects Hayek’s realisation that fairly
straightforward interactions on an individual level, when in concert, can generate great com-
plexity in the overall system. These conditions, formalisations of Hayek (1937, 1945, 1988)
and based on a psychology in part inspired by Hayek (1952), are satisfied by two individuals
knowing each other, knowing one has some money, one has some good or service and each
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thinking that inter alia, trading the one for the other would lead to the best outcomes. Informa-
tion from, and knowledge of but their own locality, nothing more.
Hayek (1988) made much of the idea that this knowledge need not even necessarily be
“knowledge” in the traditional sense but rather simple rule structures. Mario Rizzo (forthcom-
ing) reminds us of the equal coexistence and subtle relation of reason and rule following as
determinants of behaviour critical to Hayek’s thought. Condition 4. of the Smith-Hayek the-
orem is as satisfied by the application and adherence to the dictats of a behavioural rule as
by any number of complex reasoning processes (see appendix B). This is the foundation for
our economic systems in all their unfathomable complexity - the co-ordination of individuals
acting on the basis of knowledge structures ranging from complex, multi-faceted reasoning
about a long-term mega-investment to the quotidian rule that one needs buy a carton of milk on
Mondays.
Turning now to the father of our discipline, Adam Smith; he is so because of his genius
in recognising the range of content knowledge structures gH
(
ρci∨{ωk∈ni}
(
vNci∨{ωk∈ni}(g)
))
,
gH
(
ρc j∨{ωk∈n j}
(
vN
c j∨{ωk∈n j}(g)
))
may contain which lead to coordination of market ex-
change. There isn’t any particular need for these structures to be benevolent and other-regarding,
they may be perfectly self-regarding and still support the coordination of trade, of market ex-
change (Smith, 1776)6. It is almost gauche now to quote the example in the Wealth of Nations
(1776) which he used to illustrate this point, but it is potent. We don’t address ourselves to
the benevolence of the butcher or the baker to obtain our dinner. We address ourselves to their
self interest by offering to give them something they want in exchange for what we want. Each
party has something that the other can use for themselves - a good or service to use for con-
sumption or production, some money for the purchase of the same - and they simply trade in
order to obtain each of themselves what they themselves need and/or want.
This was an extension upon his earlier work, the Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), in
which Smith investigated the centrality and importance of what he called sympathy, but which
6Note that recognising the broad range of knowledge which may support market exchange, so broad that
regard of the other is not particularly necessary for market exchange, is most certainly not the same as claiming
that markets function best when knowledge is only self-regarding. This is the basis for great misunderstanding
of Smith by all political ideologies, Left and Right, and a remarkable inability by many to understand why in his
earlier work he claimed other-regard to be so important for human civilisation.
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we might confuse now a little with empathy - the ability of individuals to consider others’
needs and desires in their understanding of the world. The reasoning individual assuming the
mantel of the “impartial spectator” is predicated on their ability to understand the reactions
of all people, not just one person, to a particular situation. Smith saw that this empathy, the
ability to consider the impact of actions upon others, was at the core of a civilisation, it was
what prevented the descent into the barbarity of each pursuing their own self-interest without
scruple. Wealth of Nations showed that it was not particularly necessary that human beings
be other-regarding in order for market systems to function, that the material necessities of life
might be obtained from a fairly self-interested society, Theory of Moral Sentiments showed
that sympathetic/empathetic motivations would make the function of society a little easier, less
base, more civilised.
Again, let us fuse this vision - Wealth of Nations and Theory of Moral Sentiments together -
with the five Smith-Hayek conditions above. Smith’s insights pertain the content of knowledge
structures necessary to support market exchange, condition 4. This condition are robust to
the exact content of that knowledge, the only requirement it places is that the aesthetics of
that knowledge are such that the implications of the action containing the elements of market
exchange are preferable over all other actions. Those actions may be purely self-regarding,
relating the elements of market exchange
[
xnin j mnin j
]
to personal needs and desires only,
or equally, they may consider the needs and desires of the other individual, which we could
imagine (so long as the relevant party is not malicious or vindictive), would serve to ease the
process of coordination by aligning preferable implications to a greater extent to the particular
exchange in question7.
So, Hayek showed just how little information is needed for economic structure to form,
mostly the content of conditions 1., 2. and 4. of his theorem, Smith showed just what a broad
range of content could be in knowledge in order for that structure to form, mostly the content
of condition 4. of his theorem but also 3. to some extent. It is interesting that the neoclassical
7The Smith-Hayek condition is thus a rigorous economic analogue of Social Exchange Theory, a framework
which studies social systems as formed out of individual decisions about interaction, and frames individual de-
cisions as in the pursuit of satiating certain motivations, social exchange arising when these motivations align so
that the exchange is mutually beneficial (Knox, 1963; Emerson, 1976). Nord (1973) argues that Social Exchange
Theory, already influenced by the economic approach to economic systems, is actually the direct descendant of
Adam Smith.
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Figure 6.2: Smith-Hayek theorem as a logical test
school of economics, which claims the inheritance of Smith and Hayek, and with its central
focus on prices and the constraints on preference, has all but exclusively focused its attention
on the undeniably important, but somewhat trivial, condition 3. which is the only place prices
enter directly a priori into the decision process other than by linking the two elements of market
exchange together in a connective act. Hayek and Smith of course make much of price as a
reflection of value, but their primary focus, even in this, is on knowledge - price takes its place
amongst the knowledge of the individual about their environment.
By way of conclusion, we would do well to note that like the Mauss-Commons theorem,
the Smith-Hayek theorem, as it formulates necessary and sufficient conditions for non-market
exchanges to exist, constitutes the foundation for policy analysis. It gives us a logical test (the
structure of which is given in figure 6.2 ) for the design of policy to encourage or discourage
formation of market structures. The Smith-Hayek conditions, 1. through 5., are sufficient, and
thus if each of them are met a market exchange will come to exist. If any one of them is not met,
their being necessary means a market exchange will not exist. As with the Mauss-Commons
theorem, taking in hand this particular politics, the Smith-Hayek theorem may act as a guide
for understanding why the structure of a market system Ms may be inconsistent with the dictats
of that politics, and how policy may be designed such that the structure becomes consistent
with the dictats of that politics.
In the Smith-Hayek theorem we have revealed available to the policymaker a number of
means by which policy may obstruct market structures from arising, and a number of means
by which it must operate in order to encourage structures to arise. Policy to encourage market
structures arising is a matter of “making connections” between potential market participants
(condition 1.), ensuring the information is available to both that they know what exchange they
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may engage in (condition 2.). It must ensure the environment contains information such that
potential participants form an analysis of the decision environment such that the elements of ex-
change takes its place in a feasible action (condition 3.) which has more preferable implications
than any other feasible action (condition 4.). And it must ensure that there is a stable expec-
tation in the minds of both parties to market exchange that there will be a mutual exchange, a
quid pro quo mediated by the ratio of exchange, the price (condition 5.). By contrast, policy
to obstruct market structures from arising need only break one particular condition: awareness
of the other party to and elements of market exchange, feasibility, preferability of implications,
expected mutuality, and the market exchange will not arise.
The Smith-Hayek theorem reveals available to the policymaker a drastically expanded
means of influencing market structure, drastically expanded beyond the traditional method of
manipulating prices. It provides a formal and rigorous theoretical foundation for developing
wholesale the approach to economic policy set forth by Thaler and Sunstein (2008) which seeks
to structure the decision environment to influence decision processes, rather than simply rely
on altering the price ratio in the hope that buyer or seller behaviour is responsive to prices.
It gives this approach direction, a systematic view of all the factors at play in the formation
of market structures which has hitherto been lacking in a field of individuated, disconnected
policy experiments. Open to policymakers is the process of public reasoning to literally change
minds, the manipulation of information environments to take advantage of salience properties,
and to elicit particular personality traits, multiple selves, or particular decision algorithms.
The Smith-Hayek theorem also shows us the limits to traditional policies of price manipula-
tion. It reveals to us the hitherto under-explored “deep” constraints upon market structure - the
existence of pre-requisites, co-requisites, and complementarity - which act as basic obstacles to
either the removal from or the formation within the market system of connections through the
influence of policymakers in the minds of individuals. Pre-requisites, and no-go zones mean
that there are certain connections which are always, if possible, going to be made, and not going
to be made respectively. Without the presence of some other object complementing a particular
set of actions, the selection of that action may simply not have preferable enough implications.
This means either drastic price policy will have to be engaged in to make the avoidance of the
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“desired” behaviour impossible, or the source of the pre-requisite sets and no-go zones (needs)
must, if possible, be removed from consideration and any necessary complementary objects
made available to the individual.
6.4 Some points of interpretation
It will do us well now to reflect further on what the Mauss-Commons and Smith-Hayek theo-
rems mean and how we ought interpret them and their place in our foundations for economic
analysis. The Mauss-Commons and Smith-Hayek theorem complete the first stage of analy-
sis of economic systems, as their provisions reveal to us the determinants of the structure and
function g(N), gMs (N) of economic Es ⊃ g(N) and market systems Ms at the level of the indi-
vidual interaction. They reveal to us the government of the formation of structure connection
by connection, each in their particular socioeconomic environment.
These theorems provide us a viewpoint on one of the faces of the Janus (Koestler, 1978) that
is the economic system (and the market systems which emerge from them). They provide us an
understanding of the determination, connection by connection, of the whole of organised parts.
In this way, the Mauss-Commons and Smith-Hayek theorems are the primary, the central, the
core results of microeconomics. They provide the basis for our understanding of the other face
of Janus which looks to the function of the system as a whole and properties emergent from it
as a whole, meso-macroeconomics (sections 3.2 and 3.3), which cannot be divorced from an
understanding of the system as a whole of organised parts any less than microeconomics can
be divorced from understanding the individual as extant within a system of other individuals.
It is worth noticing, further, that these theorems contain no reference to any entity outside
of socioeconomic systems (but for the physical, non-socioeconomic environment), they con-
tain no reference to other than the two individuals who are to interact with one another and
their environment. The Mauss-Commons and Smith-Hayek theorems, necessary and sufficient
conditions for the formation of structure, indicate to us therefore that the structure and func-
tion of the economic system emerges, organises, through the actions of its parts alone. There
is no outside entity, such as the Walrasian auctioneer, who coordinates interaction, all outside
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influences on the system are mediated through the individual’s process of perception, analysis,
decision. The system self-organises, it generates its own order from within.
There was some controversy in evolutionary economics through the extended 1990s around
whether the economy ought be analysed using the random variation-selection-retention model
of evolutionary biology (Hodgson, 2002), or ought be constructed with reference to the self-
organisation perspective in which variation and diffusion is produced by purposeful behaviour
(Foster, 1997; Witt, 1999). The argument has well been settled in favour of the self-organisational
approach, for it is really the only one properly consistent with the reality of economic systems
(Vromen, 2012). But a rigorous and formal narrative of how an economy self-organises on the
basis of the behaviour of its parts has really yet to be provided in evolutionary economics8.
The Mauss-Commons and Smith-Hayek theorems elaborate the process by which this self-
organisation occurs. Individual by individual, we observe their process of perception, analysis,
decision in their environment, and if that process satisfies the Mauss-Commons conditions for
a potential connection, a non-market exchange forms in Es. And if it satisfies the Smith-Hayek
conditions for a potential connection, the physical primitives for a market exchange form in Es
and the corresponding connection in Ms. Repeated across all individuals, we come to observe
the self-organisation of the system as a whole through the interaction of its parts.
It is well that the Smith-Hayek theorem is so called, for later in his career, Hayek came
to use the language of self-organisation and spontaneous order (well established as part of
nonlinear dynamics complex systems science - (Nicolis and Prigogine, 1989)) to expound his
vision of the market system. Hayek (1988), in perhaps the most comprehensive statement
of his vision, characterised the process of the self-organisation of a market system as one in
which the interactions which together comprise an economic system arise on a pairwise basis
through the application by individuals of behavioural rules to the environment in which they
find themselves. The Smith-Hayek theorem encapsulates, and actually rather completes his
vision - it formulates mathematically the factors in self-organisation of an economic system
based on a psychology Hayek himself (Hayek, 1952) was a proponent of.
8Foster (1993, 2005a) provides an account of self-organisation as a diffusion process using logistic curves to
represent the stage of diffusion, which is a fairly high level approach consistent with nonlinear dynamic modeling
of complex systems, but which does not give a satisfactory account of how this diffusion arises of individual
behaviour and interaction.
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What is a little surprising to an economist raised on prior approaches to economic analysis,
but perhaps not so much to someone lay of the economics discipline as it currently exists, is
the relative non-centrality of price in the determination of market structures in the provisions
of the Mauss-Commons and Smith-Hayek theorems. Prices are no more pre-eminent in the
determination of demand or supply than anything else the individual i chooses to care about in
their considerations gH (Hi) of the world. Their primary purpose is to be the ratio of exchange
of the one thing for another in market exchange, and to thus constrain for the individual their
budget set - what they may exchange for what. They may or may not play a role in addition
to this, say, in the signalling of relative qualities supplied or of wealth on the part of buyers,
but this is a matter for empirical determination. This relative non-priority makes some sense,
for unlike prior approaches to economic analysis (the canonical such being Arrow and Debreu
(1954) and Debreu (1959)), we have neither assumed nor set out to demonstrate this or that
particular reliance of supply and demand upon prices. Rather, as we have set out to build a
formalism consistent with the form of the economy and of psychology, we see illustrated the
proper place of price as primarily a mediator of exchange and constraint upon actions.
6.4.1 Incompleteness: Mauss-Commons, Smith-Hayek as theories of what
connections aren’t made
These matters of interpretation now considered, we may now consider one final property of the
Mauss-Commons and Smith-Hayek theorems which allows us to pivot our focus from the de-
termination of structure to its evolution after briefly considering a point of scientific philosophy.
These theorems explain not only of what connections do exist, but also and more importantly
what connections do not exist. The Mauss-Commons and Smith-Hayek are theorems of incom-
pleteness in g(N) ⊂ Es and gMs (N) ⊂ Ms. And if there are connections which aren’t made,
there is the possibility of non-destructive evolution of structure, the addition of new links as
well as the removal of the old.
As necessary conditions, conditions 1. through 5. of the theorems constitute a theory of
what connections aren’t made. If a non-market exchange does not exist, it must be because
at least one of the necessary conditions 1. through 5. of the Mauss-Commons theorem is
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not satisfied, and if a market exchange does not exist, it must be because at least one of the
necessary conditions 1. through 5. of the Smith-Hayek theorem is not satisfied. And if no
connection exists at all between two individuals, then it must be because at least one of the
conditions of both the Mauss-Commons and Smith-Hayek theorems are not satisfied.
The most pertinent of the Mauss-Commons and Smith-Hayek conditions are their con-
ditions 1.-4., which are equivalent but for the requirement of mutuality in the Smith-Hayek
theorem. The most basic absences of a connection can be attributed to what might be called
the “awareness” necessary conditions, 1. and 2., which require individuals to be aware of their
counterparty in interaction, and the elements of the exchange which they may form with them.
If this information is not salient, if it does not have a sufficient impression on the sensory
organs to lead to its perception or does not elicit perceptions through personal constructs no
non-market or market connection can form between them. Moving to the “feasibility” neces-
sary conditions (condition 3.), if the elements of a potential exchange are not contained within
an action itself contained within the individual’s set of feasible actions, then no non-market or
market connection may form involving those elements. Finally, with respect to the “desirabil-
ity” conditions (condition 4.), if we find the elements of the relevant connection to be contained
within a no-go zone, not overlap with the relevant pre-requisites, or to have not sufficient com-
plements within the rest of the relevant containing action to make it preferable over all others,
or simply not preferable enough within the personal constructs of the situation held in the mind
of the individual, then no connection may arise.
Of course, the breaking of each of the Mauss-Commons or Smith-Hayek conditions are
perfectly reasonable and eminently commonplace. In fact, given that there are well over seven
billion persons currently populating the planet, the failure of the “awareness” necessary condi-
tions must be the norm, not the exception. Given the proliferation of production organisations
which produce very similar products, we can expect that the “feasibility” and “desirability” nec-
essary conditions holding for one production organisation with respect to one individual would
preclude their satisfaction for every other production organisation by virtue of the elements of
those connections being contained in non-preferable or infeasible actions.
Our graphs g(N) ⊂ Es, gMs (N) ⊂ Ms of system structure we can expect therefore to be
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sparse, most definitely incomplete. There will be connections which simply are not made, and
many of them, indeed the majority of potential connections will not be made. To understand
the significance of this result, we need to recognise that in the neoclassical model of economics
(Mas-Collel et al., 1995; Jehle and Reny, 2011), to model this situation would require a utility
function which would generate a corner solution in some several billion sets of dimensions
corresponding to the potential exchanges which the individual is assumed to know (by the
“completeness” axiom) but will not form9. In addition to being an extremely complex utility
function which precludes calculus being applied this would break all manner of convexity and
asymptotic assumptions which all operational neoclassical models rely on.
That model is simply not designed to consider incompleteness, it requires the system be akin
to an electromagnetic field in order for the equilibrium mathematics of electromagnetic fields
to be readily applicable. The present model is deliberately constructed to understand how
an individual responds to their systemic environment within the bounds of their psychology,
which always contains a subset of the system as a whole, and in all realistic scenarios contains
extremely limited information by comparison to the information contained in the whole. It
generates de rigeur an incomplete structure in g(N)⊂ Es, gMs (N)⊂Ms.
As Potts (2000) argued, where the neoclassical school has concerned itself with a totally
connected field in g(N) ⊂ Es, gMs (N) ⊂ Ms, the non-mainstream research programs have al-
ways concerned themselves - without particularly knowing so - with understanding the struc-
ture and function of incomplete economic systems. And we see in particularly the Smith-Hayek
conditions distilled the factors they consider to be decisive. Post Keynesian economics of the
“radical” (Coddington, 1976a,b) or “Shackleian” variety, building on Shackle (1969, 1972) and
ultimately Keynes (1936, Ch.12) identify the deterioration of expectations of future returns in
a radically uncertain world to be the reason for the failure of condition 4. of the Smith-Hayek
theorem as applies to the failure of connections in the financial market on a large scale. Those
of a more “hydraulic” persuasion (Coddington, 1976a,b; Hicks, 1937; Keen, 1995, 2011; God-
9If we were to limit economic interactions to exist only between consumers for instance, sans production
organisations, given N× (N−1) is the number of potential connections which may exist within a network of N
elements and there are currently well over seven billion persons residing on the planet, there are well over 49
billion potential economic connections to be formed! This is not all the potential information contained within
the economy either, for those connections also could contain information about the elements of those connections
contained within several billion dimensions of commodity space.
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ley and Lavoie, 2001-2002, 2007) tend to identify the deterioration of inflows of cash through
borrowing constraints and defaulted repayments to be the reason for the failure of condition 3.
of the Smith-Hayek theorem as applies to the same10. Neo-Ricardian economics, of the post-
Sraffian variety (Sraffa, 1960; Pasinetti, 1977) is directly concerned with what industries are
related and which are not related to others, the source of this being the necessity of obtaining
inputs for the production of this output or that in this or that locality of the economy - con-
tributing to the perception of certain alternatives and not others (condition 2.) and the link be-
tween certain inputs and outputs in implications (condition 4.). Austrian economics (especially
Hayek (1937, 1945, 1988) but also Schumpeter (1911)) identifies two particular factors in the
incompleteness of economic systems, the restricted information environment of the individual’s
location in the system (the failure of conditions 1. and 2.), and the constraints of individual psy-
chology (the failure of condition 4.). Institutional economics of all varieties (Hamilton, 1919;
Commons, 1924, 1931; Hodgson, 1998, 2004, 2010; Lawson, 2015b,d,a) identifies the dictates
of the routines and habits which become social institutions as the deciding factor between an
individual selecting this connection or that to form (the failure of condition 4.).
This generation by the formalism of an incomplete network structure to Es and Ms in all
reasonable situations is critical for it implies the possibility of evolution. Potts (2000), and
then Foster (2005b) note the simple fact that a complete network cannot evolve in a structural
manner but destructively. A complete network cannot evolve by the addition of new links,
only by the removal of existing connections. The only non-destructive evolution possible is the
changing composition of flows - function evolves, but not structure. So the fact that the Mauss-
Commons and Smith-Hayek conditions are not satisfied for a large part, in fact really the vast
majority, of potential connections in Es and Ms in all reasonable situations means that our
model admits the possibility of structural evolution in economic systems. The incompleteness
of Es and Ms makes our formalism one which can form the foundations for an evolutionary
economics.
We will return to the investigation of the process of evolution of economic structures, and
this will complete the foundations for the analysis of the economy as a complex evolving sys-
10The New Keynesians, an offshoot of the neoclassical school of thought, maintain the field perspective and
assume equilibrium flows across this field are disrupted by some random shock (Coddington, 1976a,b).
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tem. But before this, we shall consider one final point of interpretation of the model thus far
with respect to its property of uniqueness.
6.4.2 Uniqueness up to creativity: consonance with scientific philosophy
Theorem 16 (Uniqueness of Es, Ms). Suppose that all matters of indeterminacy in gH (Hi) ∀ i
have been resolved. Subject to the realisation of a particular set of environments vNi(g) for
economic individuals i = ci ∨
{
ωi ∈ n j
}
, there is one, and only one configuration of Es (and
Ms) which satisfies the formation equations 6.7 and 6.17. That is, Es and Ms are uniquely
determined for a particular set of environments up to indeterminacy within gH (Hi) ∀ i .
This result is primarily of intellectual interest as it stands the formalism of the present
work in relation to scientific philosophy. The fact that, up to the facts of the world - initial
psychologies gH (Hi), the specific form of perception ρi (·) , the environment of individuals
vNi(g), and aesthetics  ◦2gH(Hi) - there is only one system that can arise after the settlement of
any matters for determination by an act of the consciousness, is not so useful to us in explaining
the world. But it indicates our explanation of the world has a great degree of “power”, which
brings this work into consonance with the criteria of Karl Popper (1934) for scientific theory.
And what this formalism takes as given (and thus necessary before we can determine what
configuration of the world will emerge) is important with respect to the consonance of this
work with the extension of Karl Popper put forth by Imre Lakatos (1968-1969).
We must clarify at this point that the majority of what has been considered thus far in
this work is not strictly what we might call (within the strictures of Popper’s philosophy), a
scientific theory. It sits at the nexus of philosophy and science, being a grammar out of which
particular theories of this or that structure and function may be constructed, but beyond this also
offering basic theories of certain phenomena. It is a work which, as Bergson (1946) and also
Wittgenstein (1914-1916, 1921); Wittgenstein et al. (1930-1932); Wittgenstein (1953) might
have put it, is philosophical insofar as it seeks to set forth a language, a logical structure,
in which science (scienta, knowledge) may proceed, but is also scientific as it also provides
some explanations of fairly “high-level”, or “deep-structural”, phenomena. The movement
between the two arenas is determined by how much structure we place on the initial facts of the
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world - initial psychologies gH (Hi), the specific form of perception ρi (·) the environment of
individuals vNi(g), and aesthetics  ◦2gH(Hi). The more assumptions we make about the initial
facts of the world, the more we arrive at particular theories of what structures of Es will and
will not arise.
So of the whole of the present work it is not particularly profitable to ask “is it empirically
testable”? It would be akin to asking, prior to the setting of their parameters “are Einstein’s
field equations empirically testable”? The truth of the formalism taken as a whole cannot be
verified by reference to observation of this particular structure of Es or that, as it tries to distill
the essence of our intuition about the manner in which the structure of the world is determined,
not determine which structure will actually arise.
On the other hand, notice that rarely in this work have we said “it shall be assumed that...”.
This work is not built upon assumptions, but statements that appear axiomatic, self-evidently
true. Where we have made assumptions, or at least allowed for assumptions about goods and
services to exist - for instance, in s.5.2.2 where we consider the distinction of needs from
wants, and theorem 8 where we consider household production - we obtain less a grammar for
speaking about economic structure Es, and more explanation thereof. If we push further and
continue to make assumptions about the initial facts of the world - initial psychologies gH (Hi),
the specific form of perception ρi (·) the environment of individuals vNi(g), and aesthetics 
◦2gH(Hi) - we come closer to being able to determine highly specific empirical predictions (via
equations 4.6, 6.1 and 6.14) about which structures of Es ⊃ g(N) will arise, predictions which
are quite definite. By theorem 16, these predictions will be of the form that one and only one
structure Es ⊃ g(N) may arise, and that all other structures will not.
Theories, “specific” theories which are constructed thus out of the formalism by making
particular assumptions are theories of the structure and function of Es which are testable by
comparison of their predictions with observation. If the prediction is consistent with observa-
tion, then we may say of the particular set of assumptions made, and the formalism which takes
them as inputs to make predictions on their basis, that together they have some degree of truth,
or more accurately, consonance with reality. If the prediction is inconsistent with observation,
then we may say of the particular set of assumptions made, and the formalism which takes them
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as inputs to make predictions on their basis, that together their existence in reality is refuted.
Specific theories constructed out of the present formalism are hence consonant with the
attributes Popper (1934) accords a “good” scientific theory. They say that with a given set of
assumptions, one configuration of the world may arise, and no other configuration may arise.
They have great “power” in this way as they “rule out” many events. They can thus be well
“tested”, in the vulgar expression, or more accurately, the predictions of theory compared with
reality to determine the consonance with reality of the assumptions and the theory formed out
of them together. This - and we seem to tend to forget this is the point of Popper’s philosophy -
allows us to determine whether our assumptions and our concomitant explanation of the world
are false, or whether we may provisionally accept it as not inconsistent with reality.
Refutation of a specific theory however does not invalidate the formalism as a whole. Any
structure could be explained with this formalism, but, (and this is an extremely important albeit
subtle point), it can only be explained, by theorem 16, with a particular set of assumptions
about initial psychologies gH (Hi), the specific form of perception ρi (·) the environment of
individuals vNi(g), and aesthetics  ◦2gH(Hi). Refutation of a specific theory developed from
this formalism invalidates that particular set of assumptions. But by revisiting the assumptions
we have made about the facts of the world in formulating this particular theory or that out of
our formalism, we may arrive at a “new” theory which explains that phenomena which has
refuted our “old” theory. With the present formalism we can see quite clearly how each of
our assumptions about psychology and environment take their place alongside others and are
carried forward in our formulations, which grants a clarity to our calculations in search of
explanation of anomalies.
The present formalism is thus consistent with being the “core” of a research program with
- provided the researchers within it adhere to the “right” research ethic - the attributes Lakatos
(1968-1969) accords a “progressive” research program. When faced with a refutation of a
specific theory of economic structure and function formulated using our formalism, this is not
the “end of the road” as it might be thought to be on a naive interpretation of Popper. If
the refutation is convincing (is repeated and cannot be reasonably attributed to measurement
errors, misinterpretation or semantics) then our formalism is of aid in indicating to us which
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of our assumptions may not be consistent with reality as it is clear what assumptions must
be made and what place they take in our calculations. We will know that our assumptions
about initial psychologies gH (Hi), the specific form of perception ρi (·) the environment of
individuals vNi(g), and aesthetics  ◦2gH(Hi) are either at odds with reality, or we know that
there must be some factors within initial psychologies gH (Hi), the specific form of perception
ρi (·) or the environment of individuals vNi(g) which we have not accounted for.
The present formalism thus does all that can be done outside of personal ethics to advance
knowledge - when faced with refutation, it indicates directions by which we might advance
our knowledge. Provided the researcher is committed to the scientific ethic of the seeking of
knowledge rather than defending existing theory with games of semantics and ad hoc defence
of existing sets of assumptions with further auxiliary assumptions11, the formalism presented
here aids the researcher in reformulating the assumptions which are input into the process of
the formalism to derive specific theories of the structure and function of Es and Ms in order that
refutations may be explained, and knowledge may grow.
6.5 Recapitulation
This chapter has been organised around the task of “bringing psychologies together”. We took
our psychological model of behaviour and used it to breath anima into our taxonomy of socioe-
conomic systems by understanding how it governs the formation of individual interactions. Im-
mediately upon defining how individual behaviours collected together give rise to the structure
and function of socioeconomic systems we see that fundamental blocks exist to the formation
of socioeconomic structures in the existence of pre-requisites, co-requisites and no-go zones.
But beyond that, the Mauss-Commons and Smith-Hayek theorems formulate the necessary
and sufficient conditions for structure to arise on the basis of individual interactions. They
11The difference between efforts toward reformulation of assumptions and defence thereof by semantics or
auxiliary assumptions, which constitutes the demarcation between “progressive” and “degenerative” research pro-
grams for Lakatos (1968-1969) is a very subtle one, but one which is important. The test for what constitutes
one or the other is unfortunately, though upon reflection inevitably subjective: “does this effort in response to
refutation advance our understanding or simply defend existing understanding”? But we must also recognise this
test is only applicable when we are certain of sufficient evidence to constitute a refutation - we are not faced with
misunderstandings, nor measurement errors, but with a genuine inconsistency of predictions with reality. Failing
to defend certain sets of assumptions against prima facie refutation may impede the progress of knowledge just as
much as continuing to defend them, if the apparent refutation is based upon error.
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thus provide the departure point for policy analysis. They rectify the traditional privelege
given to prices in the determination of economic structure and function while expanding the
range of factors therein which may be understood. And they provide explanations of why
economic structures are incomplete and may thus evolve. Because they contain no especial ref-
erence to some entity outside of economic systems, these theorems thus illustrate the process of
self-organisation in economic systems. And, most importantly for the scientific-philosophical
credentials of this work, up to the psychological correlate of the wave-function, these consider-
ations imply that our model is uniquely determined - one, and only one structure and function
of the socioeconomic system may emerge.
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Chapter 7
Interactions in economic systems:
evolution of structure
The possibility of incompleteness in Es (by extension, Ms), gives rise to the possibility of its
structural evolution. In this chapter we will consider some of the means by which evolution
of structure is brought about. As the proverb goes we shall “kill two birds with one stone” in
these considerations, for the question of how connections in economic and market systems are
subjected to the evolution of structure is equivalent to asking what makes certain connections
more robust, more “strong” than others. The evolution of structure proceeds by the addition of
links and the removal of existing ones, so the more robust a link within Es (by extension, Ms),
the less it will be susceptible to removal through the structural evolutionary process.
Of course, in order to consider evolution, we must consider time, and so first we shall
consider the role of time in economic systems, which has hitherto been “lurking in the back-
ground” but which we must now “bring into the light”. We will define socioeconomic history
as a formal logico-mathematical object and elucidate how we map from one system to the
next through time. We will then consider the basis for evolution of structure in competition
on the basis of two variables: price and product attributes. With respect to the first we will
formulate the Chamberlin-Robinson theorem which bounds price differentials, and elaborates
competition on the basis of price. With respect to product attributes, we will formulate the
Lancaster-Ironmonger theorem which indicates competition on the basis of attributes. Before
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turning to our final theoretical consideration in the foundations for economic analysis, we will
briefly reflect on the revelation to us through these theorems of the secondary importance of
prices in the competitive process. Our final consideration in the foundations for economic
analysis shall be the process of diffusion, the process by which change in one part of the sys-
tem affects change in another part of the system, and the process by which this occurs will be
investigated in the development of the “Chinese Whispers” theorem.
7.1 Time in economics and formal economic history
The role of time in economic analysis has hitherto remained somewhat obscured - we have
taken an initial systemic environment as given and worked forward to the determination of
economic structure on this basis. The analysis of Es has hitherto taken place in one single
“duration” of time. This concept of duration is different to the concept of an instant, nor is it
a discreet interval of time treated as a block, it is a concept set forth by Bergson (1946) which
attempts in some manner to resolve the paradoxes of time1. It is an interval in the sense that
it is that portion of time we are aware of as the present, but it is constantly moving. Bergson
likened duration to the portion to the portion of a scroll visible while it is simultaneously being
unrolled at one end and rolled up at the other. As we move through the formalism, from
the environment, to its perception, to its analysis, to decision based on that analysis and the
determination of economic structure and function we are moving through one duration. We
now want to extend our understanding into the realm of multiple durations.
Take a set of iterations of the world {V t} which contain iterations of socioeconomic sys-
tems, {Ets ∪ Its ⊂V t} realised in particular durations t. If there is some information vτ ⊂ V t ⊃
Ets ∪ Its which can be pre-ordered by a transitive pre-ordering twe call this information the
reports of a clock. We will restrict now on this basis the index of duration t to be contained
within a subset T = [0,T ]⊂R of the real line, and append to it also the name “metric of time”,
1The dichotomy between instant and interval is the source of Zeno’s arrow paradox, for if an arrow moves by
changing spatial position one instant from the next, at any instant it is “at” a position, and it is not moving, and
since time is a progression of instants, motion does not exist (Durie, 2000).
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and define it to have the property
t ≥ t ′ ⇐⇒ ∃vτ ⊂V t &vτ ⊂V t : vτtvτ ′ (7.1)
This information allows us to array iterations of socioeconomic systems along the metric
of time T according to their particular metric t, this array becoming socioeconomic history.
Definition 10 (Socioeconomic history). Socioeconomic history is the set {Ets ∪ Its}Tt=0 of itera-
tions of socioeconomic systems within a particular duration t arrayed according to their metric
of time t ∈ T = [0,T ].
If we expanded this object out diagrammatically, socioeconomic history would be presented
as a series of network structures changing - evolving - as we moved along the series.
Socioeconomic history, its telling, is what provides economics with its data. And in a
sense, economics is socioeconomic history, its explanation. History is both telling and ex-
planation (Carr, 1961). Economics concerns itself with understanding the process by which
socioeconomic history unfolds.
Definition 11 (The process of socioeconomic history). The process of socioeconomic history
is a mapping f∆t between a prior iteration of history V t ⊃ Ets ∪ Its containing socioeconomic
history, and some succeeding iteration in time t+∆t, ∆t > 0
f∆t :
{
V t ⊃ Ets ∪ Its
}→ {Et+∆ts ∪ It+∆ts }
In a sense, the whole of this work has been concerned with elucidating a formalism for
understanding the process of socioeconomic history - elucidating f∆t . The process of history
unfolds through, f∆t is formed of, the objects contained in table 3.1, table 5.1 and equations 6.8,
6.10 and 6.17. The world system V t ⊃ Ets∪ Its from duration t contains all the information vNi(g)
contained within various individual i’s environments, which becomes the basis for their percep-
tion ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
of their environment, in turn the basis of their analysis gH
(
ρi
(
vNi(g)
)\{Rhh′}),
and this, finally becomes the basis for their decision about actions a∗i . Collected across i, these
actions a∗i determine economic structures in the next duration and we repeat the treatment until
we arrive at the configuration Et+∆ts ∪ It+∆ts at duration t+∆t.
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Note that property 7.1 by which we establish the ordering of duration makes use of a pre-
ordering t over information vτ ⊂V t which we call the report of clocks we have not ruled out
as being symmetric. So it is possible that vτtvτ
′
and vτ
′
tvτ for vτ ⊂V t and vτ ′ ⊂V t ′ and both
t ≥ t ′ and t ′≥ t so that t = t ′ and the world-systems V t ⊃Ets∪Its and V t
′ ⊃Et ′s ∪It
′
s are associated
with the same duration and time metric in socioeconomic history {Ets ∪ Its}Tt=0. The process of
history f∆t may be one-to-one from one point in socioeconomic history to the next. The only
way (and this ought be more formally demonstrable) for two iterations of economic systems to
share a duration, and the process of history f∆t to map to more than one iteration, is for there to
be indeterminacy in individual psychologies, for it is up to these and to the social and physical
environment (the latter being determined) only that the economic system is unique by theorem
16.
Hence the association of two world systems V t ⊃ Ets ∪ Its and V t
′ ⊃ Et ′s ∪ It
′
s with the same
duration and time metric t = t ′ is indicative of the presence of indeterminacy in individual
psychologies, an indeterminacy which cannot be resolved until the progress of time allows
the solution of this indeterminacy by the phenomenological “I”. The possibility of a genuine
creativity in this indeterminacy, the ability of the phenomenological “I” to call into existence
thoughts which have no reason for existence other than the “I” calling them into existence,
means that this indeterminacy will be of a non-distributional type, as we will not have the req-
uisite data to form any truly “objective” representation of the future, as any such representation
will rest upon the belief any creative thoughts will be non-relevant. We see illustrated here
the connection between time, uncertainty and creativity alluded to by Bergson (1946), Shackle
(1969, 1972) and Taleb (2007).
7.2 The process of competition and the process of evolution
In the progression of economic history thus conceived, how do we determine whether struc-
tures have evolved? This is elementary: structural evolution has occurred if the configuration
of the economic system g(N) ⊂ Es changes between two durations, so that [g(N)⊂ Ets] 6=[
g(N)⊂ Et ′s
]
. More specifically, at some point in time the process of socioeconomic his-
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tory generates a change of economic systemic structure so that
[
g(N)⊂ f (Et+∆ts ∪ It+∆ts )] 6=
[g(N)⊂ Ets ∪ Its]. There are of course many means by which this evolution may be brought
about, but we will focus here on two particularly salient factors external in the first instance to
the individual’s psychology: prices and product attributes.
Evolutionary economics, with its focus always on the economy as a set of processes, allows
the structure, not merely the function, of the economy to evolve through time. Economies are
incomplete network structures (Potts, 2000) formed by interacting rule-users (Nelson and Win-
ter, 1982; Metcalfe, 1998; Fagerberg, 2003; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004; Dopfer and Potts,
2007; Witt, 2008; Markey-Towler, 2016). Beyond the origination of novelty (Dopfer et al.,
2004; Foster, 2005a), the process of evolution is all but equivalent with the process of com-
petition in evolutionary economics (Metcalfe, 1998), competition as “creative destruction”, as
Schumpeter (1950) called it. The economic system acts to self-organise, to select amongst dif-
ferent alternative firms for differential survival, based on their ability to compete for custom on
various platforms. Competition is a process, a process of differential survival, not an outcome
as it is rather curiously understood in the neoclassical school of thought (Arrow and Debreu,
1954; Debreu, 1959; Mas-Collel et al., 1995; Jehle and Reny, 2011).
Though it hadn’t been put in this language until Potts (2000), in competing for custom
individuals and organisations are competing for connections. “Creative destruction” is a dra-
matic though accurate description of the process of competition. In the transition from one
graph g(N) ⊂ Ets to the next g(N) ⊂ Et+∆ts , some new connections nkn j ∈ g(N) are created,
and some existing connections nin j ∈ g(N) are removed. The individual or organisation nk sur-
vives and is selected by attracting custom, accumulating connections from other individuals or
organisations ni, and non-survives, is non-selected, by losing custom to other individuals or or-
ganisations ni. We will focus here on understanding the process of competition primarily with
respect to fundamental variables, price and product attributes, though we will operate by refer-
ence to individual perceptions of these objects, and so allow for the possibility of competition
not by actual changes of these variables, but by marketing.
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7.2.1 The Chamberlin-Robinson theorem: the process of competition through
prices and the bounding of price differentials
As noted above, prices have had an unusually subdued place in our analysis thus far, given that
prior approaches to economics, especially the neoclassical (Arrow and Debreu, 1954; Debreu,
1959; Mas-Collel et al., 1995; Jehle and Reny, 2011), has focused almost exclusively on their
determination. The relative non-primacy of prices is revealed, because we have not set out to
study them with any priority over any other economic variable of interest. If we wish to extend
our analysis of prices, we must make assumptions (as in section 5.2) about how they enter into
thought and preference, as a psychological variable, as with any other economic variable of
interest.
We do, however, observe in reality that prices have quite some significance as a platform
for competition between goods and services of a very similar nature, where the preference
between their implications is likely to be decided at least in part by the expense incurred in
their acquisition. The process of competition for market connections - custom - is elaborated
by the Chamberlin-Robinson theorem, so named for Joan Robinson and Edward Chamberlin
who pioneered the understanding of why price differentials may exist for goods in the same
market, and what their bounds may be, where the neoclassical model assumed (and still does
at the core) their non-existence of necessity.
Theorem 17 (Chamberlin-Robinson theorem). Define for convenience i = c j ∨
{
ωq′ ∈ n j
}
,
ℵ = ci ∨
{
ωq ∈ ni
}
and k = ck ∨
{
ωq′′ ∈ nk
}
. Suppose there exist two potential actions for
i= c j∨
{
ωk′ ∈ n j
}
ai : ai ⊃
[
xnin j mn jni pnin j
]
&ai 6⊃
[
xnkn j mn jnk pnkn j
]
(7.2)
a′i : a
′
i ⊃
[
xnkn j mn jnk pnkn j
]
&a′i 6⊃
[
xnin j mn jni pnin j
]
(7.3)
where ai \
[
xnkn j mn jnk pnkn j
]
= a′i \
[
xnin j mn jni pnin j
]′, that initially ai = a∗i, and
a∗k ⊃
[
xnkn j mn jnk pnkn j
]
, a∗ℵ ⊃
[
xnin j mn jni pnin j
]
throughout. Now further suppose that
for a given price pnkn j and a price ¯pnin j:
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1. The goods and services
[
xnkn j
]′ ⊂ a′i are substitutable for the goods and services[
xnin j
]⊂ ai, in the context of ai,a′i
2. Preferences over courses of action a′i are non-increasing with respect to prices paid for
goods and services therein (that is, gp2ai 6 gp1ai ⇐⇒ p2 > p1) but maintain comparability
3. The preference structure  ◦2gH(Hi) is transitive with respect to rankings of the alterna-
tive courses of action ai and a′i
4. The actions ai,a′i, remain feasible and strictly preferable to all other alternative courses
of action a′′i in the feasible set B
The connection nin j will be eliminated from Ms and the connection nkn j will be formed,
that is, nin j ∈ gMs (N) ,nkn j /∈ gMs (N)→ nin j /∈ gMs (N) ,nkn j ∈ gMs (N) once the price pnin j
exceeds ¯pnin j .
This theorem needs a little interpretation because it is fairly involved, the reason being
that we have a three-body problem, a three-body problem being well known to be analytically
unsolvable (Qiu-Dong, 1991). In order to focus on a particular aspect of interaction between
three elements of a system we must hold constant many things, and this is why the Chamberlin-
Robinson theorem becomes rather involved. Stripping away all the technical conditions neces-
sary to reduce a three-body problem to something more tractable, we arrive at the core of the
Chamberlin-Robinson theorem by recognising that it relates the concept of substitutability to
the ability of an individual or organisation to attract connections from others on the basis of
their price.
Corollary 3 (Restatement: Chamberlin-Robinson theorem). Given two actions ac j∨{ωq′∈n j},a
′
c j∨{ωq′∈n j}
as defined by the Chamberlin-Robinson theorem (theorem 17) and technical conditions 2., 3.
and 4. of the same, if for a given price pnkn j and a price ¯pnin j the goods and services
[
xnkn j
]′ ⊂
a′
c j∨{ωq′∈n j} are substitutable for the goods and services
[
xnin j
] ⊂ ac j∨{ωq′∈n j}, in the context
of ac j∨{ωq′∈n j},a
′
c j∨{ωq′∈n j}, the connection nin j will be eliminated from Ms and the connection
nkn j will be formed, that is, nin j ∈ gMs (N) ,nkn j /∈ gMs (N)→ nin j /∈ gMs (N) ,nkn j ∈ gMs (N)
once the price pnin j exceeds ¯pnin j .
Thus does the Chamberlin-Robinson theorem at once both illustrate the limits to price dif-
ferentials and also the process of competition on the basis of price. Given the price pnkn j of the
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Figure 7.1: The process of price competition (the Chamberlin-Robinson theorem): As we move
left to right in the half-space to the left of the point of substitutability, the original connection
in Ms is maintained. Once we cross that point into the half-space to its right, the connection is
transferred to the competitor.
output offered by individual or organisation nk, the price of some good or service pnin j offered
by individual or organisation ni may increase only to the upper limit ¯pnin j at which the good or
service offered by nk becomes a substitute for that offered by ni. The limit on the price differ-
ential is ¯pnin j− pnkn j . If the price pnin j rises above ¯pnin j , pnin j > ¯pnin j , and the price differential
pnin j − pnkn j rises above ¯pnin j − pnkn j , pnin j − pnkn j > ¯pnin j − pnkn j , then we will find the mar-
ket exchange nin j removed, and the market exchange nkn j created, ni loses its custom to nk.
Conversely, if it is the price pnkn j which is changing - as when nk competes for the custom of
ni on the basis of price - then we establish the price ¯pnin j at which the goods and services of
nk become substitutes for the goods and services of ni, and observe the price pnin j . And again,
if the price pnin j is above ¯pnin j , pnin j > ¯pnin j , and the price differential pnin j − pnkn j is above
¯pnin j− pnkn j , pnin j− pnkn j > ¯pnin j− pnkn j , then we will find the market exchange nin j removed,
and the market exchange nkn j created, ni loses its custom to nk.
Notice here the centrality of the concept of substitutability. It is the point at which two
goods and services vectors become substitutes, the point at which the one may be switched for
the other without change of preferability in implications, which bounds the price differential
and provides scope for competition on the basis of price. If there is no point of substitution, no
point at which prices have brought about an ability to substitute the one good for another with-
out effecting the preferability of the implications of that act, then the Chamberlin-Robinson
theorem no longer applies. Unless there is some scope for the individual or organisation nk to
produce some goods and services with the “right” perceived attributes which generate impli-
cations equivalent in preferability to the goods and services produced by ni then they cannot
compete by a strategy of “catch up, then surpass”, they must simply produce some good or
171
service which has outright “better” implications. Conversely, ni may insulate themselves from
competition on the basis of price to some degree (some, for nk may devise some product which
is outright more preferable) by producing some good or service for which no substitute exists,
or at least by doing so increase the upper bound ¯pnin j .
We call the Chamberlin-Robinson theorem so, for it demonstrates logico-mathematically
the arguments of Edward Chamberlin and Joan Robinson concerning the pervasive existence of
price differentials in markets, and the delimitation of their potential scale. Prior to their innova-
tion, economics did not have a theory of price per se, but rather a theory of what uniform price
would have to be set by the “Walrasian auctioneer” in order for aggregate quantity supplied as
a function of price qs (p) to equal aggregate quantity demanded as a function of price qd (p) in
perfectly competitive markets, in which prices are taken as a given by all market participants2.
The theory of equilibrium price pe in perfectly competitive markets, and really all of neoclas-
sical economic thought, is neatly summarised by the statement pe = p : qs (p) = qd (p). But
to assume uniform prices across a market obviously is contradictory to all but the most tortur-
ous delineation of markets which anyway undermines their affinity with perfectly competitive
conditions.
Robinson (1933) realised that this could be resolved by reinterpreting the already extant
model of monopoly markets where one firm supplied the whole market and thus found prices
for its output determined by the down-sloping-in-price market demand so that this demand
curve became a firm-specific demand curve where the responsiveness of prices to output, and
thus ability of the firm to decide its prices, reflected the intensity of competition. The greater
the intensity of competition, the less response of price to output, and the less ability of the
firm to decide its prices, the less its “market power”. Chamberlin (1933) was more radical
2Depending on the authority these vary, but perfectly competitive markets have the primary characteristic that
all buyers and sellers are price “takers”, they cannot influence the price, this commonly intuited (the author is
unaware of any formal demonstration of this) to rest upon the satisfaction of four conditions:
1. There exist sufficiently many sufficiently small buyers and sellers that no individual one may influence the
market price - neither qd (p) nor qs (p) respond to individual actions.
2. The goods and services traded within the market are homogenous: utterly undifferentiated, totally identical.
3. All relevant information about the market is available to those within it and outside it.
4. There is free entry and exit of buyers and sellers into the market.
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in his departure from the perfect competition model, and recognised an equivalent model to
Robinson’s only in the case of a “large group” of competing buyers and sellers, large enough
that no one buyer or seller had noticeable impact on another, though each still had market
power alone. His analysis of competition in the case of “small groups” of competing buyers
and sellers was not dissimilar to, in fact was essentially a simplified diagrammatic distillation
of, the well known duopoly/oligopoly models of Cournot and Bertrand, which recognise the
inter-dependency of firm demand. Over time, in both models, free entry drives the firm-specific
demand curve over time to a state of tangency (the so-called “tangency solution” (Dewey, 1969,
pp.24-41)) with the average cost curve where by definition profits have been eliminated, yet still
heterogeneity of prices across the market might be maintained.
Chamberlin (1933) and Robinson (1933) justified their firm-specific demand curves reflect-
ing a responsiveness of price to output, and thus market power, by an argument now crystallised
logico-mathematically in their eponymous theorem (theorem 17). Robinson (1933) attributed
the existence of price differentials to “market imperfections”, the reason for why
“... not all the customers, who are attached in varying degrees to a particular firm
by the advantages which it offers them, will immediately forsake it for a rival who
offers similar goods at an infinitesimally smaller price”
(Robinson, 1933, p.90)
and they exist because
“... in actual markets, the customer takes into account a great deal besides the
prices at which rival producers offer him their goods. Quite apart from inertia or
ignorance which prevents him from moving instantly from one seller to another,
as soon as a differences in the prices which they charge, he has a number of good
reasons for preferring one seller to another”
(Robinson, 1933, p.88-89)
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Chamberlin (1933) went a little further and identified what it is that is “taken into account
besides the price” with “product differentiation”, the “utilities” in the literal sense of “use”
(here ga
c j∨
{
ωq′ ∈n j
}⊃xnin j ) which are in effect purchased when c j∨
{
ωq′ ∈ n j
}
purchases xnin j
“Anything which makes buyers prefer one seller to another... differentiates the
thing purchased to that degree, for what is bought is really a bundle of utilities, of
which these things are a part.”
(Chamberlin, 1933, pp.7-8)
“A general class of product is differentiated if any significant basis exists for dis-
tinguishing the goods (or services) of one seller from those of another. Such a
basis may be real or fancied, so long as it is any importance whatever to buyers,
and leads to preference of one product variety of the product over another. Where
such differentiation exists, even though it may be slight, buyers will be paired with
sellers, not by chance and at random (as under pure competition) but according to
their preferences.”
(Chamberlin, 1933, p.56)
The heterogeneity of prices is supported by the heterogeneity of participants in the markets,
in their thoughts about means-end chains, in their ability to produce, in the sensitivity of their
preferences over consequences to price changes. Differentiation exists when it cannot be es-
tablished that two products “Do” the same “Thing”, or “Things” equivalent in preferability, if
ga
c j∨
{
ωq′ ∈n j
}⊃xnin j 6∼approx. gac j∨{ωq′ ∈n j}⊃xnkn j
3. Under certain circumstances if attributes are sub-
stitutable (see Lancaster-substitutability, theorem 3 above). In the language of the model here,
provided there is some range of price differential pnin j − pnkn j < ¯pnin j − pnkn j before the goods
and services xnin j become substitutes for xnkn j . There is some range of prices below ¯pnin j for
3Note the improvement thus made by the Chamberlin-Robinson theorem in capturing the insights of Chamber-
lin and Robinson compared with the canonical formal treatment given them by the neoclassical school of thought
in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The parameter σ in the Dixit-Stiglitz utility function uc j∨{ωk′∈n j} (·) generating a
uniform differentiation amongst products is taken as a given there, where here we understand differentiation to be
identified with the differential implications ga
c j∨{ωk′ ∈n j}⊃xnin j to arise from their attributes and their preferability.
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which they do not “Do” the same thing and the individual or organisation ni has some power to
change their prices without losing their custom.
Rightfully we ought name the Chamberlin-Robinson theorem the Triffin-Chamberlin-Robinson
theorem, for it is a picture closest of all to the masterly account of price-based competition given
by Robert Triffin (1949). He found unsatisfactory both the approaches of Chamberlin (1933)
and Robinson (1933) which both largely avoid the difficult question of how and why firms’
demand curves interact with one another, and where Chamberlin (1933) did consider this in his
“small group” analysis he had to make unsatisfactory assumptions of symmetry across firms
(rather contradictory to the idea of their differentiation) to make his diagrams tractable. But
even more than this he found deeply unsatisfactory the primary basis for their analysis in the
highly amorphous concept of a “market” (Triffin, 1949, p.79), at best delineated based on a
rather arbitrarily selected degree of substitutability between differentiated goods (Triffin, 1949,
p.22-23). Triffin’s (1949, p.97-123) approach was instead to start with a nebula of individual
firms of interest, and to then identify their impacts upon each other, without resort to any notion
of a delimited “market”. The analysis of competitive interaction proceeds by the study of the
impact of pricing strategies upon revenues, making use of the elasticities of revenue p jRi
∂Ri
∂ p j
of
firm i with respect to firm j’s price to understand the degree of competitive pressure between
firms. The larger this elasticity, the greater the competitive pressure.
A game theory-oriented economist would of course see Triffin’s framework as merely the
primitives of a game theoretic model where equilibrium properties are to be characterised using
Nash (1951). But Triffin’s approach to studying competition on the basis of price, can also be
understood to be a precursor to the richer analysis of competition on the basis of price as an
interactive process, rather than an outcome, which is set forth in evolutionary economics. Non-
zero cross-price elasticities of demand, p jqi
∂qi
∂ p j
4, between firms facilitates what Downie (1958)
called the “transfer mechanism” by which firms grow through the expansion of production to
meet the new acquisition of custom. Downie (1958) prefigured the later Nelson and Winter
4Note that in speaking of revenue elasticities, Triffin’s approach to price competition was a precursor of evo-
lutionary economics insofar as he was speaking of a “higher” concept, since
Ri = piqi =⇒ p jRi
∂Ri
∂ p j
= 1+
pi
qi
∂qi
∂ pi
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(1982), in seeing the price movements by which this transfer mechanism facilitated evolution
being made possible by investment out of retained profits to lower operating costs and prices
(Nightingale, 1997). This implied a feedback loop between survival through the accumulation
of custom and the favourable operation of the transfer mechanism upon price differentials. Met-
calfe (1998) and also Markey-Towler (2016) later set down similar models of the evolutionary
process as facilitated by price competition between firms with non-zero cross-price elasticities
of demand, p jqi
∂qi
∂ p j
.
The Chamberlin-Robinson theorem elaborates on the origins of Downie’s “transfer mecha-
nism” in the behaviour of individual buyers, and the process by which competition on the basis
of price leads to evolution of structure. The “transfer mechanism” is revealed to be literally a
process by which the links nin j of some element ni ∈Es are transferred to some other element nk
in the process of price competition. If the individual or organisation nk can produce some good
or service xnkn j which is substitutable for another, xnin j - “does something” of an equivalent
preferability - then they may transfer the connections of ni to themselves through the lowering
of their own prices. By the same phenomena however, ni may insulate themselves from price
competition, from the process of evolution, and force nk to compete on the basis of some non-
price variable by producing some good or service which is not substitutable for another. As
Post-Keynesians used to call it (Earl, 1983), by breaking the “chain of substitution”.
7.2.2 The Lancaster-Ironmonger theorem: the process of competition
through innovation
A rather more direct platform for competition between elements of the economic system for
market connections is the non-price realm, the realm of product attributes. The use-value of ob-
jects lies in their attributes, attributes being descriptors α construed to be attached to the goods
or services xnkn j in the mind gH (Hi) of the individual i = c j ∨
{
ωq′ ∈ n j
}
. The use-value of
an object xnkn j , the implications gai⊃xnkn j ⊂ gH
(
H ′i
)
its selection is to have, follows upon the
use value of its attributes α
(
xnkn j
)∈ gH (H ′i), far more than the object itself (Lancaster, 1966b;
Ironmonger, 1972; Ratchford, 1975; Earl, 1986b, 1983, 1986a), so that we might say gai⊃xnkn j
are gα with the addition of the attribute-establishing links α
(
xnkn j
)
, gai⊃xnkn j = gα ∪α
(
xnkn j
)
.
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To alter the attributes α
(
xnkn j
)
established for xnkn j in the mind of i is to alter the implica-
tions to follow from the selection of xnkn j , potentially their preferability with respect to other
alternatives, and thus have an impact upon the structure of the economic Es and market Ms
systems.
One might compete outright through the change of product attributes, but we cannot say
particularly much about this process other than to say that we need check whether, given the
attributes α
(
xnkn j
)
construed of xnkn j , the implications gai⊃xnkn j of selecting that object are
preferred to the implications of all other actions as demanded by equation 4.6. The Lancaster-
Ironmonger theorem - named for the two great Australian economists who pioneered the eco-
nomic analysis of product attributes - considers a more ordered process of interaction between
competitors competing on the basis of product attributes, where we ask at what point in a se-
quence of product attribute vectors a transfer of the connections of ni to nk is induced.
Theorem 18 (Lancaster-Ironmonger theorem). Define for convenience i = c j ∨
{
ωq′ ∈ n j
}
,
ℵ = ci ∨
{
ωq ∈ n j
}
and k = ck ∨
{
ωq′′ ∈ nk
}
. Suppose there exist two potential actions for
i= c j∨
{
ωq′ ∈ n j
}
ai : ai ⊃
[
xnin j mn jni pnin j
]
&ai 6⊃
[
xnkn j mn jnk pnkn j
]
(7.4)
a′i : a
′
i ⊃
[
xnkn j mn jnk pnkn j
]
&a′i 6⊃
[
xnin j mn jni pnin j
]
(7.5)
where ai \
[
xnkn j mn jnk pnkn j
]
= a′i \
[
xnin j mn jni pnin j
]′, that initially ai = a∗i, and
a∗k ⊃
[
xnkn j mn jnk pnkn j
]
, a∗ℵ ⊃
[
xnin j mn jni pnin j
]
throughout. Now further suppose that
for a given set of product attributes α
(
xnin j
)
and another set of product attributes ¯α
(
xnkn j
)
:
1. The goods and services
[
xnkn j
]′ ⊂ a′i are substitutable for the goods and services[
xnin j
]⊂ ai, in the context of ai,a′i
2. Preferences over courses of action a′i are non-decreasing with respect to the index θ ∈R
of product attributes αθ
(
xnkn j
)
of goods and services xnkn j therein contained within a sequence{
αθ
(
xnkn j
)}Θ
θ=0 (that is, g
αθ
ai 6 g
αθ ′
ai ⇐⇒ θ > θ ′ ) but maintain comparability
3. The preference structure  ◦2gH(Hi) is transitive with respect to rankings of the alterna-
tive courses of action ai and a′i
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4. The actions ai,a′i, remain feasible and strictly preferable to all other alternative courses
of action a′′i in the feasible set B
The connection nin j will be eliminated from Ms and the connection nkn j will be formed,
that is, nin j ∈ gMs (N) ,nkn j /∈ gMs (N)→ nin j /∈ gMs (N) ,nkn j ∈ gMs (N) if the substitute vec-
tor ¯α
(
xnkn j
)
lies not at the endpoint of the sequence
{
αΘ
(
xnkn j
)}Θ
θ=0, that is
¯α
(
xnkn j
)
=
αθ¯
(
xnkn j
) ∈ {αθ (xnkn j)}Θθ=0 : θ¯ < Θ, and the attributes α (xnkn j) change to some product
attributes αθ
(
xnkn j
)
: θ > θ¯ .
As with the Chamberlin-Robinson theorem we might strip away all the technical conditions
necessary to reduce a three-body problem to something more tractable, and arrive at the core
of the Lancaster-Ironmonger theorem to recognise that it once again relates the concept of
substitutability to the ability of an individual or organisation to attract connections from others
on the basis of their product attributes.
Corollary 4 (Restatement: Lancaster-Ironomger theorem). Given two actions ac j∨{ωq′∈n j},a
′
c j∨{ωq′∈n j}
as defined by the Lancaster-Ironmonger theorem (theorem 18) and technical conditions 2., 3.
and 4. of the same, if for a given set of product attributes α
(
xnin j
)
and another set of prod-
uct attributes ¯α
(
xnkn j
)
the goods and services
[
xnkn j
]′ ⊂ a′
c j∨{ωq′∈n j} are substitutable for
the goods and services
[
xnin j
] ⊂ ac j∨{ωq′∈n j}, in the context of ac j∨{ωq′∈n j},a′c j∨{ωq′∈n j}, the
connection nin j will be eliminated from Ms and the connection nkn j will be formed, that is,
nin j ∈ gMs (N) ,nkn j /∈ gMs (N)→ nin j /∈ gMs (N) ,nkn j ∈ gMs (N) once the attributes α
(
xnkn j
)
exceed ¯α
(
xnkn j
)
in the preference sequence constructed in condition 2.
Thus illustrated is the process of competition on the basis of product attributes, the process
of structural evolution on the basis of product attributes, and also the resilience of market
connections to the process of competition and evolution on the basis of product attributes.
Provided that the individual or organisation nk can produce a product xnkn j with construed
5
attributes α
(
xnkn j
)
such that it becomes a substitute for xnin j , they may transfer the market
connections of individual or organisation ni to themselves. This is Downie’s (1958) transfer
5Notice here the possibility that the product need not necessarily have certain attributes, but that the individual
or individuals within organisation n j may merely construe it to have certain attributes, so that product attribute
competition may proceed as much through marketing of product attributes as production itself.
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Figure 7.2: The process of product competition (the Lancaster-Ironmonger theorem): As we
move from left to right in the half-space to the left of the point of substitutability (reduced here
to a multidimensional points arrayed along a single line), the original connection is maintained
in Ms. Once we move to the right half-space however, the connection is transferred to the
competitor.
mechanism operating by another means - the ability of one producer to produce a “better”
product than another in terms of attributes. Conversely, we see illustrated actually two means
by which a producer ni may insulate themselves from competition and evolutionary processes.
They may, rather obviously, simply produce some good or service which is so “good” in terms
of attributes, that it might be impossible for nk to produce a substitute for, and thus transfer
connections by means of that substitute (no point in the sequence
{
αθ
(
xnkn j
)}Θ
θ=0 of condition
2. of theorem 18 creates the requisite substitutability) - “outperform” potential competitors. Or
ni may find some product which has attributes it is impossible for nk to produce a substitute
for outright. In the common sensibility we call this “finding a niche”, finding a product which
no potential competitor has the capability to produce, a locality Nni (g) ⊂ Es in the economic
system which no other competitor has the potential to occupy. At the very least, this will
force any potential competitor nk to compete for connections outright, by simply trying to
produce some good with better “fit” with the needs and desires of customers rather than trying
to outperform ni.
Out of the process of trying to compete for custom on the basis of product attributes, we can
draw an interesting implication explored in Markey-Towler (2016) by which we may attribute
innovation both radical and incremental to the pressure to compete on the basis of product
attributes. As discussed above, Schumpeter (1911) described the process of economic devel-
opment as one of carrying out new “combinations”, which is what we now call “innovation”.
So after a fashion, all competition on the basis of product attributes constitutes competition on
the basis of innovation, as it proceeds through the implementing of production of products with
new combinations of attributes. But these alterations of product attributes may be incremental
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enough that they do not constitute a change of the product itself, a product being defined by
some region or locality C ⊂ C in characteristic space C rather than a point α ∈ C. Provided
competition on the basis of product attributes brings only changes incremental enough that
they do not leave the locality C, we do not observe the emergence of novelty, or at least, radical
novelty. We find ourselves in the world of Schumpeter (1950), Schumpeter “Mark II” (Fager-
berg, 2003) where innovation is incremental. But if the attribute vector ¯α
(
xnkn j
)
at which xnkn j
becomes a substitute for xnin j lies outside the region C ⊂ C in characteristic space C which
characterises a particular good or service, ¯α
(
xnkn j
) 6⊂C, then the transfer of connections in the
process of competition will cause the emergence of a new product. We then find ourselves in
the world of Schumpeter (1911), Schumpeter “Mark I” (Fagerberg, 2003), where competition
on the basis of product attributes leads to innovation of a radical nature which removes the
product to a new region of characteristic space characterising a new product.
The Lancaster-Ironmonger theorem thus provides an account of the process of competition,
the process of structural evolution, through product innovation. This has been spoken of at
length in evolutionary economics, especially in the context of the emergence and diffusion
of meso-rules for production (Dopfer et al., 2004; Dopfer and Potts, 2007). The “patterns of
corporate evolution” in evolutionary economics are realised largely through competition on the
basis of non-price factors (Kay, 1997, pp.11-28 and Ch.2). But nonetheless it has been spoken
of largely informally, and in this the Lancaster-Ironmonger theorem expands our knowledge of
evolutionary processes. The requirements to produce some good or service substitutable for
another, and thus transfer the connections of their rival to themselves may lead a competitor
to develop a new product, and to introduce novelty into the system. Competition breeds, and
proceeds through, innovation, and evolution proceeds through competition.
7.2.3 Downie’s “transfer mechanism” and the surprising secondary im-
portance of price
Together, the Chamberlin-Robinson and Lancaster-Ironmonger theorems elaborate the process
of competition through the transfer of connections, and thus the process of structural evolution
in economic and market systems Es, Ms. They elaborate, the “transfer mechanism” of which
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Downie (1958) spoke, and which lies at the heart of models of evolutionary economics (Nelson
and Winter, 1982; Metcalfe, 1998; Fagerberg, 2003; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004; Dopfer and
Potts, 2007; Witt, 2008; Markey-Towler, 2016). They extend these accounts by extending
the basis for competition into the realm of non-price product attributes (of which Kay (1997)
has written at length albeit informally). And they give an account of greater depth, for they
illustrate what precisely - beyond bids to alter of buyer behaviour outright - makes the transfer
of connections by one element to another possible, instead of assuming a response of demand to
competitors’ variables. This being the ability to produce a good or service which is a substitute
for goods and services currently being traded within market systems.
The theorems together expose the granularities of the process of structural evolution through
competition for connections which underlies the evolutionary economic approach. Unless there
is to be radical outright competition which alters demand schedules in a fundamental way,
the process of competition set forth in the Chamberlin-Robinson and Lancaster-Ironmonger
theorems is one of finding some means of production by which goods and services can be
made substitutable for some already extant set, and then lowering price below or improving
attributes beyond those of competitors. And in the latter case, where the transfer, competitive,
evolutionary process is brought about by changes of product attributes, we may observe the
emergence out of competition new products.
In exposing the process of competition and evolution through the transfer of connections,
the Chamberlin-Robinson and Lancaster-Ironmonger theorems also demonstrate to us why cer-
tain connections in economic and market systems Es, Ms are more robust to changes in prices
and attributes than others. They show us why certain connections are “stronger” than others,
more able to withstand the process of competition, relatively inoculated against the effects of
structural evolution. In both cases, the ability of the individual or organisation ni who main-
tains the connections nin j ∈Ms to provide a product which the individual or organisation n j can
substitute for no other at least forces potential competitors nk to bid for connections by produc-
ing more preferable goods and services outright. They may effectively inoculate themselves
from the effects of competition and evolution on the basis of price by breaking the “chain of
substitution” (Earl, 1983) with respect to their product, as the Chamberlin-Robinson theorem
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dictates. And the Lancaster-Ironmonger theorem suggests that they may achieve at least partial
inoculation against the effects of competition and evolution through innovation either by con-
sistently outperforming their potential competitors in their product attributes, or by finding a
niche in the market system which no other competitor has the capability to occupy.
To make the point again, for it is surprising given the emphasis on price in prior approaches
to economics, both the Chamberlin-Robinson and Lancaster-Ironmonger theorems demonstrate
that price has no particular a priori priority over any other economic variable in the determina-
tion and evolution of the structure and function of economic systems. Prices take their central
place in the neoclassical school of thought for they are assumed to have such a place, the whole
project of neoclassical economics being really little more than price theory - an attempt to deter-
mine the form of an assumed correspondence between prices, demand and supply. Prices here,
where we have not assumed the centrality of this correspondence for understanding economic
systems, take their proper place (as in reality), primarily as the ratio of exchange in market
exchanges, and thus as constraints upon the range of potential exchanges to be made, beyond
this no more privileged a variable than any other the individual chooses to care about.
The assumptions made about thought and preference to establish the response of behaviour
to prices in the Chamberlin-Robinson theorem are far less innocuous than those made to estab-
lish the response of behaviour to product attributes by the same in the Lancaster-Ironmonger
theorem. Condition 2. of the Lancaster-Ironmonger theorem does little more than set up in the
analysis an ordering of attribute vectors from those which induce the least preferable implica-
tions to those which induce the most preferable. By contrast we might with good reason, and
contrary to condition 2. of the Chamberlin-Robinson theorem, suppose that the preferability of
implications is increasing in the price of goods and services, as prices can signal relative qual-
ity, scarcity value, or the wealth of the individual paying them, quite common in the calculus
of decision.
Even making this assumption, we find in the Chamberlin-Robinson theorem that price com-
petition cannot occur without the attributes of the goods and services under consideration being
such that they are substitutable for one another. Prices really are moot as a basis for competition
without two goods and services being sufficiently within each others locality in characteristic
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space or preferability of implication for them to be substitutes, a logic that the neoclassical
school of thought has tended to obscure in the assumption of the primacy of price and the
search for its correspondence to demand and supply. Earl (1995) as well as Kay (1997) have
made much of the fact that much competition, and even price-based competition, depends on
non-price factors - product attributes. But their work, unfortunately, does not progress much be-
yond vague informal narratives of the process of competition and the place therein of non-price
factors.
What we have, by contrast, in the Chamberlin-Robinson and Lancaster-Ironmonger theo-
rems is an exact and precise characterisation of the process of competition. We know exactly
the point at which the structure of the economic system will evolve by the transfer of connec-
tions. That being the point of substitutability. And we know therefore, excluding “outright”
competition what exactly it is that makes a connection more or less robust - the ability of the
competitor to develop capabilities to reach the point of substitution. Lancaster-substitutability
(theorem 3) and Ironmonger-Earl non-substitutability (theorem 4) suggest this point of substi-
tution is predicated upon some sort of similarity of non-price factors - product attributes. The
primary grounds for competition, the primary basis upon which the structural evolution of eco-
nomic systems proceeds, is not price, but rather product attributes, what the product “does” for
the buyer.
7.3 The Chinese Whispers theorem: diffusion of changes
To complete our foundations for economic analysis we need now consider one final critical
aspect of the formalism presented above concerning the evolution of economic systems. A
unique property of network mathematics is its ability to narrate the process by which a change
at some locality ni ∈ {N g(N)} brings about a change at some other locality n j ∈ {N g(N)}
in the system {N g(N)} (Newman, 2003). We have focussed hitherto in this work on what we
must - the individual interaction and its determinants. It is primary, necessary if we are to gain
fuller insight into the economy once we fit these together into a network. But the real power of
network analysis lies in its revelation of structure and function of relations, the relation of all
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Figure 7.3: The diffusion question: The Chinese Whispers asks and answers whether, over the
course of history, a change of behaviour at, say, ! will diffuse to cause a behavioural change at,
say, ? in socioeconomic systems.
parts of the system to each other. A change at one location can set in motion a chain of events
operating within the network structure which eventually engender a change at some other far-
removed location. In order to analyse this phenomenon of sociecoeconomic systems Es ∪ Is
using the formalism above we must first define it.
Definition 12 (Diffusion). Diffusion of a behavioural change atℵ= ci∨{ωk ∈ ni} in {Ets ∪ Its}t=T
to i= c j∨
{
ωk′ ∈ n j
}
in {Ets ∪ Its}t≤T¯ if, when there is a change of behaviour on the part of ℵ
at t = T
aℵ (t = T) = a∗ℵ→ a′ℵ (t = T) = a∗ℵ (7.6)
there is a change of behaviour on the part of i at t ≤ T¯
ai (t ≤ T¯ ) = a∗i→ a′i (t ≤ T¯ ) = a∗i (7.7)
when compared with an initial block {Ets ∪ Its}T¯t=T of socioeconomic history and the actions
{{ai (t)}i}T¯t=T which generate it (according to equations 6.8 and 6.9).
This definition in hand we may formulate necessary and sufficient conditions for diffusion
of a change of behaviour at one point of a point in economic history Ets ∪ Its to another. This
result we will call the “Chinese Whispers” theorem for the resemblance its provisions bear to
the eponymous parlour game in which information is progressively whispered person to person
around a circle.
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Theorem 19 (The Chinese Whispers theorem). Suppose we take a block of history {Ets ∪ Its}T¯t=T¯
, and we hold constant the progression of non-socioeconomic history in {V t \Ets ∪ Its}T¯t=T¯ , and
also the progression of psychologies gH (Hi) for each individual i. For diffusion of a be-
hvavioural change atℵ= ci∨{ωk ∈ ni} in {Ets ∪ Its}t=T to i= c j∨
{
ωk′ ∈ n j
}
in {Ets ∪ Its}t≤T¯ ,
supposing that initial behaviours remain feasible throughout it is necessary that
1. (The “absent firewall” condition): A chain
{
ntn′t+∆t ∈ Ets ∪ Its
}t<T¯
t=T reflecting changed
behaviours (ntnt+∆t ∈ Ets ∪ Its→ ntn′t+∆t ∈ Ets ∪ Its) with respect to the initial block {Ets ∪ Its}t=T
exist between nT = ni and nT¯ = n j.
And it is sufficient that
2. (The “sufficient conduits” condition): There exist chains
{
ntn′t+∆t ∈ Ets ∪ Its
}t<T¯
t=T reflect-
ing changed behaviours (ntnt+∆t ∈ Ets ∪ Its→ ntn′t+∆t ∈ Ets ∪ Its) with respect to the initial block
{Ets ∪ Its}t=T between nT = ni and nT¯ = n j with the property that
{
a′kt
}
kt∈Nkt+∆t (g)
⊂ v′Nkt+∆t (g) : a
′
kt+∆t ∈ B&gakt+∆t  ga′′kt+∆t ∀a
′′
kt+∆t ∈ B (7.8)
for everykt ∈
{
nt :
{
ntn′t+∆t ∈ Ets ∪ Its
}t<T¯
t=T
}
andkt = ct∨{ωkt ∈ nt}. That is, every changed
action of elements nt in the environment of elements nt+∆t at each point in these chains is con-
tained within the set of information which would induce a changed action on the part of nt+∆t
to be feasible and associated with the most preferable implications of all actions.
These fairly austere provisions may be brought to some more life by explicating their
nomenclature. In order for there to be diffusion of a change of behaviour between two points
in socioeconomic systems at two points of history there must exist no “firewall”, no break
in the chain of changed behaviours between the two relevant parts, and at least one chain of
changed behaviours which extends the full length between them. This is the requirement of the
necessary condition, the “absent firewall” condition.
Note, and this is quite an important property, that the breaking of the “absent firewall”
condition does not require that no chain between two points in socioeconomic systems exist
through socioeconomic history, but rather only that no chain of links consisting entirely of
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changed behaviours exist. If there is some individual kt in every chain
{
ntn′t+∆t ∈ Ets ∪ Its
}t<T¯
t=T
between two points ℵ, i in socioeconomic history which may “absorb” the change of be-
haviours, some individual whose selected behaviour is robust to changes in their environment,
then the “absent firewall” condition will hold and no diffusion will be possible. This subtlety
means that we might maintain chains of connections between two points in socioeconomic his-
tory and still prevent diffusion if a set of elements impervious to behavioural change interpose
between those two points.
But by the other side of the same argument, we cannot say the “absent firewall” condition
will hold if merely there exists some chain between two points in socioeconomic systems at two
points of history. Note thus that there may well be such a chain which is yet impervious to diffu-
sion, fails to facilitate it, because there exists a point kt in that chain which is robust to changes
in its environment. In order for diffusion to occur, there must exist no such “robustness”, no
such “absorptive capacity” on the part of any point in any chain through socioeconomic history.
The deep constraints upon the formation of economic structures (theorem 13) also constitute
deep constraints on diffusion. As long as any changed behaviour in the changed information
environment of any point in chains between two points ℵ and i exists within a “no-go zone”
or if behaviour which creates the next link in this chain is a pre-requisite behaviour we will find
an all-but impenetrable barrier to diffusion.
However, the “absent firewall” condition is but necessary, endowing merely the potential
for diffusion. We will be able to say that diffusion will occur between two points in socioeco-
nomic systems at two points in socioeconomic if the “sufficient conduits” condition holds. The
sufficient conduits condition requires that for all the chains
{
ntn′t+∆t ∈ Ets ∪ Its
}t<T¯
t=T between
two points ℵ and i in socioeconomic systems at two points of history that we have each point
in that chain changing behaviour such as to change the information in the environment of the
next point so that they find changing their behaviour both feasible and more preferable than
any other course of action. And so on. At each step, the change of behaviour must be “passed
on”, the change must not be absorbed. Much as the mouth of a river will have sufficient force
to clear sand deposits if the dams on its tributaries are releasing sufficient flows, or electricity
is delivered to a particular node in a network if the conduits leading to it are not dampening the
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flow.
This argument may be understood as a formalisation of Antonelli (1996). The structure of
an economic system is important - both conditions require that there exist chains between the
relevant two points in economic systems before diffusion may occur. But the structure of the
system is moot (the “absent firewall condition) unless the nodes within it are receptive to the
process of diffusion, they accept and commute the changes of behaviour of nodes “upstream”
to nodes “downstream”, and sufficiently so that “downstream” nodes cannot outright absorb
the change, but must themselves change their behaviour.
Now we may understand why the theorem containing these conditions is called the “Chi-
nese Whipsers” theorem. Diffusion of a behavioural change between two points ℵ and i in
socioeconomic systems at two points of history is totally contingent upon the passage of a sig-
nal through chains of interrelated individuals, at each stage an individual receiving a changed
signal which they must perceive, analyse, and act upon, much as in the epynomous parlour
game. We placed no requirement on the relation of the action a′ℵ (t = T) = a
∗
ℵ which consti-
tutes the prime mover of diffusion, and its ultimate culmination in the action a′i (t ≤ T¯ ) = a∗i,
so it is possible that the change is quite chaotic insofar as it being difficult to discern prior to
the fact that the changed behaviour a′i (t ≤ T¯ ) = a∗i might result from the changed behaviour
a′ℵ (t = T) = a
∗
ℵ.
Broadening our view somewhat beyond the diffusion between two points ℵ and i in so-
cioeconomic systems at two points of history, we can see how the Chinese Whispers theorem
elaborates the process of diffusion of behaviour changes from one point ℵ in socioeconomic
history to a range of points i in socioeconomic history. The more central ℵ is to socioeco-
nomic networks, or the more they have influence over some element kt central to the network
with a small ability to absorb the change outright and a high ability to absorb the change and
pass it on, the more, ceteris paribus, elements i in socioeconomic history the provisions of the
Chinese Whispers theorem may hold for. The Chinese Whispers theorem elaborates how each
of these chains, originating at the central element ℵ or routing through the central element
kt must, in the evolving structure and function of socioeconomic systems, have an absence
of “firewalls” impervious to changes of behaviour, and provide sufficient “conduits” to their
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termini, i, in order that behaviour at these termini will change.
The Chinese Whispers theorem advances upon prior academic research on diffusion by
revealing to us a systematic vision of the deep intricacies of the process of diffusion without
which we cannot hope to understand it holistically on a macroscopic scale. Previous approaches
have focused on one or the other aspect of the factors in diffusion at the cost of losing sight
of all of them acting together, in concert. In financial economics models of contagion such as
Gai and Kapadia (2010); Gai et al. (2011); Markose et al. (2012); Giansante et al. (2012); Ace-
moglu et al. (2015, 2012); Jackson et al. (2014) draw analogies between the spread of behaviour
across social networks and models of mathematical epidemiology or percolation in engineering
(Albert et al., 2000; Newman, 2003; Watts, 2004; Jackson, 2008). With fairly simple “takeup”
or “failure” rules for each node akin to electrical “pass-on” thresholds these models tend to
obscure the complexities of the human element in diffusing behavioural change which the Chi-
nese Whispers theorem brings into the foreground. Other models of diffusion, such as those
of Haas (2015); Klarl (2014); Metcalfe (2008); Metcalfe et al. (2006); Metcalfe (1998); Foster
(2005a); Dopfer et al. (2004) take and apply the Lotka-Volterra predator-prey or replicator dy-
namic equations (Page and Nowak, 2002), similar to “susceptible, infected, removed” models
of mathematical epidemiology (Newman, 2003; Munz et al., 2009) and models of diffusion
through a chemical medium (Nicolis and Prigogine, 1989), to model the proportion of a popu-
lation within an economic system engaging in a particular kind of behaviour. By focusing on
aggregated systemic parameters, these tend to obscure the importance of interactive structures
in diffusing behaviour change, upon which the Chinese Whispers demonstrates that diffusion
is in fact predicated.
The most complete account of diffusion, to which the Chinese Whispers theorem is closest
being a formal elaboration of, is not in fact a strictly academic account. Malcom Gladwell’s
The Tipping Point (2000) fuses together the vast academic literature on diffusion in (primar-
ily) sociology to provide a (characteristically) pithy demonstration of three core factors in the
diffusion of some localised change of behaviour to a change of behaviour on a large, systemic
scale. He emphasises the complex human element in diffusion often overlooked in more mech-
anistic models. Firstly, the chain from one point ℵ in socioeconomic history to a range of
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points i in socioeconomic history must route through an element kt central to socioeconomic
networks which Gladwell calls a “maven” - an old Jewish term meaning someone who is re-
spected, trusted for their knowledge and who is eager to accumulate it and pass it on (condition
1. indicates the necessity of this). Secondly, the change of behaviour must be contained within
an idea which is, in the terminology of Heath and Heath (2007), “made to stick” (condition 2.,
particularly the inducement of preference, argues for the sufficiency of this). But this change
of behaviour must also present an idea to each point in the chain in the right context - the right
systemic environment and the right and the right time - if it is to pervade the system (condition
2. emphasises that changed behaviours change part of the information contained within the
environment).
The Chinese Whispers theorem does add to Gladwell’s account though beyond providing
formal rigour to emphasise that we cannot focus only on the “super-spreader” node in a net-
work, for each and every stage in the chains between one point ℵ in socioeconomic history and
a range of points i in socioeconomic history has an important role to play in ensuring the infor-
mation presented at each i is sufficient to change behaviour. The existence of a super-spreader
node is more important in allowing for the necessary condition for diffusion to be satisfied for
a greater range of points i in socioeconomic history. It isn’t quite the case that we can say of
the Chinese Whispers theorem that diffusionary effects are only as strong as the weakest link
in the chains between two points, for there may be many conduits by which diffusion may find
a path through socioeconomic history. But diffusion is demonstrated to be critically contingent
upon each stage of what Earl et al. (2007) have called “decision rule cascades”.
7.4 Recapitulation
In this chapter we have moved forward from the analysis of the individual interaction toward
the government of the evolution of structures. The transfer of connections through the process
of competition, the concept of socioeconomic history and the diffusion of changes across struc-
tures existing in that history. We have discovered, in the Chamberlin-Robinson and Lancaster-
Ironmonger theorems, an exact picture of the process of evolution through competition for mar-
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ket connections, and a precise characterisation of the point at which the transfer of custom from
one part of the system to another occurs. In those same theorems we see illustrated the relative
a priori impotence of price in the process of competition compared with non-price attributes of
the goods and services constituting market connections. Competition is all but (all but) predi-
cated on the ability to produce substitutes for currently extant goods and services in the market,
goods and services with the same attributes, or equally preferable implications stemming from
them. Partial inoculation from the process of competition is achieved by manufacturing some
break in the chain of substitution.
In the Chinese Whispers theorem we have an unusual account of diffusion in economic
systems - one focused both on microeconomic structure and the psychological factors in the
diffusion of behavioural changes. The theorem makes clear that the diffusion of changes is
predicated on an evolving structure throughout historical time. But it also makes clear that
there is a human element beyond this mechanics, so that the structure is not sufficient to guar-
antee diffusion of behavioural changes from one point in the system to another across the
course of history. There must exist no “firewalls” - a barrier of elements of the system with
the ability to absorb any shock. And there must be “sufficient conduits” - an ability to transfer
sufficient changes in decision environments further along the chain of diffusion. A core theme
of this work is reflected in both conditions: that psychology, knowledge, perception, and the
response thereof to changes in the environment are the foundation for the structure and function
of socioeconomic systems.
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Part IV
Conclusions and Appendices
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Chapter 8
Conclusion: by way of recapitulation
Stripped of all auxiliary considerations and distilled only in its ancilliary, the structure of the
model developed above can be shown in the following diagrams and stated in essence in the
following table (table 8.1). These are intended to act as both recapitulation, and as a “glossary”
of sorts.
Observe in figure 8.2 (revealing the structure of the model with components labeled logico-
mathematically) and in figure 8.1 (revealing the structure of the model with components labeled
in plain English) the structure of the model presented in what precedes for the foundations of
economic analysis. We begin with the structure and function, the architecture of the socioeco-
nomic system as it exists at the beginning of the duration under analysis.
If we are proceeding with microeconomic analysis we then pivot by focusing our attention
on the individual within that systemic context, using the concept of systemic neighbourhood to
obtain the information environment in that locality of the system. This forms the basis for the
individual’s perception of the information contained within their locality in the system. The ob-
jects of the world are then analysed by the individual through the application of their knowledge
of the world, after the phenomenological “I” has determined that which it needs to determine
- the genesis of genuinely creative thoughts, and the incorporation of new connections into the
individual’s knowledge of their world. If the individual is then to make a decision the indi-
vidual deduces the set of actions available to them, and the implications attendant upon each
of them, be these chains of rational (or irrational) “because” statements, or the application of
192
C
on
ce
pt
Sp
ec
ifi
cs
M
at
he
m
at
ic
al
ob
je
ct
E
qu
at
io
n
E
co
no
m
y
E
s
=
{ N
g
(N
)}
3.
1
E
le
m
en
ts
N
=
{ C
P}
R
el
at
io
ns
[n
in
j
∈
g
(N
)]
=
[ x n in
j
m
n i
n
j]
So
ci
et
y
I s
=
{ N
g v
(N
)}
3.
4
E
le
m
en
ts
N
=
{ C
P}
R
el
at
io
ns
[n
in
j
∈
g
(N
)]
=
v n
in
j
O
rg
an
is
at
io
n
n i
=
{ N
n i
g n
i
(N
n i
)}
3.
6
E
le
m
en
ts
N
n i
=
{ W
n i
X n
i
M
n i
}
R
el
at
io
ns
[η
kη
k′
∈
g n
i
(N
n i
)]
=
[ x n in
j
m
n i
n
j
v n
in
j]
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gy
of
be
ha
vi
ou
r:
in
di
vi
du
al
i
M
in
d
of
i
µ i
=
{ H
i
g H
(H
i)
}
4.
1
Pe
rc
ep
tio
n
ρ i
( v N i(g
)) =
{ H
′ i
{ R
hh
′ }}
4.
2
A
na
ly
si
s
g H
(H
′ i)
⊂
g H
(H
i)
4.
3
Im
pl
ic
at
io
ns
g a
i
=
{ R hh
′ ∈
g H
(H
′ i)
:h
h′
∈
{ h
kh
k+
1}
K k=
0
⊂
g H
(H
i)
&
h 0
∈
a i
}
4.
5
D
ec
is
io
n
a∗ i
=
{ a i∈
B
:g
a i

g a
′ i∀
a′ i
∈
B
}
4.
6
Fo
rm
at
io
n
of
st
ru
ct
ur
es
:E
s
⊃
g
(N
),
M
s
⊃
g M
s
(N
)
an
d
I s
⊃
g v
(N
)
Fo
rm
at
io
n
ou
to
fa
∗ i=
c i
∨ω
i
E
co
no
m
y
g(
N
)
=
{ [ x n
in
j
m
n i
n
j] 6=
/0
⊂
a∗ i
=
c i
∨{ a
∗ k=
ω
k
} ω k∈
n i
} n i∈N
6.
8
M
ar
ke
t
g M
s
(N
)
=
    [ m
n
jn
i
=
p n
in
jx
n i
n
j] :
[ x n in
j
m
n
jn
i] 6=
/0
&
p n
in
j
:m
n
jn
i
=
p n
in
jx
n i
n
j
∈
a∗ i
=
c i
∨{ a
∗ k=
ω
k
} ω k∈
n i
&
a∗ j
=
c j
∨{ a
∗ k′ =
ω
k′
} ω k′∈
n i
    
6.
17
So
ci
et
y
g v
(N
)
=
{ [ v n
in
j] 6=
/0
⊂
a∗ i
=
c i
∨{ a
∗ k=
ω
k
} ω k∈
n i
} n i∈N
6.
9
Ta
bl
e
8.
1:
L
og
ic
o-
m
at
he
m
at
ic
al
fo
un
da
tio
ns
fo
re
co
no
m
ic
an
al
ys
is
193
Figure 8.1: The cyclic structure of the present formalism - English
Figure 8.2: The cyclic structure of the present formalism - Glyphic
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behavioural rules. The aesthetics of these implications then lead to the selection of that course
of action, that behaviour, which is associated with the most preferable implications out of the
feasible subset of available actions.
This course of action selected by the individual then influences the structure of the economic
system in their locality. Where the individual selects a course of action which contains the
elements of economic (or social) exchange with another element of the economic (or social)
system, a connection, an economic (or social) interaction comes to exist between that individual
and that other element of the economic (or social) system. Collecting together these behaviours
individual by individual, we have determined the structure and function, the architecture of the
economic (and social) systems as a whole.
We have neither reduced the determination of the economic system to the isolated individ-
ual, nor lost sight of the heterogeneity of individuals who make up an economic system. We
use each individual as a pivot point, analysing the economic system by observing how the sys-
tem effects their thinking and thus behaviour, and how that behaviour then in return effects the
system. There is an ongoing circle of causality, from the system to the individual within their
particular locality. Or to put it vulgarly, there is an ongoing cycle of cause and effect between
the macroeconomics of the socioeconomic system and its microeconomics.
Each of the important mathematical objects in this analysis referred to in figure 8.2 are
cross-referenced with their nomenclature (the interpretation to be given them) and their equa-
tion number in the preceding work in table (table 8.1), which contains all the basic logico-
mathematical objects of economic analysis. In table 8.2 we summarise in a similar fashion
the core definitions of chapter 4 by means of which we placed the psychology of behaviour
developed in Markey-Towler (2015) in an economic context.
The key auxiliary considerations of this formalism - specifically the different theorems,
lemmas and corollaries - and their relevance in a few words for economic analysis may be sum-
marised and organised also, by means of tabulation, in table 8.2. Theorems 3 and 4 illustrate
potential sources, respectively, for substitutability and non-substitutability. Theorem 8 reveals
to us potential sources of complementarity between different economic objects in household
and worker production technologies. Theorems 6 and 7 provide the foundation for theorem
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13 which elaborates some primordial constraints on the economic structures which may arise
born of the generation by the existence of needs of pre-requisite sets and no-go zones. Ex-
tending upon these elaborations of the government of the structure and function of economic
systems, the Mauss-Commons and Smith Hayek theorems (14 and 15) elaborate the necessary
and sufficient conditions for the existence of, respectively, non-market and market interactions,
connections within the economic system and the market system for which it provides the prim-
itive physical basis.
We arrive by this at an understanding of the government of the architecture of economic
systems on a granular basis. And it is important to remember that in the necessity of their
conditions the Mauss-Commons and Smith-Hayek theorems provide theories of why economic
systems are incomplete, why there are connections which aren’t made, which don’t exist. And
because of this, they provide the explanation for that incompleteness of structure, of economic
architecture, which allows for non-destructive evolution of structure to occur by the addition of
new interactions, connections, alongside the removal of those existing.
The Chamberlin-Robinson and Lancaster-Ironmonger theorems (17 and 18) reveal the pro-
cess of evolution through for the transfer of connections in the process of competition on the
basis of, respectively, prices and non-price attributes. When we extend our analysis to study
economic history, the process of diffusion whereby a change of economic behaviour within the
socioeconomic system at one point in socioeconomic history leads to another is described by
the Chinese Whispers theorem (19).
This formalism, and these results to be arrived at within it, constitute the foundations for
economic analysis. The foundations for an economics which views the socioeconomic system
just as it exists, a system of individual human beings interacting on the basis of their psychology
to generate a pattern of interaction with an architecture, a structure which can be represented,
expressed, by a mathematical network. An architecture which is not complete, and thus an
architecture which can evolve.
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8.1 Beyond foundations: theoretical development, empirical
and policy application
It was said at the outset of this work that it mounts the first major assault by the literature it
seeks to create on hitherto only reconnoitered or sidestepped redoubts of that frontier thrown up
by the intransigence of human psychology and complex architecture of economic systems. And
as might be expected by a first major assault, it has breached the walls of these redoubts, gained
us a vantage point which allows us to survey the territory beyond. In any intellectual endeavour,
such as this, this is what a formalism laying out the foundations for the analysis of a particular
system such as the economic aims to do. But it remains for us to breakout and conquer the
territory of our ignorance. In any intellectual endeavour, this is achieved by building on the
foundations for the analysis of a particular system such as the economy, pushing beyond it to
develop more specific theories of particular phenomena using its formalism, collecting data for
and then testing those theories for their consonance with reality, and revisiting the assumptions
input into the formalism when specific theories are refuted by the data.
As a guide for this further work, we will consider directions for the development of mi-
croeconomics1 beyond the foundations presented here classed as three. There is much work to
be done, and there is actually already much work being done, which develops upon the view
of economies as systems with an architecture, a structure and function expressible in network
mathematics, in the theoretical, the empirical and the policy spheres of complex economic
systems scienta.
8.1.1 Theoretical
The scope for further development of theoretical perspectives of economic structure and func-
tion on the basis of the formalism presented falls within three categories: the understanding of
existing theories in its light, the extension of theoretical understanding of economic structure
and function, and the integration of explanations of empirically observed phenomena such as
these within the remit of a single model. We might elaborate these categories in reverse order.
1The development of macroeconomics may proceed, as indicated above (s.3.3) by utilisation of the micro-
meso-macro framework.
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The first, most obvious theoretical direction in which we may extend using the formal-
ism outlined above is the integration within a single model of economic structure and function
explanations of the many peculiarities of psychology and behaviour observed by behavioural
economics. We may continue weaving behavioural economics together into a single tapestry
expressing the interrelated complexities of human economic behaviour. Some first steps in
this project have already been taken in Chapter 6 of the Sketches of an Architecture of Mind
(Markey-Towler, 2015) in which it is shown that by elaborating various objects within the for-
malism of the psychology of behaviour we arrive at explanations and predictions of many com-
monly observed psychological and behavioural phenomena. Progressing by elaborating the
peculiar properties of perception, personal knowledge, aesthetics we arrive not at a collection
of fairly disconnected epicyclic relaxations2 of the standard model (the project for behavioural
economics outlined by Rabin (2013a,b)), but rather a systematic and integrated analysis of hu-
man behaviour in the context of the whole of the economic system. The fairly simple shift of
our axiomatic basis to that provided here will allow us to capture all these peculiarities within
the one model that much more easily than relaxing it in every which way, while also allowing
us to place behaviour fairly easily within the context of the systemic structure it generates3.
In general, theoretical analysis of the economic system may develop by taking the axiomatic
structure presented here and placing yet further restrictions on the contents thereof to arrive
at narratives explaining specific structures and functions within g(N) ⊂ Es. As discussed in
section 16 we develop more specific theories of the structure and function of economic systems
by taking our axiomatic foundations and restricting them by placing further assumptions on
them - specific assumptions about initial psychologies gH (Hi), the specific form of perception
ρi (·), the environment of individuals vNi(g), and aesthetics◦2gH(Hi). We by this process arrive
at more specific explanations and predictions of structure and function within Es which can be
tested against our observation. This constitutes our breakout into and occupation of the territory
2Ptolemaic astronomy, based on the terracentric axiom, explained deviations of the predicted positions of the
planets in their supposed passage around the sun from their actual positions by reference to “epicycles”, orbits of
the planets within their orbits, of which literally thousands began to be attached to the model. Making it all but
impossible to explain and predict the solar system with.
3Copernicus, then Galileo, by simply replacing the axiom of terracentricism with heliocentricism in the cycles
traced by the planets were able to at a stroke provide an account of the solar system far more consistent with
observation, while also simple and integrated.
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hitherto but surveilled from our breach-point on the frontier of our ignorance.
As a methodological sidebar (an important one), in executing this program it will be impor-
tant for economics, and specifically but not only analytical economics, to mature beyond the
adolescent need to have an analytical solution for this or that economic variable in hand before
analysis can be thought “tractable”. The failure to understand that adequate analysis may pro-
ceed on the basis of equations and relations without analytical closure is what has led to the
belief in the necessity of the much-ridiculed (Quiggin, 2010) “representative agent” model in
which one agent is supposed to exist which can represent all. Any system with n > 2 interact-
ing parts (i.e. any interesting economy) cannot (feasibly) be described by equations which have
analytical solutions (Qiu-Dong, 1991). As with physics, economics will develop by its prac-
titioners’ ability to use mathematical analysis without requiring analytically closed relations.
And analytical economics will be complemented, as with physics, by increasing adoption of
simulation methods (such as those outlined in Kirman (2011); Chen (2012); Elsner (2012)4),
which have great potential in their flexibility and brute-force computation to elaborate that
which analytical economics cannot because of its rigour.
A more strictly academic development of theoretical analysis, though one still with signifi-
cant practical import, may proceed by seeking the conditions under which the present formal-
ism becomes equivalent with prior analyses (Neoclassical, Post Keynesian, Ricardian/Sraffian,
Austrian, Evolutionary/Institutional). As the formalism developed here seeks to represent the
reality of the economy just as it is, this ought reveal better how prior analyses of the economic
system approximate the reality of the economy, revealing the full range of assumptions they
make in order to achieve this or that analysis. This is of course of great practical benefit, il-
lustrating to us under which conditions certain theoretical arguments are valid and which are
not. But it also constitutes the exercise imagined by Potts (2000) of elaborating exactly how
territory already gained in economic science is incorporated within a single formalism.
4Steve Keen (1995, 2011) has made much productive use of simulation methods to elaborate macroeconomic
phenomena arising from non-analytically solvable equations.
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8.1.2 Empirical
As empirical economics - collecting and analysing data on the economic system - lacks di-
rection without the invigoration of theory, so too is theoretical economics relativistic without
the input and arbitration of empirical economics. Empirical economics informs the theorist
of appropriate assumptions (reflective of reality) which may be adopted to further narrow the
“axioms”. At the other end of the scientific process, it acts as an arbiter for testing theories
of specific phenomena, whether the assumptions which are input into the formalism in their
development are consistent with the reality of economic structure and function or inconsistent.
And thus serves as instigator of revisions to the assumptions of economic analysis.
There is no better source of data for the economist than the annals of history. History,
descriptive history, is empirical social science and vice versa. History, explanatory history
(Carr, 1961), is rightly theoretical social science. The considerations of, in particular, s7.1 and
s7.3, demonstrate the prescience of consistently ignored calls for the wholesale reintegration
of economic history into the discipline of economics. There is really no such thing as an
economic science which excludes economic history. It is a phantasmagoria. History provides
the narratives by which we may test specific theories of this or that structure and function of
the economic system, and attempts to explain its progress are attempts to formulate theories of
the structure and function of the economic system (see s7.1).
The economic history which may serve to develop upon the foundations for economic anal-
ysis here focuses on identifying the structural properties of socioeconomic systems over time,
and developing narratives thereof which can form the basis for explanatory theories. It iden-
tifies those portions within {Ets ∪ Its}T¯t=T ⊂ {Ets ∪ Its}Tt=0 of socioeconomic history {Ets ∪ Its}Tt=0
relevant to the testing of specific theories of the structure and function of economic systems Es,
and constructs narratives of the mapping f∆t : {V t ⊃ Ets ∪ Its}→
{
Et+∆ts ∪ It+∆ts
}
from one point
of world history to the next of socioeconomic history which serve as and as inputs for specific
theories of the structure and function of economic systems Es. Research of this sort is already
being conducted by Ivano Cardinale (Cardinale and Coffman, 2014; Cardinale, 2015), where a
structural approach is taken to identifying the interactive relations between different parts of the
economy (here g(N)⊂ Es), and narratives developed concerning how this structure effects the
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thought processes of individuals i = ci∨
{
ωi ∈ n j
}
which give rise to political systems within
society (here g(N) ⊂ Is), which in turn constrain Es to take certain forms. The general “case
studies” approach to business history which serves as the foundation for organisational science,
refined and extended to the study of the structure and function of economic systems g(N)⊂ Es
as a whole as well as the organisations n j ∈ N within it would develop upon the foundations
here into the realm of empirical economics.
Turning to the empirical psychology of economic behaviour, the mind is absolutely not a
“black box” into which the economist cannot look, as has in the past been the prevalent view
(Bruni and Sugden, 2007; Hands, 2010). There are many techniques extant within psychology
and sociology and neuroscience, indeed some even within economics, which allow us a vantage
point on the contents of an individual’s mind by reconstructing portions {H ′i gH (H ′i )} at any
point in time. One might try the behaviourist, anti-psychological, almost solipsistic defence of
revealed preference theory that the contents of the mind are ultimately knowable only to the
subject, but the reality is that, even allowing for the ability of the subject to conceal their state
of mind (and there are techniques to mitigate for this confounding factor), much is to be gained
by studying the process of perception, analysis and decision.
The correlate of the neoclassical revealed preference theory, which aims at constructing
preferences over actions (Wong, 1978), for the foundations for economic analysis offered here,
seeks to reconstruct the implication chains upon which preferences operate. Hermeneutics
as applied to economics seeks to understand the institutional and historical factors at play in
choice, behaviour, by attempting to reconstruct the drives and thoughts concerning actions
within the mind of the individual (Koppl and Whitman, 2004). Here, hermeneutics seeks to
recover from observed behaviour a∗i the chains of implications gai ⊂ gH (H ′i ) and the pref-
erences  ◦2gH(H ′i) they support, which in turn determine behaviour. Much as the original
hermeneutics seeks to recover the reasoning behind literary texts, the motivation for writing
them, socioeconomic behaviour becomes the text we are seeking to interpret (c.f. de Certeau
(1984)). Alfred Schutz (1932)5 sought understanding of the objects within the “stream of con-
sciousness” by which the individual comes to make decisions about social behaviour much as
5A disciple of the famed Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises who was a prominent member of his Kreis in
the latter days of classical Vienna.
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Margaret Archer (2003) in the contemporary era seeks to recover the “internal conversation”
constituting the psychology which guides social behaviour. Hermeneutics is very similar to
the approach advocated by Ulrich Witt (2001), who argues that in order to understand choice,
we must understand the chains of implications gai ⊂ gH (H ′i ) constructed around alternative
behaviours and which form the basis for preferences between consequences  ◦2gH(H ′i).
More conventional methods for recovering the more relevant portions of gH (H ′i ) ⊃ gai for
◦2gH(H ′i) and thus economic behaviour can be found widely practiced throughout psychology.
The most famous, of course, being the psychoanalytical techniques of Freud, Jung and Adler
(Makari, 2008; Lester, 1995), in which the analyst attempts through a conversation with an in-
dividual to reconstruct the thought process of that individual as revealed in their conversation -
to recover gH (Hi). After a fashion this is an exercise in hermeneutics, in which the analyst tries
to uncover motivation, their skill being in their ability to recover gH (Hi) even when the relation
between gH (Hi) and the information presented by them i to the analyst j, vi j is not direct (i.e.
when the subject is resistant). A similar, and less controversial technique6 is that of repertory
grid method for revealing personal constructs gH (Hi), elaborated and applied at length by Hin-
kle (1965), in which the subject is primed to elicit particular aspects gH (H ′i )⊂ gH (Hi) of their
knowledge of the world gH (Hi) before being asked, literally, to connect objects h ∈ H ′i with
descriptors δ ∈ ∆∩H ′i of those objects (called “axes”) on a grid, which are in turn linked with
other concepts h′ ∈H ′i . Selecting h∈ ai ⊂ A′i in this process allows us in theory to progressively
recover gai ⊂ gH (H ′i ). And of course, the correlation of certain regions of the brain with certain
types of thought (Kandel et al., 2013) allows us, upon applying some neuroimaging technology
to the subject i, in principle to observe the neural correlates of gH (H ′i ), as has been made use
of by neuroeconomists for some time (Camerer et al., 2005).
Finally, as regards the more immediate concern with identifying quantitative metrics of in-
teraction, much innovation in identifying, representing and expressing economic structure is
already occurring7. The most obvious way in which to collect data on the structure and func-
6Psychoanalysis being of course legendarily plagued with the Procrustean force-fitting of observation to theory
much as in revealed preference theory.
7It is worth noting that the Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) methodology for measuring economic complexity
using network metrics is more an exercise in macroeconomics, studying emergent properties, than in identifying
the structure and function g(N)⊂ Es of economic systems Es. That methodology constructs a network of related
products, and reveals that the more a country’s exports exist at locations of that network indicating complexity,
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tion of economic systems Es ⊃ g(N) is to collect data on individual transactions nin j ∈ g(N),
data which is available in the records of storekeepers (sometimes even the tax office), though it
is often more practical to collect data on interactions between classes of individuals classed by
a meso-rule such as industry production methods. Rita Strohmaier (2014) has made use of such
data in order to study the concentration of the inter-industry production structure of the econ-
omy within g(N)⊂ Es around “general purpose technologies” which through diffusion exist at
the core of many production processes. Similarly, spurred by the realisation that vulnerability
of income to financial institutions, like income to consumers, is also influenced by their place
within the system Es at up to and beyond five, six steps remove (Giansante et al., 2012), Sheri
Markose (Markose, 2013; Markose et al., 2012) has developed programs which take data on the
cross-holdings of financial instruments by financial institutions to recover and operate on the
network of individual interactions nin j ∈ Fs in the financial system Fs ⊂ Es. Even traditional
econometric methods can be co-opted and employed in identifying the structure of networks
within Es, as has been shown by Anufriev and Panchenko (2015), who regress financial assets
of each institution in financial systems against those of the others and use a non-zero correla-
tion as a proxy for interactions nin j ∈ Fs in order to recover the network of the financial system
Fs ⊂ Es.
8.1.3 Policy
Policy analysis is the realm peculiar to the social sciences in which theory and empirics are
uniquely closely combined in order to gain a vantage point on problems of encouraging or
discouraging economic structures from arising. The traditional approach to economic policy
has been dominated by the view that the manner in which economic policy may proceed to
encourage or discourage economic structures is price manipulation. The present work does not
deny outright the efficacy of price manipulation policies. It even giving us an improved means
of understanding their effectiveness in theorems 2, 3, 14, 15 and 17. But the advances made by
the present work can be perhaps best encapsulated in the drastic expansion of the factors influ-
encing the structure and function of the economic system which policymakers may understand.
the more economically developed it is.
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We might even derive something akin to an algorithm for conduct of policy analysis.
The primordial step, before any further analysis can occur, is for the policymaker, guided by
theorem 13 to become aware of any potential deep constraints on the structures to the economic
system. The effectiveness of non-drastic price manipulation policy will be constrained by the
existence of no-go zones into which behaviour will not stray and pre-requisite sets out of which
behaviour will not stray unless doing so is impossible to avoid. Until the relevant connection
to needs in the psyche is altered, the relevant needs somehow supressed, or some truly drastic
price policy affected no policy will be successful bringing into existence connections contained
in no-go zones, or eliminating connections contained in pre-requisite sets. In the context of
Australian economic policy this new vision of policy becomes immediately apparent as regards
regional development policy. Successive Federal, State and Territory governments have for
many years spent billions on developing the regional areas of Australia and employing the
people therein to little avail in the belief that market “failures” have caused price “signals”
to be “distorted”. The present work would instead commend the views of Adamson (2013)
and Tremblay (2010) that the issues go deeper than prices to fundamental needs that must be
addressed before development may proceed through decisions to engage in economic behaviour
in regional Australia.
Once this primordial analysis is made, the primary analysis of the policymaker is guided
by the Mauss-Commons theorem in seeking to understand non-market connections and the
Smith-Hayek theorem in seeking to understand market connections. In order ensure that some
connection is brought into existence, or understand why some connection is currently in exis-
tence the policymaker is guided by the formal properties of the five conditions of each to come
to understand what factors will combine to cause their satisfaction. But the particular advance
our formalism makes is the guide it offers the policymaker in ensuring some connection is not
brought into existence, or understand why some connection is currently not in existence. Here
the policymaker is directed by the conditions of the Mauss-Commons and Smith-Hayek theo-
rems to five potential causes of the non-existence of any given connection. Alongside traditional
problems of pricing, the policymaker is guided to seek factors contributing to non-existence or
the elimination of connections in the structure of the socioeconomic system, perception of
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information contained therein, deep non-substitutabilities related to needs and the complemen-
tarity of objects. In the realm of environmental policy, Earl (forthcoming) has noted that relying
on price manipulation policy alone may not be as effective as a concerted effort by the govern-
ment to effect the manner of individuals’ thought to address non-subsitutabilities in the psyche
as concerns, and invest in infrastructure which might complement, the adoption of “green”
lifestyles in economic behaviour. A further important question discussed between Earl and the
present author concerns the relevance of condition 4. of the Smith-Hayek theorem and the con-
cept of complementarity provide a better understanding of the process of “takeoff” in economic
development - when the presence of some complement to certain economic behaviour may be
decisive in the fulfilling of the Smith-Hayek conditions for market exchange.
Supplementary considerations in the analytical process of the policymaker concern the sat-
isfaction of condition 4 of the Mauss-Commons and Smith-Hayek theorems - the “getting
into” the psyche of the requisite implications that this or that particular economic behaviour
is preferable to all others. The policymaker remains a “technician” in the less radical task of
manipulating the information contained in the environment of the individual - what Thaler and
Sunstein (2008) call the “choice architecture” - guided by theorem 11 in order that perception
and analysis generate the necessary chains of implications that condition 4. is satisfied. But
the policymaker becomes rhetorician when engaged in the more radical behaviour of seeking
to present information to the individual which will suggest new ideas likely to incorporated
within, and therefore change, personal constructs, lifestyle, the way people individuals think
about the world guided by the “made to stick” theorems 1 and 10. As regards the importance
of this style of thinking, in addition to the context of environmental policy as alluded to above,
the Australian policy context is instructive again. Given the addictive properties of nicotine it
is likely the persistent efforts of successive Federal, State and Territory governments to edu-
cate the public of the dangers of cigarette consumption, and the almost draconian packaging
laws requiring the presentation of disturbing images of the health consequences of cigarette
consumption has been far more effective than ever higher “sin” taxes on the same.
This rounds out a formal framework to invigorate policy analysis in the style of Earl (forth-
coming), approaching the challenge of encouraging or discouraging economic structures in a
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simultaneously comprehensive and systematic manner. But beyond the basic problems of en-
couraging and discoruaging certain economic connections to come and from comming into ex-
istence, the Chamberlin-Robinson and Lancaster-Ironmonger theorems provide us some guid-
ance in matters of competition policy, and the Chinese Whispers theorem into the microeco-
nomics of macroeconomic policy.
A neat property of the Chamberlin-Robinson and Lancaster-Ironmonger theorems is that
they demonstrate to us what makes certain connections more robust to competition on the basis
of prices and attributes respectively. Thus they have a clear bearing on policy insofar as they
relate the robustness of connections, and thus the degree of non-competitiveness to the degree
of non-substitutability in the market systen. Assuming their co-presence in action spaces the
degree of competitiveness faced by any particular entity within the economic system is directly
proportional to the degree of substitutability of their outputs. This is not a new idea, though
its rigorous demonstration is. But what is novel and policy-relvant is that in theorem 3 we
have a theory of the origins substitutability which allow us to form expectations of competi-
tiveness prior to the observation of (anyway controversial) estimates of cross-price elasticities.
And yet further we have in theorem 4 a theory of the origins of the most profound possible
non-substitutability by means of which we can form expectations of under what conditions
competitiveness will be eliminated to the greatest extent possible. Once more, in the Australian
context for instance, there are thus contributions to be made to the manner in which the Aus-
tralian Competition and Consumer Commission evaluates merger and acquisition activity with
a view to its effect on the competitiveness of Australian markets.
There is already work being conducted (Gai et al., 2011; Lee, 2013; Anand et al., 2013;
Tellez, 2013; Markose, 2013)8, to understand the policy relevance of a more mechanical ac-
count of diffusion of shocks in financial systems upon which the Chinese Whispers theorem
extends to provide an understanding of the human factor. The content of the Chinese Whispers
theorem offers yet still more insight to the policymaker into the spread of shocks across finan-
cial systems and business cycles across the economy and the impact of policy thereon not as a
purely mechanical process, but rather mediated by the psyche, a series of behaviour changes on
8Acemoglu et al. (2015) and Jackson et al. (2014) develop similar arguments to this research without particu-
larly careful reference to it.
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the part of interacting human beings. The contents of the theorem, along with the contents of
the Schumpeter theorem (theorem 9) ought provide us a more systematic view of the microe-
conomic impacts of National Innovation Systems, which seek to provide finance to innovators
within the economic system (Dodgson et al., 2011), allowing us to obtain more subtle insights
into how policy interacts with the process of the diffusion of innovations and what more might
be done to facilitate it.
8.2 What are these the fruits of our labour?
Now finally at the conclusion of our development of the foundations for economic analysis,
let us reconsider what it is we have obtained here for economic science. We have developed a
formalism which grants us and allows us a method to develop further insight into and under-
standing of the causalities of the structure and function of an economic system, when economic
systems are understood as systems which may be represented and expressed as a network struc-
ture. With a definite architecture.
The formalism presented here incorporates, in fact pivots around, a formal model of the
psychology of economic behaviour (Part II) from whence arises (Part III), the structure of
economic interaction represented by a network. The theoretical determination of the structure
and function of the economic system not only explains why certain connections (interactions)
come to exist, but also which connections (interactions) do not come to exist and why. It
offers an explanation (s6.4.1) not only of the structure and function of economic systems, but
why that structure is incomplete. Therefore it offers an explanation for the possibility of non-
destructive structural evolution in the economic system, the progressive change over time of the
pattern of economic interaction by the addition of new connections and the removal of those
existing. And the formalism presented here offers an explanation of how and why connections
are transferred from one part of the system to another through the competitive process, as well
as through the outright addition of new links through the incorporation of novelty in production
and consumption behaviour (Ch.7, and ss5.1,5.3.1).
The formalism presented here drastically expands the set of variables of microeconomic
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interest and microeconomic variables the determination of which we may formulate under-
standing, beyond prices and the level of activity in amorphous “markets”, to the fine-grained
structure of economic interaction and the prices, non-price attributes, psychological factors,
social context and socioeconomic systemic environment influencing that interaction. And it
demonstrates, both importantly and perhaps surprisingly to those of a neoclassical persuasion,
that prices are only more important than any other aspect of the choice environment the indi-
vidual chooses to care about in their considerations or rule-following in their role as the ratio of
exchange and their constraining of the feasible set of economic behaviour. They otherwise have
no a priori privileged place in economic analysis, certainly not as arguments of the individual’s
understanding of their world.
In expanding our knowledge thus of incompleteness and evolution, and the psycho-sociological
factors in economic behaviour, we do not lose territory already gained in our understanding of
economic systems. As Potts (2000) argued, each of the prior schools of thought in economic
analysis are concerned with the structure and function of economic systems, but had not the
mathematical system of graph theory by which this structure and function might be expressed
and so approximate it in various ways. The neoclassical school concerns itself by and large
with the special case of a complete network in which equilibrium mathematics might be ap-
plied to flows across this network, sacrificing analysis of structure to analyse function. The
heterodox schools of thought concern themselves with various sources of incompleteness in
economic structure, yet without the benefit of the mathematics of graph theory to represent
economic systems with such structure and function.
The formalism presented here is intellectually competitive with its predecessors. It provides
an integrated account of the psychology of economic behaviour and the determination by that
behaviour of the structure and function of economic systems. This account is holistic in the
vision it gives of the individual interaction within a systemic context, the whole of that system
having an incomplete and evolutionary structure. And it provides a systematic elaboration of
the foundations for economic analysis, proceeding formally, rigorously, logically to develop
a mathematical system for the representation and analysis of the structure and function of the
socioeconomic system. And all this by way of presenting a picture of the reality of economic
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systems just as they exist. As complex social systems of psychologically driven human beings.
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Chapter 9
Appendix A: Different approaches to
socioeconomic systems
Modern academic standards demand that one always undertake a review of relevant literature
to force youthful impatience to muse upon its insignificance relative to the elders. The problem
is always at which point to delineate “relevance”. This is a particular problem in this work,
for there are vast reams of research on “complexity” in economics, and there are vast reams of
research on “networks” in economics. But each of these literatures, while prima facie relevant
because of their nomenclature, take in fact such a different approach to the study of economic
systems, and with such a different focus as to outcomes to be reached as to make them border-
line irrelevant on the whole to this work. It will be necessary however, to satisfy the strictures of
scholastic showmanship to demonstrate these differences. While it is not traditional, it is better
to consider these literatures here in an appendix, after we have developed our own system for
economic analysis. Doing so means we can consider them in its light and draw comparisons
with something we are already acquainted with and thus far better understand their relation,
rather than constantly referring to limitations of extant literature that will (one promises) be
addressed in “what follows”.
We will first discuss some representatives of the literature on complexity economics, their
focus and their limitations. We will then turn to two, broadly defined strands of the cluster of
literatures swirling about neoclassical economics which adopt network methodology in their
212
analysis, and discuss their focus and limitations. In all cases we will try to faithfully repre-
sent the core of the approach taken within these literatures and cite some particularly salient
examples of these approaches while assessing the approach itself. Any attempt in the modern
day to provide an exhaustive review of literatures so widely dispersed and so voluminous is a
fools errand. We will see that the focus of these fields limits their ability to analyse economic
systems in an integrated, holistic and systematic manner, and thus see that the present work has
engaged with a project hitherto broached only informally as discussed above (s.24). What is
unique in the work above is the manner in which it develops an integrated, holistic and system-
atic vision of the structure, function and evolution of economic systems as networks formed
out of individuals acting on the basis of their psychology and social position.
9.1 Neoclassical approaches to socioeconomic networks
The literature on socioeconomic networks in neoclassical economics is, as all neoclassical eco-
nomics is, variations on a theme1. The theme being the behavioural model of the “rational”
agent qua maximiser of utility/preferences. That is, the actions a∗i of individual i maximise
expected utility Eui (·), which is a mapping from the space Ai ⊂ RNA+ of potential actions to
utility, Eui (·) : Ai→ R, constrained by the set B⊂ Ai of feasible actions. So that
a∗i = argmaxx∈BEui (ai) (9.1)
A reading of Jackson (2008) confirms the neoclassical approach to economics develops
around this equation one of two ways, sometimes both. It is applied either to the actions of an
individual node i= ni ∈ {N g(N)} either via the form of the feasible set B or the definition of
actions Ai. In the former case, the action ai j ⊂ ai of i with respect to j being within the feasible
1We will not concern ourselves with the literature on “network externalities” nor “network regulation”. The
first (see Shy (2011)) concerns networks in name only, and consists only of studying the properties of markets
in which the utility of a good or service is contingent upon the number (not the network) of others using that
good or service. The second concerns the peculiar problems of regulating corporations which administer physical
networks: electrical, water, transport, telecommunications etc. These are at best vaguely connected to a work con-
sidering the structure and function of economic systems understood as systems of individuals whose interactions
can be represented using networks. We will also not concern ourselves with the concept of the Shapley value,
s(g(N)), which essentially maps graphs to some welfare metric.
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set B is made contingent on the presence of a connection n jni ∈ g(N) (or nin j ∈ g(N)). That is
{
ai ⊃ ai j
}⊂ B ⇐⇒ n jni ∈ g(N)∨nin j ∈ g(N) (9.2)
In the latter, the action ai j ⊂ ai of i with respect to j is what the connection nin j ∈ g(N) is
made contingent upon. So, much as in the method adopted in our own system
nin j ∈ g(N) ⇐⇒ ai ⊃
(
ai j 6= 0
)
(9.3)
Clearly this is fairly uninteresting left merely thus. So a∗i in either approach are collected
together and the properties of the equilibrium strategy profile {a∗i }i∈N (where the parameters
of Eui (·) over which i has no control are such that ai = a∗i ∀ i ∈ N) are studied. In the former
variant we find “allocation games” played on networks, games played “on” networks in general,
and models of interaction constrained by networks (Kranton and Minehart, 2001; Gale and
Kariv, 2007; Blume et al., 2009; Manea, 2011; Abreu and Manea, 2012b,a; Bayati et al., 2015;
Condorelli et al., 2016). In the latter we find all manner of network formation games (Kranton
and Minehart, 2001; Goyal and Moraga-Gonzailez, 2001; Jackson and Watts, 2002; Jackson,
2008; Konig et al., 2012; Hatfield et al., 2013). The “matching” literature can also be interpreted
through this latter lens (Kamada and Kojima, 2015; Roth, 1982).
In this literature we end up with the same results of neoclassical economics as without su-
perimposing a network structure on the rational agent, merely caveated so as to be constrained
by the network structure. Equilibria exist, their presence in the “core” of the game, the first and
second welfare theorems, all hold “subject to the network structure”, or not at all if there are
no constraints on B due to the network structure. This ought hardly be surprising of course, the
behavioural model generating network structures remains unchanged. All that has been added
to this model are some few additional constraints in Ai and B. Of course we will simply repro-
duce the standard results emerging from the neoclassical rational agent model with some few
additional caveats. There is no real advance of significance to our knowledge of the structure
and function of economic systems.
The network of socioeconomic interaction is an afterthought to the neoclassical economist,
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an extension to the basic touchstone theory of the “rational” agent. There is a failure on the part
of the neoclassical economist to realise, as Potts (2000) did, the profundity of the recognition
that the network is the core of socioeconomic reality. Not on the periphery. The neoclassical
approach to socioeconomic networks starts with the unchanged core of neoclassical economics
and applies it to a node in a network, rather than starting with the system qua network, working
forward through the impact of that system on the individual’s psychology understood as a
network itself, and then to the behaviour of that individual which then effects the system.
Indeed, we can see quite easily the tendency in the neoclassical rational agent model (equa-
tion 9.1) to generate a field (a complete network of interaction) but for constraints openly placed
upon that potential structure of interaction.
Theorem 20. If Eui (·) represents complete and convex preferences over a convex set of actions
Ai, ai ∈Ai : ai =
{
ai j
}
j∈N′ ∀ j∈N′, and Eui
([(
ai \ai j
)∪ (ai j 6= 0)])≥Eui ([(ai \ai j)∪ (ai j = 0)]),
and a∗i satisfies equation 9.1 then a∗i ⊃
(
ai j > 0
) ∀ j ∈ N′ unless this is infeasible2.
Now everything in this theorem ought be familiar and standard to neoclassical economists
except for the assumption that Eui
([(
ai \ai j
)∪ (ai j 6= 0)]) ≥ Eui ([(ai \ai j)∪ (ai j = 0)]).
But this is really a weak form of monotonically, requiring that the addition of some action
ai j of i with respect to j to the action ai is not less strictly preferable than the action without it.
What this theorem reveals is the tendency of the neoclassical behavioural model to gener-
ate an interactive field, a complete network of interactions. For unless some constraints are
placed to prevent N′ = N, or ai ⊃
(
ai j > 0
) ∈ B∀ j ∈ N′ then a network {N g(N)} formed of
interactions ai j will be complete. The interactive structure of a system of individuals who are
2The result is fairly straightforward to demonstrate:
Proof. If Eui (·) represents complete preferences over Ai then any two elements within Ai may be ranked against
one another, and since Ai is convex, so to can any combination therein be ranked against any other. Now if Eui (·)
represents convex preferences then (Debreu, 1959; Mas-Collel et al., 1995; Rubinstein, 2006; Jehle and Reny,
2011) for α ∈ [0,1] we have
Eui
(
αa′i+(1−α)ai
)≥ Eui (ai)
if Eui (a′i)≥ Eui (ai). Now, suppose that ai ⊃ ai j = 0 and a′i \ai j = ai but a′i ⊃ ai j 6= 0 for some arbitrary j ∈ N′.
If that is the case, then we have Eui ([(ai \ai j)∪ (ai j 6= 0)]) ≥ Eui ([(ai \ai j)∪ (ai j = 0)]) and thus, since Eui (·)
represents convex preferences, we have for such ai and a′i that Eui (αa′i+(1−α)ai)≥ Eui (ai). Now by the rules
of vector scalars and addition, αa′i j +(1−α)ai j 6= 0, and since Ai ⊂ RNA+ , αa′i j +(1−α)ai j > 0.
This argument will hold for any ai ∈ a∗i , so a contradiction of equation 9.1 results if a∗i 6⊃ (ai j > 0), unless
@(ai ⊃ (ai j > 0)) ∈ B. Thus, since we picked j arbitrarily, if a∗i satisfies equation 9.1 then a∗i ⊃ ai j > 0∀ j ∈ N′
unless this is infeasible.
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neoclassical rational agents is only incomplete insofar as it is assumed to be incomplete in the
constraints placed on the potential interactive structure.
We can appreciate better now the limitations of the literature on socioeconomic networks
in neoclassical economics by reference to our own system developed in this work. The first
truly major limitation is born of the nature of equilibrium. Our own model illustrates the self-
organisation process through the Mauss-Commons and Smith-Hayek theorems, and we know
it self-organises to but one configuration up to the psychological wave function. Models con-
structed to characterise equilibria do not have this definiteness, for equilibria are not a priori
equivalent with attractor points. They exist or they don’t, that is all. Either some sequence must
be specified for convergence to an equilibrium with yet more assumptions placed on the model,
or some external agent - the Walrasian auctioneer, the social planner, or the “matching” agent -
must select an equilibrium for the system to settle at.
Furthermore, we forego an understanding of all the phenomena our psychological model
explains by an adherence to the actually anti-psychological, rational agent model (Wong, 1978;
Bruni and Sugden, 2007; Hands, 2010). Models based on utility maximisation can only really
be extended one modification at a time before returning to the basic template, and utility mod-
els do not reflect adaption except insofar as assumptions are placed nakedly upon the evolution
of the utility function. And so we arrive at best at a piecemeal understanding of the social-
psychological factors in the formation of socioeconomic systems. We lose an understanding of
the place of knowledge in socioeconomic systems; how the system presents new ideas to the
individual, or influences the contents of the individuals’ mind at any particular duration, the fac-
tors which influence whether the individual will accept or reject those ideas, the effect of limita-
tions of knowledge, the problem of salience-contingency of perception, anchoring, preference
reversal, multiple selves, sociological considerations. In short, the socio-psychological factors
in the evolution of demand and supply. An integrated, holistic and systematic understanding
of all these factors in the structure and function of socioeconomic systems which contribute to
their incompleteness and evolution is lost by the neoclassical rational agent model.
Perhaps most fundamentally, at least to the mind of Earl (1983) is the inability of the model
of the rational agent to make sense of the “deep” constraints on economic structure arising from
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non-substitutability in any but a contortionary fashion. Because utility Eui (·) maps all points
in Ai to a single utility measure, it necessarily enforces comparability of different alternatives
to which no barrier exists in principle to indicating equivalence. And so non-substitutability
can only be enforced by increasingly heavy modifications and restrictions of Eui (·) to ensure
certain points in Ai are mapped to the left or right always of some other points in R. So we
lose the vision, without major contortions, which we obtain with relatively simple mathematics
in our present formalism, of the routine and fundamental blockages to the formation of certain
socioeconomic structures in the psyche of individuals.
It is not so much that the neoclassical economics cannot obtain some vantage point on
the phenomena our present model can, it is important to note. Of course it can with such
a nebulous concept as “utility” (Fumagalli, 2013) make the requisite modifications to obtain
such vision as an afterthought. Much like the Ptolemaic astronomy it becomes unwieldy and
complex when such epicyclic modifications are made. Unlike the Ptolemaic astronomy the
vantage point thus obtained must be typically forgone to obtain another. The applicability of
calculus becomes questionable with each modification. But this is what we would expect. The
rational agent model is not a picture of reality. Marshall developed its antecedents to obtain a
theory of prices (Foster, 1993; Raffaelli, 2003; Metcalfe, 2007), not of the network structure
of interactions. The present formalism strives to be a picture of reality, and so may present
reality to us in an integrated, holistic and systematic manner. It embraces the notion of system
as network at its core, and the model of psychology it applies operates on this conception of
the system. Neither of these things are attempted in the neoclassical framework, which applies
an essentially unchanged behavioural model to networks almost as an afterthought.
9.2 Complexity economics
The complexity economics literature is relevant not so much for its orientation toward net-
works, but for the epithet “complexity” which is attached to it. It is fragmented, disjointed,
and distinctly iconoclastic. “It” tends to know what it does not like, but less so a definite form
of economics which it does. It is difficult to find a representative of this literature as such, its
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non-systematic nature makes it very easy to proliferate, though in a fairly disunited manner.
But it can, taking Kirman (2011) and Elsner (2012) to be broadly representative, be distilled
into two variants. Nonlinear dynamics and agent-based simulation.
We can distill the form of these models into two equations. The nonlinear dynamics variant
of complexity economics sees systemic variables Yt as determined by some variables Xt (it may
be, and often is the case, that Xt ⊃ Yt−1) which are related by a nonlinear function f (·). That
is:
Yt = f (Xt) : f (·) /∈ L (9.4)
where L = { f (·) : Yt = αXt}. Chaotic dynamics can result from geometric compounding
in f (·), for even if it is linear in Yt−1 it will become (as can be easily verified by an exercise in
recursive substitution) nonlinear in any coefficients for Yt−i. Alternatively, in the agent based
simulation variant, system variables Yt are some aggregative function g(·) of individual actions
ati determined by some rule ri (·) operating on decision-information xti collected across the set
N of individuals. That is:
Yt = g
({
ati
}
i∈N
)
(9.5)
where ati = ri (x
t
i). Chaotic dynamics can result from extremely simple rule forms ri (·) and
aggregation g(·) as the set of individuals becomes large if there are interactions between rules
(at
′
−i ∈ xti) as forward-recursions, “feedback loops”, may develop.
Strictly speaking then, much of micro-founded evolutionary economics (of which Markey-
Towler (2016) is one of the more recent contributions) classifies as complexity economics of
the agent-based variant. Yet other parts of it (such as Foster (2005a) and Klarl (2014)) classify
as complexity economics of the nonlinear dynamics variant. Any economics which employs
computational techniques (Chen, 2012; Al-Suwailem, 2011) to simulate the interaction of indi-
viduals in an equation system like that of g(·) classifies as agent-based complexity economics.
An interesting subclass of this approach is econophysics (Lux and Marchesi, 1999; Chen
et al., 2001; Gallegati et al., 2006; Samanidou et al., 2007; Rickles, 2011), in which either f (·)
or {ri (·)}i∈N are formulated by analogy to some equation system in statistical mechanics for the
state of a physical system as a whole or for the motion of a particle through space. In one sense,
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the “people aren’t particles” critique of this literature is facile. But in another it is profound,
for particles (as far as we know) do not have an internal psychological agency. They are acted
upon as atoms (in the original Greek sense of that word) by the laws of nature. “People” on
the other hand have an internal psychological process by which stimulus is transformed into
response. Like the behaviourist psychologist, we restrict the knowledge we might otherwise
obtain by ignoring this.
A wider criticism of the complexity economics literature is that it lacks form. It lacks
commonality of logico-mathematical expression let alone of unity of approach. In fact, the dis-
tillation of such a common form as provided here is the first such of which the author is aware.
And in these two equations we can see the root of the fractiousness of this literature. For each
scholar may pick their particular functional form to infuse into the equations f (·) or {ri (·)}i∈N
according to their own particular prejudices - unconstrained by a common framework for analy-
sis. And the tendency in this literature is to do so in order to study a quite specific phenomenon,
so specific as to seriously constrain the generalisability of results obtained which are already
so constrained by their derivation in this or that model peculiar almost to single authors. Thus
we find a multitude of models with equations formulated specifically to study, for instance, the
Marseilles Fish Market for a period of twelve years, but not much by way of insights into the
causality underlying economic systems in general.
Complexity economics is anything but integrated, holistic and systematic. It at best some
pretensions to holism in its analysis of systems. But it is all but totally lacking in integration
and systemisation. It thus cannot hope to provide an intellectually competitive alternative for
economic analysis, let alone push the frontiers of knowledge, and still less be taught wholesale
to students. It is even labeled a mere supplement to neoclassical economics, an extension even
(Durlauf, 2012). An insult if ever there was to the vast potential of the literature, but not
unjustified given its current disjointed, fractious, over-specialised, non-generalisable state. The
present work, of course, exists to address exactly this lacuna of an integrated and systematic
approach to study the complexity and intricacy of economic phenomena.
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9.3 Fragility and resilience in socioeconomic networks
There is explosive growth, following the contribution of Gai and Kapadia (2010), of interest
in studying the fragility and resilience of (in particular financial) socioeconomic systems un-
derstood as networks. All of this literature is really increasingly sophisticated and analytical
(contra computational) variations on a simple mechanical point put forth by Albert et al. (2000).
This point being that a highly concentrated network, where a core set of nodes have many con-
nections relative to a periphery, is more robust to “attacks” distributed randomly across the
network compared to a diverse network, but critically vulnerable to “attacks” targeted at the
core of the network. Vulnerable to cascading failures of connections. Concentration simulta-
neously endows resilience to the core and those parts of the network whose interactions with
the periphery are mediated by the core with respect to the periphery, and fragility of the whole
to the core.
This has obvious applicability to financial systems. Gai and Kapadia (2010); Gai et al.
(2011); Arinaminpathy et al. (2012); Giansante et al. (2012); Anand et al. (2013); Krause and
Giansante (2012); Lee (2013); Markose et al. (2012); Markose (2013) and also the curiously
almost separately developed accounts in Jackson et al. (2014); Acemoglu et al. (2015) use the
method to drastically improve on the primitive account of fragility of socioeconomic systems
(particularly financial networks) given by Allen and Gale (2000). It also has applicability to
understanding why localised microeconomic shocks can generate macroeconomic fluctuations
(Gabaix, 2011; Acemoglu et al., 2012). It even adds to understanding of the “accelerator”
in macroeconomic fluctuations as originating in the structure of financial networks and their
embeddedness within the economic system at large (Delli Gatti et al., 2010; Ricetti et al., 2013;
Bargigli et al., 2014).
There really is little to criticise in this literature. Neoclassical economists Jackson et al.
(2014); Acemoglu et al. (2015) have succeeded in demonstrating the computational results of
Albert et al. (2000) analytically by drawing on some straightforward phase transition mathe-
matics in engineering (Gai and Kapadia (2010) did the same and also acknowledged the origin
of this mathematics). While there is a peculiar focus (as always) on equilibria and convergence
thereto in the more neoclassically-minded contributions, Sheri Markose in particular has made
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much of the dynamics of the process of shock spreading and the potential for chaotic diver-
gences toward accumulating failures, or even total failure. Though her work is curiously absent
of attention in the more neoclassical interpretations, it is influential in the Bank of England and
the Reserve Bank of India and contributing to policy analysis.
The literature of course achieves only what it sets out to achieve, and demonstrates a partic-
ular specialised point about fragility and resilience. But in this connexion it is still somewhat
limited. Albert et al. (2000) clearly had in mind more physical networks such as the internet or
electricity grids, and so the economic literature inherits its mechanistic nature. Node failures in
this literature are governed by simple or more elaborate criteria isomorphic with hydro-electric
“threshold” inequations for the on-flow of water or electricity. Undoubtedly an important por-
tion of the causality of fragility and resilience. But such models will tend to obscure the equally
important human factor in the fragility and resilience of socioeconomic networks in favour of
the simple mechanics of the problem. The literature thus lacks an appreciation of the human
factor in financial systems, emphasising instead their more mechanical aspects. And in this the
present work makes some advance in our knowledge, for the Chinese Whispers theorem brings
exactly the human factor in cascading failures into the analytical foreground.
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Chapter 10
Appendix B: Some points of interpretation
of gH (Hi)
On the face of it, the theory of choice, equation 4.6 may appear to be the same theory of choice
as that of neoclassical economics, that theory, as with 4.6 being one of constrained optimisation
of preference1. It is not. While it keeps the truth of that theory it is more general, is constructed
explicitly by reference to the psychology of individual behaviour, and contains a number of
explanations of behaviour within a unified model which the neoclassical model struggles to
explain in a systematic manner. In particular, in order to better understand the nature of the
object gH (Hi), we will consider how it incorporates two major views of psychology into the
formalism. In the same logico-mathematical formalism we shall see contained the psychology
of thought as linguistic representation of sentence equivalents (of which rational thought is a
subset), and the psychology of decision rules.
10.1 gH (Hi) as rational thought
The first, and most intuitive interpretation of the object gH (Hi) is that it expresses chains of
thought expressed in linguistic symbols. When gH (H ′i )⊂ gH (Hi) is elicited by the perception
of the situation H ′i ⊂ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
, gH (H ′i ) expresses the syntax of the sentences spoken within
the “inner conversation” if you will (Archer, 2003), the conversation we reveal to others by
1This appendix is a reproduction of part of a chapter to be included within Markey-Towler (2015).
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“thinking out loud”, and which we struggle to verbalise when it’s conducted in symbols outside
conventional language. The logico-mathematics of language and sentences was developed at
length in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1914-1916, 1921); Wittgenstein et al. (1930-1932);
Wittgenstein (1953), and we can formalise this form of thought most intuitive to us.
Definition 13 (Sentence equivalents). A sentence equivalent is a string of symbols p1, p2, ..., pn
the content of which taken together is syntactically and semantically equivalent to a linguistic
sentence l ∈ L contained within a potential (not necessarily extant) linguistic system L when
expressed as a sentence equivalent.
We can now prove that as long as the linguistic system conforms to certain conditions
(which aren’t very strenuous), thoughts as expressed in sentence equivalents can be expressed
in chains within gH (Hi).
Theorem 21 (gH (H ′i ) may express sentence equivalents). If thoughts can be expressed as sen-
tence equivalents p1, p2, ..., pn and any linguistic sentence l ∈ L contained within any potential
linguistic system L must express a sequential series of relations between two subjects/objects
then those thoughts may be represented by a chain {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (Hi).
It takes no particular effort to demonstrate then that “rational” thought can be accommo-
dated within gH (Hi).
Corollary 5 (gH (H ′i ) may express rational thought). If rational thoughts are thoughts which
can be expressed as sentence equivalents and a linguistic sentence l ∈ L contained within any
potential linguistic system L must express a series of relations between two subjects/objects
then rational thoughts may be represented by a chain {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (Hi).
And indeed the conditions of corollary 5 are met by rational thoughts. Rational thoughts
when conceived of as a series of “because/therefore” statements, ratio decidendi as they are
called in jurisprudence, are sentence equivalents of the reasons we would give in constructing
a particular chain of reasoning. Indeed, directly, without even working through the concept of
thought as a sentence equivalent we know such statements as ratio decidendi are, are examples
of cause-and-effect relations Rhh′ ⊃ h =⇒ h′ terminating with some axiomatic statement2.
2This is a conception of rational thought far more consistent with the notion of rationality as reason widely
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Alternatively, rational thoughts conceived of as logical statements a la the early Wittgenstein
(1921) and Ayer (1936) and even the later Wittgenstein (1953) are sentence equivalents of
linguistic propositions, whose truth or falsehood are another sentence equivalent of a truth
function. And it seems almost trivial to say it is extremely difficult to think of a linguistic
system which did not ultimately in one fashion or another express a series of relations between
two subjects/objects.
Thoughts, even when expressed as sentence equivalents, need not necessarily conform how-
ever with the logical forms of the objects of reality as perceived H ′i and the relations between
them as construed within gH (H ′i ) as required by Wittgenstein (1921) and Ayer (1936) for them
to express logical propositions. This is an out and out assumption, and in any case the de-
marcation between rational thought and non-rational thought is always a somewhat arbitrary
criterion. Thoughts may be other sentence equivalents with no particularly strong foothold in
observed reality, and therefore according to Ayer (1936) metaphysical nonsense, or according
to Wittgenstein (1921) we must pass over them in silence, were we to only speak in a logical
manner. If gH (Hi) contained only such thoughts as were logical or rational we might have
a rather bleak existence. Non-rational thoughts may exist within gH (Hi) - indeed the whole
project of Wittgenstein is to draw a boundary between those thoughts which conform to a log-
ical system and those thoughts which do not (Pears, 1971). Such thoughts may quite have a
profound significance attached them by consciousness and may influence preference and there-
fore action. The point of religious ideas is not to express truths about the world in a logical
fashion so much as to have a “positive” impact on the existence and behaviour of those who
hold them in their worldview gH (Hi) (Pears, 1971). The entrepreneurs who drive economic
growth would never act if their expectations of the future within gH (H ′i )⊂ gH (Hi) conformed
to the logical form of the information contained within a particular environment vNi(g) (Schum-
peter, 1911; Gerschlager, 2012; Metcalfe, 2014).
accepted in philosophy and law than the decidedly aberrant definition given to it by economists as a decision rule
supported by a pre-ordering of available actions which is complete (every single action can be ranked against
every other) and transitive (if three actions are ranked a1 to a2 and a2 to a3, then a1 is ranked to a3) (Debreu, 1959;
Mas-Collel et al., 1995; Rubinstein, 2006; Jehle and Reny, 2011). This is really no more “rational” than picking at
random, there is no “reason” for the choice other than the decidedly poor reason “because it is preferred, period”,
no reason in thinking about the actions available. Really it is rather irrational, there is no consideration of the
consequences of the act beyond preference, there is certainly no proposition to be tested against reality.
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10.2 gH (Hi) as rules, routines and habit
An alternative, and important interpretation of gH (Hi) is found in cognitive psychology, where
thoughts supporting behaviour are conceived of as the operation of different behavioural rules,
and behaviour the outcome of the application of those rules. The incomparable Herbert Simon
was a pioneer in this area following his famous break (Simon, 1955) with what continues to be
the standard model of psychology in economics on the grounds it did not reflect the reality of
human decision making. Instead, he developed the idea (Simon, 1969) perhaps first proposed
by Alan Turing (1950) that the mind operates in a manner akin to a computer - executing a
series of tasks upon the receipt of certain inputs - and that seemingly complex and individ-
uated behaviour can be understood to be the outcome of very simple rules operating on the
information contained within the environment (Simon, 1956)3.
Definition 14 (Decision rules as algorithms). A decision rule is an algorithm, which is ex-
pressed mathematically as a recursive function fK ( fK−1 (... fK−K (·))) where each individual
function fk (·) ∈ { fk (·)}Kk=0 maps the outputs Hk of either the function fk−1 (·) or some basic
information H0 into the inputs Hk+1 of either the function fk+1 (·) or some terminal information
HK+1 ∈ fK (·). That is fk (·) : Hk→ Hk+1∀k ∈ [1, ..., I].
The functions fk (·) of which we here speak are the steps of an algorithmic chain which
branch to one or the other answer to a question - the “if this, then that”, “Yes/No”, “True/False”
statements of an algorithmic forward recursion. Each successive step answers a question posed
of the outcome at the conclusion previous step. We can demonstrate these may be expressed
within gH (Hi) in “long form” (the full algorithm) or within gH (H ′i ) in a particular iteration (the
algorithm applied to perceptions H ′i ⊂ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
of a particular set of information vNi(g).
Theorem 22 (gH (Hi)may express decision rules). Decision rules in long form, fK ( fK−1 (... fK−K (H0)))
may be represented as chains
{
{hkhk+1}hk∈Hk
}K
k=0
⊂ gH (Hi). Iterations fK ( fK−1 (... fK−K (h0 ∈ H0)))
may be represented as single chains {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (H ′i ), provided that {hk}K+1k=0 ∈ H ′i .
The classic example of such a behavioural rule is of course the original “satisficing” rule
3Augier (2001) notes that this isomorphism between the mind and the computer was what led Herbert Simon to
enter the field of computer science and make seminal contributions therein approaching the significance of those
of Alan Turing himself.
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proposed by Simon (1955): “is the action ai feasible?”, “if yes, do the attributes of ai meet
certain levels of acceptability?”, “if yes, then ai is a satisfactory action to select”. Selten (1998,
1999) modifies the rule ever so slightly so that the second question becomes “if yes, do the
attributes of ai meet certain aspiration levels?” where the aspiration levels are carried over
from adjustments made to prior levels according to whether previous courses of action exceed
those levels or not.
Of course, satisficing is but one of many different heuristics (behavioural rules) an individ-
ual can hold in their mind to apply to perceptions H ′i ⊂ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
of particular sets of infor-
mation vNi(g). The elimination by aspects approach to choice (Tversky, 1972) is another such
heuristic which may be expressed in long form within gH (Hi) as is the commonly observed
algorithm of ranking attributes according to a lexicographic ordering of attribute dimensions
(Earl, 1990)4. Newell et al. (1958, 1962) even developed certain algorithms which guided their
computers to derive the sequences of symbols proving of a number of theorems Russell and
Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica and Simon (1998) was able to write a ludicrously simple
algorithm capable of deriving the law of gravitation from data on planetary movements just as
Newton did. Gerd Gigerenzer (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer, 1999; Gigerenzer
and Selten, 1999b), the leader of the modern “Simonian” cognitive psychologists has identified
many rules - heuristics - which individuals hold in their minds in an “adaptive toolbox” for
application in particular environments to guide their behaviour.
Theorem 14 also demonstrates that under a certain interpretation, habit psychology can be
accommodated within gH (Hi) also. Though far less austerely formal than heuristic cognitive
psychology, habit psychology in effect speaks of what cognitive psychology calls a heuristic as
a habit. Habit psychology had a significant hand in the development of institutional economics
and sociology (Hodgson, 1998, 2004; Lawson, 2015d,a) via Veblen (1899), Hamilton (1919)
and Commons (1924, 1931), who saw institutions as behavioural rules commonly held across
society - habits. Habits are tendencies to behave in a certain manner which evolve, consol-
idate and stabilise over time in the absence of intervention, a form of rule which pushes the
4In these cases, the iteration of the algorithm within gH (H ′i ) would consist of comparisons of attributes in an
eliminative or lexicographic process, and the implications gai ⊂ gH (H ′i ) of any particular alternative will contain
the information contained in the algorithm concerning that action ai (ultimately, whether it is eliminated, whether
it is superseded or not in attribute dimensions).
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individual toward a particular course of action based upon the consequences of past actions
(Hodgson, 2010; Prattern, 2015; Lawson, 2015d). After a fashion, gH (Hi) is the embodiment
habit anyway, for it evolves over time through experience and guides thoughts. But insofar as it
may express behavioural rules (theorem 14 ) also it must capture some notion of habit. Indeed,
by theorem 21, gH (Hi) can also express the reasons which may support a habitual tendency
and which make the concept of habit a slightly richer psychology of decision making than pure
heuristic psychology.
The outcomes of heuristics, behavioural rules, or habits as applied to a particular situa-
tion vNi(g) certainly influence behaviour, they may even be the sufficient factor in  ◦2gH(H
′
i),
but they do not necessarily determine behaviour. There may be more than one rule within
gH (Hi) which are applicable to a particular situation vNi(g), an iteration of which is included
in gH (H ′i ) ⊂ gH (Hi), and they may “disagree” over what alternative ought be selected. In his
very first formal paper on heuristic decision making Simon (1955) admitted that satisficing
alone did not guarantee a unique solution to the problem of choice. The present formalism
builds on and extends the heuristic cognitive psychology in resolving these problems. Deci-
sion rules play into the thought of the individual, and by definition must therefore have an
impact upon  ◦2gH(H ′i), but decisions must ultimately conform to equation 4.6, otherwise
choice will not be well defined and the Make up Your Mind/Checkmate theorem (to be dis-
cussed in Markey-Towler (2015)) holds. This might be, and probably often is, a trivial matter,
and decision rules generate a unique course of action to be selected, and determine  ◦2gH(H ′i)
sufficiently for equation 4.6 to be well defined. But where decision rules aren’t sufficient to de-
termine  ◦2gH(H ′i), provided a preference sufficient for equation 4.6 to be well defined exists,
the preference acts as a “tie-breaker” among competing alternatives (Earl, 1990).
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Chapter 11
Appendix C: The Made to Stick Theorem
Definition 15. A proposed idea is a set {Rhh′}P of connections between percepts h,h′ of the
objects of reality.
We also require the following property to be defined to demonstrate our result1:
Definition 16. Suppose any subset v′ ⊂ vNi(g) of information contained within an environment
vNi(g) and that environment itself may be mapped to a metric σ : 2
VNi(g) → R representing the
overall “noticeability” of that information with respect to the senses. Perception is subject to
the “salience property” when
h ∈ ρi
(
v′ ⊂ vNi(g)
) ⇐⇒ σ (v′)−σ (vNi(g))≥ σ¯i (11.1)
Theorem 23 (When ideas are “made to stick”). Suppose, in addition to the model hitherto
developed, that individual i’s perception, ρi (·), has the salience property 11.1, and the like-
lihood pi (·) of the incorporation of relations Rhh′ can be extended to map sets of relations.
The likelihood of any proposed idea {Rhh′}P being incorporated into the mind of individual i,
pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
in the particular environment vNi(g) is
1This appendix is a reproduction of part of a chapter to be included within Markey-Towler (2015), in which a
much fuller discussion of this theorem is intended which is precluded here by the necessity of brevity.
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1. Decreasing in the number of relations
∣∣∣{Rhh′}P∣∣∣ the idea contains:
∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
∂
∣∣∣{Rhh′}P∣∣∣ ≤ 0 (11.2)
2. Increasing in the number of relations in the idea already incorporated in individual i’s
mind,
∣∣∣Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P : Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi)∣∣∣:
∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
∂
∣∣∣Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P : Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi)∣∣∣ ≥ 0 (11.3)
3. Increasing in the relative noticeability σ (v′)−σ (vNi(g)) of the information v′ ∈ 2vNi(g) :
h = ρi (v′) which supports the percept h for each of the objects of reality h related by any
individual relation in the idea Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P
∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
∂
[
σ (v′)−σ (vNi(g))] ≥ 0∀v′ ∈ 2vNi(g) : h = ρi
(
v′
)
&Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P
4. Decreasing in the dissonance of each individual relation in the idea Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P:
∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
∂
∣∣{Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (H ′i) : Rhh′ =⇒ ¬Rh′′h′′′}∣∣ ≥ 0∀Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P (11.4)
where |{Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (H ′i ) : Rhh′ =⇒ ¬Rh′′h′′′}| is the number of relations in gH (H ′i ) the re-
lation Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P is dissonant with.
5. Decreasing in the centrality within the system of personal constructs, gH (Hi), c
(
CgH(Hi) (h) CgH(Hi) (h
′)
)
of each individual relation Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P in the idea:
∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
∂c
(
CgH(Hi) (h) CgH(Hi) (h
′)
) ≥ 0∀Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P (11.5)
where c(·) is some combination of the network centralities CgH(Hi) (h) and CgH(Hi) (h′).
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Chapter 12
Appendix D: Proofs of Theorems
12.1 Theorems in Chapter 5: The Psychology of Economic
Behaviour
12.1.1 Proof of lemma 1: Substitutability and cross-price effects
Proof. This is rather elementary. If, by assumption 1. the goods and services [xnki]nk∈N′ ⊂
ai=ci∨ωi are substitutable for another [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ ⊂ a′i=ci∨ωi , in the context of ai,a′i : ai=ci∨ωi \
[xnki]nk∈N′ = a
′
i=ci∨ωi \ [xnki]′nk∈N′ then
gai ∼approx. ga′i (12.1)
where ai=ci∨ωi ⊃ [xnki]nk∈N′ a′i=ci∨ωi ⊃ [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ and ai=ci∨ωi \ [xnki]nk∈N′ = a′i=ci∨ωi \ [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ .
Now, if we have an increase in the prices of the goods and services [xnki]nk∈N′ ⊂ ai=ci∨ωi ,
p1→ p2 : [∂ pnki]nk∈N′ > 0, we find that, because by condition 2. preferences over courses of
action ai, a′i are non-increasing with respect to prices paid for goods and services therein and
invariant to any other prices
gp2ai 6 gp1ai (12.2)
which by definition of  ◦2gH(Hi) implies that gp2ai 6∼ gp1ai and so, as the two actions remain
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comparable
gp2ai ≺ gp1ai = gai (12.3)
If  ◦2gH(Hi) is transitive with respect to rankings of the alternative courses of action ai and
a′i then
gp2ai ≺ gp1ai = gai ∼approx. ga′i =⇒ g
p2
ai ≺ ga′i (12.4)
and once again subsuming the prices contained within the implications gai we have our
result gp2ai ≺ ga′i .
12.1.2 Proof of theorem 2: Substitutability, cross-price effects and ob-
served behaviour
Proof. If the actions ai=ci∨ωi ⊃ [xnki]nk∈N′ and a′i=ci∨ωi ⊃ [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ , (where ai=ci∨ωi \ [xnki]nk∈N′ =
a′i=ci∨ωi \ [xnki]′nk∈N′) remain feasible and preferable to all other alternative courses of action a′′i
in the feasible set B, formally we have
ai=ci∨ωi,a
′
i=ci∨ωi ∈ B (12.5)
and
ai=ci∨ωi,a
′
i=ci∨ωi  a′′i=ci∨ωi ∀a′′i=ci∨ωi ∈ B (12.6)
If further we were able to establish either ai=ci∨ωi  a′i=ci∨ωi or ai=ci∨ωi ≺ a′i=ci∨ωi then
the choice function (equation 4.6) would be well defined for either ai=ci∨ωi or a′i=ci∨ωi respec-
tively. If, now, the prices [pnki]nk∈N′ of the goods and services [xnki]nk∈N′ ⊂ ai=ci∨ωi were to
increase, because the the goods and services [xnki]nk∈N′ ⊂ ai=ci∨ωi are substitutable for another
[xnki]
′
nk∈N′ ⊂ a′i=ci∨ωi , in the context of ai,a′i : ai=ci∨ωi \ [xnki]nk∈N′ = a′i=ci∨ωi \ [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ , condi-
tions 1., 2. and 3. of lemma 1 hold, and therefore
[∂ pnki]nk∈N′ > 0 =⇒ ga′i  gai (12.7)
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And thus, we can establish that ai=ci∨ωi ≺ a′i=ci∨ωi in addition by assumption to
ai=ci∨ωi  a′′i=ci∨ωi ∀a′′i=ci∨ωi ∈ B (12.8)
and ai=ci∨ωi ∈ B, and thus a′i=ci∨ωi satisfies the choice function (equation 4.6)
a′i = a
∗
i =
{
ai ∈ B : gai  ga′i ∀a
′
i ∈ B
}
(12.9)
and thus observed behaviour is a′i.
12.1.3 Proof of theorem 3: Lancaster-substitutability
Proof. Take two goods and services
[
xn ji
]
n j∈N′ and
[
x′n ji
]
n j∈N′
and suppose they exist within
actions ai,a′i : ai\
[
xn ji
]
n j∈N′ = a
′
i\
[
x′n ji
]
n j∈N′
respectively. And two sets of attributes α,α ′ ∈Hi
such that
gα ∼approx. gα ′
where gα =
{
Rhh′ ∈ gH (H ′i ) : hh′ ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 &h0 ∈ α
}
. Now if we have NgH (ai) =
NoutgH (ai)=α and NgH (a
′
i)=N
out
gH (a
′
i)=α ′, then gα∪{Raiα}= gai⊃
[
xn ji
]
n j∈N′
and gα ′∪
{
Ra′iα ′
}
=
g
a′i⊃
[
x′n ji
]
n j∈N′
. If, further, we have that gα  gα ′ =⇒ gα ∪{Raiα}  gα ′ ∪
{
Ra′iα ′
}
, then we
can infer that we have both g
ai⊃
[
xn ji
]
n j∈N′
 g
a′i⊃
[
x′n ji
]
n j∈N′
and g
a′i⊃
[
x′n ji
]
n j∈N′
 g
ai⊃
[
xn ji
]
n j∈N′
.
So we may conclude that g
ai⊃
[
xn ji
]
n j∈N′
∼approx. gai⊃
[
xn ji
]
n j∈N′
and therefore that
[
xn ji
]
n j∈N′ and[
x′n ji
]
n j∈N′
are substitutes in the context ai and a′i.
12.1.4 Proof of theorem 4: Ironmonger-Earl non-substitutability
Proof. Take the understanding of a particular environment gH (H ′i ) and two actions ai⊃
[
xn ji
]
n j∈N′
and a′i ⊃
[
x′n ji
]
n j∈N′
such that ai \
[
xn ji
]
n j∈N′ = a
′
i \
[
x′n ji
]
n j∈N′
which are associated with im-
plications gai,ga′i ⊂ gH (H ′i ). Now since ∃ψ ∈ H ′i : ¬ψs ∈ gai ⇐⇒ @RaiαN ∈ gai and we sup-
posed that g
a′i⊃
[
x′n ji
]
n j∈N′
6⊃ Ra′iαN , but gai⊃
[
xn ji
]
n j∈N′
⊃ RaiαN , it is the case that ∃¬ψs ∈ ga′i and
@¬ψs ∈ gai . Since we suppose that @¬ψs ∈ gai =⇒ ∃ψs ∈ gai , we therefore have ∃¬ψs ∈ ga′i
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and ∃ψs ∈ gai . Since ψ is a need, we may conclude by definition 4 that
g
ai⊃
[
xn ji
]
n j∈N′
 g
a′i⊃
[
x′n ji
]
n j∈N′
But by definition this implies that g
a′i⊃
[
x′n ji
]
n j∈N′
6 g
ai⊃
[
xn ji
]
n j∈N′
and thus that g
a′i⊃
[
x′n ji
]
n j∈N′
6∼approx.
g
ai⊃
[
xn ji
]
n j∈N′
. Thus by definition 2,
[
xn ji
]
n j∈N′ and
[
x′n ji
]
n j∈N′
are not substitutable in the con-
text aia′i.
12.1.5 Proof of theorem 5: If possible, needs can’t not be met
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is a chain {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (H ′i ) : h0 ∈
ai &hK = ψ from that course of action ai ∈ A′i to a need elicited by the environment, ψ ∈ H ′i ,
in which a relation exists ¬ψs indicating its non-satiation, and another course of action a′i for
which there is a chain {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (H ′i ) : h0 ∈ ai &hK = ψ in which a relation exists ψi
indicating its satiation. That is
∃Rhψ = ¬ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH
(
H ′i
)
: h0 ∈ ai &hK = ψ (12.10)
and
∃a′i ∈ B :
{
∃Rhψ = ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH
(
H ′i
)
: h0 ∈ a′i &hK = ψ
}
(12.11)
since by the definition of B (p.4.2.1) and equation 4.4 B ⊂ 2A′i ⊂ 2Ai , and by definition 4.3
gH (H ′i )⊂ gH (Hi) we have therefore that
∃a′i ∈ 2Ai :
{
∃Rhψ = ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (Hi) : h0 ∈ a′i &hK = ψ
}
(12.12)
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Now by definition 4 we have that
∃Rhψ = ¬ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH
(
H ′i
)
: h0 ∈ ai &hK = ψ
=⇒ ga′i  gai ∀a
′
i ∈ 2Ai :
{
∃Rhψ = ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (Hi) : h0 ∈ a′i &hK = ψ
}
(12.13)
and so we can conclude that ga′i  gai . Further, we know that a′i ∈ B by supposition, and so
∃a′i ∈ B : ga′i  gai
and therefore by theorem 4.6, ai 6= a∗i : ai =
{
ai ∈ B : gai  ga′i ∀a′i ∈ B
}
. Therefore, condi-
tions 1. and 2. are necessary for the course of action ai to be selected (ai = a∗i ).
12.1.6 Proof of corollary 1: If needs can’t be met, they aren’t
Proof. Take a course of action ai ∈ B for which there is a chain {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (H ′i ) : h0 ∈
ai &hK = ψ from that course of action ai ∈ A′i to a need elicited by the environment, ψ ∈ H ′i ,
in which a relation exists ¬ψs ∈ gH (H ′i ) indicating its non-satiation. That is
∃Rhψ = ¬ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH
(
H ′i
)
: h0 ∈ ai &hK = ψ (12.14)
By definition 4 therefore,
ga′i  gai ∀a
′
i ∈ 2Ai :
{
∃Rhψ = ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (Hi) : h0 ∈ a′i &hK = ψ
}
(12.15)
But by supposition, if there is no action a′i ∈ 2Ai so defined within B,
@a′i ∈ B :
{
∃Rhψ = ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (Hi) : h0 ∈ a′i &hK = ψ
}
Now, provided we have that gai is strictly preferred to all other alternatives not so defined
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within B,
gai  ga′i ∀a
′
i ∈ B : ¬
{
∃Rhψ = ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (Hi) : h0 ∈ a′i &hK = ψ
}
we can conclude that because gai is strictly preferred to all ga′i in
a′i ∈ B : ¬
{
∃Rhψ = ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (Hi) : h0 ∈ a′i &hK = ψ
}
and the complement in B of this set,
a′i ∈ B :
{
∃Rhψ = ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (Hi) : h0 ∈ a′i &hK = ψ
}
is empty, we must have that
gai  ga′i ∀a
′
i ∈ B
And since by supposition ai ∈B, we have with theorem 4.6 that ai = a∗i : ai =
{
ai ∈ B : gai  ga′i ∀a′i ∈ B
}
.
12.1.7 Proof of theorem 6: necessary properties of actions
Proof. Theorem 5 implies that an action ai may be selected only if
1. there is no chain {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (H ′i ) : h0 ∈ ai &hK = ψ from that course of action
ai ∈ A′i to a need elicited by the environment, ψ ∈ H ′i , in which a relation exists ¬ψs ∈ gH (H ′i )
indicating its non-satiation, and
2. there is no other feasible course of action a′i ∈ B for which there is a chain {hkhk+1}Kk=0⊂
gH (H ′i ) : h0 ∈ ai &hK = ψ in which a relation exists ψs ∈ gH (H ′i ) indicating its satiation.
Now, by assumption, there is some feasible action containing an element of the set P of
pre-requisites
∃ai ∈ B :
{
[xink xnki]nk∈N′ ∈ P
}
⊂ ai (12.16)
And by definition 5 therefore
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P =
{
[xink xnki]nk∈N′
}
⊂ A′i
:
{
∃ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gai⊃[xink xnki]nk∈N′∈P
: h0 = [xink xnki]nk∈N′ &hK = ψ
}
(12.17)
condition 2. of theorem 5 is not satisfied, and there is some feasible course of action a′i ∈ B
for which there is a chain {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (H ′i ) : h0 ∈ ai &hK = ψ in which a relation exists
ψs ∈ gH (H ′i ) indicating the satiation of a need ψ ∈ H ′i .
So any action ai may be selected only if condition 1. holds and there is no chain {hkhk+1}Kk=0⊂
gH (H ′i ) : h0 ∈ ai &hK = ψ from that course of action ai ∈ A′i to a need elicited by the environ-
ment, ψ ∈ H ′i , in which a relation exists ¬ψs ∈ gH (H ′i ) indicating its non-satiation.
With respect to the set P of pre-requisites, all elements of P by definition 5 satiate a need
ψ ∈ H ′i , for
P =
{
[xink xnki]nk∈N′
}
⊂ A′i
:
{
∃ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gai⊃[xink xnki]nk∈N′∈P
: h0 = [xink xnki]nk∈N′ &hK = ψ
}
(12.18)
and so by the assumption of mutual exclusivity and collective exhaustion of existence of sa-
tiation or non-satiation relations in chains {hkhk+1}Kk=0⊂ gai⊃[xink xnki]nk∈N′∈P
: h0 = [xink xnki]nk∈N′ &hK =
ψ to needs ψ ∈ H ′i , i.e. that
@ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gai⊃[xink xnki]nk∈N′∈P
: h0 = [xink xnki]nk∈N′ &hK = ψ
⇐⇒ ¬ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gai⊃[xink xnki]nk∈N′∈P
: h0 = [xink xnki]nk∈N′ &hK = ψ (12.19)
it is the case that the complement in A′i of the set P, CA′i (P) is
CA′i (P) =
{
[xink xnki]nk∈N′
}
⊂ A′i :{
¬ψs ∈ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gai⊃[xink xnki]nk∈N′∈P
: h0 = [xink xnki]nk∈N′ &hK = ψ
}
(12.20)
236
Since [xink xnki]nk∈N′ ∈ ai, and because CA′i (P) is the complement of P in A′i, the only
actions ai ⊃ [xink xnki]nk∈N′ which satisfy condition 1. of theorem 5 that there be no chain
{hkhk+1}Kk=0⊂ gH (H ′i ) : h0 ∈ ai &hK =ψ from that course of action ai ∈A′i to a need elicited by
the environment, ψ ∈ H ′i , in which a relation exists ¬ψs ∈ gH (H ′i ) indicating its non-satiation,
are those actions ai which have a non-empty intersection with P. Therefore, by theorem 5 an
action may only be selected ai = a∗i only if it contains some element of P, that is ai = a∗i ⇐⇒
ai∩P 6= /0 and therefore
∃ai ∈ B :
{
[xink xnki]nk∈N′ ∈ P
}
⊂ ai =⇒ a∗i ∩P 6= /0 (12.21)
12.1.8 Proof of theorem 7: No-go zones avoided if possible
Proof. Observe that for any action ai ⊃ [xink xnki]nk∈N′ ∈ Z, condition 1. of theorem 5 is
contradicted by definition of Z (definition 7). In order for ai ⊃ [xink xnki]nk∈N′ ∈ Z to be
selected then it must be the case, by corollary 1, that there is no other feasible course of action
a′i ∈ B for which there is a chain {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (H ′i ) : h0 ∈ ai &hK = ψ in which a relation
exists ψs ∈ gH (H ′i ) indicating its satiation.
12.1.9 Proof of theorem 8: Complementarity in household and worker
production
Proof. By definition (equations 4.25 and 4.56), if [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ /∈ argϕi (·) then [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ ∈ ai=ci∨ωi ⇐⇒
[xnki]
′
nk∈N′ ∈ [XXici]Xi∈H ′i , but this is not the case, so
[xnki]
′
nk∈N′ /∈ argϕi (·) =⇒ [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ /∈ ai=ci∨ωi (12.22)
And further, since the outputs ϕi (·)∩H ′i are contained within ai=ci∨ωi by definition (equa-
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tions 4.25 and 4.56) we have
[xink ]nk∈N′ ∨ x
c
i ∈ ϕi (·) ∈ ai=ci∨ωi (12.23)
and finally, by definition (equations 4.25 and 4.56) we have
[xnki]
′
nk∈N′ ∈ argϕi (·) =⇒ [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ ∈ ai=ci∨ωi (12.24)
Now, the vector of outputs [xink ]nk∈N′ ∨ xci ∈ ϕi (·) is contingent upon the presence of two
sets of inputs [xnki]nk∈N′ and [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ , that is,
[xink ]nk∈N′ ∨ x
c
i ∈ ϕi (·) ⇐⇒ [xnki]nk∈N′ , [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ ∈ argϕi (·) (12.25)
Without loss of generality, suppose that [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ /∈ argϕi (·), so that
[xnki]
′
nk∈N′ /∈ argϕi (·) =⇒ [xink ]nk∈N′ ∨ x
c
i /∈ ϕi (·) (12.26)
by 12.22, and by 12.23 therefore
[xnki]
′
nk∈N′ /∈ ai=ci∨ωi =⇒ [xink ]nk∈N′ ∨ x
c
i /∈ ai=ci∨ωi (12.27)
and thus
[xnki]
′
nk∈N′ /∈ ai=ci∨ωi =⇒ ai=ci∨ωi 6⊃ [xink ]nk∈N′ ∨ x
c
i (12.28)
Alternatively, we have both [xnki]nk∈N′ , [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ ∈ argϕi (·) and thus [xink ]nk∈N′∨xci ∈ϕi (·),
or one direction of 12.25
[xnki]nk∈N′ , [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ ∈ argϕi (·) =⇒ [xink ]nk∈N′ ∨ x
c
i ∈ ϕi (·) (12.29)
and by 12.24, and by 12.23 therefore
[xnki]nk∈N′ , [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ ∈ ai=ci∨ωi =⇒ [xink ]nk∈N′ ∨ x
c
i ∈ ai=ci∨ωi (12.30)
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and thus
ai=ci∨ωi ⊃ [xnki]nk∈N′ , [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ =⇒ ai=ci∨ωi ⊃ [xink ]nk∈N′ ∨ x
c
i (12.31)
Because the vector of outputs [xink ]nk∈N′∨xci of worker or household production is such that
the preferability of the implications gai=ci∨ωi are increasing in the presence or not of this vector
in the actions ai=ci∨ωi
gai=ci∨ωi⊃[xink ]nk∈N′∨x
c
i
 gai=ci∨ωi 6⊃[xink ]nk∈N′∨xci
(12.32)
The action ai=ci∨ωi : [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ /∈ ai=ci∨ωi is therefore (implication 12.28) an action ai=ci∨ωi 6⊃
[xink ]nk∈N′∨xci , while the action ai=ci∨ωi ⊃ [xnki]nk∈N′ , [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ is one (implication 12.31) such
that ai=ci∨ωi ⊃ [xink ]nk∈N′ ∨ xci . It follows therefore that
gai=ci∨ωi⊃[xnki]nk∈N′ ,[xnki]
′
nk∈N′
 gai=ci∨ωi\[xnki]′nk∈N′
(12.33)
suppressing subscripts we arrive then at
gai⊃x,x′  gai\x′ (12.34)
and so the inputs [xnki]nk∈N′ and [xnki]
′
nk∈N′ are (definition 9) complements.
12.1.10 Proof of theorem 9: Schumpeter theorem
Proof. Recall from equation 4.6 that
a∗i =
{
ai ∈ B : gai  ga′i ∀a
′
i ∈ B
}
(12.35)
where here we are considering the case of i = ωi. First let us demonstrate the necessity of
conditions 1., 2. and 3. for equation 4.6 to hold for an innovative act ai ⊃ ϕ ′i to be selected
(ai = a∗i ). Firstly, observe that, by definition (p.4.2.1 or definition 18 of Markey-Towler (2015))
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of B, specifically that B⊂ 2A′i
ϕ ′i ∈ a∗i =⇒ ϕ ′i ∈ A′i (12.36)
and by definition (equation 4.4) of A′i ⊂ {H ′i gH (H ′i )}, we have that
ϕ ′i ∈
{
H ′i gH
(
H ′i
)}
(12.37)
specifically, ϕ ′i ∈ gH (H ′i ) by definition 4.56 of A′i=ωi . This establishes the necessity of
condition 1. for ϕ ′i ∈ a∗i=ωi . Now, observe that if ϕ ′i ∈ a∗i then it must be the case by equation
4.6 that, since a∗i = ai : ai ∈ B, ϕ∗i ∈ ai ∈ B. This establishes the necessity of condition 2. for
ϕ ′i ∈ a∗i=ωi . Finally, observe that if ϕ ′i ∈ a∗i then it must be the case by equation 4.6 that, since
a∗i = ai : gai  ga′i ∀ai ∈ B, it must be the case that ϕ ′i ∈ ai : gai  ga′i ∀ai ∈ B, thus gai⊃ϕ ′i = gai :
gai  ga′i ∀ai ∈ B. This establishes the necessity of condition 3. for ϕ ′i ∈ a∗i=ωi .
But now consider the cases where either conditions 1., 2. or 3. do not hold. If condition 1.
does not hold, then it is impossible for ϕ ′i ∈ a∗i=ωi as ϕ ′i /∈ gH (H ′i ) implies, by definition 4.56 of
A′i=ωi and thus (equation 4.4) of A
′
i, that ϕ ′i /∈ A′i, and thus by definition (p.4.2.1 or definition 18
of Markey-Towler (2015)) of B, specifically that B ⊂ 2A′i that ϕ ′i /∈ B. If condition 2. does not
hold, then ai /∈ B∀ai ⊃ ϕ ′i , and as such by equation 4.6 cannot be selected and it is impossible
for ϕ ′i ∈ a∗i=ωi . Finally, if condition 3. does not hold, then @ai ⊃ ϕ ′i : gai  ga′i ∀a′i ∈ B and by
equation 4.6 it is impossible for ϕ ′i ∈ a∗i=ωi , as ∃a′i : ga′i  gai ∀ai ⊃ ϕ ′i . Therefore, no single
condition among 1., 2. or 3. can be sufficient, for if any one among them does not hold then
ϕ ′i /∈ a∗i=ωi .
However, if there is ai ⊃ ϕi such that conditions 1., 2. and 3. hold simultaneously then
∃ϕ ′i ∈ gH
(
H ′i
)∩Ai (12.38)
∃ai ⊃ ϕ ′i : ai ∈ B (12.39)
∃ai ⊃ ϕ ′i : gai  ga′i ∀a
′
i ∈ B (12.40)
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and thus for this ai ⊃ ϕ ′i
ai =
{
ai ∈ B : gai  ga′i ∀a
′
i ∈ B
}
(12.41)
which, by definition 4.6, ensures that ai = a∗i , and thus ϕ ′i ∈ a∗i , where i = ωi.
12.1.11 Proof of theorem 11: Preference reversal
Proof. (Sufficiency): There has been a change in environment vNi(g)→ v′Ni(g) sufficient to in-
duce
gH
(
ρi
(
v′Ni(g)
)
\{Rhh′}
)
: g′a′i  g
′
a′′i
∀a′′i ∈ B′ (12.42)
We have that g′a′i  g
′
a′′i
∀a′′i ∈ B′, and we have already by assumption that a′i ∈ B′. So
a′i ∈ B′&g′a′i  g
′
a′′i
∀a′′i ∈ B′ and therefore satisfies 4.6, so a′i =
{
ai ∈ B′ : g′a′i  g
′
a′′i
∀a′′i ∈ B′
}
,
and there will be a change of behaviour a∗i → a′i.
(Necessity): If it is to be the case that a′i =
{
ai ∈ B′ : g′a′i  g
′
a′′i
∀a′′i ∈ B′
}
and a change of
behaviour a∗i → a′i when a∗i ,a′i ∈ B′, it must be the case that g′a′i  g
′
a′′i
∀a′′i ∈ B′ where hitherto
gai  ga′′i ∀a′′i ∈ B. Hence there must have been a change in the environment vNi(g) → v′Ni(g)
which, when perceived, ρi
(
v′Ni(g)
)
, generates an understanding gH
(
ρi
(
v′Ni(g)
)
\{Rhh′}
)
suf-
ficient for the implications g′a′i to be established as more preferable than the implications g
′
a′′i
of any other alternative a′′i ∈ B′. That is, there must have been a change of the environment
sufficient to induce
gH
(
ρi
(
v′Ni(g)
)
\{Rhh′}
)
: g′a′i  g
′
a′′i
∀a′′i ∈ B′ (12.43)
12.1.12 Proof of corollary 2: Management/marketing
Proof. This is elementary. If ∃vωik⊂ v′Nk(g) which generates gH
(
ρk
(
vωik ⊂ v′Nk(g)
)
\{Rhh′}
)
⊃
g′a′i,g
′
a′′i
and we find g′a′i  g
′
a′′i
∀a′′i ∈ B then theorem 11, and there is a change of behaviour
a∗k → a′k.
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12.1.13 Proof of theorem 12: Simon theorem
Proof. Let us partition gH (H ′i ) into sets (which are therefore mutually exclusive and collect-
ively exhaustive) gH (H ′i )
C and gH (H ′i )
U which comprise, respectively, the links made at a
conscious, and a subconscious levels of awareness.
Since the time taken to form gH (H ′i ) and determine ◦2gH(H
′
i) is monotonically increasing
in the cardinality
∣∣∣gH (H ′i )C∣∣∣, and increasing at a comparatively infinitesimal rate in ∣∣∣gH (H ′i )U ∣∣∣,
it follows that the time-minimal allocation of link formation between conscious and subcon-
scious places all link formation in the subconscious but for that which must take place on a
conscious level. In the model of decision making presented here, the only link formation which
must take place on a conscious level is the creation of those links which do not hitherto exist,
which are therefore an act of creation, and an act therefore of consciousness. This establishes
property (iii).
Let us now consider what is required of the structure gH (H ′i ) to satisfy the conditions (1),
(2) and (3). Given that time taken to form gH (H ′i ) and determine  ◦gH (H ′i ) is monotonically
increasing in the cardinality
∣∣∣gH (H ′i )C∣∣∣, and infinitesimal in ∣∣∣gH (H ′i )U ∣∣∣ we can focus our atten-
tion on the conditions for minimising time taken in situations where gH (H ′i )
C = gH (H ′i ) (that
is, all knowledge about a particular context is in consciousness). This is because if we structure
gH (Hi) to minimise the time required to reach a decision for gH (H ′i ) when gH (H ′i ) = gh (H ′i )
C,
then the only manner in which decision making time for gH (H ′i ) to be further decreased beyond
this time is for connections in gH (H ′i ) to be transferred from gH (H ′i )
C to gH (H ′i )
U , which is
not a matter of structure of gH (H ′i ) since gH (H ′i ) = gH (H ′i )
C∪gH (H ′i )U .
Suppose, in contradiction to property i, the network gH (H ′i ) formed between fewer H ′i than
the minimal sufficient to establish  ◦2gH(H ′i). If this is the case, then  ◦2gH(H ′i) cannot
be established and a decision cannot be made, as a∗i requires  ◦2gH(H
′
i) in order to be well
defined. This contradicts condition (1). Suppose further by way of contradiction that gH (H ′i )
forms between more H ′i than the minimal sufficient to establish◦2gH(H
′
i). This means that we
might remove certain h from H ′i and reduce time taken to make a decision, thus contradicting
condition (2), without also contradicting condition (1). This establishes property i1.
1Note: The inclusion only of those H ′i which are necessary to establish  ◦gH (H ′i ) does not guarantee that
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Let us now consider what connections shall be included in the network gH (Hi). Suppose
we have a connection Rhh′ ∈ gH (H ′i ) which is not part of a sentence-equivalent chain which
expresses a “because” conjoint between production tuples and behavioural axioms, or is not
necessary to the formation of these sentence-equivalents or to establish a hierarchy between
behaviour-relevant axioms. Because condition (3) requires decision making be reasoned, pref-
erences  ◦2gH(H ′i) will be invariant to decision making, and so their removal will not lead to
a violation of condition (1), hence they are not connections necessary to the decision making
process. Hence by their removal, the time taken to arrive at a decision will be reduced, which
contradicts condition (2). This establishes property ii.
12.2 Theorems in chapter 6: what structures arise?
12.2.1 Proof of theorem 13: Certain structures g(N) ⊂ Es and gMs (N) ⊂
MS do not arise
Proof. The structures of g(N) and gMs (N) are given by equations 6.8 and 6.17:
g(N) =
{[
xnin j mnin j
] 6= /0⊂ a∗i=ci ∨{a∗k=ωk}ωk∈ni}ni∈N (12.44)
gMs (N) =
[mn jni = pnin jxnin j] :
[
xnin j mn jni
] 6= /0
& pnin j : mn jni = pnin jxnin j
∈
a∗i=ci ∨
{
a∗k=ωk
}
ωk∈ni
&a∗j=c j ∨
{
a∗k′=ωk′
}
ωk′∈ni

(12.45)
In order for these graphs to not include elements of pre-requisites Pi it is necessary and
sufficient that
{g(N)∪gMi (N)}∩Pi = /0∀ i = ci∨
{
ωi ∈ n j
}
(12.46)
and thus by equations 6.8 and 6.17 it is necessary and sufficient that
{
a∗i=ci ∨
{
a∗k=ωk
}
ωk∈ni
}
∩Pi = /0∀ i = ci∨
{
ωi ∈ n j
}
(12.47)
condition (1) will be satisfied.
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theorem 6 prohibits this from being the case if there are elements of Pi contained within the
budget set, and so it is only possible that this be the case, and g(N) and gMs (N) not include
elements of Pi if these elements are not contained within the budget set.
Now, further, in order for the graphs g(N) and gMs (N) to include elements of no-go zones
it is necessary and sufficient that
{g(N)∪gMi (N)}∩Zi 6= /0∀ i = ci∨
{
ωi ∈ n j
}
(12.48)
and thus by equations 6.8 and 6.17 it is necessary and sufficient that
{
a∗i=ci ∨
{
a∗k=ωk
}
ωk∈ni
}
∩Zi 6= /0∀ i = ci∨
{
ωi ∈ n j
}
(12.49)
theorem 7 prohibits this from being the case unless there is no other action within the budget
set which does not overlap with this zone, and so it is only possible that this be the case, and
g(N) and gMs (N) include elements of Zi if all actions within the budget set overlap with the
no-go zone Zi. That is, it is only possible that g(N) and gMs (N) include elements of Zi if there
is no other action within the budget set which does not include them.
12.2.2 Proof of theorem 14: Mauss-Commons theorem
Proof. (Necessity): Observe first that by condition 6.14
nin j ∈ gMs (N) ⇐⇒

[
xnin j mn jni
] 6= /0
pnin j : mn jni = pnin jxnin j
∈
a∗i=ci ∨
{
a∗k=ωk
}
ωk∈ni
&a∗j=c j ∨
{
a∗k′=ωk′
}
ωk′∈ni
(12.50)
in order for
[
nin j ∈ g(N)⊂ Es
]
/∈ Ms, since Ms ⊃ gMs (N), it is necessary that this condi-
tion not be satisfied. Hence the necessity of condition 5. is demonstrated. However, note that its
non-satisfaction is contingent upon an “and” statement, so it is possible that
[
nin j ∈ g(N)⊂ Es
]
/∈
Ms, for observing equation 6.8
g(N) =
{[
xnin j mnin j
] 6= /0⊂ a∗i=ci ∨{a∗k=ωk}ωk∈ni}ni∈N (12.51)
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we see that
[
nin j ∈ g(N)
] ∈ Es so long as [xnin j mnin j] 6= /0 ⊂ a∗i=ci ∨{a∗k=ωk}ωk∈ni but
that
[
nin j ∈ g(N)
]
/∈Ms provided the other conditions of equation 6.14 are not satisfied as per
condition 5. We may now establish the necessity of conditions 1. through 4. using equation 6.1
nin j ∈ g(N) ⇐⇒ a∗i=ci ∨
{
a∗k=ωk
}
ωk∈ni ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
] 6= /0 (12.52)
We have defined, for convenience ℵ= ci∨{ωk ∈ ni}, so this condition collapses to
nin j ∈ g(N) ⇐⇒ a∗ℵ=ci∨{ωk∈ni} ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
] 6= /0
or, further, to
nin j ∈ g(N) ⇐⇒ a∗ℵ ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
] 6= /0 (12.53)
Now consider equation 4.6 as defined for ℵ
a∗ℵ =
{
aℵ ∈ Bℵ : gaℵ  ga′ℵ ∀a
′
ℵ ∈ Bℵ
}
(12.54)
Immediately, we may verify the necessity of conditions 4. and 3. for, if
[
xnin j mnin j
] 6= /0
and
[
xnin j mnin j
]⊂ a∗ℵ, it must be the case that
[
xnin j mnin j
]⊂ {aℵ ∈ Bℵ : gaℵ  ga′ℵ ∀a′ℵ ∈ Bℵ} (12.55)
and thus, it must be the case that
[
xnin j mnin j
]⊂ aℵ : gaℵ  ga′ℵ ∀aℵ ∈ Bℵ (12.56)
and also [
xnin j mnin j
]⊂ aℵ ∈ Bℵ (12.57)
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Now, pushing further, by the definition of B (p.4.2.1), Bℵ ⊂ 2A′ℵ , we find it necessary that
[
xnin j mnin j
]⊂ aℵ ∈ Bℵ =⇒ [xnin j mnin j]⊂ aℵ ⊂ A′ℵ (12.58)
Observe now by definition 4.4 that
A′ℵ = ρℵ
(
vaNℵ(g) ⊂ vNℵ(g)
)
∩{H ′ℵ gH (H ′ℵ)} (12.59)
and thus, since (definition 6 of Markey-Towler (2015) ρℵ
(
vaNℵ(g) ⊂ vNℵ(g)
)
⊂ ρℵ
(
vNℵ(g)
)
and that therefore
A′ℵ ⊂ ρℵ
(
vaNℵ(g) ⊂ vNℵ(g)
)
⊂ ρℵ
(
vNℵ(g)
)
(12.60)
it is the case that
[
xnin j mnin j
]⊂ aℵ ⊂ A′ℵ =⇒ [xnin j mnin j]⊂ aℵ ⊂ ρℵ (vNℵ(g)) (12.61)
and thus, defining
[
xnin j mnin j
]
as an element of perception rather than a subset, we have
[
xnin j mnin j
] ∈ ρℵ (vNℵ(g)) (12.62)
and thus have demonstrated the necessity of condition 2. Now as to the necessity of condi-
tion 1., consider the contradiction, if n j /∈ ρℵ
(
vNℵ(g)
)
. If n j is not included within ρℵ
(
vNℵ(g)
)
,
then we cannot sensibly define
[
xnin j mnin j
]
, which we have demonstrated to be included
within ρℵ
(
vNℵ(g)
)
as a matter of necessity. Hence it is necessary that condition 1. hold, and
that n j ∈ ρℵ
(
vNℵ(g)
)
.
(Sufficiency): Note that by condition 1. we may sensibly define to exist, by condition 2.
[
xnin j mnin j
] ∈ ρℵ (vNℵ(g)) (12.63)
By both definitions 4.26 and 4.56, and, as hardly needs definition, Axmℵ ,A
ω
ℵ ⊂ A′ℵ it is there-
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fore the case that [
xnin j mnin j
] ∈ A′ℵ (12.64)
and therefore
∃aℵ ⊂ A′ℵ : aℵ ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
]
(12.65)
Now, by condition 3., we know that, for such aℵ ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
]
[
xnin j mnin j
]⊂ aℵ ∈ Bℵ (12.66)
and by condition 4., we know that for such aℵ ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
]
[
xnin j mnin j
]⊂ aℵ : gaℵ  ga′ℵ ∀aℵ ∈ Bℵ (12.67)
and so therefore, such aℵ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
]
(aℵ as contains
[
xnin j mnin j
]
) satisfies equation
4.6, so that
a∗ℵ =
{
aℵ ∈ Bℵ : gaℵ  ga′ℵ ∀a
′
ℵ ∈ Bℵ
}
(12.68)
and, remembering that by supposition
[
xnin j mnin j
] 6= /0 we may conclude that
a∗ℵ ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
] 6= /0 (12.69)
Now, equation 6.1 dictates that
nin j ∈ g(N) ⇐⇒ a∗i=ci ∨
{
a∗k=ωk
}
ωk∈ni ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
] 6= /0 (12.70)
which, remembering that ℵ= ci∨{ωk ∈ ni}, collapses to
nin j ∈ g(N) ⇐⇒ a∗ℵ ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
] 6= /0 (12.71)
And since we have established that a∗ℵ ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
] 6= /0, we have that conditions 1.
through 4. are sufficient for nin j ∈ g(N) ⊂ Es. But in order for nin j ⊂ Es∩Ms, it must be the
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case that condition 6.14 is satisfied, since
nin j ∈ gMs (N) ⇐⇒

[
xnin j mn jni
] 6= /0
pnin j : mn jni = pnin jxnin j
∈
a∗i=ci ∨
{
a∗k=ωk
}
ωk∈ni
&a∗j=c j ∨
{
a∗k′=ωk′
}
ωk′∈ni
(12.72)
This is not the case by condition 5. and so
[
nin j ∈ g(N)⊂ Es
]
/∈MS. Hence conditions 1.
through 5. are sufficient for
[
nin j ∈ g(N)⊂ Es
]
/∈MS.
12.2.3 Proof of theorem 15: Smith-Hayek theorem
Proof. (Necessity): Observe first that by condition 6.14
nin j ∈ gMs (N) ⇐⇒

[
xnin j mn jni
] 6= /0
pnin j : mn jni = pnin jxnin j
∈
a∗i=ci ∨
{
a∗k=ωk
}
ωk∈ni
&a∗j=c j ∨
{
a∗k′=ωk′
}
ωk′∈ni
(12.73)
which, when we define ℵ= ci∨{ωk ∈ ni} and i= c j∨
{
ωk′ ∈ n j
}
, collapses to
nin j ∈ gMs (N) ⇐⇒

[
xnin j mn jni
] 6= /0
pnin j : mn jni = pnin jxnin j
∈
a∗ℵ=ci∨{ωk∈ni}
&a∗i=c j∨{ωk′∈n j}
(12.74)
or further to
nin j ∈ gMs (N) ⇐⇒

[
xnin j mn jni
] 6= /0
pnin j : mn jni = pnin jxnin j
∈ a∗ℵ&a∗i (12.75)
Now consider equation 4.6 as defined for ℵ and i
a∗ℵ =
{
aℵ ∈ Bℵ : gaℵ  ga′ℵ ∀a
′
ℵ ∈ Bℵ
}
(12.76)
a∗i =
{
ai ∈ Bi : gai  ga′i ∀a
′
i ∈ Bi
}
(12.77)
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For a moment set aside the necessity of pnin j ⊂ a∗ℵ&a∗i : mn jni = pnin jxnin j . Immediately, we
may verify the necessity of conditions 4. and 3. for, if
[
xnin j mn jni
] 6= /0 and [xnin j mn jni]⊂
a∗ℵ&a
∗
i, it must be the case that
[
xnin j mn jni
]⊂ {aℵ ∈ Bℵ : gaℵ  ga′ℵ ∀a′ℵ ∈ Bℵ} (12.78)
[
xnin j mn jni
]⊂ {ai ∈ Bi : gai  ga′i ∀a′i ∈ Bi} (12.79)
and thus, it must be the case that
[
xnin j mn jni
]⊂ aℵ : gaℵ  ga′ℵ ∀aℵ ∈ Bℵ (12.80)
[
xnin j mn jni
]⊂ ai : gai  ga′i ∀a′i ∈ Bi (12.81)
and also [
xnin j mn jni
]⊂ aℵ ∈ Bℵ (12.82)
[
xnin j mn jni
]⊂ ai ∈ Bi (12.83)
Now, pushing further, by the definition of B (p.4.2.1), Bℵ ⊂ 2A′ℵ and Bi ⊂ 2A′i , we find it
necessary that
[
xnin j mn jni
]⊂ aℵ ∈ Bℵ =⇒ [xnin j mn jni]⊂ aℵ ⊂ A′ℵ (12.84)
[
xnin j mn jni
]⊂ ai ∈ Bi =⇒ [xnin j mn jni]⊂ ai ⊂ A′i (12.85)
Observe now by definition 4.4 that
A′ℵ = ρℵ
(
vaNℵ(g) ⊂ vNℵ(g)
)
∩{H ′ℵ gH (H ′ℵ)} (12.86)
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A′i = ρi
(
vaNi(g) ⊂ vNi(g)
)
∩{H ′i gH (H ′i)} (12.87)
and thus, since (definition 6 of Markey-Towler (2015) ρℵ
(
vaNℵ(g) ⊂ vNℵ(g)
)
⊂ ρℵ
(
vNℵ(g)
)
and that therefore
A′ℵ ⊂ ρℵ
(
vaNℵ(g) ⊂ vNℵ(g)
)
⊂ ρℵ
(
vNℵ(g)
)
(12.88)
A′i ⊂ ρi
(
vaNi(g) ⊂ vNi(g)
)
⊂ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
(12.89)
it is the case that
[
xnin j mn jni
]⊂ aℵ ⊂ A′ℵ =⇒ [xnin j mn jni]⊂ aℵ ⊂ ρℵ (vNℵ(g)) (12.90)
[
xnin j mn jni
]⊂ ai ⊂ A′i =⇒ [xnin j mn jni]⊂ ai ⊂ ρi (vNi(g)) (12.91)
and thus, defining
[
xnin j mn jni
]
as an element of perception rather than a subset, we have
[
xnin j mn jni
] ∈ ρℵ (vNℵ(g)) (12.92)
[
xnin j mn jni
] ∈ ρi (vNi(g)) (12.93)
and thus have demonstrated the necessity of condition 2. Now as to the necessity of condi-
tion 1., consider the contradiction, if n j /∈ ρℵ
(
vNℵ(g)
)
and/or ni /∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
. If n j and/or is not
included within ρℵ
(
vNℵ(g)
)
and/or ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
, then we cannot sensibly define
[
xnin j mn jni
]
respectively for ℵ or i, which we have demonstrated to be included within ρℵ
(
vNℵ(g)
)
and/or
ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
as a matter of necessity. Hence it is necessary that condition 1. hold, and that
n j ∈ ρℵ
(
vNℵ(g)
)
and ni ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
.
Finally, let us turn our attention to condition 5. Observe the necessity from condition 6.14
that pnin j ⊂ a∗ℵ&a∗i : mn jni = pnin jxnin j . Now notice again that, by the same argument as estab-
lished the necessity of conditions 1. and 2. above, this implies that
pnin j ⊂ a∗ℵ ⊂ A′ℵ = ρℵ
(
vaNℵ(g) ⊂ vNℵ(g)
)
∩{H ′ℵ gH (H ′ℵ)} (12.94)
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pnin j ⊂ a∗i ⊂ A′i = ρi
(
vaNi(g) ⊂ vNi(g)
)
∩{H ′i gH (H ′i)} (12.95)
Which establishes that, following the convention that pnin j is an element within the net-
works
{
H ′ℵ gH (H
′
ℵ)
}
and
{
H ′i gH
(
H ′i
)}
, and a relation pnin j : mn jni = pnin jxnin j between
the objects of reality
pnin j ∈ gH
(
H ′ℵ
)
(12.96)
pnin j ∈ gH
(
H ′i
)
(12.97)
which, by recognising the origins of gH (H ′ℵ) and gH
(
H ′i
)
(equation 4.3), that gH (H ′ℵ) ⊂
gH (Hℵ) and gH
(
H ′i
)⊂ gH (Hi), demonstrates the necessity of
pnin j ∈ gH (Hℵ) (12.98)
pnin j ∈ gH (Hi) (12.99)
From the same condition we may also establish that
pnin j ⊂ a∗ℵ ⊂ A′ℵ =⇒ pnin j ∈ ρℵ
(
vaNℵ(g) ⊂ vNℵ(g)
)
(12.100)
pnin j ⊂ a∗i ⊂ A′i =⇒ pnin j ∈ ρi
(
vaNi(g) ⊂ vNi(g)
)
(12.101)
and, finally, given the definition of a∗ℵ,a
∗
i (p.4.2.1), that
a∗ℵ = ρℵ
(
va
∗
ℵ
Nℵ(g)
)
∩A′ℵ (12.102)
a∗i = ρi
(
va
∗
i
Ni(g)
)
∩A′i (12.103)
we may establish that if, as is necessary, pnin j ⊂ a∗ℵ and pnin j ⊂ a∗i, we must have that
pnin j ∈ ρℵ
(
va
∗
ℵ
Nℵ(g)
)
∩A′ℵ (12.104)
pnin j ∈ ρi
(
va
∗
i
Ni(g)
)
∩A′i (12.105)
And thus we have demonstrated the necessity of condition 5.
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(Sufficiency): Note that by condition 1. we may sensibly define to exist, by condition 2.
[
xnin j mn jni
] ∈ ρℵ (vNℵ(g))∩ρi (vNi(g)) (12.106)
By both definitions 4.26 and 4.56, and, as hardly needs definition, Axmℵ ,A
ω
ℵ ⊂ A′ℵ and
Axmi ,A
ω
i ⊂ A′i it is therefore the case that
[
xnin j mn jni
] ∈ A′ℵ (12.107)
[
xnin j mn jni
] ∈ A′i (12.108)
and therefore
∃aℵ ⊂ A′ℵ : aℵ ⊃
[
xnin j mn jni
]
(12.109)
∃ai ⊂ A′i : ai ⊃
[
xnin j mn jni
]
(12.110)
Now, by condition 3., we know that, for such aℵ ⊃
[
xnin j mn jni
]
and ai ⊃
[
xnin j mn jni
]
[
xnin j mn jni
]⊂ aℵ ∈ Bℵ (12.111)
[
xnin j mn jni
]⊂ ai ∈ Bi (12.112)
and by condition 4., we know that for such aℵ ⊃
[
xnin j mn jni
]
and ai ⊃
[
xnin j mn jni
]
[
xnin j mn jni
]⊂ aℵ : gaℵ  ga′ℵ ∀aℵ ∈ Bℵ (12.113)
[
xnin j mn jni
]⊂ ai : gai  ga′i ∀ai ∈ Bi (12.114)
and so therefore, such aℵ ⊃
[
xnin j mn jni
]
and ai ⊃
[
xnin j mn jni
]
(aℵ and ai as contains[
xnin j mn jni
]
) satisfies equation 4.6, so that
a∗ℵ =
{
aℵ ∈ Bℵ : gaℵ  ga′ℵ ∀a
′
ℵ ∈ Bℵ
}
(12.115)
a∗i =
{
ai ∈ Bi : gai  ga′i ∀a
′
i ∈ Bi
}
(12.116)
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and, remembering that by supposition
[
xnin j mn jni
] 6= /0 we may conclude that
a∗ℵ ⊃
[
xnin j mn jni
] 6= /0 (12.117)
a∗i ⊃
[
xnin j mn jni
] 6= /0 (12.118)
Consider again that equation 6.1 dictates
nin j ∈ g(N) ⇐⇒ a∗i=ci ∨
{
a∗k=ωk
}
ωk∈ni ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
] 6= /0 (12.119)
or, in collapsed form recognising that ℵ= ci∨{ωk ∈ ni}
nin j ∈ g(N) ⇐⇒ a∗ℵ ⊃
[
xnin j mnin j
] 6= /0 (12.120)
we have thus established that nin j ∈ g(N) ⊂ Es. We now need demonstrate for the suffi-
ciency of conditions 1. through 5. for
[
nin j ∈ g(N)⊂ Es
] ∈ Ms. Which is contingent upon
condition 6.14. Recall again the collapsed form of condition 6.14
nin j ∈ gMs (N) ⇐⇒

[
xnin j mn jni
] 6= /0
pnin j : mn jni = pnin jxnin j
∈ a∗ℵ&a∗i (12.121)
we have demonstrated that a∗ℵ,a
∗
i ⊃
[
xnin j mn jni
] 6= /0. All that remains to demonstrate
the sufficiency of conditions 1. through 5. for
[
nin j ∈ g(N)⊂ Es
] ∈Ms is to demonstrate that
a∗ℵ,a
∗
i ⊃ pnin j : mn jni = pnin jxnin j . Now observe that by condition 5., we have
pnin j ∈ gH (Hℵ)∩gH (Hi) (12.122)
pnin j ∈ ρℵ
(
vaℵNℵ(g) ⊂ vNℵ(g)
)
∩ρi
(
vaiNi(g) ⊂ vNi(g)
)
(12.123)
pnin j ∈ ρℵ
(
va
∗
ℵ
Nℵ(g)
)
∩ρi
(
va
∗
i
Ni(g)
)
(12.124)
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Now, by remembering the definition of gH (H ′ℵ) ,gH
(
H ′i
)
(equation 4.3), and that pnin j :
mn jni = pnin jxnin j constitutes a connection between the two objects of reality
[
xnin j mn jni
]
contained within H ′ℵ,H
′
i by supposition (condition 2.), we may replace the first line of condi-
tion 5. with
pnin j ∈ gH
(
H ′ℵ
)∩gH (H ′i) (12.125)
which in combination with the second line of condition 5. allows us to establish that
pnin j ∈ A′ℵ (12.126)
pnin j ∈ A′ℵ (12.127)
and finally, the third line of condition 5. in combination with these last two objects and the
definition of acts a∗ℵ,a
∗
i (p.4.2.1) allows us to conclude that
pnin j ∈ a∗ℵ∩a∗i (12.128)
Thus conditions 1. through 5. are sufficient for
[
nin j ∈ g(N)⊂ Es
] ∈Ms.
12.2.4 Proof of theorem 16: Uniqueness of Es, Ms
Proof. Observe that equations 6.7 and 6.17
g(N) =
{[
xnin j mnin j
] 6= /0⊂ a∗i=ci ∨{a∗k=ωk}ωk∈ni}ni∈N (12.129)
gMs (N) =
[mn jni = pnin jxnin j] :
[
xnin j mn jni
] 6= /0
& pnin j : mn jni = pnin jxnin j
∈
a∗i=ci ∨
{
a∗k=ωk
}
ωk∈ni
&a∗j=c j ∨
{
a∗k′=ωk′
}
ωk′∈ni

(12.130)
which govern the formation of the graphs g(N) and gMs (N) are totally contingent upon
a∗i=ci ∨
{
a∗k=ωk
}
ωk∈ni
, or, recognising that i = ωi ∈ nk ∈ N, the same graphs are totally contin-
gent upon a∗i=ci∨ωi , defined by equation 4.6. Arbitrarily select one such individual i, if there is
254
but one action ai=ci∨ωi which satisfies equation 4.6, then when taken together, there is but one
graph g(N) and one graph gMs (N) formed of the collection of objects which satisfy equation
4.6 for each individual i.
Consider the theory of choice which defines a∗i=ci∨ωi , equation 4.6:
a∗i =
{
ai ∈ B : gai  ga′i ∀a
′
i ∈ B
}
(12.131)
Now suppose, by way of contradiction and without loss of generality, that there are two
actions a1i and a
2
i which satisfy equation 4.6 (the same result will follow if we supposed ℵ
actions satisfied equation 4.6). Then this means that
a1i =
{
ai ∈ B : gai  ga′i ∀a
′
i ∈ B
}
(12.132)
a2i =
{
ai ∈ B : gai  ga′i ∀a
′
i ∈ B
}
(12.133)
Respectively, these equations imply that a1i ,a
2
i ∈ B. The first equation implies further there-
fore that ga1i  ga2i , while the second implies that ga2i  ga1i ,which is obviously a contradiction.
Therefore, a∗i=ci∨ωi must be unique up to the uniqueness of gH (H
′
i ) from whence {gai} emerge
(definition 4.5) and the particular set of environments vNi(g), the perception from whence the
set H ′i emerges. Thus a∗i=ci∨ωi , and therefore the graphs g(N) and gMs (N) are unique after all
matters of creativity/freedom of will are determined with respect to the incorporation of links
Rhh′ into gH (Hi), and subject to the realisation of a particular set of environments vNi(g).
12.3 Theorems in chapter 7: evolution of structure
12.3.1 Proof of theorem 17: Chamberlin-Robinson theorem
Proof. Observe from condition 6.14 that
nin j ∈ gMs (N) ⇐⇒

[
xnin j mn jni
] 6= /0
pnin j : mn jni = pnin jxnin j
∈
a∗i=ci ∨
{
a∗q=ωq
}
ωq∈ni
&a∗j=c j ∨
{
a∗k′=ωq′
}
ωq′∈ni
(12.134)
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and notice that with our notation i = c j ∨
{
ωq′ ∈ n j
}
and ℵ = ci ∨
{
ωq ∈ n j
}
and k =
ck∨
{
ωq′′ ∈ nk
}
this condition becomes, respective to nin j and nkn j
nin j ∈ gMs (N) ⇐⇒

[
xnin j mn jni
] 6= /0
pnin j : mn jni = pnin jxnin j
∈
a∗ℵ=ci∨{ωq∈n j}
&a∗i=c j∨{ωq′∈n j}
(12.135)
nkn j ∈ gMs (N) ⇐⇒

[
xnkn j mn jnk
] 6= /0
pnkn j : mn jnk = pnkn jxnkn j
∈
a∗ℵ=ci∨{ωq∈n j}
&a∗k=ck∨{ωq′′∈nk}
(12.136)
We have supposed that a∗k ⊃
[
xnkn j mn jnk pnkn j
]
and a∗ℵ ⊃
[
xnin j mn jni pnin j
]
. So
given the definition
ai : ai ⊃
[
xnin j mn jni pnin j
]
&ai 6⊃
[
xnkn j mn jnk pnkn j
]
(12.137)
a′i : a
′
i ⊃
[
xnkn j mn jnk pnkn j
]
&a′i 6⊃
[
xnin j mn jni pnin j
]
(12.138)
the movement
nin j ∈ gMs (N) ,nkn j /∈ gMs (N)→ nin j /∈ gMs (N) ,nkn j ∈ gMs (N) (12.139)
will be contingent upon the movement (will occur if this occurs)
ai = a∗i→ a′i = a∗i (12.140)
Now observe that in conditions 1. through 4. that we have supposed to hold at the price
¯pnin j for a given price pnkn j , we have equivalent conditions to the conditions of theorem 2 but
for certain notations, where we are considering two behaviours ai and a′i. Thus if the price
pnin j were to exceed ¯pnin j then by theorem 2 we will observe that a
′
i = a
∗
i. And since we
assumed ai = a∗i we will observe when the price pnin j exceeds ¯pnin j the movement
ai = a∗i→ a′i = a∗i (12.141)
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Thus, we have the movement
nin j ∈ gMs (N) ,nkn j /∈ gMs (N)→ nin j /∈ gMs (N) ,nkn j ∈ gMs (N) (12.142)
12.3.2 Proof of theorem 18: Lancaster-Ironmonger theorem
Proof. As with the Chamberlin-Robinson theorem (theorem 17), observe from condition 6.14
that
nin j ∈ gMs (N) ⇐⇒

[
xnin j mn jni
] 6= /0
pnin j : mn jni = pnin jxnin j
∈
a∗i=ci ∨
{
a∗q=ωq
}
ωq∈ni
&a∗j=c j ∨
{
a∗q′=ωq′
}
ωq′∈ni
(12.143)
and notice that with our notation i = c j ∨
{
ωq′ ∈ n j
}
and ℵ = ci ∨
{
ωq ∈ n j
}
and k =
ck∨
{
ωq′′ ∈ nk
}
this condition becomes, respective to nin j and nkn j
nin j ∈ gMs (N) ⇐⇒

[
xnin j mn jni
] 6= /0
pnin j : mn jni = pnin jxnin j
∈
a∗ℵ=ci∨{ωq∈n j}
&a∗i=c j∨{ωq′∈n j}
(12.144)
nkn j ∈ gMs (N) ⇐⇒

[
xnkn j mn jnk
] 6= /0
pnkn j : mn jnk = pnkn jxnkn j
∈
a∗ℵ=ci∨{ωq∈n j}
&a∗k=ck∨{ωq′′∈nk}
(12.145)
We have supposed that a∗k ⊃
[
xnkn j mn jnk pnkn j
]
and a∗ℵ ⊃
[
xnin j mn jni pnin j
]
. So
given the definition
ai : ai ⊃
[
xnin j mn jni pnin j
]
&ai 6⊃
[
xnkn j mn jnk pnkn j
]
(12.146)
a′i : a
′
i ⊃
[
xnkn j mn jnk pnkn j
]
&a′i 6⊃
[
xnin j mn jni pnin j
]
(12.147)
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the movement
nin j ∈ gMs (N) ,nkn j /∈ gMs (N)→ nin j /∈ gMs (N) ,nkn j ∈ gMs (N) (12.148)
will be contingent upon the movement (will occur if this occurs)
ai = a∗i→ a′i = a∗i (12.149)
Now observe that if, as we have assumed by condition 1., the two goods and services[
xnkn j
]′ ⊂ a′i are substitutable for the goods and services [xnin j]⊂ ai, in the context of ai,a′i,
that by definition 2
gai ∼approx. ga′i (12.150)
where gai′ = g
α¯
ai′ for it is supposed that substitutability occurs at a given set of product
attributes α
(
xnin j
)
and another set of product attributes ¯α
(
xnkn j
)
. This latter set of product at-
tributes is supposed to be equal to some αθ¯
(
xnkn j
)
contained within the sequence
{
αθ
(
xnkn j
)}Θ
θ=0
but at a location θ¯ < Θ (so gα¯ai′ = g
αθ¯
a′i
). It is supposed that the attributes α
(
xnkn j
)
change to
some product attributes αθ
(
xnkn j
)
: θ > θ¯ , which is possible because it was supposed that
θ¯ <Θ. By condition 2. we can establish that, since θ > θ¯ ,
gαθa′i
6 gαθ¯a′i (12.151)
and given the nature of  ◦2gH(Hi), we can thus establish that, as comparability has been
maintained
gαθa′i
 gαθ¯a′i (12.152)
We have assumed in condition 3. that◦2gH(Hi) remains transitive with respect to rankings
of implications of actions ai,a′i , so if
gαθa′i
 gαθ¯a′i &g
α¯
ai′ = gai ∼approx. ga′i (12.153)
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then since gα¯ai′ = g
αθ¯
a′i
,
gαθa′i
 ga′i (12.154)
Now, by the supposition of condition 4. we have assumed that the actions ai,a′i remain
feasible and strictly preferable to all other alternative courses of action a′′i in the feasible set B
, so we find that
a′i ∈ B&gαθa′i  gai ,ga′′i ∀ga′′i (12.155)
And so we have established that a′i now satisfies equation 4.6, and we have a movement
ai = a∗i→ ai′ = a∗i
which we have above established to be the contingency which generates the movement
nin j ∈ gMs (N) ,nkn j /∈ gMs (N)→ nin j /∈ gMs (N) ,nkn j ∈ gMs (N) (12.156)
12.3.3 Proof of theorem 19: Chinese Whispers theorem
Proof. (Necessary conditions): Let us remind ourselves of definition 12. Diffusion of a be-
havioural change at ℵ= ci∨{ωk ∈ ni} in {Ets ∪ Its}t=T to i= c j ∨
{
ωk′ ∈ n j
}
in {Ets ∪ Its}t≤T¯
if, when there is a change of behaviour on the part of ℵ at t = T
aℵ (t = T) = a∗ℵ→ a′ℵ (t = T) = a∗ℵ (12.157)
there is a change of behaviour on the part of i at t ≤ T¯
ai (t ≤ T¯ ) = a∗i→ a′i (t ≤ T¯ ) = a∗i (12.158)
when compared with an initial block {Ets ∪ Its}T¯t=T¯ of socioeconomic history and the actions
{{ai (t)}i}T¯t=T¯ which generate it (according to equations 6.8 and 6.9). Now, notice that, by the
choice equation 4.6, in order for the change of behaviour on the part of of i at t ≤ T¯ , it is
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necessary that there be a movement
ai (t ≤ T¯ ) =
{
ai ∈ B : gai  ga′′i ∀a
′′
i ∈ B
}
→ a′i (t ≤ T¯ ) =
{
ai ∈ B : gai  ga′′i ∀a
′′
i ∈ B
}
(12.159)
where gai ⊂ gH
(
ρi
(
vNi(g)
)\{Rhh′}) ∀ai ∈ B (equations 4.5, 4.3 and 4.2). We have sup-
posed that initial behaviours (here ai (t ≤ T¯ )) are feasible (ai (t ≤ T¯ ) ∈ B), so this move-
ment must be due to a change of preferability so that a′i (t ≤ T¯ ) becomes associated with
the most preferable implications out of B. But we have assumed that the progression of psy-
chologies gH (Hi) is constant through history, so this change of preferability of implications
must be due to a change in the implications gai associated with ai, and this therefore, since
gai ⊂ gH
(
ρi
(
vNi(g) \{Rhh′}
)) ∀ai ∈ B (equations 4.5, 4.3 and 4.2), must be due to a change
of information contained within the environment
vNi(g)→ v′Ni(g) : gai  ga′′i ∀a
′′
i ∈ B (12.160)
where gai ⊂ gH
(
ρi
(
v′Ni(g)
)
\{Rhh′}
)
∀ai ∈ B. Now, observing that i= c j∨
{
ωk′ ∈ n j
}
,
we find that the movement
vNi(g)→ v′Ni(g) (12.161)
is equivalent (equation 4.17 for i= c j and equation 4.52 for i=ωk′ ∈ n j), recognising that
the non-socioeconomic environment is held constant to the progression of non-socioeconomic
history in {V t \Ets ∪ Its}T¯t=T¯ , to the movement
{[
xinλ ,xnλi,minλ ,mnλi,vinλ ,vnλi
]
n j∈{Ndi(g) Ndi(gv)}d∈{in,out}
}
→
{[
xinλ ,xnλi,minλ ,mnλi,vinλ ,vnλi
]′
n j∈{Ndi(g) Ndi(gv)}d∈{in,out}
}
(12.162)
where the vectors are expanded accordingly if i = ωk′ ∈ n j or nλ ∈ P = N \C to reflect
the interactions of i with other elements of the organisations n j and/or nλ . If this movement
has indeed occurred, then because these objects are the contents of socioeconomic connections
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nλn j ∨ n jnλ ∈ g(N)∨ gv (N), and because these connections are formed of the actions a∗k se-
lected by individuals k= cλ ∨{ωk′′ ∈ nλ} (equations 6.8 and 6.10), there must have been some
movement
ak (t−∆t ≤ T¯ ) = a∗k→ a′k (t−∆t ≤ T¯ ) = a∗k (12.163)
in {Ets ∪ Its}t=t−∆t at duration t−∆t, for the economic system is determined pairwise at each
duration (equations 6.8 and 6.10), such that any change is manifest in connections which form
the basis for decisions, decisions which determine the system at the next duration. Now, either
this movement of individuals k = cλ ∨{ωk′′ ∈ nλ} is the movement of the original individual
ℵ = ci ∨ {ωk ∈ ni} in {Ets ∪ Its}t=T at t = T , or it is not, in which case the argument from
equation 12.158 onward to this point now applies again. The argument terminates when we do
arrive at the movement of the original individual ℵ= ci∨{ωk ∈ ni} in {Ets ∪ Its}t=T at t = T .
At each stage of the argument we establish the necessity of some change of behaviour
ntnt+∆t ∈ Ets∪ Its→ ntn′t+∆t ∈ Ets∪ Its as when we arrive at equation 12.163, where we index the
individuals involved by the duration t at which the change in their interaction ntnt+∆t→ ntn′t+∆t
occurs and which of them (nt) instigates that change through their behaviour. Now if we collect
these together, recognising that the terminus nt≤T¯ of these chains is i = c j ∨
{
ωk′ ∈ n j
}
in
{Ets ∪ Its}t≤T¯ at t ≤ T¯ and their beginning nT has been established to exist at ℵ= ci∨{ωk ∈ ni}
in {Ets ∪ Its}t=T at t = T , we obtain a chain of connections
{
ntn′t+∆t ∈ Ets ∪ Its
}t<T¯
t=T reflecting the
changed behaviour profile throughout socioeconomic history. Thus we establish the necessity
of a chain of connections
{
ntn′t+∆t ∈ Ets ∪ Its
}T¯
t=T reflecting changed behaviours (ntnt+∆t ∈ Ets∪
Its → ntn′t+∆t ∈ Ets ∪ Its) with respect to the initial block {Ets ∪ Its}t=T exist between nT = ni
and nT¯ = n j for diffusion of a behavioural change at ℵ = ci ∨ {ωk ∈ ni} in {Ets ∪ Its}t=T to
i= c j∨
{
ωk′ ∈ n j
}
in {Ets ∪ Its}t≤T¯ .
(Sufficient conditions): Again, let us remind ourselves of the definition (definition 12) of
diffusion. Diffusion of a behavioural change at ℵ = ci ∨ {ωk ∈ ni} in {Ets ∪ Its}t=T to i =
c j∨
{
ωk′ ∈ n j
}
in {Ets ∪ Its}t≤T¯ if, when there is a change of behaviour on the part of ℵ at t = T
aℵ (t = T) = a∗ℵ→ a′ℵ (t = T) = a∗ℵ (12.164)
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there is a change of behaviour on the part of i at t ≤ T¯
ai (t ≤ T¯ ) = a∗i→ a′i (t ≤ T¯ ) = a∗i (12.165)
when compared with an initial block {Ets ∪ Its}T¯t=T¯ of socioeconomic history and the actions
{{ai (t)}i}T¯t=T¯ which generate it (according to equations 6.8 and 6.9). Now, notice that, by the
choice equation 4.6, there will be a change of behaviour on the part of of i at t ≤ T¯ if there is
a movement
ai (t ≤ T¯ ) =
{
ai ∈ B : gai  ga′′i ∀a
′′
i ∈ B
}
→ a′i (t ≤ T¯ ) =
{
ai ∈ B : gai  ga′′i ∀a
′′
i ∈ B
}
(12.166)
where gai ⊂ gH
(
ρi
(
vNi(g)
)\{Rhh′}) ∀ai ∈ B (equations 4.5, 4.3 and 4.2). Now this is
equivalent to stating that the movement will occur if understanding of the environment gH
(
H ′i
)
contains a feasible set B which includes a′i (t ≤ T¯ ), gH
(
H ′i
) ⊃ B ⊃ a′i (t ≤ T¯ ), and there is a
change of preferability so that a′i (t ≤ T¯ ) becomes associated with the most preferable impli-
cations out of B. We have assumed that the progression of psychologies gH (Hi) is constant
throughout history, so this change of preferability of implications will be induced by a change in
the implications gai associated with ai, and this in turn, since gai ⊂ gH
(
ρi
(
vNi(g) \{Rhh′}
)) ∀ai ∈
B (equations 4.5, 4.3 and 4.2), will be induced by a change of information contained within the
environment sufficient to induce this preferability
vNi(g)→ v′Ni(g) : a′i (t ≤ T¯ ) ∈ B&gai  ga′′i ∀a
′′
i ∈ B (12.167)
where gai ⊂ gH
(
ρi
(
v′Ni(g)
)
\{Rhh′}
)
∀ai ∈ B. So, if we can establish conditions under
which a change of a behavioural change at ℵ = ci ∨ {ωk ∈ ni} in {Ets ∪ Its}t=T will induce
condition 12.167 to hold, we will establish sufficient conditions for diffusion of a behavioural
change from ℵ= ci∨{ωk ∈ ni} in {Ets ∪ Its}t=T to i= c j∨
{
ωk′ ∈ n j
}
in {Ets ∪ Its}t≤T¯ .
To that end, suppose there exist chains
{
ntn′t+1 ∈ Ets ∪ Its
}t<T¯
t=T reflecting changed behaviours
(ntnt+∆t ∈ Ets∪ Its→ ntn′t+∆t ∈ Ets∪ Its) with respect to the initial block {Ets ∪ Its}t=T such as exist
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between nT = ni and nT¯ = n j. Take, without loss of generality any point in these chains, the
set [kt = ct ∨{ωkt ∈ nt}]∈
{
nt :
{
ntn′t+∆t ∈ Ets ∪ Its
}t<T¯
t=T
}
. The economic system is determined
pairwise at each duration (equations 6.8 and 6.10), such that any change at t is manifest in con-
nections which form the basis for decisions, decisions which determine the system at the next
duration t +∆t. Let us now investigate what is sufficient on the part of {akt} in order for there
to be a changed behaviour a′kt+∆t selected on the part of [kt+∆t = ct+∆t ∨{ωkt+∆t ∈ nt+∆t}] ∈{
nt+∆t :
{
ntn′t+∆t ∈ Ets ∪ Its
}t<T¯
t=T
}
.
We can repeat our argument above, there will be a change of behaviour on the part of kt if
there is a movement
akt+∆t =
{
akt+∆t ∈ B : gakt+∆t  ga′′kt+∆t ∀a
′′
kt+∆t ∈ B
}
→ a′kt+∆t =
{
akt+∆t ∈ B : gakt+∆t  ga′′kt+∆t ∀a
′′
kt+∆t ∈ B
}
(12.168)
where gakt+∆t ⊂ gH
(
ρkt+∆t
(
vNkt+∆t (g)
)
\{Rhh′}
)
∀akt+∆t ∈ B (equations 4.5, 4.3 and 4.2).
Now again this is equivalent to stating that the movement will occur if understanding of the
environment gH
(
H ′kt+∆t
)
contains a feasible set B which includes a′kt+∆t , gH
(
H ′kt+∆t
)
⊃ B ⊃
a′kt+∆t , and there is a change of preferability so that a
′
kt+∆t becomes associated with the most
preferable implications out of B. Again, we have assumed that the progression of psychologies
gH
(
Hkt+∆t
)
is constant throughout history, so this change of preferability of implications will
be induced by a change in the implications gakt+∆t associated with akt+∆t , and this in turn,
since gakt+∆t ⊂ gH
(
ρkt+∆t
(
vNkt+∆t (g) \{Rhh′}
))
∀akt+∆t ∈ B (equations 4.5, 4.3 and 4.2), will
be induced by a change of information contained within the environment sufficient to induce
this preferability
vNkt+∆t (g)→ v
′
Nkt+∆t (g)
: a′kt+∆t ∈ B&gakt+∆t  ga′′kt+∆t ∀a
′′
kt+∆t ∈ B (12.169)
Now, this change will be brought about if there has been a change of behaviour akt → a′kt
on the part of {kt} ∈
{
nt :
{
ntn′t+∆t ∈ Ets ∪ Its
}t<T¯
t=T
}
such that the contents of this behaviour
will cause the movement vNkt+∆t (g) → v
′
Nkt+∆t (g)
. Observe from equations 4.17 and 4.52, and
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from equations 6.8 and 6.9 that this will be the case if those actions
{
a′kt
}
contained within the
set of those engaged in by individuals within kt+∆t’s environment Nkt+∆t (g),
{
a′kt
}
kt∈Nkt+∆t (g)
are themselves contained within v′Nkt+∆t (g)
as defined above
{
a′kt
}
kt∈Nkt+∆t (g)
⊂ v′Nkt+∆t (g) (12.170)
Now, realising that if this holds true for all kt+∆t ∈
{
nt+∆t :
{
ntn′t+∆t ∈ Ets ∪ Its
}t<T¯
t=T
}
then
when kt+∆t = i, the sufficient condition for diffusion (12.167) is met. Thus a sufficient con-
dition for diffusion of a behavioural change at ℵ = ci ∨ {ωk ∈ ni} in {Ets ∪ Its}t=T to i =
c j∨
{
ωk′ ∈ n j
}
in {Ets ∪ Its}t≤T¯ is that
{
a′kt
}
kt∈Nkt+∆t (g)
⊂ v′Nkt+∆t (g) : a
′
kt+∆t ∈ B
&gakt+∆t  ga′′kt+∆t ∀a
′′
kt+∆t ∈ B (12.171)
for every kt ∈
{
nt :
{
ntn′t+∆t ∈ Ets ∪ Its
}t<T¯
t=T
}
and kt = ct ∨{ωkt ∈ nt}.
12.4 Theorems in Appendix B: Some points of interpretation
of gH (Hi)
12.4.1 Proof of theorem 21 and corollary 5: gH (Hi) may express sentence
equivalents and rational thoughts
Proof. (Theorem 21) If thoughts can be expressed as sentence equivalents p1, p2, ..., pn, then
by definition 13 they are syntactically and semantically equivalent to a linguistic sentence l ∈ L.
That is [p1, p2, ..., pn] = l. The linguistic system L of which l is a sentence must express a se-
ries of relations between two subjects/objects and so can be expressed in the form of a graph
whose formalism we can define without loss to be {Hi gH (Hi)} where Hi contains the sub-
jects/objects of the linguistic system L and gH (Hi) contains the relations between any two
264
subjects/objects within the linguistic system L. The simplest sentence therefore consists of a
simple relation Rhh′ = {hh′ ∈ gH (Hi)}, while more complex sentences consist of sequential se-
ries of relations which are expressed become chains
{
Rhkhk+1
}K
k=1 = {hkhk+1 ∈ gH (H ′i )}
I
i=1 =
{hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (H ′i ).
(Corollary 5): If rational thoughts are thoughts which can be expressed as sentence equiva-
lents then Theorem 21 applies and they may be expressed as chains {hkhk+1}Kk=0⊂ gH (H ′i ).
12.4.2 Proof of theorem 22: gH (Hi) may express decision rules
Proof. By definition 14 a decision rule is an algorithm, and may be expressed mathematically
as a recursion fK ( fK−1 (... fK−K (·))) where each individual function fk (·) ∈ { fk (·)}Kk=0 maps
the outputs of either the function fk−1 (·) or some basic information H0 into the inputs of ei-
ther the function fk+1 (·) or some terminal information HK ∈ fK (·). Take the first function
f0 (·) ∈ { fk (·)}Kk=0 in the algorithmic recursion. We can define H0 upon which this function
f0 (·) : H0→ H1 operates to exist within the set Hi of percepts of the objects of reality within
an individual’s environment, H0 ⊂ Hi, and the set H1 into which it outputs as also within per-
cepts of the objects of reality within an individual’s environment, H1 ⊂ Hi. For each individ-
ual individual input h0 ∈ H0 ⊂ Hi we have it mapped to the output h1 = f0 (h0) ∈ H1 ⊂ Hi,
and we may represent this mapping within a relation Rh0h1 ⊃ f0 (h0), which is a relation
h0h1 ∈ gH (Hi). If we collect such relations Rh0h1 across h0 ∈ H0 we obtain a set of relations
{h0h1}h0∈H0 ⊂ gH (Hi) representing the mapping f0 (·) in gH (Hi). Similarly, we can take the
second function f1 (·) ∈ { fk (·)}Kk=0. We can again define H1 upon which this function operates
to exist within the set Hi, H0 ⊂ Hi, and the set H2 as also within Hi, H2 ⊂ Hi. For each individ-
ual individual input h1 ∈ H1 ⊂ Hi we have it mapped to the output h2 = f0 (h0) ∈ H1 ⊂ Hi, and
can represent this within a relation Rh1h2 ⊃ f1 (h1), which is a relation h1h2 ∈ gH (Hi). If we
collect such relations Rh1h2 across h1 ∈ H1 we obtain a set of relations {h1h2}h1∈H1 ⊂ gH (Hi)
representing the mapping f1 (·) in gH (Hi). We can continue this process for each fk (·) in the
recursion and collect the resulting set of relations into a set
{
{hkhk+1}hk∈Hk ⊂ gH (Hi)
}K
k=0
, or{
{hkhk+1}hk∈Hk
}K
k=0
⊂ gH (Hi).
Now, a particular iteration fK ( fK−1 (... fK−K (h0 ∈ H0))) of this algorithm maps a particular
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bit of information h0 ∈H0 backward along the algorithm, and because each step in the recursion
is a function, it maps to single values, from h1 = f0 (h0) to h2 = f1 (h1) and so on until hK+1 =
fK (hK). . Using the argument above, each of these steps hk+1 = fk (hk) in the algorithm
can be associated with one relation hkhk+1 ∈ {hkhk+1}hk∈Hk ⊂ gH (Hi). If we extract these we
obtain a single chain {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (Hi). Provided that the elements {hk}K+1k=0 of these
relations are contained within H ′i , {hk}K+1k=0 ∈ H ′i , we know that since gH (H ′i ) ⊂ gH (Hi) by
definition (equation 4.3) that their relations are contained within gH (H ′i ), that is {hk}K+1k=0 ∈
H ′i =⇒ {hkhk+1}Kk=0 ⊂ gH (H ′i ).
12.5 Theorems in Appendix C: The Made to Stick Theorem
12.5.1 Proof of theorem 23: When ideas are “made to stick”
Proof. It will be advantageous, first, to establish the response of the likelihood of any proposed
idea {Rhh′}P being incorporated into the mind of individual i, pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
to the
likelihood of any individual relation Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P within it being incorporated into the mind
of individual i, pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
. Note that because the event {Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi) is con-
tingent upon every single relation Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P being incorporated into gH (Hi), if there is a
single relation Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}Psuch that Rhh′ /∈ gH (Hi) then {Rhh′}P 6⊂ gH (Hi). That is,
∃Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P : Rhh′ /∈ gH (Hi) =⇒ {Rhh′}P 6⊂ gH (Hi) (12.172)
Let us now prove each of the five properties 1.-5. in turn.
1. Take the idea {Rhh′}P and add a new relation Rh′′h′′′ to be included within that idea. By
condition 12.172, whether Rh′′h′′′ is incorporated into gH (Hi) will determine whether or not
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi). Now because of this contingency upon every one of the individual links, we
can establish a relation between the likelihood pi
(
Rh′′h′′′ ∪{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
of the expanded
idea Rh′′h′′′∪{Rhh′}P being incorporated into gH (Hi) and the likelihood pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
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of the original idea {Rhh′}P being incorporated into gH (Hi). We have two possibilities, either
pi (Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (Hi))≥ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
(12.173)
where pi (Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (Hi)) is conditioned on whatever events it is conditioned on, and so
the likelihood pi
(
Rh′′h′′′ ∪{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
is equal to the original likelihood pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
.
So
pi (Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (Hi))≥ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
=⇒ pi
(
Rh′′h′′′ ∪{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
= pi
(
Rh′′h′′′ ∪{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
(12.174)
Or, alternatively we have
pi (Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (Hi))< pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
(12.175)
where pi (Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (Hi)) is conditioned on whatever events it is conditioned on, and so
the likelihood pi
(
Rh′′h′′′ ∪{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
is less than the original likelihood pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
,
because of the contingency 12.172. So
pi (Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (Hi))< pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
=⇒ pi
(
Rh′′h′′′ ∪{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
< pi
(
Rh′′h′′′ ∪{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
(12.176)
The relations 12.174 and 12.176 therefore imply that with the addition of new relations to
the idea, Rh′′h′′′ ∪{Rhh′}P, we have ∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
≤ 0. Therefore, we have that
∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
∂
∣∣∣{Rhh′}P∣∣∣ ≤ 0
This proves property 1.
2. Let us now take an individual relation Rh′′h′′′ ∈ {Rhh′}P which is already incorporated
within gH (Hi). By definition 1
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Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (Hi) =⇒ pi (Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (Hi)) = 1 (12.177)
Since by definition 1 pi (Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (Hi)) ∈ [0,1] then, as we move between the states
Rh′′h′′′ /∈ gH (Hi) and Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (Hi) we find pi (Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (Hi))→ 1. Now, again because
of condition 12.172,
∃Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P : Rhh′ /∈ gH (Hi) =⇒ {Rhh′}P 6⊂ gH (Hi) (12.178)
we know that the event {Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi) is contingent upon the incorporation of any
individual relation Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P being incorporated. With respect to the likelihood of the
event {Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi) we therefore have two possibilities as we move between the states
Rh′′h′′′ /∈ gH (Hi) and Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (Hi). Either
pi (Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (Hi))> {Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi) (12.179)
and so the movement pi (Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (Hi))→ 1 has no effect upon pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
,
and
pi (Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (Hi)) → 1 =⇒ ∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
= 0 (12.180)
Alternatively, we have
pi (Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (Hi)) = pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
(12.181)
and so the movement pi (Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (Hi))→ 1 has at least no effect upon pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
,
and
pi (Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (Hi)) → 1 =⇒ ∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
≥ 0 (12.182)
So we can conclude from relations 12.180 and 12.182 that as we find individual relations
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Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P already incorporated into gH (Hi) we have ∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
≥ 0. There-
fore we have that
∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
∂
∣∣∣Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P : Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi)∣∣∣ ≥ 0
This proves 2.
Before proving properties 3.-5., let us derive the relation between the likelihood of the
idea {Rhh′}P being incorporated into gH (Hi), pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
and the likelihood of the
individual relation Rhh′ being incorporated into gH (Hi), pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi)). Note again that
because of condition 12.172
∃Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P : Rhh′ /∈ gH (Hi) =⇒ {Rhh′}P 6⊂ gH (Hi) (12.183)
it is the case that
pi
(
{Rhh′}P 6⊂ gH (Hi)
)
∝ pi (Rhh′ /∈ gH (Hi)) (12.184)
Which allows us to conclude that
∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P 6⊂ gH (Hi)
)
∂ pi (Rhh′ /∈ gH (Hi))
≥ 0 (12.185)
Now, the law of complements tells us that
pi
(
{Rhh′}P 6⊂ gH (Hi)
)
= 1− pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
(12.186)
pi (Rhh′ /∈ gH (Hi)) = 1− pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi)) (12.187)
Now substituting this into equation 12.185 we have that
∂
[
1− pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)]
∂ [1− pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi))]
≥ 0 (12.188)
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Applying some tautologies, we get that
∂
[
1− pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)]
∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
) ∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
∂ pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi))
∂ pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi))
∂ [1− pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi))]
≥ 0
(12.189)
It is fairly obvious that
∂
[
1− pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)]
∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
) < 0 (12.190)
∂ pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi))
∂ [1− pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi))]
< 0 (12.191)
and so by equation 12.189 it must be the case that
∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
∂ pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi))
≥ 0∀Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P (12.192)
This makes the process of proving properties 3.-5. substantially easier. If we can establish
that ∂ pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi))≥ 0 or ∂ pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi))≤ 0 then we will know by equation 12.192
that ∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
≥ 0 or ∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
≤ 0 respectively. Let us turn to
each property in turn:
3. Note that by the law of suggestion (definition 1), we have
∂ pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi))
∂ I
(
Rhh′ ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)) ≥ 0 (12.193)
where
I
(
Rhh′ ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
))
=

1
0
i f Rhh′ ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
i f Rhh′ /∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
) (12.194)
Multiplying this by equation 12.192 we have
∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
∂ pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi))
∂ pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi))
∂ I
(
Rhh′ ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)) ≥ 0∀Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P (12.195)
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and
∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
∂ I
(
Rhh′ ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)) ≥ 0∀Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P (12.196)
But notice that, by definition (equation 4.2), a relation Rhh′ may be perceived, Rhh′ ∈
ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
, only if the objects of reality it relates h,h′ are also perceived
Rhh′ ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
=⇒ h,h′ ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
(12.197)
and so from the negation (without loss of generality) h /∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
of this necessary con-
dition we may infer that Rhh′ /∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
h /∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
=⇒ Rhh′ /∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
(12.198)
Now imagine there is an indicator function
Ih
(
h ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
))
=

1
0
i f h ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)
i f h′ /∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
) (12.199)
The implication 12.198 tells us that if Ih
(
h ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
))
= 0 then I
(
Rhh′ ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
))
= 0,
but if Ih
(
h ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
))
= 1 then I
(
Rhh′ ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
))≥ 0 so
∂ I
(
Rhh′ ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
))
∂ Ih
(
h ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)) ≥ 0 (12.200)
Multiply this now by equation 12.196 and we get
∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
∂ I
(
Rhh′ ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)) ∂ I (Rhh′ ∈ ρi (vNi(g)))
∂ Ih
(
h ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)) ≥ 0∀Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P (12.201)
and
∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
∂ Ih
(
h ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)) ≥ 0∀Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P (12.202)
However, notice that if, as we assume, individual i’s perception, ρi (·), has the salience
property 11.1, then
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h ∈ ρi
(
v′ ⊂ vNi(g)
) ⇐⇒ σ (v′)−σ (vNi(g))≥ σ¯i (12.203)
where v′ ∈ 2vNi(g) : h = ρi (v′). So if σ (v′)−σ
(
vNi(g)
) ≥ σ¯i then h ∈ ρi (v′ ⊂ vNi(g)) and
(equation 12.199) Ih
(
h ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
))
= 1, and if σ (v′)−σ (vNi(g))< σ¯i then h /∈ ρi (v′ ⊂ vNi(g))
and (equation 12.199) Ih
(
h ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
))
= 0, so we have
∂ Ih
(
h ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
))
∂
[
σ (v′)−σ (vNi(g))] ≥ 0 (12.204)
where v′ ∈ 2vNi(g) : h = ρi (v′). Now if we multiply 12.204 by 12.202 we get
∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
∂ Ih
(
h ∈ ρi
(
vNi(g)
)) ∂ Ih (h ∈ ρi (vNi(g)))
∂
[
σ (v′)−σ (vNi(g))] ≥ 0∀v′ ∈ 2vNi(g) : h = ρi
(
v′
)
&Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P
(12.205)
and
∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
∂
[
σ (v′)−σ (vNi(g))] ≥ 0∀v′ ∈ 2vNi(g) : h = ρi
(
v′
)
&Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P
4. By the law of resistance to dissonance (definition 3) we have that
∂ pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi))
∂
∣∣{Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (H ′i) : Rhh′ =⇒ ¬Rh′′h′′′}∣∣ ≥ 0∀Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P (12.206)
Multiplying this by equation 12.192 we have
∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
∂ pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi))
∂ pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi))
∂
∣∣{Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (H ′i) : Rhh′ =⇒ ¬Rh′′h′′′}∣∣ ≥ 0∀Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P
and
∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
∂
∣∣{Rh′′h′′′ ∈ gH (H ′i) : Rhh′ =⇒ ¬Rh′′h′′′}∣∣ ≥ 0∀Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P
5. By the law of resistance to changes at the core of personal constructs (definition 2) we
have that
∂ pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi))
∂c
(
CgH(Hi) (h) CgH(Hi) (h
′)
) ≥ 0∀Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P (12.207)
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Multiplying this by equation 12.192 we have
∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
∂ pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi))
∂ pi (Rhh′ ∈ gH (Hi))
∂c
(
CgH(Hi) (h) CgH(Hi) (h
′)
) ≥ 0∀Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P
and
∂ pi
(
{Rhh′}P ⊂ gH (Hi)
)
∂c
(
CgH(Hi) (h) CgH(Hi) (h
′)
) ≥ 0∀Rhh′ ∈ {Rhh′}P
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